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+# AGENTS.md - DECEIVE
+
+This document gives AI coding agents the project-specific context needed to make
+consistent, idiomatic changes to DECEIVE.
+
+## Project Overview
+
+DECEIVE, the DECeption with Evaluative Integrated Validation Engine, is a
+proof-of-concept high-interaction SSH honeypot. It accepts SSH connections,
+authenticates according to configurable honeypot account rules, sends attacker
+input to a configured LLM backend, returns realistic Linux-like command output,
+and writes JSON Lines telemetry for the full session.
+
+The LLM-backed SSH interaction is DECEIVE's core simulation surface. The core
+engineering goal is to make that live interaction observable, bounded, testable,
+and believable without exposing a real shell or real filesystem.
+
+Primary implementation files:
+
+- `SSH/ssh_server.py` - AsyncSSH server, authentication, prompt assembly,
+  LangChain message history, JSON logging, and runtime configuration.
+- `SSH/config.ini.TEMPLATE` - tracked operator configuration template.
+- `SSH/prompt.txt` - default user prompt describing the host being emulated.
+- `tests/` - unit and integration coverage for configuration, authentication,
+  logging, session behavior, and real AsyncSSH connectivity with a fake LLM.
+- `README.md` - user-facing setup, runtime, testing, and log format reference.
+- `TODO.txt` - lightweight backlog and known priorities.
+
+## Start-Of-Work Checklist
+
+For any non-trivial change:
+
+1. Read `README.md`, `pyproject.toml`, and `TODO.txt` before editing.
+2. Check `git status --short`; preserve user changes already in the tree.
+3. Inspect the relevant tests before changing behavior.
+4. Update `TODO.txt` only when the change completes, changes, or adds a tracked
+   backlog item.
+5. Update `README.md` and `SSH/config.ini.TEMPLATE` when setup, config keys,
+   runtime behavior, or log fields change.
+
+## Tech Stack
+
+- Python 3.11, pinned by `.python-version` and `requires-python` in
+  `pyproject.toml`.
+- `uv` for dependency management and command execution.
+- `asyncssh` for the SSH server and integration test clients.
+- LangChain provider integrations for OpenAI, Azure OpenAI, Ollama, AWS Bedrock,
+  and Google Gemini.
+- `pytest` and `pytest-asyncio` for automated tests.
+- Standard library `argparse`, `configparser`, `logging`, `json`, `asyncio`, and
+  path utilities. The current CLI is argparse-based; do not switch frameworks
+  unless explicitly requested.
+
+## Dependency Management
+
+Use `uv`; do not add `requirements.txt` or install dependencies with bare `pip`.
+
+Common commands:
+
+```bash
+uv sync
+uv run pytest
+uv run pytest tests/test_ssh_server_unit.py
+uv run pytest tests/test_ssh_integration.py
+uv run python SSH/ssh_server.py
+```
+
+When adding or removing dependencies, update `pyproject.toml` and `uv.lock`
+together. This project currently has `package = false`, so treat it as a script
+repository rather than an installed Python package.
+
+## Code Style
+
+- Prefer clear, direct Python over clever abstractions.
+- Add type hints for new or significantly changed functions. Existing code is
+  still being modernized, so avoid broad type-only churn.
+- Use specific exceptions and actionable error messages at runtime boundaries.
+- Avoid bare `except Exception` in new code unless it is at `main()` or another
+  intentional process boundary.
+- Prefer `pathlib.Path` for new path-heavy code, but match nearby code when a
+  small change in `SSH/ssh_server.py` would otherwise create needless churn.
+- Keep lines readable, around 100 characters where practical.
+- Use comments sparingly for non-obvious async, logging, or security behavior.
+- Do not add linting or formatting tool mandates unless the project config is
+  updated to support them.
+
+## Runtime Architecture
+
+### SSH Server
+
+`start_server()` creates an AsyncSSH listener from the active config. Preserve
+these behavior contracts:
+
+- `listen_host` may constrain binding; tests use `127.0.0.1`.
+- `port = 0` must work in tests to request a random local port.
+- Host private keys are resolved relative to the loaded config file first, then
+  relative to `SSH/`.
+- The server version string intentionally imitates OpenSSH.
+- The process handler must never grant access to a real local shell.
+
+`MySSHServer` owns SSH connection/auth callbacks. `handle_client()` owns
+interactive and non-interactive command handling. There is known cleanup work in
+`TODO.txt` around lifecycle ownership; avoid deepening the split between server
+instances and process handling.
+
+### Authentication Semantics
+
+The honeypot intentionally supports deceptive login modes:
+
+- `username =` accepts login without a password.
+- `username = secret` requires the exact password.
+- `username = *` accepts any password, including empty passwords.
+- Unknown usernames currently authenticate like wildcard accounts.
+
+Do not "fix" the unknown-user behavior unless implementing an explicit auth
+policy option. Tests should cover all four modes.
+
+### LLM Simulation
+
+`build_message_history()` composes:
+
+1. The configured system prompt from `[llm].system_prompt`.
+2. The user prompt from `--prompt`, `--prompt-file`, or `SSH/prompt.txt`.
+3. Per-session message history trimmed to `trimmer_max_tokens`.
+
+Preserve per-session isolation through `llm_sessions` and the session id passed
+in LangChain config. Runtime supports provider selection through `choose_llm()`;
+new providers should be small, testable branches with provider-specific config
+kept in `SSH/config.ini.TEMPLATE`.
+
+Interactive and non-interactive behavior differs:
+
+- Interactive sessions receive an initial banner/MOTD and shell prompt.
