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feat(crashtracking): collect all native stacks for unhandled exception and also crashing thread#2155

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feat(crashtracking): collect all native stacks for unhandled exception and also crashing thread#2155
gyuheon0h wants to merge 2 commits into
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gyuheon0h/PROF-15198-collect-crashing-thread-receiver

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@gyuheon0h

@gyuheon0h gyuheon0h commented Jun 23, 2026

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What does this PR do?

Previously, when a runtime reported an unhandled exception, only the runtime-provided stack trace was captured; no native stacks were collected for any thread because PR_SET_PTRACER was not set for unhandled exceptions. Additionally, when all-thread collection was enabled for signal-based crashes, the crashing thread was excluded from the threads array.

This change:

  1. Enables native stack collection for all threads (including the crashing thread) when reporting unhandled exceptions with collect_all_threads enabled. The receiver now has the necessary ptrace permissions to unwind every thread in the process.
  2. Includes the crashing thread in the error.threads array (marked with crashed: true) for both signal-based crashes and unhandled exceptions. Its native stack is collected by the receiver using ptrace, same as every other thread.

The runtime-provided stack remains in error.stack as the canonical crash context, while error.threads provides a uniform native view of all threads at the time of the crash.

This gives us two immediate benefits:

  1. Unhandled exception crash reports now include native stacks for all threads, providing visibility into what the process was doing at the OS level; not just the managed runtime view.
  2. The crashing thread's native stack is now collected in the receiver alongside all other threads, establishing a path toward consolidating all stack collection in the receiver process in the future.

Motivation

What inspired you to submit this pull request?

Additional Notes

Anything else we should know when reviewing?

How to test the change?

Describe here in detail how the change can be validated.

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@datadog-datadog-prod-us1

datadog-datadog-prod-us1 Bot commented Jun 23, 2026

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Tests

🎉 All green!

🧪 All tests passed
❄️ No new flaky tests detected

🎯 Code Coverage (details)
Patch Coverage: 25.00%
Overall Coverage: 74.02% (-0.05%)

This comment will be updated automatically if new data arrives.
🔗 Commit SHA: 8ba90b9 | Docs | Datadog PR Page | Give us feedback!

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Clippy Allow Annotation Report

Comparing clippy allow annotations between branches:

  • Base Branch: origin/main
  • PR Branch: origin/gyuheon0h/PROF-15198-collect-crashing-thread-receiver

Summary by Rule

Rule Base Branch PR Branch Change

Annotation Counts by File

File Base Branch PR Branch Change

Annotation Stats by Crate

Crate Base Branch PR Branch Change
clippy-annotation-reporter 5 5 No change (0%)
datadog-ffe-ffi 1 1 No change (0%)
datadog-ipc 22 22 No change (0%)
datadog-live-debugger 4 4 No change (0%)
datadog-live-debugger-ffi 10 10 No change (0%)
datadog-profiling-replayer 4 4 No change (0%)
datadog-sidecar 45 45 No change (0%)
libdd-common 13 13 No change (0%)
libdd-common-ffi 12 12 No change (0%)
libdd-data-pipeline 6 6 No change (0%)
libdd-ddsketch 2 2 No change (0%)
libdd-dogstatsd-client 1 1 No change (0%)
libdd-profiling 13 13 No change (0%)
libdd-remote-config 3 3 No change (0%)
libdd-telemetry 20 20 No change (0%)
libdd-tinybytes 4 4 No change (0%)
libdd-trace-normalization 2 2 No change (0%)
libdd-trace-obfuscation 3 3 No change (0%)
libdd-trace-stats 1 1 No change (0%)
libdd-trace-utils 11 11 No change (0%)
Total 182 182 No change (0%)

About This Report

This report tracks Clippy allow annotations for specific rules, showing how they've changed in this PR. Decreasing the number of these annotations generally improves code quality.

@gyuheon0h gyuheon0h changed the title collect all native stacks for unhandled exception and crashing thread feat(crashtracking): collect all native stacks for unhandled exception and crashing thread Jun 23, 2026
@gyuheon0h gyuheon0h changed the title feat(crashtracking): collect all native stacks for unhandled exception and crashing thread feat(crashtracking): collect all native stacks for unhandled exception and also crashing thread Jun 23, 2026
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📚 Documentation Check Results

⚠️ 2762 documentation warning(s) found

📦 bin_tests - 1679 warning(s)

📦 libdd-crashtracker - 1083 warning(s)


Updated: 2026-06-23 16:05:27 UTC | Commit: 5677415 | missing-docs job results

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🔒 Cargo Deny Results

⚠️ 10 issue(s) found, showing only errors (advisories, bans, sources)

📦 bin_tests - 6 error(s)

