References audit: 50 pages

src/generic-methodologies-and-resources/basic-forensic-methodology/README.md

@@ -23,33 +23,6 @@ malware-analysis.md
 if you are given a **forensic image** of a device you can start **analyzing the partitions, file-system** used and **recovering** potentially **interesting files** (even deleted ones). Learn how in:
 
 
-{{#ref}}
-partitions-file-systems-carving/
-{{#endref}}# Basic Forensic Methodology
-
-
-
-## Creating and Mounting an Image
-
-
-{{#ref}}
-../../generic-methodologies-and-resources/basic-forensic-methodology/image-acquisition-and-mount.md
-{{#endref}}
-
-## Malware Analysis
-
-This **isn't necessary the first step to perform once you have the image**. But you can use this malware analysis techniques independently if you have a file, a file-system image, memory image, pcap... so it's good to **keep these actions in mind**:
-
-
-{{#ref}}
-malware-analysis.md
-{{#endref}}
-
-## Inspecting an Image
-
-if you are given a **forensic image** of a device you can start **analyzing the partitions, file-system** used and **recovering** potentially **interesting files** (even deleted ones). Learn how in:
-
-
 {{#ref}}
 partitions-file-systems-carving/
 {{#endref}}
@@ -119,58 +92,8 @@ anti-forensic-techniques.md
 ## Threat Hunting
 
 
-{{#ref}}
-file-integrity-monitoring.md
-{{#endref}}
-
-
-
-## Deep inspection of specific file-types and Software
-
-If you have very **suspicious** **file**, then **depending on the file-type and software** that created it several **tricks** may be useful.\
-Read the following page to learn some interesting tricks:
-
-
-{{#ref}}
-specific-software-file-type-tricks/
-{{#endref}}
-
-I want to do a special mention to the page:
-
-
-{{#ref}}
-specific-software-file-type-tricks/browser-artifacts.md
-{{#endref}}
-
-## Memory Dump Inspection
-
-
-{{#ref}}
-memory-dump-analysis/
-{{#endref}}
-
-## Pcap Inspection
-
-
-{{#ref}}
-pcap-inspection/
-{{#endref}}
-
-## **Anti-Forensic Techniques**
-
-Keep in mind the possible use of anti-forensic techniques:
-
-
-{{#ref}}
-anti-forensic-techniques.md
-{{#endref}}
-
-## Threat Hunting
-
-
 {{#ref}}
 file-integrity-monitoring.md
 {{#endref}}
 
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-

src/generic-methodologies-and-resources/phishing-methodology/phishing-documents.md

@@ -342,7 +342,7 @@ See also stego tools and carving techniques:
 
 ## JS/VBS droppers → Base64 PowerShell staging
 
-A recurring initial stage is a small, heavily‑obfuscated `.js` or `.vbs` delivered inside an archive. Its sole purpose is to decode an embedded Base64 string and launch PowerShell with `-nop -w hidden -ep bypass` to bootstrap the next stage over HTTPS.
+A recurring initial stage is a small, heavily‑obfuscated `.js` or `.vbs` delivered inside an archive. Its sole purpose is to decode an embedded Base64 string and launch PowerShell with `-nop -w hidden -ep bypass` to bootstrap the next stage over HTTPS.<sup>[[5]](#references)</sup>
 
 Skeleton logic (abstract):
 - Read own file contents

src/generic-methodologies-and-resources/python/README.md

@@ -13,6 +13,3 @@
 - [**Basic python syntax and libraries**](basic-python.md)
 
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-
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src/generic-methodologies-and-resources/python/basic-python.md

@@ -479,6 +479,6 @@ with zipfile.ZipFile("sample.zip") as zf:
 ## References
 
 - [1] [Python tarfile docs](https://docs.python.org/3/library/tarfile.html)
-- [2] [PEP 706 - Filter for tarfile.extractall](https://peps.python.org/pep-0706/)
+- [2] [PEP 706 – Filter for tarfile.extractall()](https://peps.python.org/pep-0706/)
 
