build(deps): bump loofah from 2.25.1 to 2.25.2

[dependabot]

Bumps loofah from 2.25.1 to 2.25.2.

Release notes

Sourced from loofah's releases.

2.25.2 / 2026-07-15

Security

• Ensure Loofah::HTML5::Scrub.allowed_uri? recognizes numeric character references without semicolons (e.g. javascript&#58alert(1)), which browsers decode and execute, and rejects schemes split by them. See GHSA-5qhf-9phg-95m2. @​flavorjones
• Ensure Loofah::HTML5::Scrub.allowed_uri? recognizes the named character references 	 and 
, which CGI.unescapeHTML does not decode and browsers strip from URIs, and rejects schemes split by them (e.g. java	script:alert(1)). See GHSA-8whx-365g-h9vv. @​flavorjones
• Ensure that both href and xlink:href attributes on SVG elements like use are restricted to local (same-document) references. Previously only xlink:href was restricted, allowing the SVG 2 href attribute to reference external documents. See GHSA-9wjq-cp2p-hrgf. @​flavorjones

Improved

• Harden data: URI mediatype parsing in Loofah::HTML5::Scrub.allowed_uri?. The mediatype is now parsed following the WHATWG data: URL spec and RFC 2397 instead of simply being split on a colon. A data: URI with an omitted or malformed mediatype is now treated as text/plain and allowed, and one without the required comma is now rejected. #305 @​flavorjones
• Remove feed from the default set of allowed protocols. The feed URI scheme was never accepted as a standard protocol, and no major browser supports it. Removing it reduces the attack surface particularly for non-browser contexts. #304 @​flavorjones
• Remove a vestigial &#x70 alternative from Loofah::HTML5::SafeList::PROTOCOL_SEPARATOR. This appears to be an ancient typo dating back to pre-extraction Rails circa 2007. #305 @​flavorjones

Changelog

Sourced from loofah's changelog.

2.25.2 / 2026-07-15

Security

• Ensure Loofah::HTML5::Scrub.allowed_uri? recognizes numeric character references without semicolons (e.g. javascript&#58alert(1)), which browsers decode and execute, and rejects schemes split by them. See GHSA-5qhf-9phg-95m2. @​flavorjones
• Ensure Loofah::HTML5::Scrub.allowed_uri? recognizes the named character references 	 and 
, which CGI.unescapeHTML does not decode and browsers strip from URIs, and rejects schemes split by them (e.g. java	script:alert(1)). See GHSA-8whx-365g-h9vv. @​flavorjones
• Ensure that both href and xlink:href attributes on SVG elements like use are restricted to local (same-document) references. Previously only xlink:href was restricted, allowing the SVG 2 href attribute to reference external documents. See GHSA-9wjq-cp2p-hrgf. @​flavorjones

Improved

• Harden data: URI mediatype parsing in Loofah::HTML5::Scrub.allowed_uri?. The mediatype is now parsed following the WHATWG data: URL spec and RFC 2397 instead of simply being split on a colon. A data: URI with an omitted or malformed mediatype is now treated as text/plain and allowed, and one without the required comma is now rejected. #305 @​flavorjones
• Remove feed from the default set of allowed protocols. The feed URI scheme was never accepted as a standard protocol, and no major browser supports it. Removing it reduces the attack surface particularly for non-browser contexts. #304 @​flavorjones
• Remove a vestigial &#x70 alternative from Loofah::HTML5::SafeList::PROTOCOL_SEPARATOR. This appears to be an ancient typo dating back to pre-extraction Rails circa 2007. #305 @​flavorjones

Commits

• 2706d7e version bump to v2.25.2
• 1afde0c Merge pull request #308 from flavorjones/security-2252
• f1be9d8 Update allowed_uri? to decode semicolon-less numeric character references
• 5e91af8 Update allowed_uri? to handle named whitespace character references
• 20867b9 Properly restrict SVG href attributes
• 5f3bff4 test: opt into JSON comment parsing for sanitizer testdata (#307)
• b07713d test: do not run in verbose mode
• babe7a8 doc: update CHANGELOG
• a8d8d96 Merge pull request #305 from flavorjones/drop-protocol-typo
• b52f4b0 version bump to 2.25.2.beta1
• Additional commits viewable in compare view

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@dependabot merge

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Up to standards ✅

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[codacy-production]

Pull Request Overview

This PR updates loofah to address security vulnerabilities involving URI filter bypasses and SVG attribute handling. While the update is a positive security step, the PR lacks automated verification for the specific vulnerabilities being patched (e.g., semicolon-less character references and 'feed' protocol removal). Additionally, a known security risk remains in the rails-html-sanitizer dependency within the lockfile, which should be mitigated to ensure the application's sanitization logic is fully secure.

1 comment outside of the diff

Gemfile.lock

_{line 238 🟡 MEDIUM RISK}
The rails-html-sanitizer gem is vulnerable to XSS (GHSA-cj75-f6xr-r4g7). Resolution is required to mitigate this security risk.

Test suggestions

• Test sanitization of URIs using semicolon-less numeric character references to bypass protocol checks
• Test sanitization of URIs using or to split the protocol scheme
• Test that SVG href attributes are restricted to local references
• Test that data: URIs with malformed mediatypes or missing commas are handled correctly
• Test that the 'feed' URI scheme is no longer allowed

Prompt proposal for missing tests

Consider implementing these tests if applicable:
1. Test sanitization of URIs using semicolon-less numeric character references to bypass protocol checks
2. Test sanitization of URIs using 	 or 
 to split the protocol scheme
3. Test that SVG href attributes are restricted to local references
4. Test that data: URIs with malformed mediatypes or missing commas are handled correctly
5. Test that the 'feed' URI scheme is no longer allowed

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