Show output
error[vulnerability]: NSEC3 closest-encloser proof validation enters unbounded loop on cross-zone responses
    ┌─ /home/runner/work/libdatadog/libdatadog/Cargo.lock:124:1
    │
124 │ hickory-proto 0.25.2 registry+https://github.com/rust-lang/crates.io-index
    │ ━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━ security vulnerability detected
    │
    ├ ID: RUSTSEC-2026-0118
    ├ Advisory: https://rustsec.org/advisories/RUSTSEC-2026-0118
    ├ The NSEC3 closest-encloser proof validation in `hickory-proto`'s
      `DnssecDnsHandle` walks from the QNAME up to the SOA owner name, building a
      list of candidate encloser names. The iterator used assumes the
      QNAME is a descendant of the SOA owner, terminating only when the current
      candidate equals the SOA name. When the SOA in a response's authority section
      is not an ancestor of the QNAME, the loop stalls at the DNS root and never
      terminates, repeatedly calling `Name::base_name()` and pushing newly allocated
      `Name` and hashed-name entries into the candidate `Vec`.
      
      The bug is reachable by any caller of `DnssecDnsHandle` — including the
      resolver, recursor, and client — when built with the `dnssec-ring` or
      `dnssec-aws-lc-rs` feature and configured to perform DNSSEC validation. It is
      triggered while validating a NoData or NXDomain response whose authority
      section contains an SOA record from a zone other than an ancestor of the
      QNAME, on a code path that requires NSEC3 closest-encloser proof. In practice
      this can be reached through an insecure CNAME chain that crosses zone
      boundaries into a DNSSEC-signed zone returning NoData, but the minimum
      condition is just a mismatched SOA owner on a response requiring NSEC3
      validation.
      
      A `debug_assert_ne!(name, Name::root())` guards the loop body, so debug builds
      abort with a panic on the first iteration past the root. Release builds
      compile the assertion out and run the loop unbounded, allocating until the
      process exhausts available memory (OOM). A reachable upstream attacker who
      can return such a response can therefore crash a debug-built validator or
      exhaust memory on a release-built one.
      
      The affected code was migrated from `hickory-proto` to `hickory-net` as part of
      the 0.26.0 release. The `hickory-proto` 0.26.x release no longer offers
      `DnssecDnsHandle` and so we recommend all affected users update to `hickory-net`
      0.26.1 when the implementation of that type is required.
    ├ Announcement: https://github.com/hickory-dns/hickory-dns/security/advisories/GHSA-3v94-mw7p-v465
    ├ Solution: No safe upgrade is available!
    ├ hickory-proto v0.25.2
      └── hickory-resolver v0.25.2
          └── reqwest v0.13.2
              ├── libdd-common v5.0.0
              │   ├── bin_tests v0.1.0
              │   ├── libdd-capabilities-impl v2.0.0
              │   │   └── libdd-shared-runtime v1.0.0
              │   │       └── libdd-telemetry v5.0.1
              │   │           └── libdd-crashtracker v1.0.0
              │   │               └── bin_tests v0.1.0 (*)
              │   ├── (build) libdd-crashtracker v1.0.0 (*)
              │   ├── libdd-profiling v1.0.0
              │   │   ├── bin_tests v0.1.0 (*)
              │   │   └── (dev) libdd-profiling v1.0.0 (*)
              │   ├── libdd-shared-runtime v1.0.0 (*)
              │   └── libdd-telemetry v5.0.1 (*)
              └── libdd-profiling v1.0.0 (*)

error[vulnerability]: CPU exhaustion during message encoding due to O(n²) name compression
    ┌─ /home/runner/work/libdatadog/libdatadog/Cargo.lock:124:1
    │
124 │ hickory-proto 0.25.2 registry+https://github.com/rust-lang/crates.io-index
    │ ━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━ security vulnerability detected
    │
    ├ ID: RUSTSEC-2026-0119
    ├ Advisory: https://rustsec.org/advisories/RUSTSEC-2026-0119
    ├ During message encoding, `hickory-proto`'s `BinEncoder` stores pointers to
      labels that are candidates for name compression in a `Vec<(usize, Vec<u8>)>`.
      The name compression logic then searches for matches with a linear scan.
      
      A malicious message with many records can both introduce many candidate labels,
      and invoke this linear scan many times. This can amplify CPU exhaustion in DoS
      attacks.
      
      This is similar to
      [CVE-2024-8508](https://www.nlnetlabs.nl/downloads/unbound/CVE-2024-8508.txt).
      