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src/generic-methodologies-and-resources/python/bruteforce-hash-few-chars.md

@@ -55,5 +55,3 @@ main()
 
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-
-

src/generic-methodologies-and-resources/python/bypass-python-sandboxes/README.md

@@ -2,7 +2,7 @@
 
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-These are some tricks to bypass python sandbox protections and execute arbitrary commands.
+These are some tricks to bypass python sandbox protections and execute arbitrary commands.<sup>[[1]](#references)[[2]](#references)</sup>
 
 {{#ref}}
 js2py-sandbox-escape-cve-2024-28397.md
@@ -75,7 +75,7 @@ class P(object):
 print(base64.b64encode(pickle.dumps(P(), protocol=0)))
 ```
 
-For more information about how pickle works check this: [https://checkoway.net/musings/pickle/](https://checkoway.net/musings/pickle/)
+For more information about how pickle works check this: [https://checkoway.net/musings/pickle/](https://checkoway.net/musings/pickle/)<sup>[[16]](#references)</sup>
 
 ### Pip package
 
@@ -313,7 +313,7 @@ __ixor__ (k ^= 'import os; os.system("sh")')
 
 #### Crating objects with [metaclasses](https://docs.python.org/3/reference/datamodel.html#metaclasses)
 
-The key thing that metaclasses allow us to do is **make an instance of a class, without calling the constructor** directly, by creating a new class with the target class as a metaclass.
+The key thing that metaclasses allow us to do is **make an instance of a class, without calling the constructor** directly, by creating a new class with the target class as a metaclass.<sup>[[15]](#references)</sup>
 
 ```python
 # Code from https://ur4ndom.dev/posts/2022-07-04-gctf-treebox/ and fixed
@@ -404,7 +404,7 @@ __builtins__.__dict__['__import__']("os").system("ls")
 ### No Builtins
 
 When you don't have `__builtins__` you are not going to be able to import anything nor even read or write files as **all the global functions** (like `open`, `import`, `print`...) **aren't loaded**.\
-However, **by default python imports a lot of modules in memory**. These modules may seem benign, but some of them are **also importing dangerous** functionalities inside of them that can be accessed to gain even **arbitrary code execution**.
+However, **by default python imports a lot of modules in memory**. These modules may seem benign, but some of them are **also importing dangerous** functionalities inside of them that can be accessed to gain even **arbitrary code execution**.<sup>[[4]](#references)[[5]](#references)</sup>
 
 In the following examples you can observe how to **abuse** some of this "**benign**" modules loaded to **access** **dangerous** **functionalities** inside of them.
 
@@ -776,7 +776,7 @@ https://github.com/carlospolop/hacktricks/blob/master/generic-methodologies-and-
 
 ## Python Format String
 
-If you **send** a **string** to python that is going to be **formatted**, you can use `{}` to access **python internal information.** You can use the previous examples to access globals or builtins for example.
+If you **send** a **string** to python that is going to be **formatted**, you can use `{}` to access **python internal information.** You can use the previous examples to access globals or builtins for example.<sup>[[14]](#references)</sup>
 
 ```python
 # Example from https://www.geeksforgeeks.org/vulnerability-in-str-format-in-python/
@@ -1064,7 +1064,7 @@ dis.dis('d\x01\x00}\x01\x00d\x02\x00}\x02\x00d\x03\x00d\x04\x00g\x02\x00}\x03\x0
 ## Compiling Python
 
 Now, let us imagine that somehow you can **dump the information about a function that you cannot execute** but you **need** to **execute** it.\
-Like in the following example, you **can access the code object** of that function, but just reading the disassemble you **don't know how to calculate the flag** (_imagine a more complex `calc_flag` function_)
+Like in the following example, you **can access the code object** of that function, but just reading the disassemble you **don't know how to calculate the flag** (_imagine a more complex `calc_flag` function_)<sup>[[3]](#references)</sup>
 
