diff --git a/dstack-util/src/system_setup.rs b/dstack-util/src/system_setup.rs
index 8ab531fcf..2e23f98b0 100644
--- a/dstack-util/src/system_setup.rs
+++ b/dstack-util/src/system_setup.rs
@@ -706,6 +706,46 @@ fn truncate(s: &[u8], len: usize) -> &[u8] {
     }
 }
 
+/// Return a platform-provided, per-instance value to mix into `instance_id`.
+///
+/// `instance_id` is normally derived from `instance_id_seed`, which is persisted
+/// on the data disk. That makes it unsafe on clouds where a VM can be cloned from
+/// a disk image / snapshot: every clone inherits the same seed and therefore the
+/// same `instance_id`. To keep `instance_id` unique per running VM we mix in a
+/// per-instance value that lives outside the cloneable disk.
+///
+/// On GCP we use the public key of the pre-provisioned vTPM Attestation Key. The AK
+/// is derived deterministically from the per-instance Endorsement seed held in the
+/// vTPM (not on the data disk), so a VM cloned from a disk image derives a different
+/// AK while a reboot/stop-start of the same VM keeps it stable — exactly the property
+/// we need. We hash the AK public area rather than its certificate so the binding is
+/// immune to certificate re-issuance (a re-signed cert carries new serial/validity/
+/// signature bytes for the same key).
+///
+/// Returns `Ok(None)` on platforms with no such binding; the `instance_id` then
+/// keeps its previous seed-only derivation. Fails closed: if the platform is known
+/// to provide a binding but it cannot be read, we error rather than silently fall
+/// back to a duplication-prone id.
+fn platform_instance_binding() -> Result<Option<Vec<u8>>> {
+    use dstack_types::Platform;
+    match Platform::detect() {
+        Some(Platform::Gcp) => {
+            // Prefer the ECC AK, fall back to RSA (matches the quote path).
+            let ak = match tpm::load_gcp_ak_ecc(None) {
+                Ok(ak) => ak,
+                Err(ecc_err) => tpm::load_gcp_ak_rsa(None).with_context(|| {
+                    format!("failed to load gcp vTPM AK (ecc error: {ecc_err:#})")
+                })?,
+            };
+            if ak.pub_area.is_empty() {
+                bail!("gcp vTPM AK public area is empty");
+            }
+            Ok(Some(sha256(&ak.pub_area).to_vec()))
+        }
+        _ => Ok(None),
+    }
+}
+
 fn emit_key_provider_info(provider_info: &KeyProviderInfo) -> Result<()> {
     info!("Key provider info: {provider_info:?}");
     let provider_info_json = serde_json::to_vec(&provider_info)?;
@@ -1361,6 +1401,10 @@ impl<'a> Stage0<'a> {
         } else {
             let mut id_path = instance_info.instance_id_seed.clone();
             id_path.extend_from_slice(&instance_info.app_id);
+            if let Some(binding) = platform_instance_binding()? {
+                info!("mixing platform per-instance binding into instance_id");
+                id_path.extend_from_slice(&binding);
+            }
             sha256(&id_path)[..20].to_vec()
         };
         instance_info.instance_id = instance_id.clone();
diff --git a/tpm-attest/src/gcp_ak.rs b/tpm-attest/src/gcp_ak.rs
index 56a703135..2e7766efc 100644
--- a/tpm-attest/src/gcp_ak.rs
+++ b/tpm-attest/src/gcp_ak.rs
@@ -32,6 +32,13 @@ pub struct LoadedAk {
     pub context: TpmContext,
     pub handle: u32,
     pub cert_nv_index: u32,
+    /// Marshaled TPMT_PUBLIC public area of the AK.
+    ///
+    /// Derived deterministically from the per-instance Endorsement seed, so it is
+    /// stable across reboot/stop-start but fresh on a disk clone. Unlike the AK
+    /// certificate it carries no serial/validity/signature, so it is immune to
+    /// certificate re-issuance.
+    pub pub_area: Vec<u8>,
 }
 
 /// Load GCP pre-provisioned ECC AK
@@ -56,7 +63,7 @@ pub fn load_gcp_ak_ecc(tcti_path: Option<&str>) -> Result<LoadedAk> {
     );
 
     // Create primary key under Endorsement hierarchy
-    let (handle, _public) =
+    let (handle, pub_area) =
         context.create_primary_from_template(tpm_rh::ENDORSEMENT, &template_bytes)?;
 
     debug!(
@@ -68,6 +75,7 @@ pub fn load_gcp_ak_ecc(tcti_path: Option<&str>) -> Result<LoadedAk> {
         context,
         handle,
         cert_nv_index: gcp_nv_index::AK_ECC_CERT,
+        pub_area,
     })
 }
 
@@ -93,7 +101,7 @@ pub fn load_gcp_ak_rsa(tcti_path: Option<&str>) -> Result<LoadedAk> {
     );
 
     // Create primary key under Endorsement hierarchy
-    let (handle, _public) =
+    let (handle, pub_area) =
         context.create_primary_from_template(tpm_rh::ENDORSEMENT, &template_bytes)?;
 
     debug!(
@@ -105,6 +113,7 @@ pub fn load_gcp_ak_rsa(tcti_path: Option<&str>) -> Result<LoadedAk> {
         context,
         handle,
         cert_nv_index: gcp_nv_index::AK_RSA_CERT,
+        pub_area,
     })
 }