      We recommend all affected users update to `hickory-proto` 0.26.1 for the fix.
    ├ Announcement: https://github.com/hickory-dns/hickory-dns/security/advisories/GHSA-q2qq-hmj6-3wpp
    ├ Solution: Upgrade to >=0.26.1 (try `cargo update -p hickory-proto`)
    ├ hickory-proto v0.25.2
      └── hickory-resolver v0.25.2
          └── reqwest v0.13.2
              ├── libdd-common v5.0.0
              │   ├── bin_tests v0.1.0
              │   ├── libdd-capabilities-impl v2.0.0
              │   │   └── libdd-shared-runtime v1.0.0
              │   │       └── libdd-telemetry v5.0.1
              │   │           └── libdd-crashtracker v1.0.0
              │   │               └── bin_tests v0.1.0 (*)
              │   ├── (build) libdd-crashtracker v1.0.0 (*)
              │   ├── libdd-profiling v1.0.0
              │   │   ├── bin_tests v0.1.0 (*)
              │   │   └── (dev) libdd-profiling v1.0.0 (*)
              │   ├── libdd-shared-runtime v1.0.0 (*)
              │   └── libdd-telemetry v5.0.1 (*)
              └── libdd-profiling v1.0.0 (*)

error[unsound]: Rand is unsound with a custom logger using `rand::rng()`
    ┌─ /home/runner/work/libdatadog/libdatadog/Cargo.lock:241:1
    │
241 │ rand 0.8.5 registry+https://github.com/rust-lang/crates.io-index
    │ ━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━ unsound advisory detected
    │
    ├ ID: RUSTSEC-2026-0097
    ├ Advisory: https://rustsec.org/advisories/RUSTSEC-2026-0097
    ├ It has been reported (by @lopopolo) that the `rand` library is [unsound](https://rust-lang.github.io/unsafe-code-guidelines/glossary.html#soundness-of-code--of-a-library) (i.e. that safe code using the public API can cause Undefined Behaviour) when all the following conditions are met:
      
      - The `log` and `thread_rng` features are enabled
      - A [custom logger](https://docs.rs/log/latest/log/#implementing-a-logger) is defined
      - The custom logger accesses `rand::rng()` (previously `rand::thread_rng()`) and calls any `TryRng` (previously `RngCore`) methods on `ThreadRng`
      - The `ThreadRng` (attempts to) reseed while called from the custom logger (this happens every 64 kB of generated data)
      - Trace-level logging is enabled or warn-level logging is enabled and the random source (the `getrandom` crate) is unable to provide a new seed
      
      `TryRng` (previously `RngCore`) methods for `ThreadRng` use `unsafe` code to cast `*mut BlockRng<ReseedingCore>` to `&mut BlockRng<ReseedingCore>`. When all the above conditions are met this results in an aliased mutable reference, violating the Stacked Borrows rules. Miri is able to detect this violation in sample code. Since construction of [aliased mutable references is Undefined Behaviour](https://doc.rust-lang.org/stable/nomicon/references.html), the behaviour of optimized builds is hard to predict.
    ├ Announcement: https://github.com/rust-random/rand/pull/1763
    ├ Solution: Upgrade to >=0.10.1 OR <0.10.0, >=0.9.3 OR <0.9.0, >=0.8.6 (try `cargo update -p rand`)
    ├ rand v0.8.5
      ├── (dev) libdd-common v5.0.0
      │   ├── bin_tests v0.1.0
      │   ├── libdd-capabilities-impl v2.0.0
      │   │   └── libdd-shared-runtime v1.0.0
      │   │       └── libdd-telemetry v5.0.1
      │   │           └── libdd-crashtracker v1.0.0
      │   │               └── bin_tests v0.1.0 (*)
      │   ├── (build) libdd-crashtracker v1.0.0 (*)
      │   ├── libdd-profiling v1.0.0
      │   │   ├── bin_tests v0.1.0 (*)
      │   │   └── (dev) libdd-profiling v1.0.0 (*)
      │   ├── libdd-shared-runtime v1.0.0 (*)
      │   └── libdd-telemetry v5.0.1 (*)
      ├── libdd-crashtracker v1.0.0 (*)
      ├── (dev) libdd-ddsketch v1.0.1
      │   └── libdd-telemetry v5.0.1 (*)
      ├── libdd-profiling v1.0.0 (*)
      └── proptest v1.5.0
          └── (dev) libdd-profiling v1.0.0 (*)

error[vulnerability]: Name constraints for URI names were incorrectly accepted
    ┌─ /home/runner/work/libdatadog/libdatadog/Cargo.lock:267:1
    │
267 │ rustls-webpki 0.103.10 registry+https://github.com/rust-lang/crates.io-index
    │ ━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━ security vulnerability detected
    │
    ├ ID: RUSTSEC-2026-0098
    ├ Advisory: https://rustsec.org/advisories/RUSTSEC-2026-0098
    ├ Name constraints for URI names were ignored and therefore accepted.
      