+- Interactive responses should end with a realistic shell prompt.
+- Non-interactive command output must not include a prompt or MOTD.
+- If an input would close the login shell, the model should return exactly
+  `YYY-END-OF-SESSION-YYY`.
+
+The LLM may hallucinate future user input. When changing prompts or response
+handling, preserve the rule that DECEIVE answers only the current input and does
+not invent the attacker's next command.
+
+## Logging Contracts
+
+DECEIVE logs JSON Lines to the configured `honeypot.log_file`. Relative log paths
+are resolved from the directory containing the loaded config file.
+
+Preserve these fields for session telemetry:
+
+- `timestamp` - UTC ISO 8601 with millisecond precision.
+- `level`
+- `task_name` - the stable `session-...` id for the SSH session.
+- `src_ip`, `src_port`, `dst_ip`, `dst_port`
+- `message`
+- `sensor_name`
+- `sensor_protocol` - currently `ssh`
+
+Important message types:
+
+- `SSH connection received`
+- `User attempting to authenticate`
+- `Authentication success`
+- `Authentication failed`
+- `User input`
+- `LLM response`
+- `Session summary`
+- `SSH connection closed`
+
+`User input` and `LLM response` records store full content in `details` as
+base64-encoded UTF-8. Keep that encoding contract stable so arbitrary terminal
+bytes do not break JSON logs. Include the `interactive` boolean for command and
+response records where it applies.
+
+`Session summary` records include `details` with the LLM summary and `judgement`
+as one of `BENIGN`, `SUSPICIOUS`, `MALICIOUS`, or `UNKNOWN`. Generate at most one
+summary per session.
+
+This is a honeypot: authentication logs intentionally include attempted
+usernames and passwords. Do not remove that behavior casually, but also do not
+log provider API keys, environment variables, local config contents, or stack
+traces containing secrets.
+
+## Configuration And Local Artifacts
+
+Tracked:
+
+- `SSH/config.ini.TEMPLATE`
+- `SSH/prompt.txt`
+
+Ignored/local:
+
+- `SSH/config.ini`
+- SSH host keys such as `SSH/ssh_host_key`, `SSH/deceive_host_key`, and `*.pub`
+- `*.log` files including honeypot logs
+- `.venv/`, `.pytest_cache/`, and other generated Python artifacts
+
+Do not commit local credentials, provider API keys, host private keys, generated
+logs, or deployment artifacts under `SSH/DEPLOY/`.
+
+When adding config settings:
+
+1. Add the setting to `SSH/config.ini.TEMPLATE` with a clear comment.
+2. Provide a sane default in `load_config()` if the server can run without an
+   explicit config file.
+3. Add CLI overrides only when operators need them.
+4. Cover config-file-relative behavior in tests when paths are involved.
+5. Update `README.md`.
+
+## Testing Requirements
+
+All tests must be deterministic and must not call a live LLM provider. Use fake
+message history objects, monkeypatched provider classes, or injected
+`message_history` objects.
+
+Testing conventions:
+
+- Use `tmp_path` for config files, host keys, logs, and any file I/O.
+- Bind integration servers to `127.0.0.1` and `port = 0`.
+- Use `known_hosts=None` for ephemeral local AsyncSSH clients in tests.
+- Flush and close log handlers in fixtures to avoid leaking global state.
+- Reset module globals such as `config`, `accounts`, `llm_sessions`, and
+  `with_message_history` after tests that mutate runtime state.
+- Assert log shape, base64 encoding, session id consistency, and one summary per
+  session when touching session flow.
+
+Run at least the focused test file for the code you changed. Run the full suite
+before commits or behavior-heavy changes:
+
+```bash
+uv run pytest
+```
+
+## Security And Safety
+
+DECEIVE is a proof of concept, not production-ready infrastructure. Keep that
+warning intact in user-facing docs unless the security posture materially
+changes.
+
+Prioritize bounded resource controls for public-facing behavior:
+
+- Maximum input line length.
+- Session idle and total timeouts.
+- Connection and request limits.
+- LLM call throttling.
+- Cleanup for per-session message history.
+
+Never route attacker input to a real shell or filesystem. The LLM should simulate
+output only. If adding tools, retrieval, file access, or command execution, gate
+them behind explicit design review and tests that prove attacker input cannot
+escape the simulation boundary.
+
+## Documentation Checklist
+
+Update docs when behavior changes:
+
+- `README.md` for setup, running, operator behavior, log schema, or warnings.
+- `SSH/config.ini.TEMPLATE` for config changes.
+- `SSH/prompt.txt` only for default emulation behavior.
+- `TODO.txt` for backlog changes or completed tracked priorities.
+- Tests for every observable auth, session, config, prompt, or logging contract.
+
+## Versioning And Commits
+
+The project version currently lives in `pyproject.toml` only. If asked to bump
+the version, update `pyproject.toml`, run `uv sync` so `uv.lock` stays
+consistent, and document the reason in the commit.
+
+Prefer Conventional Commit prefixes such as `feat:`, `fix:`, `docs:`, `test:`,
+`refactor:`, and `chore:` when committing.
+
+## Known Design Decisions
+
+- DECEIVE intentionally logs usernames and passwords supplied to the honeypot.
+- Unknown usernames currently authenticate successfully to maximize deception.
+- LLM calls are part of runtime behavior; only tests should replace them with
+  deterministic fakes.
+- Relative `log_file` paths resolve next to the loaded config file, not
+  necessarily the current working directory.
+- The default implementation currently lives mostly in one script. Refactor
+  incrementally and keep compatibility with documented commands.