fix(security): harden redirect validation and sanitizer blocklist (NOJS-289)#295
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ErickXavier wants to merge 2 commits into
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fix(security): harden redirect validation and sanitizer blocklist (NOJS-289)#295ErickXavier wants to merge 2 commits into
ErickXavier wants to merge 2 commits into
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A redirect value of "//evil.com" was accepted as safe because it starts with "/". Browsers resolve protocol-relative URLs to a cross-origin navigation. Add an explicit check to reject values starting with "//". Defense-in-depth fix from the 2026-07 security audit (NOJS-289 H4).
These always-rawtext tags switch the HTML parser into rawtext/plaintext mode and can smuggle un-sanitized content past the DOMParser sanitizer. Add them to _BLOCKED_TAGS. Includes rebuilt dist/. Defense-in-depth fix from the 2026-07 security audit (NOJS-289 H6).
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Summary
Two defense-in-depth fixes from the 2026-07 security audit (NOJS-289, PR #294 report). Both are confirmed non-exploitable but worth shipping as v1.20.1 hardening (EPIC NOJS-283).
_isSafeRedirectaccepts protocol-relative//host: A redirect target of//evil.comwas treated as safe becausepath.startsWith("/")matched. Browsers resolve//hostto a cross-origin navigation. Fixed by rejecting values starting with//.noembed,noframes, andplaintextswitch the HTML parser into rawtext/plaintext mode and can smuggle un-sanitized content. Added to_BLOCKED_TAGS.Test plan
//evil.comredirect blocked (warns "not a relative path")\\evil.comredirect blocked (already rejected, confirms backslash not accepted)<plaintext>wrapping payload is stripped<noembed>wrapping script payload is stripped<noframes>wrapping event-handler payload is strippednode build.jssucceeds, dist drift is only the two logic additions