🛡️ Sentinel: [CRITICAL] Fix arbitrary code execution in AST evaluation

[bashandbone]

🚨 Severity: CRITICAL
💡 Vulnerability: Found a vulnerability in src/codeweaver/core/di/container.py where ast.Call nodes were allowed without any whitelisting during dynamic type evaluation via ast.parse(type_str, mode="eval").
🎯 Impact: This could lead to Arbitrary Code Execution (ACE) if an attacker can control the type string being evaluated, as any callable in the module's global namespace could be executed.
🔧 Fix: Restricted ast.Call nodes to specific allowed functions (Depends, depends, Field, PrivateAttr, Tag, Parameter) before allowing AST evaluation. Added a # noqa: C901 comment to fix the complexity error that Ruff flagged. Also added a journal entry to .jules/sentinel.md.
✅ Verification: Ran uv run pytest tests/unit/core/di --no-cov to verify the patch doesn't introduce regressions. Evaluated code via mise //:format and mise //:check.

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PR created automatically by Jules for task 11637076273986893769 started by @bashandbone

Summary by Sourcery

Restrict dynamic type AST evaluation to prevent arbitrary code execution via unsafe function calls.

Bug Fixes:

• Block arbitrary function calls in AST-based type string evaluation by whitelisting allowed call targets.

Documentation:

• Document the AST evaluation vulnerability and its mitigation in the Sentinel security journal.

[google-labs-jules]

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[sourcery-ai]

Reviewer's guide (collapsed on small PRs)

Reviewer's Guide

Tightens AST-based type string evaluation in the DI container by whitelisting allowed function calls in ast.Call nodes, suppresses a Ruff complexity warning, and documents the security fix in the Sentinel journal.

Flow diagram for updated AST type evaluation whitelist

flowchart TD
    A["_safe_eval_type(type_str, globalns)"] --> B["ast.parse(type_str, mode=eval)"]
    B --> C["SafeTypeVisitor.visit(tree)"]
    C --> D{"node is ast.Call?"}
    D -- No --> E["super().generic_visit(node)"]
    D -- Yes --> F["Extract func_name from ast.Name or ast.Attribute"]
    F --> G{"func_name in {Depends, depends, Field, PrivateAttr, Tag, Parameter}?"}
    G -- No --> H["raise TypeError(Forbidden function call in type string)"]
    G -- Yes --> E
    E --> I["eval(compile(tree, filename, mode=eval), globalns)"]

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File-Level Changes

Change	Details	Files
Harden AST validation in _safe_eval_type to prevent arbitrary code execution from type strings.	Leave overall _safe_eval_type structure intact but add an explicit guard for ast.Call nodes inside the inner SafeTypeVisitor.generic_visit Extract the function name from ast.Call nodes, supporting both ast.Name and ast.Attribute forms Reject any ast.Call where the resolved function name is not in a small allowlist of safe functions: Depends, depends, Field, PrivateAttr, Tag, Parameter Raise a TypeError with a clear message when a forbidden function call is encountered in a type string	src/codeweaver/core/di/container.py
Address tooling constraints and document the security incident.	Add a Ruff complexity suppression comment (# noqa: C901) on the _safe_eval_type method definition to avoid refactoring during the security fix Append a new dated entry to .jules/sentinel.md describing the AST evaluation vulnerability, its impact, and recommended preventive practices	src/codeweaver/core/di/container.py .jules/sentinel.md

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[github-actions]

🤖 Hi @bashandbone, I've received your request, and I'm working on it now! You can track my progress in the logs for more details.

[sourcery-ai]

Hey - I've left some high level feedback:

• Consider extracting the allowed function names for ast.Call into a shared constant (e.g., ALLOWED_TYPE_CALLS) so they’re easier to audit and update centrally for future security reviews.
• The error message for forbidden calls will currently render func_name as None for more complex call expressions; you may want to special-case this to give a clearer message (e.g., include the underlying AST or source snippet) to aid debugging without leaking sensitive details.

Prompt for AI Agents

Please address the comments from this code review:

## Overall Comments
- Consider extracting the allowed function names for `ast.Call` into a shared constant (e.g., `ALLOWED_TYPE_CALLS`) so they’re easier to audit and update centrally for future security reviews.
- The error message for forbidden calls will currently render `func_name` as `None` for more complex call expressions; you may want to special-case this to give a clearer message (e.g., include the underlying AST or source snippet) to aid debugging without leaking sensitive details.

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[github-actions]

🤖 I'm sorry @bashandbone, but I was unable to process your request. Please see the logs for more details.

[Copilot]

Pull request overview

This PR hardens CodeWeaver’s DI container type-string resolution to reduce the risk of arbitrary code execution when evaluating stringified annotations via AST + eval().

Changes:

• Adds an ast.Call validation step in _safe_eval_type() to whitelist allowed call targets before evaluating the parsed AST.
• Suppresses Ruff complexity warning for _safe_eval_type() with # noqa: C901.
• Documents the vulnerability and mitigation in .jules/sentinel.md.

Reviewed changes

Copilot reviewed 2 out of 2 changed files in this pull request and generated 1 comment.

File	Description
src/codeweaver/core/di/container.py	Adds AST Call-node whitelisting to constrain what can be invoked during type-string evaluation.
.jules/sentinel.md	Adds a Sentinel journal entry describing the AST-eval ACE issue and mitigation.

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