      Note this library does not provide an API for asserting URI names, and URI name constraints are otherwise not implemented.  URI name constraints are now rejected unconditionally.
      
      Since name constraints are restrictions on otherwise properly-issued certificates, this bug is reachable only after signature verification and requires misissuance to exploit.
      
      This vulnerability is identified as [GHSA-965h-392x-2mh5](https://github.com/rustls/webpki/security/advisories/GHSA-965h-392x-2mh5). Thank you to @1seal for the report.
    ├ Solution: Upgrade to >=0.103.12, <0.104.0-alpha.1 OR >=0.104.0-alpha.6 (try `cargo update -p rustls-webpki`)
    ├ rustls-webpki v0.103.10
      ├── rustls v0.23.37
      │   ├── hyper-rustls v0.27.7
      │   │   ├── libdd-common v5.0.0
      │   │   │   ├── bin_tests v0.1.0
      │   │   │   ├── libdd-capabilities-impl v2.0.0
      │   │   │   │   └── libdd-shared-runtime v1.0.0
      │   │   │   │       └── libdd-telemetry v5.0.1
      │   │   │   │           └── libdd-crashtracker v1.0.0
      │   │   │   │               └── bin_tests v0.1.0 (*)
      │   │   │   ├── (build) libdd-crashtracker v1.0.0 (*)
      │   │   │   ├── libdd-profiling v1.0.0
      │   │   │   │   ├── bin_tests v0.1.0 (*)
      │   │   │   │   └── (dev) libdd-profiling v1.0.0 (*)
      │   │   │   ├── libdd-shared-runtime v1.0.0 (*)
      │   │   │   └── libdd-telemetry v5.0.1 (*)
      │   │   └── reqwest v0.13.2
      │   │       ├── libdd-common v5.0.0 (*)
      │   │       └── libdd-profiling v1.0.0 (*)
      │   ├── libdd-common v5.0.0 (*)
      │   ├── libdd-profiling v1.0.0 (*)
      │   ├── reqwest v0.13.2 (*)
      │   ├── rustls-platform-verifier v0.6.2
      │   │   ├── libdd-common v5.0.0 (*)
      │   │   ├── libdd-profiling v1.0.0 (*)
      │   │   └── reqwest v0.13.2 (*)
      │   └── tokio-rustls v0.26.0
      │       ├── hyper-rustls v0.27.7 (*)
      │       ├── libdd-common v5.0.0 (*)
      │       └── reqwest v0.13.2 (*)
      └── rustls-platform-verifier v0.6.2 (*)

error[vulnerability]: Name constraints were accepted for certificates asserting a wildcard name
    ┌─ /home/runner/work/libdatadog/libdatadog/Cargo.lock:267:1
    │
267 │ rustls-webpki 0.103.10 registry+https://github.com/rust-lang/crates.io-index
    │ ━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━ security vulnerability detected
    │
    ├ ID: RUSTSEC-2026-0099
    ├ Advisory: https://rustsec.org/advisories/RUSTSEC-2026-0099
    ├ Permitted subtree name constraints for DNS names were accepted for certificates asserting a wildcard name.
      
      This was incorrect because, given a name constraint of `accept.example.com`, `*.example.com` could feasibly allow a name of `reject.example.com` which is outside the constraint.
      This is very similar to [CVE-2025-61727](https://go.dev/issue/76442).
      
      Since name constraints are restrictions on otherwise properly-issued certificates, this bug is reachable only after signature verification and requires misissuance to exploit.
      