 ```python
 def get_flag(some_input):
@@ -1215,5 +1215,8 @@ will be bypassed
 - [11] [SECCON CTF 2022 Quals: Author writeups (English)](https://blog.arkark.dev/2022/11/18/seccon-en/#misc-latexipy)
 - [12] [Anatomy of an LLM RCE - CyberArk Threat Research Blog](https://www.cyberark.com/resources/threat-research-blog/anatomy-of-an-llm-rce)
 - [13] [BuckeyeCTF 2024 Author Writeups](https://corgi.rip/posts/buckeye-writeups/)
+- [14] [GeeksforGeeks – Vulnerability in str.format() in Python](https://www.geeksforgeeks.org/vulnerability-in-str-format-in-python/)
+- [15] [ur4ndom – [GCTF 2022] Treebox](https://ur4ndom.dev/posts/2022-07-04-gctf-treebox/)
+- [16] [checkoway.net - Musings - Pickle](https://checkoway.net/musings/pickle)
 
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src/generic-methodologies-and-resources/python/bypass-python-sandboxes/js2py-sandbox-escape-cve-2024-28397.md

@@ -67,9 +67,9 @@ PY
 
 ## Operating against web sandboxes
 
-- Any endpoint that feeds attacker-controlled JS into `js2py.eval_js` (for example, a Flask `/run_code` API) is immediately RCE if the process user has shell access.
+- Any endpoint that feeds attacker-controlled JS into `js2py.eval_js` (for example, a Flask `/run_code` API) is immediately RCE if the process user has shell access.<sup>[[2]](#references)</sup>
 - Returning `jsonify({'result': result})` will fail when `.communicate()` returns bytes; decode or direct output to DNS/ICMP to avoid serialization blockers.
-- `disable_pyimport()` **does not** mitigate this chain; hard isolation (separate process/container) or removing Js2Py execution of untrusted code is required.<sup>[[2]](#references)</sup>
+- `disable_pyimport()` **does not** mitigate this chain; hard isolation (separate process/container) or removing Js2Py execution of untrusted code is required.
 
 ## References
 

src/generic-methodologies-and-resources/python/bypass-python-sandboxes/load_name-load_const-opcode-oob-read.md

@@ -349,10 +349,9 @@ Additional mitigation ideas
 - Don’t allow arbitrary `CodeType.replace(...)` on untrusted input, or add strict structural checks on the resulting code object.
 - Consider running untrusted code in a separate process with OS-level sandboxing (seccomp, job objects, containers) instead of relying on CPython semantics.
 
-
-
 ## References
 
 - [1] [Splitline's HITCON CTF 2022 writeup "V O I D" (origin of this technique and high-level exploit chain)](https://blog.splitline.tw/hitcon-ctf-2022/)
 - [2] [Python disassembler docs (indices semantics for LOAD_CONST/LOAD_NAME/etc., and 3.11+ `LOAD_ATTR`/`LOAD_GLOBAL` low-bit flags)](https://docs.python.org/3.13/library/dis.html)
+
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src/generic-methodologies-and-resources/python/bypass-python-sandboxes/reportlab-xhtml2pdf-triple-brackets-expression-evaluation-rce-cve-2023-33733.md

@@ -7,7 +7,7 @@ This page documents a practical sandbox escape and RCE primitive in ReportLab’
 CVE-2023-33733 affects ReportLab versions up to and including 3.6.12.<sup>[[3]](#references)</sup> In certain attribute contexts (for example color), values wrapped in triple brackets [[[ ... ]]] are evaluated server-side by rl_safe_eval. By crafting a payload that pivots from a whitelisted builtin (pow) to its Python function globals, an attacker can reach the os module and execute commands.<sup>[[1]](#references)</sup>
 
