gitignore: cover the key files the node actually writes - #43
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.gitignore ignores *.dat and wallet.dat, but the node also writes three files in its data directory that are not .dat and are just as sensitive: btf_enc.key this node's .btf service key -- its network identity nostr.key the Nostr key its descriptors are signed with walletrpc.token bearer token authorising spends over the wallet API A node run with its data directory inside a working tree -- which is the obvious thing to do while developing -- leaves all three untracked but committable, and `git add -A` takes them. Losing btf_enc.key means losing your address; publishing walletrpc.token hands over the wallet to anyone who can reach the port. Also ignore key backup archives and stray .patch/.rej/.orig files. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
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…RM64 build (port of Bitflash-sh#41); gitignore: cover key files (port of Bitflash-sh#43) ## Bootstrap seeds (Bitflash-sh#36) A node with an empty cache has only the Nostr relays for discovery -- if those are down, blocked, or just slow, a first run has no way into the network at all, which is exactly the moment a user has the least patience. Seeds are the floor under that: a compiled-in list of long-lived peers, tried automatically only when the peer cache is empty. A seed entry is deliberately just an address and an encryption key, no meeting node -- the rendezvous relay pairs on the service's public key, and a .btf address is that key, so a seed is findable by walking the known relays. Recording which relay a seed was on would rot the moment it failed over, which is the exact "advertising a rendezvous nobody is registered at" failure this project has chased before. Seeds carry no special authority: they hand out the same signed, self-certifying descriptors any peer does, so a hostile seed can stall a bootstrap but can't forge a peer or feed a false chain. The compiled list here is empty, deliberately -- upstream shipped their own dedicated bootstrap node's address in their version of this commit, but that's their infrastructure, not something this fork has any relationship to or authority to point users at. /btfseed= ADDRESS:ENCHEX (repeatable, CLI-only) covers testing and private networks without needing a compiled entry. Adapted the hex-decode call to our own BtfPeerCacheHexToBytes rather than a generic HexToBytes upstream doesn't have under that name. ## ARM64 build failure (Bitflash-sh#41) ByteReverse(word32) in sha.h used the x86 bswap instruction via inline asm, guarded only by #if defined(__GNUC__) -- true on every architecture GCC/Clang target, so on aarch64 the assembler rejected the instruction outright. The 64-bit ByteReverse right below it already had the correct guard (&& defined(__x86_64__)); the 32-bit one just never got it. Fails the build on Apple Silicon, ARM servers, or a Raspberry Pi -- all plausible headless-node hosts. ## .gitignore gaps (Bitflash-sh#43) *.dat/wallet.dat were covered, but btf_enc.key (this node's .btf identity) and nostr.key (its Nostr signing key) are not .dat files and are exactly as sensitive -- already listed explicitly in our .gitignore from an earlier session, but walletrpc.token (bearer authority to spend from the wallet over the wallet API) was missing entirely, along with a general *.key catch-all and patterns for key backup archives, mempool dumps, and stray .patch/.rej/.orig files. A node run with its data directory inside a working tree -- the obvious thing to do while developing -- would otherwise leave all of this untracked but committable.
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Right on the substance — those three files are the node's actual secrets and none of them end in Checked that nothing currently tracked would start being ignored: Clean, so this is purely additive. One thing worth knowing rather than changing: The explicit entries alongside the glob are the right belt-and-braces: they document which files matter, which the glob alone does not. Reviewed clean. |
.gitignore ignores *.dat and wallet.dat, but the node also writes three files in its data directory that are not .dat and are just as sensitive:
btf_enc.key this node's .btf service key -- its network identity
nostr.key the Nostr key its descriptors are signed with
walletrpc.token bearer token authorising spends over the wallet API
A node run with its data directory inside a working tree -- which is the obvious thing to do while developing -- leaves all three untracked but committable, and
git add -Atakes them. Losing btf_enc.key means losing your address; publishing walletrpc.token hands over the wallet to anyone who can reach the port.Also ignore key backup archives and stray .patch/.rej/.orig files.