diff --git a/shared/secrets_masker/src/airflow_shared/secrets_masker/secrets_masker.py b/shared/secrets_masker/src/airflow_shared/secrets_masker/secrets_masker.py
index fb5e10302d7f9..1fc046de5830e 100644
--- a/shared/secrets_masker/src/airflow_shared/secrets_masker/secrets_masker.py
+++ b/shared/secrets_masker/src/airflow_shared/secrets_masker/secrets_masker.py
@@ -344,14 +344,18 @@ def _redact_all(
     def _redact(
         self, item: Redactable, name: str | None, depth: int, max_depth: int, replacement: str = "***"
     ) -> Redacted:
-        # Avoid spending too much effort on redacting on deeply nested
-        # structures. This also avoid infinite recursion if a structure has
-        # reference to self.
-        if depth > max_depth:
-            return item
         try:
+            # Key-name-based redaction is unbounded by depth — sensitive keys
+            # must fail closed at any nesting level. The depth cutoff below is
+            # only used to bound the work of pattern-based string masking and
+            # to terminate recursion through self-referential iterables.
             if name and self.should_hide_value_for_key(name):
                 return self._redact_all(item, depth, max_depth, replacement=replacement)
+            # Always walk dicts so deeper sensitive keys are still caught;
+            # JSON-loaded payloads cannot be self-referential, and any
+            # in-memory cycle hits Python's own recursion limit and is caught
+            # by the except clause below (which fails closed via
+            # "<redaction-failed>").
             if isinstance(item, dict):
                 to_return = {
                     dict_key: self._redact(
@@ -360,6 +364,10 @@ def _redact(
                     for dict_key, subval in item.items()
                 }
                 return to_return
+            # Avoid spending too much effort on pattern-based masking of
+            # deeply nested non-dict structures.
+            if depth > max_depth:
+                return item
             if isinstance(item, Enum):
                 return self._redact(
                     item=item.value, name=name, depth=depth, max_depth=max_depth, replacement=replacement
diff --git a/shared/secrets_masker/tests/secrets_masker/test_secrets_masker.py b/shared/secrets_masker/tests/secrets_masker/test_secrets_masker.py
index e23cb1c274438..930748e2ed0d0 100644
--- a/shared/secrets_masker/tests/secrets_masker/test_secrets_masker.py
+++ b/shared/secrets_masker/tests/secrets_masker/test_secrets_masker.py
@@ -690,6 +690,44 @@ def test_redact_max_depth(self, val, expected, max_depth):
             got = redact(val, max_depth=max_depth)
             assert got == expected
 
+    @pytest.mark.parametrize(
+        ("val", "expected"),
+        [
+            # Sensitive key at exactly MAX_RECURSION_DEPTH (5) is redacted.
+            (
+                {"a": {"b": {"c": {"d": {"password": "leaked"}}}}},
+                {"a": {"b": {"c": {"d": {"password": "***"}}}}},
+            ),
+            # Sensitive key one level past MAX_RECURSION_DEPTH is also redacted.
+            (
+                {"a": {"b": {"c": {"d": {"e": {"password": "leaked"}}}}}},
+                {"a": {"b": {"c": {"d": {"e": {"password": "***"}}}}}},
+            ),
+            # Two levels past MAX_RECURSION_DEPTH, under a non-sensitive
+            # intermediate key, still fails closed.
+            (
+                {"a": {"b": {"c": {"d": {"e": {"f": {"token": "leaked"}}}}}}},
+                {"a": {"b": {"c": {"d": {"e": {"f": {"token": "***"}}}}}}},
+            ),
+            # Other sensitive key names recognised by should_hide_value_for_key.
+            (
+                {"a": {"b": {"c": {"d": {"e": {"secret": "leaked"}}}}}},
+                {"a": {"b": {"c": {"d": {"e": {"secret": "***"}}}}}},
+            ),
+            (
+                {"a": {"b": {"c": {"d": {"e": {"api_key": "leaked"}}}}}},
+                {"a": {"b": {"c": {"d": {"e": {"api_key": "***"}}}}}},
+            ),
+        ],
+    )
+    def test_redact_sensitive_key_past_max_depth(self, val, expected):
+        secrets_masker = SecretsMasker()
+        configure_secrets_masker_for_test(secrets_masker)
+        with patch(
+            "airflow_shared.secrets_masker.secrets_masker._secrets_masker", return_value=secrets_masker
+        ):
+            assert redact(val) == expected
+
     def test_redact_with_str_type(self, logger, caplog):
         """
         SecretsMasker's re replacer has issues handling a redactable item of type