[3.10] gh-146581: Fix vulnerability in shutil.unpack_archive() for ZIP files on Windows (GH-146591) (GH-149071) (#155440)

[3.11] gh-146581: Fix vulnerability in shutil.unpack_archive() for ZIP files on Windows (GH-146591) (GH-149071)

gh-146581: Fix vulnerability in shutil.unpack_archive() for ZIP files on Windows (GH-146591)

Use ZipFile.extractall() to sanitize file names and extract files.

Files with invalid names (e.g. absolute paths) are now skipped.

Files containing ".." in the name are no longer skipped.
(cherry picked from commit 7ef7dd0)


(cherry picked from commit fc829e8)

Co-authored-by: Serhiy Storchaka <storchaka@gmail.com>

Author: miss-islington

Lib/shutil.py

@@ -1200,27 +1200,9 @@ def _unpack_zipfile(filename, extract_dir):
     if not zipfile.is_zipfile(filename):
         raise ReadError("%s is not a zip file" % filename)
 
-    zip = zipfile.ZipFile(filename)
-    try:
-        for info in zip.infolist():
-            name = info.filename
-
-            # don't extract absolute paths or ones with .. in them
-            if name.startswith('/') or '..' in name:
-                continue
-
-            targetpath = os.path.join(extract_dir, *name.split('/'))
-            if not targetpath:
-                continue
-
-            _ensure_directory(targetpath)
-            if not name.endswith('/'):
-                # file
-                with zip.open(name, 'r') as source, \
-                        open(targetpath, 'wb') as target:
-                    copyfileobj(source, target)
-    finally:
-        zip.close()
+    with zipfile.ZipFile(filename) as zip:
+        zip._ignore_invalid_names = True
+        zip.extractall(extract_dir)
 
 def _unpack_tarfile(filename, extract_dir, *, filter=None):
     """Unpack tar/tar.gz/tar.bz2/tar.xz `filename` to `extract_dir`

Lib/test/test_shutil.py

@@ -1670,6 +1670,71 @@ def test_unpack_archive_zip(self):
         with self.assertRaises(TypeError):
             self.check_unpack_archive('zip', filter='data')
 
+    def test_unpack_archive_zip_badpaths(self):
+        srcdir = self.mkdtemp()
+        zipname = os.path.join(srcdir, 'test.zip')
+        abspath = os.path.join(srcdir, 'abspath')
+        with zipfile.ZipFile(zipname, 'w') as zf:
+            zf.writestr(abspath, 'badfile')
+            zf.writestr(os.sep + abspath, 'badfile')
+            zf.writestr('/abspath', 'badfile')
+            zf.writestr('C:/abspath', 'badfile')
+            zf.writestr('D:\\abspath', 'badfile')
+            zf.writestr('E:abspath', 'badfile')
+            zf.writestr('F:/G:/abspath', 'badfile')
+            zf.writestr('//server/share/abspath', 'badfile')
+            zf.writestr('\\\\server2\\share\\abspath', 'badfile')
+            zf.writestr('../relpath', 'badfile')
+            zf.writestr(os.pardir + os.sep + 'relpath2', 'badfile')
+            zf.writestr('good/file', 'goodfile')
+            zf.writestr('good..file', 'goodfile')
+
+        dstdir = os.path.join(self.mkdtemp(), 'dst')
+        unpack_archive(zipname, dstdir)
+        self.assertTrue(os.path.isfile(os.path.join(dstdir, 'good', 'file')))
+        self.assertTrue(os.path.isfile(os.path.join(dstdir, 'good..file')))
+        self.assertFalse(os.path.exists(abspath))
+        self.assertFalse(os.path.exists(os.path.join(dstdir, 'abspath')))
+        self.assertFalse(os.path.exists(os.path.join(dstdir, 'G_')))
+        self.assertFalse(os.path.exists(os.path.join(dstdir, 'server')))
+        if os.name != 'nt':
+            self.assertTrue(os.path.isfile(os.path.join(dstdir, 'C:', 'abspath')))
+            self.assertTrue(os.path.isfile(os.path.join(dstdir, 'D:\\abspath')))
+            self.assertTrue(os.path.isfile(os.path.join(dstdir, 'E:abspath')))
+            self.assertTrue(os.path.isfile(os.path.join(dstdir, 'F:', 'G:', 'abspath')))
+            self.assertTrue(os.path.isfile(os.path.join(dstdir, '\\\\server2\\share\\abspath')))
+        if os.pardir == '..':
+            self.assertFalse(os.path.exists(os.path.join(dstdir, '..', 'relpath')))
+            self.assertFalse(os.path.exists(os.path.join(dstdir, 'relpath')))
+        else:
+            self.assertTrue(os.path.isfile(os.path.join(dstdir, '..', 'relpath')))
+        self.assertFalse(os.path.exists(os.path.join(dstdir, os.pardir, 'relpath2')))
+        self.assertFalse(os.path.exists(os.path.join(dstdir, 'relpath2')))
+
+        dstdir2 = os.path.join(self.mkdtemp(), 'dst')
+        os.mkdir(dstdir2)
+        with os_helper.change_cwd(dstdir2):
+            unpack_archive(zipname, '')
+            self.assertTrue(os.path.isfile(os.path.join('good', 'file')))
+            self.assertTrue(os.path.isfile('good..file'))
+            self.assertFalse(os.path.exists(abspath))
+            self.assertFalse(os.path.exists('abspath'))
+            self.assertFalse(os.path.exists('C_'))
+            self.assertFalse(os.path.exists('server'))
+            if os.name != 'nt':
+                self.assertTrue(os.path.isfile(os.path.join('C:', 'abspath')))
+                self.assertTrue(os.path.isfile('D:\\abspath'))
+                self.assertTrue(os.path.isfile('E:abspath'))
+                self.assertTrue(os.path.isfile(os.path.join('F:', 'G:', 'abspath')))
+                self.assertTrue(os.path.isfile('\\\\server2\\share\\abspath'))
+            if os.pardir == '..':
+                self.assertFalse(os.path.exists(os.path.join('..', 'relpath')))
+                self.assertFalse(os.path.exists('relpath'))
+            else:
+                self.assertTrue(os.path.isfile(os.path.join('..', 'relpath')))
+            self.assertFalse(os.path.exists(os.path.join(os.pardir, 'relpath2')))
+            self.assertFalse(os.path.exists('relpath2'))
+
     def test_unpack_registry(self):
 