      This vulnerability is identified as [GHSA-xgp8-3hg3-c2mh](https://github.com/rustls/webpki/security/advisories/GHSA-xgp8-3hg3-c2mh). Thank you to @1seal for the report.
    ├ Solution: Upgrade to >=0.103.12, <0.104.0-alpha.1 OR >=0.104.0-alpha.6 (try `cargo update -p rustls-webpki`)
    ├ rustls-webpki v0.103.10
      ├── rustls v0.23.37
      │   ├── hyper-rustls v0.27.7
      │   │   ├── libdd-common v5.0.0
      │   │   │   ├── bin_tests v0.1.0
      │   │   │   ├── libdd-capabilities-impl v2.0.0
      │   │   │   │   └── libdd-shared-runtime v1.0.0
      │   │   │   │       └── libdd-telemetry v5.0.1
      │   │   │   │           └── libdd-crashtracker v1.0.0
      │   │   │   │               └── bin_tests v0.1.0 (*)
      │   │   │   ├── (build) libdd-crashtracker v1.0.0 (*)
      │   │   │   ├── libdd-profiling v1.0.0
      │   │   │   │   ├── bin_tests v0.1.0 (*)
      │   │   │   │   └── (dev) libdd-profiling v1.0.0 (*)
      │   │   │   ├── libdd-shared-runtime v1.0.0 (*)
      │   │   │   └── libdd-telemetry v5.0.1 (*)
      │   │   └── reqwest v0.13.2
      │   │       ├── libdd-common v5.0.0 (*)
      │   │       └── libdd-profiling v1.0.0 (*)
      │   ├── libdd-common v5.0.0 (*)
      │   ├── libdd-profiling v1.0.0 (*)
      │   ├── reqwest v0.13.2 (*)
      │   ├── rustls-platform-verifier v0.6.2
      │   │   ├── libdd-common v5.0.0 (*)
      │   │   ├── libdd-profiling v1.0.0 (*)
      │   │   └── reqwest v0.13.2 (*)
      │   └── tokio-rustls v0.26.0
      │       ├── hyper-rustls v0.27.7 (*)
      │       ├── libdd-common v5.0.0 (*)
      │       └── reqwest v0.13.2 (*)
      └── rustls-platform-verifier v0.6.2 (*)

error[vulnerability]: Reachable panic in certificate revocation list parsing
    ┌─ /home/runner/work/libdatadog/libdatadog/Cargo.lock:267:1
    │
267 │ rustls-webpki 0.103.10 registry+https://github.com/rust-lang/crates.io-index
    │ ━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━ security vulnerability detected
    │
    ├ ID: RUSTSEC-2026-0104
    ├ Advisory: https://rustsec.org/advisories/RUSTSEC-2026-0104
    ├ A panic was reachable when parsing certificate revocation lists via [`BorrowedCertRevocationList::from_der`]
      or [`OwnedCertRevocationList::from_der`].  This was the result of mishandling a syntactically valid empty
      `BIT STRING` appearing in the `onlySomeReasons` element of a `IssuingDistributionPoint` CRL extension.
      
      This panic is reachable prior to a CRL's signature being verified.
      
      Applications that do not use CRLs are not affected.
      
      Thank you to @tynus3 for the report.
    ├ Solution: Upgrade to >=0.103.13, <0.104.0-alpha.1 OR >=0.104.0-alpha.7 (try `cargo update -p rustls-webpki`)
    ├ rustls-webpki v0.103.10
      ├── rustls v0.23.37
      │   ├── hyper-rustls v0.27.7
      │   │   ├── libdd-common v5.0.0
      │   │   │   ├── bin_tests v0.1.0
      │   │   │   ├── libdd-capabilities-impl v2.0.0
      │   │   │   │   └── libdd-shared-runtime v1.0.0
      │   │   │   │       └── libdd-telemetry v5.0.1
      │   │   │   │           └── libdd-crashtracker v1.0.0
      │   │   │   │               └── bin_tests v0.1.0 (*)
      │   │   │   ├── (build) libdd-crashtracker v1.0.0 (*)
      │   │   │   ├── libdd-profiling v1.0.0
      │   │   │   │   ├── bin_tests v0.1.0 (*)
      │   │   │   │   └── (dev) libdd-profiling v1.0.0 (*)
      │   │   │   ├── libdd-shared-runtime v1.0.0 (*)
      │   │   │   └── libdd-telemetry v5.0.1 (*)
      │   │   └── reqwest v0.13.2
      │   │       ├── libdd-common v5.0.0 (*)
      │   │       └── libdd-profiling v1.0.0 (*)
      │   ├── libdd-common v5.0.0 (*)
      │   ├── libdd-profiling v1.0.0 (*)
      │   ├── reqwest v0.13.2 (*)
      │   ├── rustls-platform-verifier v0.6.2
      │   │   ├── libdd-common v5.0.0 (*)
      │   │   ├── libdd-profiling v1.0.0 (*)
      │   │   └── reqwest v0.13.2 (*)
      │   └── tokio-rustls v0.26.0
      │       ├── hyper-rustls v0.27.7 (*)
      │       ├── libdd-common v5.0.0 (*)
      │       └── reqwest v0.13.2 (*)
      └── rustls-platform-verifier v0.6.2 (*)

advisories FAILED, bans ok, sources ok

📦 libdd-crashtracker - 4 error(s)

Show output
error[unsound]: Rand is unsound with a custom logger using `rand::rng()`
    ┌─ /home/runner/work/libdatadog/libdatadog/Cargo.lock:204:1
    │
204 │ rand 0.8.5 registry+https://github.com/rust-lang/crates.io-index
    │ ━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━ unsound advisory detected
    │
    ├ ID: RUSTSEC-2026-0097
    ├ Advisory: https://rustsec.org/advisories/RUSTSEC-2026-0097
    ├ It has been reported (by @lopopolo) that the `rand` library is [unsound](https://rust-lang.github.io/unsafe-code-guidelines/glossary.html#soundness-of-code--of-a-library) (i.e. that safe code using the public API can cause Undefined Behaviour) when all the following conditions are met:
      