 Key points
-- Trigger: inject [[[ ... ]]] into evaluated attributes such as <font color="..."> or any style path that eventually reaches `reportlab.lib.colors.toColor` within ReportLab/xhtml2pdf.
+- Trigger: inject [[[ ... ]]] into evaluated attributes such as <font color="..."> or any style path that eventually reaches `reportlab.lib.colors.toColor` within ReportLab/xhtml2pdf.<sup>[[4]](#references)</sup>
 - Sandbox: rl_safe_eval replaces dangerous builtins but evaluated functions still expose __globals__.
 - Bypass: craft a transient class Word to bypass rl_safe_eval name checks and access the string "__globals__" while avoiding blocked dunder filtering.
 - RCE: `getattr(pow, Word('__globals__'))['os'].system('<cmd>')`

src/generic-methodologies-and-resources/python/class-pollution-pythons-prototype-pollution.md

@@ -69,7 +69,7 @@ print(vars(emp)) #{'name': 'Ahemd', 'age': 23, 'manager': {'name': 'Sarah'}}
 
 <details>
 
-<summary>Creating class property default value to RCE (subprocess)</summary>
+<summary>Creating class property default value to RCE (subprocess)</summary><sup>[[1]](#references)</sup>
 
 ```python
 from os import popen
@@ -122,7 +122,7 @@ print(system_admin_emp.execute_command())
 
 <details>
 
-<summary>Polluting other classes and global vars through <code>globals</code></summary>
+<summary>Polluting other classes and global vars through <code>globals</code></summary><sup>[[1]](#references)</sup>
 
 ```python
 def merge(src, dst):
@@ -156,7 +156,7 @@ print(NotAccessibleClass) #> <class '__main__.PollutedClass'>
 