         formats = get_unpack_formats()

Lib/zipfile.py

@@ -1233,6 +1233,7 @@ class ZipFile:
 
     fp = None                   # Set here since __del__ checks it
     _windows_illegal_name_trans_table = None
+    _ignore_invalid_names = False
 
     def __init__(self, file, mode="r", compression=ZIP_STORED, allowZip64=True,
                  compresslevel=None, *, strict_timestamps=True):
@@ -1696,19 +1697,27 @@ def _extract_member(self, member, targetpath, pwd):
 
         # build the destination pathname, replacing
         # forward slashes to platform specific separators.
-        arcname = member.filename.replace('/', os.path.sep)
-
-        if os.path.altsep:
+        arcname = member.filename
+        if os.path.sep != '/':
+            arcname = arcname.replace('/', os.path.sep)
+        if os.path.altsep and os.path.altsep != '/':
             arcname = arcname.replace(os.path.altsep, os.path.sep)
         # interpret absolute pathname as relative, remove drive letter or
         # UNC path, redundant separators, "." and ".." components.
-        arcname = os.path.splitdrive(arcname)[1]
+        drive, arcname = os.path.splitdrive(arcname)
+        if self._ignore_invalid_names and (drive or arcname.startswith(os.path.sep)):
+            return None
+        if self._ignore_invalid_names and os.path.pardir in arcname.split(os.path.sep):
+            return None
         invalid_path_parts = ('', os.path.curdir, os.path.pardir)
         arcname = os.path.sep.join(x for x in arcname.split(os.path.sep)
                                    if x not in invalid_path_parts)
         if os.path.sep == '\\':
             # filter illegal characters on Windows
-            arcname = self._sanitize_windows_name(arcname, os.path.sep)
+            arcname2 = self._sanitize_windows_name(arcname, os.path.sep)
+            if self._ignore_invalid_names and arcname2 != arcname:
+                return None
+            arcname = arcname2
 
         targetpath = os.path.join(targetpath, arcname)
         targetpath = os.path.normpath(targetpath)

Misc/NEWS.d/next/Security/2026-03-29-12-51-33.gh-issue-146581.4vZfB0.rst

@@ -0,0 +1,5 @@
+Fix vulnerability in :func:`shutil.unpack_archive` for ZIP files on Windows
+which allowed to write files outside of the destination tree if the patch in
+the archive contains a Windows drive prefix. Now such invalid paths will be
+skipped. Files containing ".." in the name (like "foo..bar") are no longer
+skipped.