      - The `log` and `thread_rng` features are enabled
      - A [custom logger](https://docs.rs/log/latest/log/#implementing-a-logger) is defined
      - The custom logger accesses `rand::rng()` (previously `rand::thread_rng()`) and calls any `TryRng` (previously `RngCore`) methods on `ThreadRng`
      - The `ThreadRng` (attempts to) reseed while called from the custom logger (this happens every 64 kB of generated data)
      - Trace-level logging is enabled or warn-level logging is enabled and the random source (the `getrandom` crate) is unable to provide a new seed
      
      `TryRng` (previously `RngCore`) methods for `ThreadRng` use `unsafe` code to cast `*mut BlockRng<ReseedingCore>` to `&mut BlockRng<ReseedingCore>`. When all the above conditions are met this results in an aliased mutable reference, violating the Stacked Borrows rules. Miri is able to detect this violation in sample code. Since construction of [aliased mutable references is Undefined Behaviour](https://doc.rust-lang.org/stable/nomicon/references.html), the behaviour of optimized builds is hard to predict.
    ├ Announcement: https://github.com/rust-random/rand/pull/1763
    ├ Solution: Upgrade to >=0.10.1 OR <0.10.0, >=0.9.3 OR <0.9.0, >=0.8.6 (try `cargo update -p rand`)
    ├ rand v0.8.5
      ├── libdd-common v5.0.0
      │   ├── libdd-capabilities-impl v2.0.0
      │   │   └── libdd-shared-runtime v1.0.0
      │   │       └── libdd-telemetry v5.0.1
      │   │           └── libdd-crashtracker v1.0.0
      │   ├── (build) libdd-crashtracker v1.0.0 (*)
      │   ├── libdd-shared-runtime v1.0.0 (*)
      │   └── libdd-telemetry v5.0.1 (*)
      ├── libdd-crashtracker v1.0.0 (*)
      └── (dev) libdd-ddsketch v1.0.1
          └── libdd-telemetry v5.0.1 (*)

error[vulnerability]: Name constraints for URI names were incorrectly accepted
    ┌─ /home/runner/work/libdatadog/libdatadog/Cargo.lock:221:1
    │
221 │ rustls-webpki 0.103.10 registry+https://github.com/rust-lang/crates.io-index
    │ ━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━ security vulnerability detected
    │
    ├ ID: RUSTSEC-2026-0098
    ├ Advisory: https://rustsec.org/advisories/RUSTSEC-2026-0098
    ├ Name constraints for URI names were ignored and therefore accepted.
      
      Note this library does not provide an API for asserting URI names, and URI name constraints are otherwise not implemented.  URI name constraints are now rejected unconditionally.
      
      Since name constraints are restrictions on otherwise properly-issued certificates, this bug is reachable only after signature verification and requires misissuance to exploit.
      
      This vulnerability is identified as [GHSA-965h-392x-2mh5](https://github.com/rustls/webpki/security/advisories/GHSA-965h-392x-2mh5). Thank you to @1seal for the report.
    ├ Solution: Upgrade to >=0.103.12, <0.104.0-alpha.1 OR >=0.104.0-alpha.6 (try `cargo update -p rustls-webpki`)
    ├ rustls-webpki v0.103.10
      ├── rustls v0.23.37
      │   ├── hyper-rustls v0.27.7
      │   │   └── libdd-common v5.0.0
      │   │       ├── libdd-capabilities-impl v2.0.0
      │   │       │   └── libdd-shared-runtime v1.0.0
      │   │       │       └── libdd-telemetry v5.0.1
      │   │       │           └── libdd-crashtracker v1.0.0
      │   │       ├── (build) libdd-crashtracker v1.0.0 (*)
      │   │       ├── libdd-shared-runtime v1.0.0 (*)
      │   │       └── libdd-telemetry v5.0.1 (*)
      │   ├── libdd-common v5.0.0 (*)
      │   ├── rustls-platform-verifier v0.6.2
      │   │   └── libdd-common v5.0.0 (*)
      │   └── tokio-rustls v0.26.0
      │       ├── hyper-rustls v0.27.7 (*)
      │       └── libdd-common v5.0.0 (*)
      └── rustls-platform-verifier v0.6.2 (*)

error[vulnerability]: Name constraints were accepted for certificates asserting a wildcard name
    ┌─ /home/runner/work/libdatadog/libdatadog/Cargo.lock:221:1
    │
221 │ rustls-webpki 0.103.10 registry+https://github.com/rust-lang/crates.io-index
    │ ━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━ security vulnerability detected
    │
    ├ ID: RUSTSEC-2026-0099
    ├ Advisory: https://rustsec.org/advisories/RUSTSEC-2026-0099
    ├ Permitted subtree name constraints for DNS names were accepted for certificates asserting a wildcard name.
      
