GH-50355: [C++][Gandiva] fix out-of-bounds read in utf8_length_ignore_invalid#50356
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GH-50355: [C++][Gandiva] fix out-of-bounds read in utf8_length_ignore_invalid#50356Arawoof06 wants to merge 1 commit into
Arawoof06 wants to merge 1 commit into
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Rationale for this change
utf8_length_ignore_invalidextendschar_lenwhile scanning continuation bytes and never rechecks the buffer end, so an input ending in a truncated multi-byte utf8 sequence (a0xF0lead byte followed by non-continuation bytes) reads pastdata_len. It is reached from untrusted string data throughlpad/rpad, which count the input glyphs before padding. Reproduced against a verbatim copy of the function under AddressSanitizer with the 4-byte input{0xF0, 'a', 'a', 'a'}in an exactly-sized heap buffer, givingheap-buffer-overflow READ ... 0 bytes after 4-byte region.What changes are included in this PR?
Bound the continuation-byte scan with
i + j < data_len, the same guard the sibling helpers (utf8_length,reverse_utf8,utf8_byte_pos) already use. Valid input is unaffected because a well-formed glyph always satisfiesi + char_len <= data_len.Are these changes tested?
Yes. Added
TestStringOps.TestPadMalformedUtf8NoOverread, which runslpad/rpadon the truncated multi-byte input placed in an exactly-sized heap buffer so the over-read trips ASAN; the existing pad tests still pass.Are there any user-facing changes?
No.
This PR contains a "Critical Fix". It fixes an out-of-bounds read in the Gandiva utf8 length helper reachable from
lpad/rpadon crafted string data.