feat(egress): host-side guarded-egress proxy (policy + forward proxy)#2
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First slice of M6-6 guarded egress: a self-contained egress package with the allow-list policy schema + evaluator and a host-side forward proxy — CONNECT tunnelling (host allow/deny) plus absolute-form HTTP with node-side credential injection and typed 403 denials. Stdlib-only and not yet wired into the claim path; config, per-sandbox listeners, the silkd egress_dial verb, and nftables enforcement land in follow-up slices.
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M6-6 / M7-A guarded egress — first slice
Introduces a self-contained
sandboxd/egresspackage: the foundation for turning egress into an allow-listed, audited resource enforced host-side, so a sandbox gets the effect of a credential and never the credential itself.What lands here
policy.go): the config schema (Policy,Rule,Decision) and a pure evaluator — host matching (exact /*.suffixwildcard that excludes the apex /*), method filtering,Validate,Eval.proxy.go): a host-sidehttp.Handlerhandling CONNECT tunnels (host allow/deny + splice) and absolute-form HTTP (allow/deny + method check + node-side secret injection that overwrites any guest-supplied value + response relay), with typed 403 denials and pluggableDialFunc/Secrets/Auditseams.Scope
Stdlib-only, touches no existing file, and is not wired into the claim/refill hot path — so it cannot affect the running data plane. Deliberately out of this slice (follow-ups): config wiring, per-sandbox listeners, the silkd
egress_dialverb, TLS interception CA, and nftables enforcement. The full design is incocoon-specs/sandbox/sandbox-m6-6-guarded-egress.md.Gates
go build ./... && go test ./egress/...green;golangci-lint0 issues on linux and darwin.