      This was incorrect because, given a name constraint of `accept.example.com`, `*.example.com` could feasibly allow a name of `reject.example.com` which is outside the constraint.
      This is very similar to [CVE-2025-61727](https://go.dev/issue/76442).
      
      Since name constraints are restrictions on otherwise properly-issued certificates, this bug is reachable only after signature verification and requires misissuance to exploit.
      
      This vulnerability is identified as [GHSA-xgp8-3hg3-c2mh](https://github.com/rustls/webpki/security/advisories/GHSA-xgp8-3hg3-c2mh). Thank you to @1seal for the report.
    ├ Solution: Upgrade to >=0.103.12, <0.104.0-alpha.1 OR >=0.104.0-alpha.6 (try `cargo update -p rustls-webpki`)
    ├ rustls-webpki v0.103.10
      ├── rustls v0.23.37
      │   ├── hyper-rustls v0.27.7
      │   │   └── libdd-common v5.0.0
      │   │       ├── libdd-capabilities-impl v2.0.0
      │   │       │   └── libdd-shared-runtime v1.0.0
      │   │       │       └── libdd-telemetry v5.0.1
      │   │       │           └── libdd-crashtracker v1.0.0
      │   │       ├── (build) libdd-crashtracker v1.0.0 (*)
      │   │       ├── libdd-shared-runtime v1.0.0 (*)
      │   │       └── libdd-telemetry v5.0.1 (*)
      │   ├── libdd-common v5.0.0 (*)
      │   ├── rustls-platform-verifier v0.6.2
      │   │   └── libdd-common v5.0.0 (*)
      │   └── tokio-rustls v0.26.0
      │       ├── hyper-rustls v0.27.7 (*)
      │       └── libdd-common v5.0.0 (*)
      └── rustls-platform-verifier v0.6.2 (*)

error[vulnerability]: Reachable panic in certificate revocation list parsing
    ┌─ /home/runner/work/libdatadog/libdatadog/Cargo.lock:221:1
    │
221 │ rustls-webpki 0.103.10 registry+https://github.com/rust-lang/crates.io-index
    │ ━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━ security vulnerability detected
    │
    ├ ID: RUSTSEC-2026-0104
    ├ Advisory: https://rustsec.org/advisories/RUSTSEC-2026-0104
    ├ A panic was reachable when parsing certificate revocation lists via [`BorrowedCertRevocationList::from_der`]
      or [`OwnedCertRevocationList::from_der`].  This was the result of mishandling a syntactically valid empty
      `BIT STRING` appearing in the `onlySomeReasons` element of a `IssuingDistributionPoint` CRL extension.
      
      This panic is reachable prior to a CRL's signature being verified.
      
      Applications that do not use CRLs are not affected.
      
      Thank you to @tynus3 for the report.
    ├ Solution: Upgrade to >=0.103.13, <0.104.0-alpha.1 OR >=0.104.0-alpha.7 (try `cargo update -p rustls-webpki`)
    ├ rustls-webpki v0.103.10
      ├── rustls v0.23.37
      │   ├── hyper-rustls v0.27.7
      │   │   └── libdd-common v5.0.0
      │   │       ├── libdd-capabilities-impl v2.0.0
      │   │       │   └── libdd-shared-runtime v1.0.0
      │   │       │       └── libdd-telemetry v5.0.1
      │   │       │           └── libdd-crashtracker v1.0.0
      │   │       ├── (build) libdd-crashtracker v1.0.0 (*)
      │   │       ├── libdd-shared-runtime v1.0.0 (*)
      │   │       └── libdd-telemetry v5.0.1 (*)
      │   ├── libdd-common v5.0.0 (*)
      │   ├── rustls-platform-verifier v0.6.2
      │   │   └── libdd-common v5.0.0 (*)
      │   └── tokio-rustls v0.26.0
      │       ├── hyper-rustls v0.27.7 (*)
      │       └── libdd-common v5.0.0 (*)
      └── rustls-platform-verifier v0.6.2 (*)

advisories FAILED, bans ok, sources ok

Updated: 2026-06-23 16:06:12 UTC | Commit: 5677415 | dependency-check job results

