chore: merge main into v2 (recover the ZeroKMS key-exchange fixes)#64
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The live security architecture page told security reviewers that the client key is transmitted to CipherStash: "The SDK sends a key derivation request to ZeroKMS with the client key component." "ZeroKMS combines the authority key and client key to produce a key seed." That inverts the property the architecture exists to provide. Corrected per product review: - The application requests a seed by sending a key ID. The request carries no key material. The ID is what gives each data key a unique identity, so the same value can be decrypted later by asking for the same ID. - ZeroKMS applies proxy symmetric re-encryption to the authority key alone and returns the key seed. It never receives the client key. - The application processes the seed with the client key, then an HMAC-based KDF expands the result into a per-value data key. Only the seed crosses the boundary, and it crosses inward. Two further claims on the same page were wrong: - "No caching needed" / data keys "never cached". No *data key* is ever cached, but Proxy caches keyset-scoped ciphers (cipher_cache_size, cipher_cache_ttl_seconds). The page now states both. - kms/index.mdx: "Root keys are stored in AWS KMS. ZeroKMS handles key derivation and wrapping." AWS KMS protects the authority key at rest; no per-value data key is wrapped or stored. - kms/keysets.mdx: keysets scope the authority key, not a per-keyset root key from which ZeroKMS derives data keys. Standardises on AES-256-GCM-SIV across the corpus (was split 6/3 with plain AES-256-GCM, including two compliance pages).
docs(security): correct the ZeroKMS key exchange and caching claims
Brings the ZeroKMS key-exchange corrections (#63) into the v2 branch. Without this, merging v2 to main at launch would revert them: v2's copy of content/stack still told security reviewers that the client key is sent to ZeroKMS. Merged cleanly, no conflicts. Second sync in a day; see the tracking issue for picking a policy rather than doing this reactively.
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Brings #63 into
v2. Merged cleanly, no conflicts.Why
#63 corrected the live security architecture page on
main, which told vendor security reviewers that the client key is transmitted to CipherStash.v2's copy ofcontent/stackstill says that. Two consequences:content/stackis served at/stackuntil the launch merge deletes it, so the v2 preview is currently serving the wrong claim.v2intomainat launch would revert docs(security): correct the ZeroKMS key exchange and caching claims #63.What comes across
The seven files from #63:
reference/security-architecture.mdx(key derivation, trust model, both data-flow paths, the caching section),cipherstash/kms/index.mdx,cipherstash/kms/keysets.mdx, plus AES naming inproxy/getting-started.mdx,deploy/troubleshooting.mdx,reference/comparisons/fhe.mdx,reference/use-cases/compliance.mdx.Checks
bun run buildpasses, 714 pages.validate-contentandvalidate-redirectspass.grepfor the old claims (with the client key component,combines the authority key,No caching needed,keyset's root key,handles key derivation and wrapping) returns nothing outside generated TypeDoc.AES-256-GCM-SIV, zero stragglers.This is the second sync in one day
#60 was the first, for the identity-API fixes. Both were reactive, and both existed because a fix landed on
mainwhilev2ran ahead of it.IA.mdcalled this on day one: "Decide day 1: soft freeze on main docs changes for the week vs daily rebase of v2." That decision was never made. The failure mode is silent, because a merge that cleanly reverts a fix produces no conflict and no test failure. Thevalidate-contentguard (#61) catches the deprecated-API subset, but nothing catches a reverted prose correction.Worth picking one before the launch merge: freeze
main, or sync on a schedule.