The only release so far is 0.1.0, published on GitHub only: packages and checksums are attached to the v0.1.0 tag, and nothing has been published to NuGet.org. 0.2.0 is upcoming. The latest released minor version is the one that receives security fixes; older ones do not.

Report privately through GitHub Security Advisories, or by email to ckidoz@gmail.com. Please do not open a public issue for a vulnerability.

Include what you have: the version, a description, and the smallest program that shows the problem. You should get an acknowledgement within seven days, and an assessment within thirty.

DotProlog runs Prolog programs. The engine's job is to run what it is given, so a Prolog program doing something destructive is not itself a vulnerability — it is the program doing what it says. What matters is when the engine does something the program did not ask for:

• Memory corruption, or reading or writing outside the heap, trail, or stacks. The engine is written in safe C#, so this should be impossible; a way to do it is a serious bug.
• A crash of the host process that a Prolog program can cause without calling halt/0 — anything the host cannot catch as a PrologException.
• Escaping the streams a host granted: reading or writing a file a program was not given.
• A generated facade or entry point that emits C# doing something the contract did not describe.
• Reading a term, or consulting a file, that executes code as a side effect of parsing it.

• A Prolog program that loops forever, exhausts memory, or grows the heap without bound. The engine has no execution limits, and adding them is a feature request rather than a fix.
• consult/1 running the directives of the file it loads. That is what consulting means; do not consult files you do not trust.
• A host that hands user_input or a writable stream to an untrusted program and is surprised by what the program does with it.

DotProlog is not a sandbox. A Prolog program has whatever access the process running it has.