@gyuheon0h gyuheon0h marked this pull request as ready for review June 23, 2026 15:24
@gyuheon0h gyuheon0h requested a review from a team as a code owner June 23, 2026 15:24
@gyuheon0h gyuheon0h force-pushed the gyuheon0h/PROF-15198-collect-crashing-thread-receiver branch from 504d740 to be53e9d Compare June 23, 2026 15:25
@gyuheon0h gyuheon0h requested a review from gleocadie June 23, 2026 15:25

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Comment thread libdd-crashtracker/src/receiver/ptrace_collector.rs
Comment thread bin_tests/src/modes/unix/test_018_thread_limit.rs Outdated
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Artifact Size Benchmark Report

aarch64-alpine-linux-musl
Artifact Baseline Commit Change
/aarch64-alpine-linux-musl/lib/libdatadog_profiling.a 84.54 MB 84.54 MB -0% (-584 B) 👌
/aarch64-alpine-linux-musl/lib/libdatadog_profiling.so 7.76 MB 7.76 MB 0% (0 B) 👌
aarch64-unknown-linux-gnu
Artifact Baseline Commit Change
/aarch64-unknown-linux-gnu/lib/libdatadog_profiling.so 10.43 MB 10.44 MB +0% (+600 B) 👌
/aarch64-unknown-linux-gnu/lib/libdatadog_profiling.a 95.68 MB 95.68 MB +0% (+392 B) 👌
libdatadog-x64-windows
Artifact Baseline Commit Change
/libdatadog-x64-windows/debug/dynamic/datadog_profiling_ffi.dll 25.02 MB 25.02 MB 0% (0 B) 👌
/libdatadog-x64-windows/debug/dynamic/datadog_profiling_ffi.lib 87.33 KB 87.33 KB 0% (0 B) 👌
/libdatadog-x64-windows/debug/dynamic/datadog_profiling_ffi.pdb 181.76 MB 181.76 MB +0% (+8.00 KB) 👌
/libdatadog-x64-windows/debug/static/datadog_profiling_ffi.lib 932.38 MB 932.38 MB -0% (-110 B) 👌
/libdatadog-x64-windows/release/dynamic/datadog_profiling_ffi.dll 8.20 MB 8.20 MB 0% (0 B) 👌
/libdatadog-x64-windows/release/dynamic/datadog_profiling_ffi.lib 87.33 KB 87.33 KB 0% (0 B) 👌
/libdatadog-x64-windows/release/dynamic/datadog_profiling_ffi.pdb 24.13 MB 24.13 MB 0% (0 B) 👌
/libdatadog-x64-windows/release/static/datadog_profiling_ffi.lib 48.20 MB 48.20 MB +0% (+122 B) 👌
libdatadog-x86-windows
Artifact Baseline Commit Change
/libdatadog-x86-windows/debug/dynamic/datadog_profiling_ffi.dll 21.68 MB 21.68 MB 0% (0 B) 👌
/libdatadog-x86-windows/debug/dynamic/datadog_profiling_ffi.lib 88.71 KB 88.71 KB 0% (0 B) 👌
/libdatadog-x86-windows/debug/dynamic/datadog_profiling_ffi.pdb 185.74 MB 185.75 MB +0% (+8.00 KB) 👌
/libdatadog-x86-windows/debug/static/datadog_profiling_ffi.lib 920.87 MB 920.87 MB -0% (-78 B) 👌
/libdatadog-x86-windows/release/dynamic/datadog_profiling_ffi.dll 6.32 MB 6.32 MB 0% (0 B) 👌
/libdatadog-x86-windows/release/dynamic/datadog_profiling_ffi.lib 88.71 KB 88.71 KB 0% (0 B) 👌
/libdatadog-x86-windows/release/dynamic/datadog_profiling_ffi.pdb 25.89 MB 25.89 MB 0% (0 B) 👌
/libdatadog-x86-windows/release/static/datadog_profiling_ffi.lib 45.82 MB 45.82 MB +0% (+44 B) 👌
x86_64-alpine-linux-musl
Artifact Baseline Commit Change
/x86_64-alpine-linux-musl/lib/libdatadog_profiling.a 75.37 MB 75.36 MB -0% (-2.57 KB) 👌
/x86_64-alpine-linux-musl/lib/libdatadog_profiling.so 8.68 MB 8.68 MB 0% (0 B) 👌
x86_64-unknown-linux-gnu
Artifact Baseline Commit Change
/x86_64-unknown-linux-gnu/lib/libdatadog_profiling.a 90.82 MB 90.81 MB -0% (-1.72 KB) 👌
/x86_64-unknown-linux-gnu/lib/libdatadog_profiling.so 10.55 MB 10.55 MB +0% (+488 B) 👌

@gyuheon0h gyuheon0h requested a review from yannham June 23, 2026 18:35
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