 <details>
 
-<summary>Arbitrary subprocess execution</summary>
+<summary>Arbitrary subprocess execution</summary><sup>[[1]](#references)</sup>
 
 ```python
 import subprocess, json
@@ -270,5 +270,3 @@ python-internal-read-gadgets.md
 - [2] [CTFtime - idekCTF 2022: task manager writeup](https://ctftime.org/writeup/36082)
 
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-
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src/generic-methodologies-and-resources/python/keras-model-deserialization-rce-and-gadget-hunting.md

@@ -74,7 +74,7 @@ Notes:
 
 Root cause:
 - _retrieve_class_or_fn used unrestricted importlib.import_module() with attacker-controlled module strings from config.json.
-- Impact: Arbitrary import of any installed module (or attacker-planted module on sys.path). Import-time code runs, then object construction occurs with attacker kwargs.<sup>[[1]](#references)[[4]](#references)</sup>
+- Impact: Arbitrary import of any installed module (or attacker-planted module on sys.path). Import-time code runs, then object construction occurs with attacker kwargs.<sup>[[1]](#references)[[4]](#references)[[5]](#references)[[6]](#references)</sup>
 
 Exploit idea:
 
@@ -151,9 +151,9 @@ Important limitation:
 
 ## ML pickle import allowlisting for AI/ML models (Fickling)
 
-Many AI/ML model formats (PyTorch .pt/.pth/.ckpt, joblib/scikit-learn, older TensorFlow artifacts, etc.) embed Python pickle data. Attackers routinely abuse pickle GLOBAL imports and object constructors to achieve RCE or model swapping during load. Blacklist-based scanners often miss novel or unlisted dangerous imports.<sup>[[8]](#references)</sup>
+Many AI/ML model formats (PyTorch .pt/.pth/.ckpt, joblib/scikit-learn, older TensorFlow artifacts, etc.) embed Python pickle data. Attackers routinely abuse pickle GLOBAL imports and object constructors to achieve RCE or model swapping during load. Blacklist-based scanners often miss novel or unlisted dangerous imports.<sup>[[8]](#references)[[14]](#references)</sup>
 
-A practical fail-closed defense is to hook Python’s pickle deserializer and only allow a reviewed set of harmless ML-related imports during unpickling. Trail of Bits’ Fickling implements this policy and ships a curated ML import allowlist built from thousands of public Hugging Face pickles.<sup>[[8]](#references)</sup>
+A practical fail-closed defense is to hook Python’s pickle deserializer and only allow a reviewed set of harmless ML-related imports during unpickling. Trail of Bits’ Fickling implements this policy and ships a curated ML import allowlist built from thousands of public Hugging Face pickles.<sup>[[8]](#references)[[13]](#references)</sup>
 
 Security model for “safe” imports (intuitions distilled from research and practice): imported symbols used by a pickle must simultaneously:<sup>[[8]](#references)</sup>
 - Not execute code or cause execution (no compiled/source code objects, shelling out, hooks, etc.)
@@ -192,9 +192,9 @@ fickling.hook.activate_safe_ml_environment(also_allow=[
   - with fickling.check_safety(): for scoped enforcement
   - fickling.load(path) / fickling.is_likely_safe(path) for one-off checks
 
-- Prefer non-pickle model formats when possible (e.g., SafeTensors). If you must accept pickle, run loaders under least privilege without network egress and enforce the allowlist.
+- Prefer non-pickle model formats when possible (e.g., SafeTensors).<sup>[[15]](#references)</sup> If you must accept pickle, run loaders under least privilege without network egress and enforce the allowlist.
 
-This allowlist-first strategy demonstrably blocks common ML pickle exploit paths while keeping compatibility high. In ToB’s benchmark, Fickling flagged 100% of synthetic malicious files and allowed ~99% of clean files from top Hugging Face repos.<sup>[[8]](#references)</sup>
+This allowlist-first strategy demonstrably blocks common ML pickle exploit paths while keeping compatibility high. In ToB’s benchmark, Fickling flagged 100% of synthetic malicious files and allowed ~99% of clean files from top Hugging Face repos.<sup>[[8]](#references)[[10]](#references)</sup>
 
 
 ## Researcher toolkit

src/generic-methodologies-and-resources/python/pyscript.md

@@ -8,7 +8,7 @@ PyScript is a new framework developed for integrating Python into HTML so, it ca
 
 ### Dumping / Retrieving files from the Emscripten virtual memory filesystem:
 
-`CVE ID: CVE-2022-30286`\
+`CVE ID: CVE-2022-30286`<sup>[[3]](#references)</sup>\
 \
 Code:
 
@@ -25,7 +25,7 @@ Result:
 
 ### [OOB Data Exfiltration of the Emscripten virtual memory filesystem (console monitoring)](https://github.com/s/jcd3T19P0M8QRnU1KRDk/~/changes/Wn2j4r8jnHsV8mBiqPk5/blogs/the-art-of-vulnerability-chaining-pyscript)
 
-`CVE ID: CVE-2022-30286`\
+`CVE ID: CVE-2022-30286`<sup>[[3]](#references)</sup>\
 \
 Code:
 
@@ -243,5 +243,6 @@ This behaviour was introduced in 2023 and is documented in the official Built-in
 
 - [1] [NVD – CVE-2025-50182](https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2025-50182)
 - [2] [PyScript Built-ins documentation – `display` & `HTML`](https://docs.pyscript.net/2024.6.1/user-guide/builtins/)
+- [3] [Cyber Guy - The Art of Vulnerability Chaining (PyScript)](https://cyber-guy.gitbook.io/cyber-guy/blogs/the-art-of-vulnerability-chaining-pyscript)
 
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src/generic-methodologies-and-resources/python/python-internal-read-gadgets.md

@@ -2,6 +2,7 @@
 
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+
 ## Basic Information
 
 Different vulnerabilities such as [**Python Format Strings**](bypass-python-sandboxes/index.html#python-format-string) or [**Class Pollution**](class-pollution-pythons-prototype-pollution.md) might allow you to **read python internal data but won't allow you to execute code**. Therefore, a pentester will need to make the most of these read permissions to **obtain sensitive privileges and escalate the vulnerability**.

src/generic-methodologies-and-resources/python/venv.md

@@ -24,5 +24,3 @@ inside the virtual environment
 
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src/generic-methodologies-and-resources/python/web-requests.md

@@ -104,5 +104,3 @@ term.cmdloop()
 
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